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ABSTRACT 
It is known that disease outbreaks, either at a local or a global scale, elicit a social response 
from the society that it affects which follows a characteristic narrative.  An epidemic narrative 
reflects and shapes the perception of the outbreak.  An examination of the mass media provides a 
glimpse of the epidemic narrative that occurs alongside a disease outbreak.  The primary 
objective of this study is to construct the 2009 H1N1 pandemic narrative from newspaper 
coverage available in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, with a focus on how discourse in the news 
changes over time and geographically.  The study draws on and combines three conceptual 
frameworks: epidemic narrative, anchoring, and framing, in order to construct the pandemic 
narrative as reflected by the newspaper coverage.  The three frameworks were combined to 
address three aspects of a narrative: 1) there are common stories for common experiences; 2) 
new stories relate to old stories; and 3) stories of the same experience can have multiple 
perspectives and interpretations.  When combined, these frameworks provide a nuanced 
understanding and analysis of an epidemic narrative.  Articles from four local Saskatoon papers, 
the StarPhoenix, Saskatoon Sun, Planet S, and The Sheaf and two Canadian national newspapers, 
the National Post and the Globe and Mail were analyzed for the study.  To analyze the articles, 
an approach referred to as qualitative content analysis was adapted.  The primary focus of this 
approach is on the discourse and meanings of the text.  The study provides an overview of the 
evolving newspaper coverage of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in newspapers distributed within 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.  The findings of the study highlight the importance of meaning and 
how meanings are constructed and reflected with a narrative.  The findings also show how the 
broader socio-cultural context influences a narrative.  The results illustrate the difficulties with 
communication during a fluid and uncertain situation such as a pandemic.  This work can 
provide a basis for communication advice for future disease outbreaks. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
On April 25, 2009, while I was browsing one of my usual news sources, Fark,
1
 I noticed the 
following headline: “President Mexico City: SHUT DOWN EVERYTHING.”  It was a reference 
to an internet catchphrase (i.e. meme) based on the 2008 online Flash game Pandemic II.
 2
  The 
meme is used to indicate an overreaction to a situation.  The headline caught my attention and I 
clicked the link to the article.  It was the first news report that I read about a severe outbreak of a 
flu-like illness in Mexico, and Mexico City had shut down the city in response.  Over the next 
few days, I noticed more and more articles from various news sources about the Mexican 
outbreak and of cases appearing in other countries.  The World Health Organization (WHO) and 
national health officials were calling for action.  Within days, the term pandemic started to 
appear in the headlines and articles.  Since I have an interest in how people react to infectious 
diseases, this really caught my attention. 
As I followed the developing news coverage over the next few weeks, I was intrigued by 
how the outbreak was discussed as it shifted from a Mexican outbreak to a potential pandemic 
and then, finally, to a pandemic.  I noticed a lot of conflicting information, uncertainty, and 
differing attitudes and opinions in the various media sources and wondered how that might 
influence people’s reaction to the disease.  I also noticed slight variation in the coverage from 
different regional news sources.  Some of the variation included references to other outbreaks or 
local experiences, differences in the public health responses and different attitudes towards the 
responses.  Based on my initial observations as the story unfolded, I decided that an in-depth 
                                                 
1
 Fark.com is a news aggregator where users submit news articles with sarcastic and satirical 
commentary, known as a Fark Headline. 
2
 The game is available online at www.crazymonkeygames.com/Pandemic-2.html.  The player 
must evolve and spread a deadly infectious disease in order kill the global population.  The 
region of Madagascar is the most difficult region to infect in the game since it has no airports or 
bordering countries.  The disease must spread through the island’s shipyard, which frequently 
shuts down early in the game.  Images and videos of the President of Madagascar yelling the 
phrase, SHUT DOWN EVERYTHING, became an online joke among fans of the game.   
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study to examine how the news discussed the pandemic over time would be interesting to do.  
Also, given the regional variation that I noticed, I decided to localize the study to news coverage 
that was available at a specific location. Saskatoon, Saskatchewan was chosen for the study 
location since it is where I live and I am personally familiar with the area.  My knowledge of the 
area would be useful in understanding the local context of the news stories.  Newspapers were 
chosen as the media source since they are widely available in the community and they have a 
local focus (i.e. the local newspapers), but also include national and international stories. When 
making this decision, I was aware of the wide range of media sources from which people obtain 
information, however, a specific media source was required which was easy to collect and would 
yield a manageable set of data.  
It is known that disease outbreaks, either at a local or a global scale, elicit a social response 
from the society that it affects.  The social response follows a characteristic narrative which 
reflects the society in which it occurs (Rosenberg, 1989).  In turn, the narrative can influence the 
public’s perception about the epidemic and can influence public health policy (Wald, 2008).  The 
mass media, a primary source through which the WHO and other health organizations 
communicate to the public, both reflect and shape the social response to the outbreak (Lyons, 
2000; Seale, 2003).  An examination of the mass media provides a glimpse of the epidemic 
narrative that occurs alongside a disease outbreak.  
1.2 Purpose of Study 
The primary objective of the study is to construct the epidemic narrative of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, with a focus on how the themes and discussions in the news change over time and 
how that narrative varies between the local and national level.  The epidemic narrative is 
reflected by the focus (i.e. the main themes) and the discourse of the news coverage over the 
course of the pandemic.  The study is guided by three main research questions: 
1. What are the main themes that are discussed in the newspapers in relation to the H1N1 
pandemic and how are they discussed (i.e. the discourse)? 
2. How do the themes and discourse change over time and how do these changes relate to 
the timeline of the pandemic? 
3. How do the themes and discourse compare between the local and national newspapers? 
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Relevant articles from four local Saskatoon papers, the StarPhoenix, Saskatoon Sun, Planet 
S, and The Sheaf and two Canadian national newspapers, the National Post and the Globe and 
Mail were analyzed for the study.  The StarPhoenix is Saskatoon's primary local daily newspaper 
and it also publishes the weekly Saskatoon Sun.  The Planet S is a free bi-weekly news, arts, and 
entertainment tabloid.  The Sheaf is a free weekly University of Saskatchewan student paper.  
The majority of Saskatoon's local newspaper coverage comes from the StarPhoenix, however, 
the other local newspapers were included to capture the range of newspapers read by Saskatoon 
residents.  The two national newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the National Post, were chosen 
to provide an overview of the national-wide news coverage, irrespective of any political 
perspective of the news organization.  The Globe and Mail is available for home delivery in 
Saskatchewan while the National Post's print edition is available in stores.  All of the 
newspapers are available online. 
The study draws on and combines three conceptual frameworks, epidemic narrative, 
anchoring, and framing, in order to construct the 2009 H1N1 pandemic narrative as reflected by 
the newspaper coverage.  The conceptual frameworks were combined to address three aspects of 
a narrative: 1) there are common stories for common experiences; 2) new stories relate to old 
stories; and 3) stories of the same experience can have multiple perspectives and interpretations.  
An epidemic narrative identifies the common stories for disease outbreaks.  Anchoring assumes 
that representations of new experiences (new stories) are anchored to previous experiences (old 
stories).  Framing assumes that stories of the same experience can have multiple perspectives and 
interpretations.  The way that the media presents the information and what they emphasize or 
omit can elicit different interpretations.   
To analyze the articles, I adapted an approach described by David Altheide (1996) as 
qualitative content analysis.  The approach shares similarities to content analysis and discourse 
analysis.  The analysis begins with a protocol of expected themes, similar to content analysis, 
however, the protocol is flexible and may be revised as the analysis progresses.  The primary 
focus of this approach is on the discourse and meanings presented in the documents. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The study provides an overview of the evolving newspaper coverage of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic in newspapers distributed within Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.  The findings of the study 
highlight the importance of meaning and how it is constructed and reflected with an epidemic 
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narrative.  The findings also illustrate how the broader socio-cultural context influences a 
narrative.  The results illustrate the difficulties with communication during a fluid and uncertain 
situation such as a disease outbreak.  The work can provide a basis for communication advice for 
future disease outbreaks. 
1.4 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is divided into 13 chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the study.  Chapter 2: 
Study Background and Context provides an overview of the study’s health organizational and 
geographical context.  It also provides background information on influenza, pandemic planning, 
and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  Chapter 3: Theoretical Perspective and Frameworks highlights 
the relationship between media and perceptions of health, and the theoretical perspective and 
conceptual frameworks that inform this work.  Chapter 4: Research Methodology includes a 
summary of the methodology, research methods, and analysis.   
The results are divided into several chapters based on common themes and presented in 
Chapters 5 through 11.  Chapter 5: Overview of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Narrative provides a 
broad overview of the epidemic narrative and outlines the remaining result chapters.  Chapter 6: 
Defining the Outbreak focuses on the theme of defining and naming.  Chapter 7: Influenza 
Activity and Spread discusses how the newspapers present stories of the sick and dead and the 
associated societal impacts.  Chapter 8: Pandemic Preparedness and Response focuses on the 
coverage of pandemic planning and preparedness.  It also presents the criticisms of the general 
public health response. Chapter 9: Public Health Measures presents the news coverage of 
specific public health measures and their associated social responses.  Chapter 10: Vaccination 
focuses on issues regarding vaccination.  Vaccination was put in a separate chapter from the 
other public health measures due to the extensive media focus on the issue.  The final results 
chapter, Chapter 11: Post Pandemic Assessment and Lessons presents the stated lessons from the 
pandemic as presented in the newspaper coverage.  Chapter 12: Summary of Results and 
Research Questions discusses the results in relation to the research questions.  The final chapter, 
Chapter 13: Discussion and Conclusions highlights the main points based on the findings and 
connects them with broader socio-cultural context, the theoretical perspective and the broader 
literature.  The chapter highlights contributions and limitations of the work and concludes with 
recommendations for future research and practice.  
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CHAPTER 2  
STUDY BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the study’s health organizational and geographical 
context.  It also provides background information on influenza, pandemic planning prior to April 
2009, and the H1N1 pandemic.  The first section focuses on the study location and provides an 
overview of the international, federal, provincial and local organizations that are responsible for 
responding to a health crisis, such as the H1N1 pandemic.  The second section provides a brief 
description of influenza.  The third section focuses on pandemic planning internationally and in 
Canada prior to the H1N1 pandemic.  The fourth section provides a brief timeline of the 
international and national spread and response the H1N1 pandemic based on official 
documentation from the associated health organizations. 
2.2 Regional Health Organizations 
2.2.1 World Health Organization 
The World Health Organization (WHO), a United Nations agency, provides leadership for 
and coordinates international public health efforts.  Additional functions of the organization 
include promoting research and knowledge translation, setting health guidelines and standards, 
providing technical support and capacity building, and international surveillance (WHO, 2007).  
The WHO consists of 193 Member States and two Associate Members (non-state territories).  
The Member States appoint delegates to the WHO Assembly, which meets every year to set the 
organization’s policy, approve the budget, and every five years appoints a Director-General for 
the WHO (WHO, 2007).  The current Director General is Dr. Margaret Chan.  Dr. Chan was 
appointed to the position in 2006 and was reappointed for a second five-year term in May 2012.  
In addition to the main headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, there are six regional offices 
(African, Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, European, South-East Asia, and Western Pacific) 
that focus on health matters within their region.  See Figure 2-1 for map of WHO regions.  
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Figure 2-1: Map of the World Health Organization Regions 
 
2.2.2 Canada 
In Canada, the health care system is publically funded and a joint responsibility between the 
federal government, and the provincial and territorial governments.  See Figure 2-2 for map of 
the Canadian provinces and territories.  At the federal level, the Public Health Agency of Canada 
(PHAC) and Health Canada had prominent roles in the overall response to the H1N1 pandemic.  
Both agencies are part of the federal Health Portfolio and report to Parliament through the 
Minister of Health.  The current Minister of Health is Leona Aglukkaq.  She was appointed to 
the position in October 2008, thus her time in office included the 2009 pandemic. 
The PHAC is the federal organization responsible for public health.  The PHAC was 
established in September 2004 as part of the response to the 2003 SARS outbreak.  The Chief 
Public Health Officer of Canada, currently Dr. Butler-Jones, manages the organization.  The role 
of the agency includes promoting health, preventing and controlling chronic disease and injuries, 
preventing and controling of infectious diseases, and preparing for and responding to public 
health emergencies such as disease outbreaks.  The agency works in collaboration with all levels 
of government, as well as with other countries and the World Health Organization (PHAC, 
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2011).  During a pandemic, the agency is responsible for coordinating the public health response 
in collaboration with the provinces and territories (Health Canada, 2009d).   
Health Canada is the federal department responsible for the health care system.  The 
provincial and territorial governments are responsible for the administration and delivery of 
health care services within their jurisdictions.  The role of Health Canada includes setting and 
administering national principles for the health care system, assisting with the financing of 
provincial and territorial health care services, delivering health care services to specific groups 
(i.e. First Nations and Inuit), and providing other health-related function such as public health, 
health programs, and health research (Health Canada, 2009a).  In the event of a pandemic, 
Health Canada provides emergency health care for First Nations reserves and federal government 
employees, and gives approval to drugs and vaccines (Health Canada, 2009d). 
 
Figure 2-2: Political Map of Canada 
 
2.2.3 Saskatchewan 
The Saskatchewan Ministry of Health supervises and co-ordinates the delivery of health care 
services in the province.  Saskatchewan Health establishes health policy, sets and monitors 
standards, provides funding, and supports regional health authorities and other health care 
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organizations.  Most services are delivered through the province’s 12 regional health authorities 
(See Figure 2-3 for map of health regions), often referred to as health regions.  The northern 
region, Athabasca Health Authority, is jointly funded through Saskatchewan Health and the 
federal government (Government of Saskatchewan, 2007b).  The Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Health is located in Regina, the provincial capital (Refer to Figure 2-2 for the location of 
Regina). 
 
Figure 2-3: Map of Saskatchewan Health Regions 
 
2.2.4 Saskatoon Health Region 
The Saskatoon Health Region (SHR) (see Figure 2-3 for location of the health region within 
the province) is responsible for planning, organizing, delivering, and evaluating health care 
services and programs within its geographical area (see Figure 2-4 for a map of the health 
region) (Government of Saskatchewan, 2007a).  SHR covers 32,000 square kilometers (5.25% of 
Saskatchewan’s geographic area) with approximately 300,000 people (30% of Saskatchewan’s 
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population).  The region is a mix of urban and rural communities with Saskatoon as the largest 
urban centre.  Over 84% of the region’s population lives in and around Saskatoon (Saskatoon 
Health Region, 2010). 
 
Figure 2-4: Map of Saskatoon Health Region 
 
2.3 Influenza 
Influenza is a common respiratory infection caused by an influenza virus.  The illness is 
commonly referred to as the flu or cold and flu.  These common terms also refer to other similar 
illnesses that include common colds.  Influenza is also mistakenly confused with the term 
stomach flu, which is applied to any illness that causes nausea, vomiting and diarrhea (i.e. 
gastroenteritis).  Influenza rarely causes these symptoms; the primary symptoms are respiratory 
(Health Canada, 2009c).  Common symptoms of influenza include sudden onset of a high fever, 
cough, fatigue, muscle aches, sore throat, headache, and runny nose.  Other less common 
symptoms include nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea (PHAC, 2012; WHO, 2012).  Most people 
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recover within one to two weeks.  However, the very young, the elderly, and those with other 
serious medical conditions can have serious complication, such as secondary bacterial infections, 
pneumonia, or death (Gladwin & Trattler, 2001; PHAC, 2012; WHO, 2012).   
Influenza virus strains circulate every year which cause annual epidemics that usually peak in 
the late fall and winter months.  The yearly outbreaks are referred to as seasonal influenza.  The 
virus easily spreads from person to person through droplets when one sneezes or coughs.  The 
virus can also spread on contaminated hands or surfaces (PHAC, 2012; WHO, 2012).  Annual 
vaccinations are promoted as the most effective way to protect against the virus.  Other 
preventive measures include hand washing, covering coughs and sneezes, cleaning common 
surfaces, and staying home when sick (Health Canada, 2009c; PHAC, 2012; WHO, 2012). 
There are three types of the influenza virus: A, B and C.  Types B and C are found almost 
exclusively in humans, while Type A has been widely found in humans and other mammals such 
as pigs and birds.  Type A influenza viruses are further classified into subtypes according to the 
different types and combinations of surface proteins referred to as H and N (Gladwin & Trattler, 
2001).  Type A viruses are also the most common strains of seasonal influenza (PHAC, 2012).  
People are exposed to different strains of the influenza virus as it mutates periodically, which 
then provides partial immunity for the next exposure.  When a drastic change occurs in a virus 
strain, a new strain can emerge where a large portion of the population has little to no immunity.  
A new influenza strain can lead to a pandemic (Health Canada, 2009c).  The next section 
discusses pandemics and pandemic planning in more detail.  
2.4 Pandemic Planning Prior to the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
A pandemic is a “worldwide outbreak of a specific disease to which people have little to no 
immunity” (PHAC, 2006).  Unlike seasonal influenza, pandemic influenza is caused by a virus 
that is "either entirely new or has not circulated recently and widely in the human population” 
(WHO, 2009b).  This creates an almost universal vulnerability to infection leading to an increase 
in worldwide illness (WHO, 2009b).  The basic assumption about an influenza pandemic is that 
it is impossible to predict when it will occur or how severe it will be, but its inevitability is 
recognized.  While the WHO does not consider it feasible to stop the spread of a pandemic virus, 
pandemic planning is considered important to minimize its impact (WHO, 2005b).   
Pandemic plans developed prior to the 2009 pandemic have been influenced by two key 
events: the increase in outbreaks of avian influenza and resulting human cases since 2003, and 
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the 2003 SARS outbreak (WHO, 2005c).  These events are discussed in the next section.  
Pandemic planning had certainly occurred prior to these events but the plans that were in place 
for the 2009 pandemic had been revised in light of new research and these outbreak experiences 
(WHO, 2005b). 
2.4.1 Influential outbreaks for pandemic planning  
Since 2003, avian influenza (H5N1) has been viewed as a “potential pandemic” threat and 
was influential in the recent pandemic plans.  The virus is endemic among bird populations in 
parts of Asia.  There has been an increase in the number of outbreaks among birds and sporadic 
human cases with relatively high mortality rates, however, there has been little to no evidence of 
person-to-person spread.  Southeast Asia, where H5N1 is endemic, is also a location where the 
majority of new influenza viruses emerge due to the large human populations in close 
interactions with pigs and domestic fowl.  The close interaction allows human, swine, and avian 
influenza viruses to mix and mutate.  There was concern that H5N1 could mutate, enabling it to 
spread person-to-person and trigger a pandemic.  The probability of a new strain emerging in 
North America was thought to be relatively low (WHO, 2005c).  As a result, pandemic planning 
frequently referred to avian influenza emerging from Asia as the next potential pandemic. 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was new disease discovered in early 2003. The 
first cases were confirmed to have occurred in November 2002 in Guangdong Province, China.  
The disease spread from China to Hong Kong and from there to Vietnam, Singapore, Canada 
(i.e. Toronto), and elsewhere via international air travel.  In Toronto, the majority of cases spread 
in the hospital setting (WHO, 2003).  While not an influenza virus, the 2003 SARS outbreak was 
notable for pandemic planning since it was an example of a recent disease outbreak with 
international spread.  The outbreak highlighted the importance of early disease recognition, 
political support for interventions, transparent communication among government and health 
partners and the public, and coordinated global and national efforts either to contain or to buy 
time for other public health measures to be implemented.  The outbreak also exposed the gaps in 
the public health system (WHO, 2005c). 
2.4.2 WHO pandemic planning and pandemic phases 
In 1999, the WHO (1999) published Influenza pandemic plan: The Role of WHO and 
guidelines for national and regional planning.  The 1999 pandemic plan required updating due 
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to scientific advancements in our knowledge about the evolutionary biology of the influenza 
virus, new techniques for vaccine development and laboratory diagnosis, improved influenza 
diagnosis techniques, ongoing revision of the International Health Regulations, recognition of 
the endemic avian influenza (H5N1) in Asia and the increasing number of human cases since 
2003, and the 2003 SARS outbreak (WHO, 2005c).  The updated WHO pandemic plan based on 
the scientific and technological, advances and the lessons from avian influenza and SARS was 
released in 2005.  The WHO urged individual countries to develop or update their national 
influenza preparedness plan according to the revised WHO version and recommendations.  The 
revised plan also redefined the pandemic phases to address the public health risk of influenza 
infections, such as H5N1 in animals, and linked the newly defined phases to changes in public 
health response and practice (WHO, 2005c). 
The pandemic phases were first introduced in 2005 when the WHO revised their pandemic 
guidance due to the potential threat of avian influenza (WHO, 2009e). In 2009, the World Health 
Organization revised the groupings and descriptions of the pandemic phases to make them easier 
to understand, more precise, and based upon observable phenomena (see Table 2-1 for a 
description of each phase).  The guidelines are based on the transmission and geographic spread 
of the disease.  In terms of pandemic preparedness and responses, Phases 1-3 correspond with 
preparedness and planning. Phases 4-6 signal the need to respond to an impending and ongoing 
pandemic, while post-pandemic (non-numbered) phases were elaborated to facilitate post-
pandemic recovery activities (WHO, 2009a).     
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PHASE DESCRIPTION 
Phase 1 No influenza virus circulating among animals have been reported to 
cause infection in humans. 
Phase 2 An animal influenza virus circulating in domesticated or wild animals 
is known to have caused infection in humans and is therefore 
considered a specific potential pandemic threat. 
Phase 3 An animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus has caused 
sporadic cases or small clusters of disease in people, but has not 
resulted in human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain 
community-level outbreaks. 
Phase 4 Human-to-human transmission of an animal or human-animal 
influenza reassortant virus able to sustain community-level outbreaks 
has been verified. 
Phase 5 The same identified virus has caused sustained community level 
outbreaks in two or more countries in one WHO region. 
Phase 6 In addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5, the same virus has caused 
sustained community level outbreaks in at least one other country in 
another WHO region. 
Post Peak 
Period 
Levels of pandemic influenza in most countries with adequate 
surveillance have dropped below peak levels. 
Post Pandemic 
Period 
Levels of influenza activity have returned to the levels seen for 
seasonal influenza in most countries with adequate surveillance. 
Table 2-1 Defintion of Pandemic Phases 
(Source: WHO, 2009a) 
The WHO's pandemic phases do not capture disease severity. Additional guidelines outline 
this dimension of the disease (WHO, 2009b).  A major determinant for the severity is the 
virulence of the virus, which is measured by the number of cases of severe illness and deaths that 
it causes.  However, other factors such as the contagiousness of the virus, population 
vulnerability, subsequent waves of spread, and the capacity to respond can influence the overall 
severity of a pandemic.  A major difficulty for the assessment of severity is the potential for 
variability in virulence.  The severity of a pandemic can vary significantly both geographically 
and over time.  The overall vulnerability of the population or segments of the population due to 
underlying health conditions and poor social conditions can contribute to the severity.  The same 
virus can cause mild illness in one location and cause high morbidity and mortality in another 
due to differences in population susceptibility.  Additionally, pandemics tend to have two or 
three waves of illness.  The severity of these waves can vary in the same locale.  The 
contagiousness of a virus can also influence the severity of the outbreak.  Combined with an 
almost universal vulnerability for infection, the virus can quickly spread leading to a large 
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number of ill individuals in a short amount of time.  This can cause social and economic 
disruption.  Rapid spread can overwhelm the capacity of governments and health care services to 
cope with the outbreak.  The outbreak may be less devastating in areas with strong health care 
systems compared to areas with weak health systems.  However, even strong health care systems 
can be overwhelmed with a large number of ill individuals (WHO, 2009b). 
2.4.3 Pandemic planning in Canada 
Canada’s pandemic influenza planning activities date back to 1983, and a pandemic 
influenza plan has been in place since 1988.  Since then, the pandemic plan has evolved based on 
advances in research and the experiences with disease outbreaks in Canada and other countries 
(PHAC, 2006).  The pandemic plan used during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the Canadian 
Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health Sector, was first published in 2004 and revised in 2006 
to reflect the changes in the WHO’s pandemic phases.1  The pandemic plan outlines how the 
health sector can prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic, outlines the actions to take 
during each pandemic phase, and clarifies the roles and responsibilities of all levels of 
government, public health officials, and front-line health care workers.  It also serves as a 
guideline and checklist for various jurisdictions, such as each level of government and health 
care institutions, to use with their own planning strategies (PHAC, 2006). The pandemic plan for 
Saskatchewan is closely aligned with the national plan (Government of Saskatchewan, 2010; 
Saskatchewan Ministry of Health, 2009). 
The Canadian outbreak of SARS in 2003 strongly influenced the nation’s pandemic 
planning.  Prior to the outbreak, health care professionals and the general public had “limited 
personal experience with large outbreaks of serious respiratory infections” (PHAC, 2006, p. 78)   
SARS has been referred to as a “dress rehearsal for pandemic influenza” (Andresen, 2004, p. 
181).  The Canadian experience with SARS highlighted response issues at the national level and 
reinforced importance of preparedness activities.  Part of the responses from SARS included the 
                                                 
1
 The pandemic plan was further revised in June 2009 in response to the H1N1 pandemic.  The 
revision included the addition of the role of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
Canada (previously Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) to the roles and responsibility section 
of the annex, Planning Consideration in On Reserve First Nations Communities. 
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establishment of the Public Health Agency of Canada and lessons from the outbreak were 
incorporated in the national pandemic plan (PHAC, 2006). 
2.5 Overview of 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
This section includes a brief outline describing how the pandemic spread internationally, 
nationally, and in Saskatchewan based on the official documentation.  Additional details of the 
pandemic are included in the results chapters as they were reported in the Canadian newspapers.  
Table 2-2 is a timeline of selected international, national, and provincial events during the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic. 
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Table 2-2: Timeline of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
 
2.5.1 International experience of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
In April 2009, an outbreak of a new strain of influenza A/H1N1, also known as swine flu, 
was identified in North America.  The virus was initially referred to as swine flu due to genetic 
International National Saskatchewan
2009 
Mar
Detection of severe respiratory infections in Mexico
Mar 17 - First known Mexican case
Mar 28 - First known US case
Apr
Apr 23 - WHO announces outbreak
Apr 25 - Declared Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern 
Apr 27 - WHO raises Alert to 4
Apr 29 - WHO raises Alert to 5, pandemic immient
Apr 29 - First death outside of Mexico in US
Apr 26 - First Canadian cases confirmed in NS & BC
Apr 27 - PHAC issues travel advisory
Apr 28 - Cases confirmed in AB and ON
Apr 30 - Case confirmed in QB
May
May 1 - WHO negotiations with vaccine manufacturers 
May 1 - WHO drops name "swine flu" for H1N1
May 3 - China quarantines Canadian & Mexican 
students
May 22 - Mexico relaxes restrictions
May 2 - Virus found at Alberta hog farm
May 4 - First severe case in Canada reported
May 4 - Cases confirmed in PEI
May 7 - First Canadian death confirmed in AB
May 8 - Community outbreaks confirmed in Canada
May 9 - Case confirmed in MB
May 12 - Case confirmed in YT
May 18 - PHAC lifted Mexican travel advisory
May 7 - First SK cases in 
Saskatoon and Regina areas
June
P
eak
 in
 Ju
n
e
June 11 - WHO declares pandemic, raises alert to 6
June 29 - First known Tamiflu-resistant case
Severe outbreaks in northern Manitoba FN 
communities
June 1 - Case confirmed in NT
June 6 - Hand sanitizer shipment to FN debate
June 13 - Case confirmed in NL
June 27 - First death reported in 
SK
July
July 16 - WHO changes reporting requirements July 21 - First Canadian case of Tamiflu-resistance July 23 - SK stops counting 
individual cases
Aug
Aug 6 - Report that Canada orders 50.4 million vaccine 
doses (Ordered in late July)
Aug 29 - First wave officially ends in Canada
Aug 30 - Second wave officially begins
Sept
Sept 16 - Priority list released
Sept 17 - Body bag shipment to FN reserves
Oct
Oct 19-25 - Shipment of vaccines to P/T
Oct 21 - Health Canada authorizes adjuvanted vaccine
Oct 22 - Canada's vaccine campaigns begins
Oct 26 - Highly publicized death of 13-year-old boy
Oct 26 - Saskatoon begins 
vaccination campaign
Nov
P
eak
 in
 
N
o
v
Nov 12 - Health Canada authorizes unadjuvanted 
vaccine
Mid Nov - Vaccine campaigns expand to general public
Nov 25 - Mass vaccination in 
Saskatoon
Dec
Early to Mid Dec - Mass clinics close down Dec 17 - Mass vacciantion 
clinics closed in Saskatoon
2010
Jan
Jan - WHO addresses allegations of improper influence 
by pharmacetuical companies
Jan 1 - PHAC and Health Canada scale back response
Jan 27 - Second Wave declared over by PHAC
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
June
July
Aug
Aug 10 - WHO declares "Post-Pandemic Phase"
F
irst W
av
e
S
eco
n
d
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av
e
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similarities with swine influenza virus, however, it was later found to be a unique reassortment 
of avian, human, and swine influenza strains (WHO, 2009i).  The virus quickly spread across the 
globe, leading to the declaration of a pandemic in June 2009 by the World Health Organization, 
the first in over forty years (WHO, 2009i). 
  The outbreak first originated in Mexico, with cases reported in early March.  The majority 
of the earliest reported Mexican cases occurred in otherwise healthy, young adults, which raised 
concerns over the new influenza strain (WHO, 2009f).  Cases caused by the virus were also 
found in the United States.  On April 24, the WHO issued its first disease outbreak report of an 
influenza-like illness in the United States and Mexico (WHO, 2009f).  The next day, the WHO 
Director-General declared the event a Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
(WHO, 2009g).  The WHO made no official recommendations for travel or trade restriction 
since they did not believe that travel restrictions would slow the spread of infection.  Instead, the 
decision was left to individual countries to issue their own travel advisories and restrictions, as 
they deemed necessary (WHO, 2009g; 2009h). 
Between April and June, the virus quickly spread to and established community-based 
transmission in multiple countries.  On June 11, the WHO officially raised the pandemic alert to 
Phase 6, the highest level, declaring the outbreak a pandemic (WHO, 2009i).  Many influenza 
scientists and public health experts disagreed with the WHO's decision to wait as long as they 
did to raise the alert to Phase 6.  They argued that the criteria for a pandemic had been met 
several weeks prior and that the WHO postponed the decision unnecessarily.  Many 
epidemiologists believed that the UK, Spain, and Japan were experiencing community-based 
outbreaks by mid-May (Cohen & Enserink, 2009).  This would have met the criterion for 
community-based spread in one country in a second WHO region.  However, WHO officials 
contended that these were localized outbreaks in schools and other institutions rather than 
community-based spread.  The WHO claimed that science wasn’t the only factor that they 
considered.  They waited to ensure that countries were well prepared to prevent an overreaction.  
Many of the national pandemic plans were developed with a much deadlier strain (i.e. avian 
influenza) in mind (Cohen & Enserink, 2009).   
On a separate scale for severity, the pandemic was rated as “moderate” (WHO, 2009i). For 
most individuals, the illness caused mild symptoms. It was severe in a minority of cases.  As the 
illness spread, individuals who experienced severe symptoms included pregnant women, children 
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under five years of age, individuals with certain chronic health conditions and individuals with 
compromised immune systems (WHO, 2009i).   
While the disease was generally considered mild, the virus “spread internationally with 
unprecedented speed.  In past pandemics, influenza viruses have needed more than six months to 
spread as widely as the new H1N1 virus [had] spread in less than six weeks" (WHO, 2009c).  
Due to the increasing number of cases in countries with sustained community transmission, it 
had become "extremely difficult, if not impossible, to try and confirm them through laboratory 
testing" (WHO, 2009c).  The WHO considered the spread of the virus within already affected 
countries and to new countries as "inevitable" (WHO, 2009c).  As a result, the WHO advised 
countries to stop counting individual cases in July 2009.  Countries were no longer required to 
submit reports on the number of confirmed cases and deaths to the WHO.  Instead, surveillance 
activities changed to indicators used for monitoring seasonal influenza to divert resources to 
other measures and activities.  Clusters of severe or fatal cases were closely monitored.  Newly 
affected countries were still required to report on the first confirmed cases and provide weekly 
aggregated case numbers and descriptive epidemiology of early cases (WHO, 2009c).  During 
the pandemic, the WHO issued guidance on public health measures that countries could apply to 
reduce or delay the transmission of the disease (WHO, 2011). 
Influenza activity decreased by November or December 2009 in many locations and 
worldwide cases were tapering off by spring 2010.  On August 10, 2010, the WHO declared the 
end of the pandemic and the beginning of the post-pandemic period (WHO, 2010).  
2.5.2 Canadian H1N1 pandemic experience 
The initial Canadian cases were among travelers returning from Mexico.  The first confirmed 
cases were reported on April 26 in Nova Scotia and British Columbia (PHAC, 2010).  Shortly 
thereafter in May, community-based outbreaks were confirmed.  Canada experienced two waves 
of the pandemic. The first began in April 2009, peaked in June and ended at the end of August 
2009.  The second wave began at the end of August and peaked in November 2009.  During the 
second wave, influenza activity began in British Columbia and spread eastwards.  Nation-wide 
influenza activity decreased in December 2009.  The second wave resulted in four to five times 
more hospitalizations and deaths compared to the first wave.  Groups who experienced higher 
rates of hospitalization and mortality included Aboriginal people, pregnant women, and 
individuals with at least one underlying health condition.  An increase in influenza activity was 
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also reported in all provinces and territories during the second wave, except for Manitoba and 
Nunavut, which experienced higher flu activity during the first wave (PHAC, 2010).   The PHAC 
declared the second wave over at the end of January 2010 (PHAC, 2010). 
2.5.3 Pandemic in Saskatchewan 
In April 2009, the Health Emergency Operations Centre was established in preparation for a 
potential outbreak and to coordinate the activities of the provincial Ministry of Health and 
relevant partners (Government of Saskatchewan, 2010).  The first cases in the province were 
detected on May 6, 2009.  The initial cases occurred among individuals who had returned from 
Mexico and their close contacts.  Like the rest of the country, Saskatchewan experienced two 
waves of the pandemic with similar peaks of influenza activity.  The first wave began in May 
2009 and peaked in June and July 2009.  The second wave began in September 2009 and peaked 
in November and December 2009 (Opondo, Wright, Findlater, Grauer, & Ugolini, 2011).  The 
number of confirmed cases decreased by January 2010 and all influenza cases had disappeared in 
the province by late winter.  The lack of any influenza at that time was “highly unusual” during 
the normal seasonal influenza cycle.  The overall pandemic response to the pandemic in 
Saskatchewan was defined as “very successful” with 50% of the population vaccinated 
(Government of Saskatchewan, 2010). 
The initial case in the Saskatoon Health Region was among the first detected in the province.  
The region experienced a similar pattern as the rest of the province.  The total number of cases in 
the region is unknown due to selective testing, however, 909 cases were confirmed.  More than 
half of these cases were among individuals under the age of 18.  There were 9 reported deaths in 
health region, all among individuals who had underlying health conditions.  More 
hospitalizations and deaths occurred among younger people than would be expected for seasonal 
influenza and pneumonia.  The region’s vaccination campaign began in October 2009 and 
resulted in 49% of population being immunized between October and March 2010 (Opondo, et 
al., 2011). 
2.6 Summary 
To summarize, influenza is a common illness that occurs every year, however, occasionally a 
new strain will emerge to which the population has little to no immunity.  This was the case for 
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  The chapter provided an overview of the relevant health 
 20 
 
organizations, the World Health Organization, Health Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada, 
the Saskatchewan Ministry of Health and the Saskatoon Health Region that responded to the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic at the international, national, and local levels.  Their response to the 
pandemic was influenced by years of pandemic planning in each health organization.  Pandemic 
planning has been ongoing for years in anticipation of a possible pandemic.  The plans are based 
on research and experiences with other disease outbreaks.  The chapter concluded with an 
overview of the international and national spread of the pandemic based on the official 
documentation.    
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CHAPTER 3  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND FRAMEWORKS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the theoretical underpinnings of media and health studies and 
highlights the theoretical perspectives that inform this thesis. The first section focuses on the 
relationship between the media and perceptions of health.  News media are recognized as 
important sources that shape and reflect public perceptions of health and illness and thus deserve 
examination.  The section includes a discussion on risk communication and perception, a 
common approach to media studies in the health promotion and public health fields.  While these 
studies tend to rely on a quantitative content analysis approach to assess the coverage and 
content of the media health messages, there is a need to move beyond this type of analysis and 
examine how the health messages are constructed.  The section also includes a review of other 
media studies of the H1N1 pandemic.    
To examine how messages are constructed in the media, I relied on a specific theoretical 
perspective, conceptual frameworks, and methodology that are an interconnected hierarchy of 
thought.  The theoretical perspective is the highest level and locates the study in a particular 
world view.  The conceptual frameworks, at the second level, are based on the theoretical 
perspective, but are explicitly grounded in the research questions and objectives.  Both the 
theoretical perspective and conceptual framework influence my interpretation of the data.   The 
methodology operationalizes the framework, informing the data collection and analysis strategy. 
The second section discusses the theoretical perspective common to the three conceptual 
frameworks (epidemic narrative, anchoring, and framing) that are combined and used in this 
study. The three conceptual frameworks are discussed in detail in the third section of this 
chapter.  Examples of media studies that utilized each of these frameworks are also presented.  
These studies informed this study’s methodology which is presented in the chapter that follows.  
3.2 Media and Health 
3.2.1 Media representation and perceptions of health 
Media representation studies essentially build from the assumption that knowledge of health 
and illness is socially constructed and shaped by the wider socio-cultural context.  In addition to 
personal experience, individuals’ knowledge of and experience about health and illness are 
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shaped and reflected by the media.  Images and words used in the media provide particular ways 
of understanding health and illness (Lyons, 2000; Seale, 2003).  As a result, media messages can 
affect the public’s perceptions of health risks and health behaviors.  Psychologist Antonia Lyons 
(2000) points out that individuals’ beliefs about health and illness do not develop in isolation; 
instead they are shaped by the broader socio-cultural context, which includes the media.  Media 
messages can, for example, influence people’s perceptions regarding their risk to certain health 
threats, the public’s attitudes towards people with an illness, their concept of who is responsible 
for health, and trust in public health interventions (Lyons, 2000; Nerlich & Halliday, 2007; 
Seale, 2003; Ungar, 1998; Wallis & Nerlich, 2005).  According to medical sociologist Clive 
Seale (2003, p. 514), 
When people get sick, or make decisions about health, or visit their health service 
providers, or decide what to think and vote about health care policy and finance, 
their behavior may be formulated in large part from resources drawn from various 
mass media.  These can include depictions of what it is like to be sick, what 
causes illness, health and cure, how health care providers behave (or ought to) and 
the nature of health policies and their impact. 
While it is difficult to determine the direct effects of any specific media type given the range 
of communications to which individuals are exposed, and the diverse patterns by which they 
access various media sources, media content does deserve examination as one mechanism from 
which representations develop (Joffe, 2002; Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002).  The primary focus of a 
media representation study, therefore, is on the content of the media rather than the audience 
response to the message since it cannot be assumed that the intended message is what the 
audience accepts (Lupton, 1999). 
Studies of media representations of health and illness have included a wide range of health 
topics and research methods.  Most media representation studies follow one of two 
methodological approaches: a quantitative content approach focused on the surface content of the 
text or a qualitative approach concerned with the latent meaning of the text and the broader 
socio-cultural context in which the media messages are produced (Kline, 2003; Lupton, 1999).  
Quantitative content analysis was the dominant approach from the 1950s to 1970s and still 
remains influential, particularly in the fields of health promotion and public health (Lupton, 
1999).  Content analysis sees the content of media as composed of discrete messages, which can 
be isolated and counted, thus arriving at a quantitative understanding of the meaning.  A 
quantitative approach is useful in determining how often a specific disease is mentioned or how 
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frequently specific health messages appear in the media over a period of time.  For example, 
Frost and colleagues (1997) examined the amount of media coverage for select leading causes 
and risk factors for death, and Bomlitz and Brezis (2008) examined the amount of coverage for 
selected health topics.  These studies are described in more detail in the next section.  The 
primary concern of the approach is the surface content of the text, however, the approach says 
little about the underlying meanings of media messages and the social context from which the 
meanings are drawn, which is the primary focus in qualitative approaches (Kline, 2003; Lupton, 
1999). 
3.2.2 Risk communication and perception 
A common focus for media studies in the health promotion and public health field is on risk 
communication and risk perception.  Risk perception is the subjective judgments that individuals 
make when evaluating of the severity and characteristics of various health concerns (Slovic, 
1987; 2000).  The frequency of media coverage and specific messages presented in the media 
can influence the public’s perception of risk.  The media also serve as the intermediary between 
public health officials and the general public for communication.  From a health promotion and 
public health point of view, media representation studies have consistently concluded that health-
related content in the media is problematic (Bomlitz & Brezis, 2008; Kline, 2006).  A ten-year 
review of health studies of media representations found that the media reports are consistently 
full of inaccuracies, misleading, and problematic themes and images.  Regardless of whether the 
studies reviewed focused on the scope of the coverage, information provided, or the framing of 
the issues, media coverage of disease and illness was found to be lacking in adequate or correct 
health information (Kline, 2006).   
The news media has been criticized for publishing inaccurate, sensationalized, or misleading 
stories that are not the most scientifically significant (Bomlitz & Brezis, 2008; Dudo, Dahlstrom, 
& Brossard, 2007; Frost, Frank, & Maibach, 1997; Glik, 2007; Kline, 2006; Nicol, Hurrell, 
McDowall, Bartlett, & Elmieh, 2008). Frost and colleagues (1997), for example, compared the 
leading causes and risk factors for death and the amount of media coverage for those causes and 
risk factors, while Bomlitz and Brezis (2008) looked at the relationship between the amount of 
media coverage for selected health topics and their actual risk to public health.  Both studies 
found that the more common the cause of death, the less likely the media covered it.  The amount 
of media coverage that a health issue may or may not receive, can distort the perceived risk from 
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the actual risk.  However, what is considered “newsworthy” has little to do with health issues 
that are “high risk.”  News reporting of disease risk has more to do with the rarity, novelty, and 
the dramatic and social components of the disease than with scientific notions of calculable risk 
(Bird, 1996; Bomlitz & Brezis, 2008; Brown, Chapman, & Lupton, 1996; Frost, Frank, & 
Maibach, 1997).   
Despite the known problems with media reporting, the media still serves as an important 
means to communicate with the public during a disease outbreak (Glik, 2007).  Several studies 
have assessed the content and effectiveness of disease risk communication in the media, 
concluding with suggestions for improvement.  For example, Shrestha (2009) reviewed the 
media reporting of avian influenza and the potential pandemic threat in a Philippine newspaper 
between 2004 and 2006.  The coverage primarily focused on the national and regional public 
policies regarding avian influenza with little focus on public awareness, preparation and 
intervention campaigns (Shrestha, 2009).  Wilson and colleagues (2009) reviewed the media 
reporting right before and during the recognition of the 1968 Hong Kong flu pandemic for 
modern day lessons.  They found a delay in the local recognition of the outbreak and local 
reporting increased abruptly once the health care and civil infrastructure were affected by 
increased absenteeism.  Both of these studies emphasized the need for early warnings of an 
outbreak and improved communication between health officials and the media regarding the 
risks posed by the disease.   
Similar studies have also assessed the media content and quality of risk communications of 
other disease outbreaks, including the 1976 swine flu inoculation campaign in the U.S. (Rubin & 
Hendy, 1977) and SARS (Lewison, 2008; Wilson, Thomson, & Mansoor, 2004), using content 
analysis.  Rubin and Hendy (Rubin & Hendy, 1977) examined news stories from newspapers, 
news broadcasts, and output from a wire service during a single week of the 1976 inoculation 
program.  They analyzed the stories for the presence or absence of information about the swine 
influenza, the swine vaccine (i.e. effectiveness, risk, side effects, priority groups), and the deaths 
that occurred (i.e. possible causes, expected death rate, local reactions).  None of the news stories 
analyzed contained incorrect information of the clinical or epidemiology features of the disease, 
however, the information was often simplistic and lacked detail.  Rubin and Hendy (1977) 
attributed the superficial reporting to the reporters being ill equipped to ask basic scientific 
questions.  He emphasized the need for better communication between the health officials and 
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the media to improve the quality of information presented in the media.  Wilson and colleagues 
(2004) examined the media coverage of SARS in a major New Zealand newspaper.  Their 
analysis focused on the presence or absence of the clinical features of SARS, transmission, and 
prevention methods in each article.  The articles that were examined did not contain any 
incorrect information but lacked detail according to the researchers.  Wilson and colleagues 
(2004) stated that their findings illustrated the usefulness of the media to convey health messages 
but the findings also highlighted the importance of and need for health authorities to keep their 
key messages short, use simple language, and to use it consistently when providing information 
to the media.   
A common feature of the previously mentioned studies is the use of quantitative content 
analysis to assess the quality and content of the disease risk communication in the media.  The 
majority of these studies used a systematic categorization of health messages, such as the 
characteristics of the disease and prevention methods, and focused on whether these messages 
were present or absent in the media coverage.  While this approach is useful to ensure that the 
health messages are conveyed in the media, it says little about the symbolic meanings that are 
conveyed and how they are constructed in the media.  The approach reduces the media coverage 
to a checklist of health messages, an approach that is ill suited to explore the explicit and implicit 
meanings and how they are constructed within the media.  As Kline (2003, p. 564) points out,  
Content analysis is not well-suited to assess social, political, and economic 
influences on health, illness, and medical issues, nor does it accommodate 
attempts to address the ways in which health discourses constitute, reflect, and 
recreate cultural ideologies and hegemonies. 
Additionally, the agendas of the media and of health professionals often conflict and it can be 
“difficult to convey complicated and contingent information to journalists who need to be direct 
and succinct – and also dramatic” (Kline, 2006, p. 51).  Even with detailed information, there can 
be incongruities between the information provided and the news reports.  The goal of the news is 
to tell a story.  Instead of scientific “facts,” “news reporting is concerned with ‘storied’ accounts 
of health threats” (Kline, 2006, p. 51).   
There is a need to move “beyond calculating the amount of coverage the news media gives 
selected health topics to an examination of how health messages are constructed” (Barry, Wharf-
Higgins, & Naylor, 2007, p. 36).  Kline (2006, p. 52) suggests that researchers need to “find 
ways to tease out the nuanced meanings and the implications of those representations.”  
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Additionally, the content of media coverage should be examined in relation to the broader social 
and historical context in which the media coverage is located (Lupton, 1999; Seale, 2003).   
3.2.3 Media studies of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
There are other media studies of the H1N1 pandemic.  The majority of the studies used 
quantitative content analysis to assess the media coverage.  Several of these studies analyzed the 
coverage for a limited period of time and focused on a specific aspect of the pandemic.   
One of the first media studies of the pandemic was a review of the European media coverage 
during the first week (April 27-May 3) of the pandemic (Duncan, 2009).  The study was 
commissioned by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in order to assess the 
effectiveness of the “announce early” strategy – one of the key principles of the WHO Outbreak 
Communication Guidelines (WHO, 2004).  The strategy is in place as an attempt to improve the 
media coverage of a health crisis.  Articles from the top three national newspapers and websites 
of the main broadcasters for 31 European countries were reviewed.  Each article was analyzed 
for the main source of information in the story and whether the messages in the story were 
supportive, critical or neutral of the actions of the health and governmental authorities.  National 
and international public health authorities were found to be the leading source of information in 
75% of the articles, with the WHO as the main source (28% of articles).  The overall tone was 
found to be factual in the majority of the articles (70%).  Twenty-four percent of the articles were 
supportive of the actions taken by authorities, while only 6% were critical of health organizations 
and governments.  Four percent of the articles were critical of health organizations and 
governments for not doing enough, while 2% were critical of health organizations and 
governments for being alarmist.  The results of the study suggest that the early engagement with 
the media by the international and national public health authorities resulted in factual and non-
alarmist reporting.  Alarmist reporting had been a common complaint in media reporting of 
disease outbreaks (Duncan, 2009). 
A second study used quantitative content analysis to examine Canadian newspapers’ 
portrayal of the vaccine and vaccination program (Rachul, Ries, & Caulfied, 2011).  The study 
examined the content and tone of a sample of articles published from June 2009 until December 
2009.  Canadian newspaper articles, excluding letters to the editors, were identified with a key 
word search for H1N1 and vaccine or vaccination.  The identified articles were stratified by 
province and a random sample of one third of the articles from each province was selected for 
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analysis.  The content was coded based on three categories: (1) to vaccinate or not to vaccinate, 
(2) scientific evidence, and (3) risk and benefits.  The tone of the article, whether it was purely 
descriptive, positive or negative towards vaccination, or both was also noted.  Overall, the 
examined articles presented a fairly positive perspective of the vaccine and were supportive of 
vaccination (Rachul, Ries, & Caulfied, 2011). 
Hilton and Hunt (2011) analyzed the content of newspaper articles in eight UK national 
newspapers from March 2009 to February 2010.  Articles were included in the analysis based on 
two criteria: 1) H1N1 was the primary focus of the article and 2) the article had to be in specific 
sections of the newspaper.  Letters to the editors were excluded in the study.  The articles were 
examined for their manifest content (i.e. what was explicitly stated).  To develop a coding 
framework for the analysis, a random sample of 100 articles was initially examined.  Additional 
batches of 20 articles were coded until no new categories emerged.  The resulting coding 
framework included 44 thematic categories.  Each article was read and coded to indicate whether 
the categories were mentioned and to rate the general tone of the article.  Descriptive statistics of 
the categories were used to analyze trends over time.   Overall, the researchers found that the 
newspaper coverage reflected the scientific uncertainties about the course of the pandemic and 
did not distort the risk of the pandemic (Hilton & Hunt, 2011).   
Fogarty and colleagues (2011) conducted a content analysis of news stories from five 
Sydney, Australia television channels between April 25, 2009 (the first report) and October 9, 
2009 (prior to the release of the vaccine).  The content was coded for messages about the 
seriousness of the disease, how the public could minimize contagion, and government responses 
to the emerging information.  The researchers found that H1N1 was the leading health story for 8 
of the 24 weeks of coverage.  The news reports were generally non-alarmist and conveyed that 
H1N1 was potentially serious, however, the coverage lacked contextualization to assist the 
viewers in understanding the personal relevance of the disease (Fogarty, et al, 2011).   
Two additional studies examined the relationship between the amount of media coverage and 
another factor.  The first study examined the relationship between the amount of coverage and 
agricultural prices of hogs, cattle, corn and soybeans (Attavanich, McCarl, & Bessler, 2011).  
The researchers compared the daily count of four English newspapers (New York Times, Japan 
Times, (London) Times, and China Daily) that mentioned H1N1 to the respective prices.  They 
did not distinguish between positive or negative articles or the focus of the articles.  They found 
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a significant but temporary negative impact on hog prices but little impact on the other prices 
which was expected given the negative perception of pigs due to the name “swine flu.”  The 
second study compared consultations rates based on lab data, hospital admissions and deaths to 
the amount of media coverage from April to December 2009 in Wales (Keramarou, et al., 2011).  
The relationship between the amount of media coverage and consultations rates was unclear in 
the study.  The analysis of the articles seemed to be secondary to a discussion of the 
consultations rates and methods used for disease surveillance. 
Instead of examining news articles, Henrich and Holmes (2011) examined user comments 
that were posted on-line in response to a news articles about the H1N1 vaccine.  The authors 
examined the comments posted in response to 12 articles about the H1N1 vaccine on the 
websites of three major Canadian news sources.  The most common themes in the comments 
were fear of H1N1 (18.8%), responsibility of media (17.85%), government competency (17.7%), 
government trustworthiness (10.7%), fear of the H1N1 vaccine (8.1%), pharmaceutical 
companies (7.6%), and personal protective measures (5.8%).   Henrich and Holmes (2011) 
assumed that the more frequently a theme was mentioned in the news articles, the more likely 
that the theme influenced public perception about the vaccine.    
Several studies examined the content of social media as a way to gauge public opinion during 
the pandemic.  Chew and Eysenbach (2010) examined the content of “tweets1” between May and 
December 2009. The researchers used an open-source infoveillance system, which Eysenbach 
(2009) developed to gather information from Twitter.  For the analysis, they examined the 
proportion of tweets that that used the term H1N1 versus swine flu.  There was a gradual 
increase in the use of H1N1.   By September, the use of H1N1 was as prevalent as the term swine 
flu.  A sample of “tweets” from 9 time points was coded using the following categories: 
resources, direct or indirect personal experiences, personal reactions or opinions, jokes/parodies, 
marketing for H1N1-related products, and unrelated posts.  The authors argue that Twitter can be 
used as a way to provide a snapshot of public opinion and behavioral response over the course of 
a public health emergency, such as the pandemic.  Szomszer and colleagues (2011) examined 
how the pandemic was discussed on Twitter and analyzed the popularity of trusted news outlets 
and official health agencies on the site.  They found that reputable sources were more popular 
than untrusted sources but there was still the potential for misinformation to spread through 
                                                 
1
 “Tweets” are individual text-based posts on Twitter.  A “tweet” is limited to 140 characters. 
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social media.  A study by Tonya Smith (2011) examined the content on a sample of “tweets” on 
Twitter.  The sample was limited to “tweets” on three key dates: (1) April 25 when the WHO 
held a press conference about the epidemic, (2) September 4 when the number of reported deaths 
“ramped up” and (3) October 24 when President Obama declared a national emergency in the 
U.S.  The sample was coded based on three categories: health information, misinformation or 
disinformation, and uncertainty.  The study also included a survey of a sample of Twitter users 
regarding their demographics, social media habits, and information about H1N1 that they 
recalled from Twitter.  The survey examined how people determine the credibility of the 
information, and whether Twitter contributed to their decision to be vaccinated.  
Unlike this study, the previously mentioned studies limited their focus to a specific topic and 
limited time period during the pandemic.  These studies also limited their analysis to a 
quantitative approach which is concerned with quantity of the media coverage and the frequency 
of selected content rather than how the messages were presented in the media which is the focus 
of this study.   
The remainder of this chapter discusses the overarching theoretical perspective and three 
conceptual frameworks, epidemic narrative, anchoring, and framing, which are combined to 
address the research objectives of this thesis.  This work is concerned with the explicit and 
implicit meanings of the media coverage of H1N1 and interprets the coverage in relation to the 
broader socio-cultural context.  The explicit meanings are clearly expressed in the text; implicit 
meanings are expressed indirectly; the reader must infer the meaning from the text.  Implicit 
meanings can be problematic since they can be open to interpretation. 
3.3 Theoretical Perspective 
The theoretical perspective, which informs this work, is concerned with the subjective and 
contextual nature of how people create meaning and how these meanings are evident in forms of 
communication.  The theoretical perspective underpins the three conceptual frameworks, 
epidemic narrative, anchoring, and framing that inform this study.  The frameworks will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section, but first, the common theoretical perspective that 
underlines and links the frameworks will be discussed.  The theoretical perspective and 
frameworks are influenced by a range of work from anthropology, psychology, and sociology 
that is concerned with culture, social representation, narrative, and communication.  The basic 
assumption of the theoretical perspective is that representations are socially constructed and are 
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shaped by the wider socio-culture context.  These representations are evident in various forms of 
communication, including the media. 
3.3.1 Culture, social representation, and meaning 
Culture is viewed as the incompletely shared perspectives, beliefs and attitudes of a social 
group.  In other words, among a social group there is a degree of overlap in their perspectives, 
beliefs, and attitudes.  While there are similarities, their perspectives, beliefs and attitudes are not 
homogenous.  Culture structures meaning and is used to make sense of an experience.  The 
“stuff” of culture includes the mental representations that are used to provide meaning and 
influences the perception of an experience.  The mental representations are shaped by previous 
experiences.  The following paragraphs address these ideas in more detail and an example will 
follow the explanation. 
Within the literature, there are several terms used to define mental representations, such as 
construct, schema, model, frame, script, and template (Bradway & Barg, 2006; Casson, 1983; 
DeMunck, 2000; Dressler & Bindon, 2000; Farr, 1993; Frank, 1998; Garro, 2000; Goffman, 
1974; Laszlo, 1997; Lyons, 2000; Moscovici, 1984; Murray, 2002; Quinn, 2005; Schwartz, 
1978; Strauss & Quinn, 1997).  There are some differences in how these terms are 
conceptualized depending on the researcher and their specific interests (Casson, 1983).  
However, for this work, it is the common definition that is the main concern.  Mental 
representations are commonly defined as the “basis for all human information processing” 
(Casson, 1983, p. 430).  Mental representations are used to form perceptions, categorize, 
organize, remember, solve problems and make decisions (Casson, 1983; DeMunck, 2000; 
Goffman, 1974; Strauss & Quinn, 1997). The basic purpose of representations, as described by 
sociologist Erving Goffman (1974, p. 21), is to “render what would otherwise be 
meaningless…into something meaningful.”  The assumptions that an individual would use to 
interpret and describe an experience are another way to define mental representations.  These 
assumptions may be explicit or implicit in their interpretation.  It is not uncommon that an 
individual would be unable to describe their mental representations in any great detail, however, 
this does not affect their ability to use it (Goffman, 1974).  An individual may use a common 
phrase, or idiom, to describe a situation, however, if asked they would be unable to give a clear 
definition of the phrase or state where the phrase came from.  For example, a common phrase 
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that people use for feeling sick is “feeling under the weather.”  People who use the phrase may 
know its meaning but may not know its origin.  
Among a group of individuals with common life experiences, there is a degree of overlap and 
similarity among their mental representations.  This overlap constitutes a shared understanding, 
which makes it a cultural or social representation.  Thus, culture can be seen as the “by-product” 
of the cumulative, shared experiences of individuals (DeMunck, 2000).  Social representations 
may be incompletely shared among members of a group or may be interpreted differently 
depending on the individual.  In this case, it may not be the underlying mental representations 
that differ but rather there are individual interpretations of the same representations, such as 
different interpretations of a common experience (Garro, 2000).  An example of this follows in 
the next paragraph. 
Social representations of health and illness are dependent on the individuals within a group 
and the context in which they live.  As an example, medical anthropologist and physician Arthur 
Kleinman’s (1988) work has examined how the cultural understandings of both patients and 
clinicians shape their definition, or representation, of a disorder or sickness.  This work has been 
applied to clinical practice and teaching as a way to improve communication between patients 
and clinicians.  Kleinman differentiates between two terms, illness and disease, as different 
representations based on the patients’ and clinicians’ perspectives and social context.  The illness 
representation is the personal and social meaning that a patient attaches to a sickness or disorder.  
It may include a biological explanation but can also reflect social factors such as family, 
education, religious beliefs, and past experiences with illness and health care (Kleinman, 
Eisenberg, & Good, 1978).  The patient’s representation reflects the patient’s understandings, 
lived experiences of the illness, and places the illness within the context of their daily life.  The 
disease representation is from the clinician’s perspective (Kleinman, Eisenberg, & Good, 1978; 
Kleinman, 1988).  The clinician’s representation is based on a combination of their 
“ethnocultural background, their professional training, and the context in which they work” 
(Kirmayer, 2001, p. 22).  In other words, illness and disease are different representations of a 
sickness that differ based on the different mental representations and social contexts of the 
patient and the clinician.  This is an example of differing perspectives of the same event 
(Goffman, 1974).   
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It is important to note that the illness and disease representations are not mutually exclusive 
from one another.  As an example of overlapping mental representations, the illness may include 
a biological explanation for the experience but not to the same extent as the disease 
representation due to differences in medical understanding of the patient and clinician 
(Kleinman, Eisenberg, & Good, 1978).  For example, an individual with diabetes would be 
concerned about the impact on their life with having to monitor and adjust their insulin levels 
with their food intake and physical activity; though they may not understand the biology and 
physiology of insulin and blood sugar level to the same extent as the physician.  The individual 
with diabetes can understand in the impact of the biological processes without understanding the 
mechanisms that cause them.  Additionally, when a patient presents an illness complaint to a 
clinician there can be “locally shared illness idioms,” or expressions, with which both are 
familiar and provide a common ground of understanding.  The clinician understands the illness 
representation and then reframes it in terms of the disease when making a diagnosis (Kleinman, 
1988, p. 5).  On the other hand, there may be no common ground of understanding between the 
patient and clinician.  For example, when the patient presents their complaints; the clinician does 
not understand the patient’s perspective and cannot make a link to a disease, which delays a 
diagnosis (Kleinman, Eisenberg, & Good, 1978). 
Social representations can also change over time (Casson, 1983; DeMunck, 2000; Dressler & 
Bindon, 2000; Schwartz, 1978).  Representations are not static but are capable to being 
manipulated, combined, or transformed in response to new experiences (Schwartz, 1978).  In 
other words, as new experiences occur, they are interpreted in terms of the existing mental 
representations while at the same time the mental representations are created or reshaped by the 
new experiences.  Returning to the illness/disease example, after a patient visits the clinician and 
receives a diagnosis, the patient may incorporate their understanding of the disease 
representation into their illness representation.  In other words, when someone first becomes ill 
and they do not know what is wrong, they may describe their sickness in terms of the symptoms 
and the effect it has on their life.  After receiving a diagnosis, they may incorporate what the 
clinician told them and may use the diagnosis as an explanation for their illness. 
3.3.2 Social representations and narrative 
Social representations are expressed through various forms of communication, including oral 
and written communication, in other words discourse (Laszlo, 1997; Quinn, 2005).  Analyzing 
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discourse provides a way to interpret the underlying assumptions, or mental representations, that 
shape the social representations.  Implicit and explicit meanings can be interpreted from clues, 
such as common key words, themes, and metaphors, in the discourse.  These clues provide a 
guide to the kinds of ideas that a group shares and for understanding how ideas about a specific 
domain are connected (Bradway & Barg, 2006; Quinn, 2005).   
A common form of discourse is a story or narrative.  Narratives provide a structure to make 
sense of the world.  They are constructed within a specific social context and are dependent upon 
the available cultural knowledge (Raoul, Canam, Henderson, & Paterson, 2007).  A narrative is 
not a simple report of “the facts” but rather it is a social construction that is used to describe and 
provide meaning to experiences in a particular way (Gubrium & Holstein, 1998).  A narrative 
organizes the representation in a way that makes sense to others within a social group since the 
group shares similar experiences and mental representations (Bradway & Barg, 2006; Laszlo, 
1997; Murray, 2002; Schank & Abelson, 1995).  There is extensive literature on narrative and 
narrative approaches, however, for this thesis, there are three aspects of narratives that are 
relevant.  Each of these aspects relate to the conceptual frameworks, described in the next 
section. The three frameworks were combined to inform this work.  
The first aspect is that there are common stories for common experiences.  These have been 
referred to as “narrative structures,” “narrative frameworks,” “narrative templates,” “narrative 
types,” “metanarratives”, and “story skeletons” in various works (Frank, 1998; Laszlo, 1997; 
Murray, 2002; Raoul, et al. , 2007).  The common stories are the culturally available narratives 
that help to shape individual stories.  Similar to mental representations, individuals “learn these 
narrative forms without knowing they know them, and they then use them both to make sense of 
new stories and to improvise stories of their own” (Frank, 1998, p. 200).  The narrative structure 
provides a way for the storyteller to organize their representations and convey meaning and for 
the listeners to “find their way through the story” (Frank, 1998, p. 200). 
Social and health psychologist Michael Murray (2002, p. 654) suggests that when there is 
“some disturbance in our lives” such as an illness, “we can bring order to it by placing it within a 
narrative.”  The resulting story, an illness narrative, is one example of a representation in the 
form of a story.  When an individual is sick, they often relate their experience in the form of a 
story as a way to assign meaning to it and to convey their experience to others (Kleinman, 1988).  
Even though the specific illness may vary, there are common elements to the illness narrative 
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such as personal experience with the illness, experiences of social barriers and stigma, shifts in 
social relationships due to the illness, and interactions with the medical institutions and health 
care providers (Raoul, et al., 2007).  Additionally, sociologist Arthur Frank (1998, p. 200) 
identifies three types of narrative structures or “skeletons on which many stories of illness are 
fleshed out.”  The first structure is the restitution story that follows the storyline of becoming 
sick, suffering, being treated and returning to health through treatment.  The second structure is 
the chaos story in which the suffering only increases, physicians are unable to find a cause or 
successfully treat the illness.  As a result, the medical problems become social problems leading 
to further suffering.  The third structure is the quest story in which the illness is seen as a 
condition from which something can be learned and passed on to others.  Frank does not propose 
these narrative structures as distinct categories for decoding and classifying stories but rather as 
“usable pathways” for understanding illness narratives (Frank, 1998, p. 200).  The narrative 
structures are not exclusive from one another and they can intertwine and shift over the course of 
the illness experience (Frank, 1998). 
The second relevant aspect of narratives is that new stories are related to old stories. In other 
words, narratives of new experiences are interpreted and constructed in terms of past experiences 
(Murray, 2002; Schank & Abelson, 1995).  The mental representations that are used to provide 
meaning are built upon past experiences and they provide material for the narrator to construct a 
new story.  Thus, past experiences are incorporated into narratives of new experiences as a way 
to provide meaning (Gubrium & Holstein, 1998). 
The third relevant aspect is that narratives of the same event can vary in perspective and 
interpretation.  Individuals may construct different stories for the same event based on their 
individual perspectives and experiences (Laszlo, 1997; Murray, 2002).  For example, the illness 
narrative can also be told from many different perspectives such as the point of view of the sick 
individual or from groups who experience an illness, from health professionals, researchers, 
policy makers, and from the broader society (Raoul, et al., 2007).  Each storyteller would provide 
a different perspective of the illness and focus on different aspects of the experience.  
Additionally, the same storyteller may select different aspects of the experience depending on the 
particular circumstances of the storytelling and their audience (Gubrium & Holstein, 1998).  The 
audience may then also interpret the narrative differently based on their own perspectives.  The 
illness and disease representations are examples of differing perspectives and interpretations of 
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the same event.  The clinician tells a particular story about a sickness using biomedical 
discourse, models, and metaphors while the patient would tell a different story based on their 
own experience and perspective.  The two stories can also differ in meaning and interpretation 
based on who is the storyteller and who is the listener (Raoul, et al.,  2007).   
To link the theoretical perspective to media, media are an important form of communication.  
Media play a role in the development of social representations (Moscovici, 1961; 1984).  In other 
words, media representations are social representations (Tuchman, 1978).  Also, the media are 
unique types of storytellers.  The individuals in the media are storytellers but they also convey 
stories from various sources.  The common narratives appear in the media coverage. 
3.4 Conceptual Frameworks 
The three aspects of narratives that were highlighted, (1) common stories for common 
experiences, (2) new stories related to old stories, and (3) differing perspectives and 
interpretation, are linked to the three conceptual frameworks that were combined for this study.  
Each framework is discussed in detail in the following sections.  The discussions also include a 
review of media representation studies that utilized each framework.  The review of media 
studies focuses on studies of infectious diseases, with a few noted exceptions.   
The first framework is the epidemic narrative, which identifies the common story for 
disease outbreaks.  The epidemic narrative shares similarities to the illness narrative, discussed 
earlier, but can be viewed as the illness experience at a broader societal level.  The second 
framework is anchoring, which comes from social representation theory (SRT).  SRT focuses on 
how a social representation develops and changes when society is faced with a new 
phenomenon.  According to the theory, the representation of a new experience is “anchored” to 
previous experiences (Moscovici, 1961; 1984).  Anchoring is similar to the idea that new stories 
are related to old stories.  The third section focuses on framing, which is based on the idea that 
stories of the same experience can have multiple perspectives and interpretations depending on 
the storytellers and audience.  The way that the media present information and what they 
emphasize can elicit different responses and interpretations.  Framing can change over time as 
new information about an epidemic becomes available, thus changing the perception of it (Glik, 
2007).  Frames also provide social meaning and can shed light on the broader social context in 
which news stories occur (Blakely, 2001).  These conceptual frameworks, which have largely 
been applied independent of each other, were combined in this study to examine the narrative 
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construction, emphasis, and meaning conveyed in the newspaper coverage of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic.     
3.4.1 Epidemic narrative 
Epidemics are as much social as biological.  Society “perceives and frames the outbreak, 
places blame, and negotiates a response” to an outbreak.  At the same time, epidemics fit into a 
“biologically based model of disease” (Rosenberg, 1989, p. 14).  Historian Charles Rosenberg 
(1989) suggests that epidemics as a social phenomenon follow a common narrative pattern.  
Common reactions to epidemics, especially when the disease is new, unexpected, or particularly 
devastating, are fear, panic, stigma, moralizing, and a call to action.  Initially, an outbreak may 
not be noticed until it is unavoidable and must be acknowledged.  Once it is acknowledged, 
explanations emerge in order to identify and contain the outbreak.  The explanations serve to 
identify the causes and responsibility for the outbreak, to help regain control over the crisis, and 
to attempt to minimize society’s sense of vulnerability to the outbreak.  As the disease spreads, it 
may be accompanied by panic, disorder, desperation, and the presence of an apocalyptic 
worldview, until the disease decreases naturally.  If control efforts fail or an immediate solution 
is not discovered, then those seen as responsible for the outbreak may receive criticism or 
become scapegoats.  These may include, for example, social groups of people or types of animals 
that are seen as carriers of the disease or even doctors, scientists, and public health and 
government officials that fail to contain the outbreak.  The victims of the disease may face 
stigma or other measures that involve degrees of avoidance and exclusion.  As the epidemic 
gradually subsides and disappears, society looks back for moral lessons that can be learned.  The 
details of an outbreak narrative can vary significantly depending on factors such as time, place, 
severity and symptoms of the disease, and which segments of the population are affected the 
most (Rosenberg, 1989). 
The epidemic narrative has a powerful influence on the public’s concern about the health 
crisis and can influence health policy.  The focus of the epidemic narrative shapes how the public 
perceives the illness and directs the response.  According to Wald (2008, p. 3), epidemic 
narratives can have a wide range of consequences: 
They affect survival rates and contagion routes.  They promote or mitigate the 
stigmatizing of individuals, groups, populations, locales (regional or global), 
behaviors, and lifestyles, and they change economics.  They also influence how 
both scientists and the lay public understand the nature and consequences of 
 37 
 
infection, how they imagine the threat, and why they react so fearfully to some 
disease outbreaks and not others at least as dangerous and pressing. 
Since the epidemic narrative reflects and influences the overall perception of an illness, it is 
important to identify and analyze the epidemic narrative found in various sources such as 
scholarly and media discussions of the epidemic (Herring, 2008; Wald, 2008). 
Researchers should examine the explicit and implicit meanings attached to specific diseases 
and the social conditions that influence which meanings are selected and favored (McGee, 1996; 
Wald, 2008).  For example, Johnston (2005) used discourse analysis to examine the overarching 
narrative structure of the SARS media coverage in magazines and to situate SARS within the 
broader social context in which it occurred.  The SARS narrative in the media followed a similar 
pattern as other epidemic narratives, however, the narrative was also shaped by and linked to 
other narratives, in other words, new stories linked to old stories.  Johnston found that the SARS 
narrative was linked to narratives of emerging infectious disease, modernity, control, and 
collective anxieties of modern living.  Johnston (2005) noted that while these were identifiable 
elements and presented each separately; they also overlapped with and were interdependent with 
one another throughout the overall narrative.  The use of strict categories in the analysis and 
presentation posed the risk of simplifying the issues, which the researcher fully recognized 
(Johnston, 2005).  This is common criticism of content analysis, which imposes categories of 
messages onto the media content.  The quantitative approach is ill-suited to assess wide range of 
social, political, and economic influences on media representations of health (Kline, 2003).  A 
similar critique was made by Frank (1998) regarding common illness narrative structures.  While 
he identified three types of illness narratives, he pointed out that they are not mutually exclusive 
from each other; they can intertwine and shift over time.  A narrative approach to media needs to 
take into account the complexity and interconnection of the news stories. 
The primarily focus of this thesis is the epidemic narrative of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic as it 
is reflected in the news print media.  For the purpose of this work, the epidemic narrative 
provides the overall conceptual framework and a structure for linking the individual news stories 
together.  The epidemic narrative provides a guide to the themes that commonly occur during an 
epidemic, however, it also recognizes that there are specific themes that are unique to the disease 
and to the broader social context.  The next two frameworks address specific aspects of the 
narrative, specifically how the new story is linked to old stories and the multiple perspectives and 
interpretations that occur in the narrative. 
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3.4.2 Anchoring and social representation theory 
Part of the social response to an epidemic involves the process of defining and representing 
the event.  One theory, which is concerned with the process in which representations of new 
ideas or events develop and change over time, is social representation theory (SRT).  The theory 
was developed by French social psychologist Serge Moscovici (1961; 1984).  Since Moscovici’s 
(1961) seminal work is in French, the description of SRT in this thesis is based on the work of 
psychologist Helene Joffe (2002).  SRT focuses on the group-based symbolic understandings 
(i.e. social representations) and communication regarding health issues (Joffe, 2002).  A social 
representation is shaped by the knowledge shared by members of a community about a given 
object or event.  When a new representation is formed, individuals build upon their known 
mental representations, which are based on previous experiences.  The representation is based on 
known images, terms, descriptions, examples, models and metaphors (Washer, 2004).   
SRT proposes that two processes are used in the development of social representations: 
anchoring and objectification (Joffe, 2002).  Anchoring is a process in which the new 
phenomenon is linked to known familiar historical events, metaphors, or symbols in order to 
make an unfamiliar event understandable.  Objectification works alongside with anchoring.  The 
links to past ideas set up by anchoring are transformed into the mental representation of the new 
phenomenon.  The new phenomenon takes on the characteristics and opinions of the past ideas to 
which it appears similar (Joffe, 2002).  For example, Joffe (2002) suggests that the link between 
AIDS and “the other” is best understood in terms of anchoring.  The AIDS epidemic was 
presented in terms of past epidemics where “the majority had been linked to foreigners, out-
groups, and perverse practices,” in other words, “the other” (Joffe, 2002, p. 564).  While these 
processes are useful for making an unfamiliar event understandable and seem less threatening, it 
can also remove what is specific and different about the new event (Joffe, 2002).  What is 
emphasized or omitted about the previous events, metaphors, or symbols to which the new object 
or event is anchored may distort the perception of the new phenomenon.  An anchor can also 
attribute blame and promote stereotypes.   
Social representation theory is also relevant for media representation studies.  The theory was 
originally developed by French psychologist Moscovici (1961; 1984) to understand what 
happened when a scientific theory, psychoanalysis, became “common knowledge.”  Moscovici 
recognized that the media often act as intermediary between the research scientist and 
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individuals interested in science and assessed the social representation of psychoanalysis among 
the French general population and with the media in the mid- to late- 1950s.  In regards to health 
issues, the first contact with a health concern may come through media and shape public 
perception.  For example, the media played a key role in raising awareness of AIDS among the 
general public (Joffe, 2002).  In regards to a public health emergency, such as the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, public health officials used the media to convey messages to the public.  The media 
served as the intermediary between public health officials and the general public. 
SRT also recognizes that since social representations are in the media as well as in people’s 
minds, it is important to analyze the representations presented in media and among the public 
(Farr, 1993; Joffe, 2002).  The public audience may accept the ideas presented in the media; but 
the ideas may also be negotiated or challenged (Joffe, 2002).  Given this potential for public 
challenge, it is important not to assume that the social representations presented in the media are 
the same among the public.  Consistent with the theoretical orientation of this study, the same 
story may be interpreted differently depending on the audience. 
Social representation theory has been used in a few media representations studies of health 
and disease (Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002; Washer, 2004; 2006; Washer & Joffe, 2006).  Joffe and 
Haarhoff (2002) examined how articles from British tabloids and broadsheets represented the 
1995/1996 outbreaks Ebola in parts of Africa (Zaire, Gabon, and South Africa) and how the 
readers made sense of an illness that had no local presence but had been brought to their 
attention by the newspapers.  Their content analysis looked for themes that emerged from an in-
depth reading of the articles and the images that accompanied them.  The main themes found in 
the print media were compared and contrasted to themes found in an analysis of 50 semi-
structured, in-depth interviews with tabloid and broadsheet readers from London and Cambridge 
about their knowledge of Ebola.  Both the newspapers’ and public’s representations viewed 
Ebola as an African problem, associated with African practices, and posing little threat to 
Britain. The media, however, emphasized its potential threat due to globalization while most 
readers felt detached from it (Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002).   
Washer’s (2004; 2006; Washer & Joffe, 2006) studies focused on media representations of 
SARS, mad cow and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureas (MRSA) in British newspapers.  
These studies did not examine whether the newspaper’s representations were similar to those 
found among the public, which is a key component of the social representation theory (Joffe, 
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2002; Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002).  Using content analysis of the newspaper’s texts, these studies 
examine the representations of each disease.  In Washer’s (2004) SARS study, he examined how 
the disease was defined as a threat to the British public.  Since SARS was unlikely to affect the 
British public, messages about “us” (i.e. the British) and “them” (i.e. the Chinese) were prevalent 
in the British coverage.  He also examined how messages from other diseases such as AIDS and 
Ebola resonated in the SARS discourse.  Washer’s (2006) examination of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow”) and variant Creutzfeld Jacob Disease (vCJD) in the British 
media focused on three “snapshots” of the coverage over a 10-year period, 1986 to 1996.  In the 
analysis, he examined how the disease was defined, who or what was at risk, who was to blame, 
and its spread.  Washer and Joffe’s (2006) study of MRSA examined how the disease was 
defined and who or what was to blame for it.  The findings of these studies are common elements 
of an epidemic narrative (Rosenberg, 1989).    
There have been a few attempts to connect social representation theory to narrative 
approaches (Flick, 1995; Laszlo, 1997; Murray, 2002).  The main criticism of studies that use 
social representation theory is the use of categorical coding schemes.  SRT considers the 
categorical anchoring of a representation rather than their storied nature.  The analysis, 
frequently content analysis, organizes anchors with categories without considering their place in 
the narrative (Murray, 2002).  Murray (2002) suggests that instead of identifying strict categories 
of anchors, categorical codes should be examined in terms of how they are used within the 
narrative.  This is a similar observation made by Frank (1998) regarding types of illness 
narratives.  Strict categories can simplify the issues and hide the complexity and interaction 
between different types of anchors within a narrative.   
For the remainder of this thesis, the terms anchor or anchoring will be used to refer to the 
conceptual framework that has been described.  This is to avoid confusion between the terms 
social representation as presented in the theoretical perspective and social representation theory 
as described in this section. 
3.4.3 Framing 
Media stories present an issue using one perspective or another, which “are called frames and 
refer to the parameters regarding what will be included and excluded in particular stories” 
(Clarke & Everest, 2006, p. 2592).  In other words, media stories define issues from a specific 
point of view.  The point of view, or perspective, influences how the issue is discussed as well as 
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how it is not discussed.  The concept of framing is derived from work in psychology and 
sociology (Davis, 1992).  This approach is grounded in the theoretical work of sociologist Erving 
Goffman (1974).  According to Goffman (1974), individuals actively classify, organize, and 
interpret their life experiences to make sense of them through the use of frames or “schemata of 
interpretation.”  The frame allows individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” events and 
occurrences and as a result provides meaning to experiences and guides action (Goffman, 1974, 
p. 21).  People essentially ask ‘what is going on?’ and their organization of information that 
answers this question is framing (Blakely, 2001).  While Goffman provides the theoretical 
underpinning of framing, it has since developed into a number of approaches used in 
management and organizational studies, social movements studies and media studies.  The 
inconsistency of approaches occurs with the definition and measurement of frames (Konig, n.d.).  
As Altheide (1996, p. 29) points out frames are “much easier to ‘talk about’ than to specify for 
research purposes.”  How a frame is defined and identified is dependent upon the perspective and 
purpose of the research project.  For example, one perspective may define a media frame as the 
format of a media story (e.g. the structure of the story, the location, the size, etc.).  Other 
perspectives might define a frame as the focus or the themes of the media story (Altheide, 1996).  
For this work, I define a frame as the perspective or main theme of the story. 
The relationship between the concept of frames and news media was further developed by 
Gaye Tuchman (1978).  Tuchman (1978) used social construction to explain how news stories 
are representative of societal knowledge.  In news media, frames are the "persistent selection, 
emphasis, and exclusion about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7).  
Frames "enable journalists to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely, to 
recognize it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it to efficiently 
relay to their audience" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7).  The frame is the perspective and interpretation of 
the storyteller.  
According to Debra Blakely (2001), a frame is the central organizing idea or story line of a 
news story that provides social meaning.  Pan and Kosicki (1993) equate the term frame to the 
theme(s) of a news story.  The theme is not the same as the topic of story (e.g. influenza).  
Instead, the theme is: 
...an idea that connects different semantic elements of a story (descriptions of an 
action or actor, quotes of sources, background information) into a coherent 
whole...The structured array of signifying elements sets up parameter of a 
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cognitive 'window' though which a news story is 'seen'.  The intended meaning of 
a news story has the capability of directing attention as well as restricting the 
perspective available to audiences.  Because of this structuring function, a theme 
is also called a frame (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 59). 
The way a phenomenon is structured, organized, presented, and interpreted by the media has 
a potential impact on the way in which the public thinks about a particular phenomenon 
(Blakely, 2001; Clarke & Everest, 2006).  News frames in terms of health information determine 
how people view an illness (Beaudoin, 2007).  The frame that is used defines the issue, explains 
who or what is responsible, and suggests potential solutions.  For example, two possible frames 
for discussing illegal drug use, for example, are as a “public health issue” or as a “criminal 
justice issue” (Altheide, 1996, p. 30).  The frame that is used influences how the issue is 
discussed and, just as significantly, how it is not discussed.  Within a criminal justice frame, drug 
use would be discussed in terms of legality and punishment.  A public health frame, on the other 
hand, would include discussions of treatment, intervention, and health education.  Any overlap in 
the different themes, such as public health themes within a criminal justice frame, would seem 
out of place (Altheide, 1996, p. 30-31).  These two frames provide different perspectives and 
meanings to the experience of illegal drug use.  Each frame defines the issue differently and 
creates a different representation.   
Frame analysis, as a methodology, is a collection of related, although not consistent, tools for 
identifying the frames of a story and the subsequent analysis (Konig, n.d.; Scheufele, 1999).  A 
common method is to look for the key themes within media texts and examine how language and 
the structure of news stories emphasize certain aspects and omit others.  To identify frames, most 
studies adapt techniques such as discourse analysis, sociolinguistics analysis, and content 
analysis to suit the needs of the study (Billing, Deacon, Golding, Konig, & Macmillan, 2005; 
Konig, n.d.).  
Both Blakely (2001; 2003) and Hume (2000) used a frame approach to examine media 
portrayals of the influenza pandemics of the 20th century.  Blakely (2001; 2003) examined the 
social construction of the 1918 Spanish flu, the 1957 Asian flu, and the 1968 Hong Kong flu 
pandemics in the New York Times while Hume (2000) focused on how the 1918 influenza and 
the anxieties surrounding the outbreak were portrayed in magazines.  Blakely (2001; 2003) 
focused on whether the social construction of each flu event changed over time in relation to the 
public health policies.  The study included all influenza-related news stories, wire stories, 
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correspondent stories, letters to the editor and editorials from 1917-1920, 1957-1960, and 1967-
1970.  For the analysis, she identified three main frames for each pandemic. The first was the 
narrative discourse of the disease, which included how the pandemic was defined, if and how it 
impacted the community, if blaming or war metaphors were present, and beliefs about causes 
and responsibility for the disease.  The second was arbiter frames, which were sources of 
information (e.g. scientists, medical practitioners, and government authorities were expected).  
The third was public health policy frames, which were the public health responses to the 
pandemic. The public health responses were identified and categorized as medical, behavioral, 
ecological, or future research and action.  Other than the three main frames and associated 
questions for each frame, Blakely did not provide a detailed description of the specific methods 
used.  Blakely (2001) did provide a detailed case study description of each pandemic and a 
summary of the findings for each identified frame.  She found that there were changes over time 
in the narrative construction of the disease, the arbiters for each pandemic, and the public health 
policy response, however, there was some overlap in the themes for all three pandemics.  The 
overall theme of the 1918 Spanish influenza was described as a panicked environment with 
behavioral measures taken by public health officials in reaction to an out-of-control situation.  
Coverage of the 1957 Asian influenza emphasized a faith in science to control the disease 
through vaccination and antibiotics, which eventually evolved into cautious optimism.  The 
theme of the 1968 Hong Kong influenza consisted of one that used nature to explain the inability 
of scientists to control the disease; instead scientists and medicine would only hold it at bay.  In 
all three pandemics, naming was an issue and war metaphors were common but were more so in 
the 1918 pandemic, which occurred during WWI.  The arbiters for each pandemic changed as 
public health policies and health mechanisms changed over time.  Individual officials were the 
majority of the arbiters during the 1918 pandemic while in the following pandemics, institutions 
such as the CDC and WHO were the main sources of information.  Overall, Blakely’s study 
provided a basis for understanding how the news media have portrayed past influenza pandemics 
and provided a useful comparison for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  It also provided a useful model 
on how to approach the news coverage of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. 
Hume (2000) also used frame analysis to examine how magazines portrayed anxieties about 
the 1918 influenza during and after the pandemic.  Magazines were chosen instead of 
newspapers because of their prominence and popularity during the time period and they were the 
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only medium to reach national audiences during the years examined.  She presents a case study 
description of pandemic similar to that presented by Blakely (2001; 2003) and like Blakely did 
not provide extensive details on the methodology.   
Stephenson and Jamieson (2009) examined the representation of the threat of an influenza 
pandemic and the public health response to it in contemporary Australian newspapers.  While 
they do not explicitly state that they use frame analysis approach, the content analysis method 
they used is commonly used in frame analysis studies.  They also used a similar theoretical 
perspective, namely that representations are socially constructed with media as one mechanism 
that helps to shape and reflect these representations.  The main purpose of the Stephenson and 
Jamieson study was to understand how public understanding of an influenza pandemic was 
shaped during a time in which the possibility of one was anticipated.  The authors also situated 
their analysis in relation to changes in biomedical, public health and public understandings of 
emerging infectious disease threats.  The two main objectives of the study were to identify the 
characteristics of an anticipated pandemic and of the public health response as portrayed in the 
newspaper coverage. They were also interested in understanding how the characteristics were 
similar or different from existing or more familiar public health threats such as other infectious 
diseases.  They examined a sample of Australia newspaper articles published between January 
2004 to February 2007 that discussed pandemic influenza and more specifically, avian influenza 
H5N1, the virus commonly discussed as one that could trigger a pandemic.  Their analysis 
focused on the themes that were explicitly mentioned in each article.  They further identified 
'taken-for-granted' or institutionalized ways of thinking that might influence what can be said and 
done about a particular health issue.  For example, a common representation of HIV was as a 
“gay disease” which served to legitimize discrimination and create “the other” (Stephenson & 
Jamieson, 2009, p. 529). An advantage of this study is that they focused on themes derived from 
the data and situated them within the scientific and public health discussions of emerging 
infectious diseases as well as in the broader social and political conditions.   
Two other studies focused on the metaphorical framing of SARS (Wallis & Nerlich 2005) 
and the anticipated influenza pandemic (Nerlich & Halliday 2007) in the British media. 
Metaphors are one device used to signify the use of frames in the media.  Others devices include 
exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images (Gamson & Modigliami, 1989; Pan & 
Kosicki, 1993).  These devices are used to imply specific meanings to the given topic.  
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According to social representation theory, these are types of anchors that provide meaning.  
Wallis and Nerlich’s (2005) and Nerlich and Halliday’s (2007) studies also provide a detailed 
description of their methods and provide a useful guide for examining the comparisons and 
metaphors that are used to define the pandemic through the use of anchoring, as described in the 
previous section.   
The Wallis and Nerlich (2005) study examined five UK daily newspapers from March 2003 
to July 2003, which included tabloid newspapers and broadsheets to give a cross section of 
political allegiances, editorial approaches, and readership profile.  Even brief mentions in 
business, sports, and comic journalism were extracted and analyzed.  The comprehensive 
approach, according to Wallis and Nerlich (2005, p. 2631), “provided better coverage of the 
readers' total exposures to the information and frames which structured representations of SARS 
in the media.”  They adapted a qualitative method standard in linguistic metaphor studies to deal 
with the amount of the material.  This involved two complete readings of the material.  The first 
was used to mark up metaphors and common phrases and to outline a map of linguistic patterns 
and frequencies.  The second read through involved a structured reading of the articles with 
pieces from all newspapers read in sequence to establish chronological patterns and linguistic 
developments through the development of the outbreak.  This method allowed the researchers to 
look at extended stretches of media discourse and not only at isolated sentences.  Wallis and 
Nerlich (2005) found that there was an avoidance of war and plague metaphors, which tend to 
dominate “control of disease” discourse. Instead there was a reliance on killer and control 
metaphors for SARS.  The results of the study identify common ways that an infectious disease 
has been defined in the media.  The Nerlich and Halliday (2007) study examined the sources for 
common phrases, metaphors, or references to pertinent historical events that were used by 
experts and the media to create images of a future pandemic in order to mobilize action in the 
present.  They also examined how the metaphors were used (i.e. to inform, to warn, to blame, 
etc) and by whom they were used.  The methods used were the same as those in the Wallis and 
Nerlich (2005) on SARS.  Both of these studies provide examples of how to analyze 
metaphorical framing used in the media coverage of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and examples of 
the types of metaphors that are commonly used in a disease outbreak.  Metaphors are also a type 
of anchor.   
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Two other media framing studies by Beaudoin (2007) and Leslie (2006) focused on SARS.  
These studies provide examples of media frames that have been used for disease reporting, how 
they change over time, and the possible consequences for such framing and changes.  Leslie 
(2006) found that when news stories about SARS framed the disease as a public health issue, 
health officials provided information and possible solutions.  SARS gradually shifted to a 
political economy framing in which politicians and business leaders provided assessments and 
possible solutions.  Leslie found that when frames shift, the disease narrative changes in terms of 
who is responsible for it and who can provide solutions.  Essentially, the media frames influence 
who should be consulted for facts and what sort of facts and solutions these sources should offer.  
Beaudoin (2007) also examined changes in media frames used for SARS in China and the United 
States.  He examines whether the news environment and the SARS timelines predicted which 
news frame would be used.  The frames identified and used in the study include attribution of 
responsibility, which included blaming; human interest, such as stories that put a human face or 
an emotional angle to humanize or dramatize a story; the economic consequences; and the 
severity of the disease.  Beaudoin (2007) noted the presence or absence of each frame and used 
several statistical analysis techniques to test for differences between news agencies, between 
months and for changes over time.   
Two other relevant studies that examined the way the media frames disease are Davis’ (1992) 
work on the media framing of chronic disease risks and Clarke and Everest’s (2006) study on the 
framing of cancer in magazine stories.  Although the focus of these two studies is on non-
infectious diseases, they both provide examples of the types of media frames used for disease 
reporting and provide methodological models.   
Davis’ (1992) central argument is that the way the media define or frame chronic disease 
risks influences the decisions that policymakers make regarding appropriate policies.  The 
decision made by policymakers depends on the message conveyed by four types of media frames 
common in disease reporting: the importance of the problem, the evidence, the impact, and the 
cause.  Each frame reflects the journalists' interpretation of the epidemiological information and 
is constructed according to a set of framing devices common in routine journalistic practices.  
Davis (1992, pp. 58-76) defined these as the story placement, visuals, the length, and a definition 
as “unique”.  For the strength of the evidence, devices include emphasis on research, 
oversimplification, and reliance on sources.  Devices for the impact include symbols or 
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metaphors, personalization, and numbers.  Cause focuses on blaming and responsibility through 
the use of metaphors and personalization.  Davis (1992) applied his framework to the media 
coverage of two chronic diseases.  The first case study was on the link between maternal alcohol 
consumption and fetal defects and the second case study was on the risks for heart disease.  The 
studies highlighted common ways in which epidemiological information is presented based on 
common journalistic practices.  The interpretation and presentation of the information can 
influence the response to the disease.  
Clarke and Everest (2006) used a different approach to examining the media framing of 
cancer.  They began with three identified frames: medical frame, political-economy frame, and 
lifestyle frame.  Each of these frames views health and illness in a different way and influences 
how an illness is discussed in terms of cause, responsibility, and solutions.  A medical frame 
discusses cancer in terms of “biologically based pathologies originating in the malfunction of the 
genes, cells, and organs in the individual body” (Clarke & Everest, 2006, p. 2592).  Treatment, 
rather than prevention, is emphasized.  The political-economy frame considers diseases as 
“originating in causes that lie outside of the individual such as social structural inequities and 
related threats to health such as poverty, unemployment, homelessness, and environmental 
contaminants” (Clarke & Everest, 2006, p. 2592).  In the lifestyle frame, “disease is thought to 
be the consequence of individual choice to engage in unhealthy behaviors such as diet, smoking, 
alcohol consumption and sexual promiscuity (Clarke & Everest, 2006, p. 2592).  The authors 
analyzed each magazine story for the manifest content or framing and the latent content.  
Manifest content was defined as the explicit, the intended and surface content.  Latent content is 
the implicit and “perhaps unintended themes” (Clarke & Everest, 2006, p. 2593).  For the 
manifest content, the articles were categorized by the type of cancer discussed and by the three 
previously identified frames: medical, political economy, and lifestyle.  For the latent analysis, 
the researchers read and re-read all the articles to discover new themes that emerged from the 
data.  The new themes were then used to analyze the articles in another systematic reading.  The 
frequency of each theme and illustrative descriptions from each article for the categories were 
included in the analysis.  The approach used by Clarke and Everest is an example of what 
Altheide (1996) refers to as ethnographic or qualitative content analysis.  In this approach, an 
initial coding scheme is developed prior to analysis while new themes that emerge from the data 
are incorporated into the coding scheme as the analysis progresses.  Unlike a quantitative content 
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analysis, both quantitative and qualitative data are collected for each category and the discourse 
or meaning within each category is closely examined. 
At least one known media representation study on an infectious disease has combined both 
social representation theory (SRT) and the concept of framing.  In the previously mentioned 
framing studies, past events, symbols and metaphors are considered in the analysis, however, the 
researchers do not make the explicit link to social representation theory and the concept of 
anchoring.  According to SRT, past events, symbols and metaphors are common anchors used to 
provide meaning to a new phenomenon.  In media framing, they are considered rhetoric devices 
that indicate a frame but media framing does not explicitly state how these devices provide 
meaning.  Boyd, Jardine and Driedger (2009) examine how the print news media frames BSE 
(“mad cow disease”) and vCJD risks in Canada.  In the study, SRT was used to understand how 
the media explains the risks of mad cow disease by anchoring the disease to past events, 
symbols, and metaphors.  According to Boyd and colleagues (2009), it is important to consider 
the comparisons or anchors that are used when talking about a disease to ensure that evidence-
based consequences are emphasized rather than speculative or unrealized consequences.  
Framing is also important to consider since how the media frames an illness draws attention to 
some aspects of the disease and away from other aspects.  As previously mentioned studies have 
shown, how the disease is framed influences who is consulted for information as well as how 
causes, responsibility, and solutions for the disease are presented and discussed.  For the 
analysis, the authors began with initial a priori categories that were developed through an 
extensive review of previous studies examining media representations of BSE (Boyd, et al., 
2009).  The articles were classified by the following categories: health, government, blame, 
mistrust, definition, descriptions, control actions, economy, and others.  Subcategories were 
added when needed.  They found that BSE was more commonly framed as an economic concern 
rather than a health concern, which would not discourage beef consumption.  They also found 
that the effects of specific use of anchors to help frame the issue help to establish its dominant 
characteristics.  According to the authors, the comparisons used actually diminished the 
perceived health risk of BSE by emphasizing the economic concerns rather than the human 
health concerns.  Even though BSE is a different type of health risk than influenza, there is 
significant overlap in the frames identified in other studies of media representation of a disease.  
This, along with other studies, assisted in the development of the protocol that was used in this 
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study for the analysis of the 2009 influenza pandemic media coverage.  The Boyd, et al. (2009) 
study also demonstrates that media framing and social representation theory can successfully be 
used together to better understand how the media represents and characterizes health risks.  
3.5 Summary 
To summarize, the overall theoretical perspective of this thesis assumes that representations 
of health and illness are socially constructed and are based on the broader socio-cultural context.  
Social representations are evident in various forms of communication, including the media.  The 
media are recognized as an important source that shapes and reflects the knowledge of and 
experiences of health and illness through the words and images that are used (Lupton, 1999; 
Seale, 2003).  These have implications for a range of issues, including risk perception, health 
behaviors, individuals’ attitudes towards people with an illness, the public’s concept of who is 
responsible for health and their trust in public health interventions (Lyons, 2000; Nerlich & 
Halliday, 2007; Seale, 2003; Ungar, 1998; Wallis & Nerlich, 2005).  As a reflection and source 
of social representations, the media content deserves examination as one mechanism from which 
representations develop (Joffe, 2002; Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002).  However, the analysis requires 
an approach that focuses on the underlying meanings and considers social context from which 
the meanings are drawn.  Underlying meanings and social context are the foundation of social 
representations.  
Additionally, the theoretical perspective assumes that social representations are frequently 
structured in a story form or a narrative.  Since “news reporting is concerned with ‘storied’ 
accounts of health threats” (Kline, 2006, p. 51), a narrative approach was determined to be 
appropriate for this study.  To construct the overall 2009 pandemic narrative in the news media, 
three aspects of narratives are highlighted: (1) there are common stories for common 
experiences; (2) new stories are related to old stories; (3) narratives of the same event can vary in 
perspective and interpretation.  To address each of these components of a narrative, three 
conceptual frameworks were chosen and discussed in this chapter.  Each framework was drawn 
from various works and the three are combined for this thesis in order to construct the overall 
narrative of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.   
The first conceptual framework, an epidemic narrative, is the common narrative pattern for 
epidemics.  While the specifics of the epidemic narrative may vary depending on the disease and 
the broader socio-culture context, there are common themes for how an epidemic is discussed 
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(Rosenberg, 1989).  The second framework, anchoring, addresses why new stories are related to 
old stories and how meaning is transferred to the new story or experience.  Anchoring is when a 
new experience is linked to known or familiar historical events, metaphors, or symbols in order 
to make the unfamiliar event understandable (Moscovici, 1961; 1984).  In terms of an epidemic 
narrative, previous epidemics or diseases may be referenced in order to makes sense of the new 
epidemic.  The concept of framing addresses the third aspect of narratives. There can be 
different stories of the same event based on different perspectives.  Based on framing, media 
stories present an issue using one perspective or another and the perspective that is presented 
influences what aspects of the experience are emphasized and omitted. Taken together, the 
conceptual frameworks influenced how and what was examined in the media coverage.  This 
will be discussed in the next chapter.   
Along with each framework, there were examples of media representations studies that 
utilize the respective framework.  These studies served as examples of how studies have applied 
each framework, how disease outbreaks and the response to them have been represented by the 
media in the past, and provided methodological models that were adapted for this study.  The 
relationship between the studies and the methodological model will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the methodology that was used in this study.  The methodology was 
informed by the theoretical orientation and conceptual frameworks discussed in the previous 
chapter.  The first section of this chapter presents the research objectives and questions.  The 
second section focuses on the specific methods that were used to address the research questions.  
An approach referred to as qualitative content analysis was adapted for the study (Altheide, 
1996).  Similar to content analysis, the analysis uses a protocol with expected themes, however, 
categories are flexible and new categories are expected to emerge as the analysis progresses.  
Additionally, the approach focuses on the language and meaning of the text.  The protocol that 
was developed for the analysis is also presented in the second section.  In the third, and final, 
section, data collection and analysis are described.   
4.2 Research Objective and Questions 
The main purpose of the study is to construct the overall 2009 H1N1 pandemic narrative 
from local and national newspapers distributed within Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.  The epidemic 
narrative is reflected by the perspective and discourse of the news coverage of the pandemic.  
The study was guided by three research questions: 
1. What are the main themes that are discussed in the newspapers in relation to the H1N1 
pandemic and how are they discussed (i.e. the discourse)? 
2. How do the themes and discourse change over time and how do these changes relate to 
the timeline of the pandemic? 
3. How do the themes and discourse compare between the local and national newspapers? 
The first question is concerned with what aspects of the pandemic are emphasized in the 
newspaper coverage and how these aspects are discussed.  For this question, articles were 
analyzed for their main theme(s) and the specific language and meanings that were used.  The 
results shed light on the overall narrative of the pandemic.  Since an epidemic narrative can vary 
over time and place (Rosenberg, 1989), the next two questions are concerned with the temporal 
and regional differences in the narrative as reflected by the newspaper reports.  The second 
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question is concerned with how the themes and discourse change over time.  For example, 
differences in the themes and discourse during the pre-pandemic period, during the pandemic, 
and during the post-pandemic period as well as changes in the focus in relation to events that 
occurred during the pandemic were anticipated.  The final question is concerned with similarities 
and differences in the main themes and discourse between the local and national newspapers.  
This sheds light on whether there were key differences between the Saskatoon context and the 
broader Canadian context. 
4.3 Methodological Approach 
4.3.1 Qualitative content analysis 
Common methodologies of media representation studies are content analysis, sociolinguistic 
analysis, discourse analysis, or some combination of these approaches.  For this study, I adapted 
Altheide’s (1996) approach, referred to as ethnographic or qualitative content analysis.  The 
approach shares similarities to content analysis and discourse analysis, beginning with a protocol 
with expected themes, similar to content analysis. However the protocol is flexible and may be 
revised as the analysis progresses.  Altheide (1996) distinguishes the approach from quantitative 
content analysis, which assumes that the frequency and patterns of messages would inform the 
“audience members” of the media messages.  However, readers are an “active audience” and can 
interpret messages in many different ways, so the impact of the message cannot be understood 
without considering the explicit and implicit meaning along with the broader context in which 
the news reporting occurs, which is similar to discourse analysis (Altheide, 1996).  In other 
words, the readers of a news story may interpret the story in different ways depending on their 
various perspectives and experiences.  
The primary focus of the approach is on the emphasis and meaning of the documents, rather 
than the frequency of specific themes.  According to Altheide (1996), the overlapping concepts 
of media frames, themes and discourse capture the emphasis and meaning of the documents. A 
media frame is a very broad thematic emphasis or definition of a report.  The frame defines the 
primary focus, parameter, or boundary for discussing a particular event.  Themes are the 
recurring concepts or meanings that occur throughout multiple reports.  Certain themes become 
appropriate if a particular frame is adopted.  The concept of discourse refers to the words and 
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meanings that one uses to talk about an issue.  The frame or emphasis, and discourse work 
together to provide meaning within the document.   
When analyzing an article using a qualitative content approach, the primary perspective (or 
frame), the recurring concepts (or themes), and discourse are all noted.  Unlike quantitative 
content analysis, both numerical and narrative data for each category are collected and analyzed.  
The approach is also useful for discovering emergent pattern, emphases, and themes by using 
systematic, but not rigid, categories and variables.  The categories are used to initially guide the 
analysis, but other categories are expected and allowed to emerge throughout the analysis 
process.  According to Altheide (1996), the disadvantage of looking at the news content as static, 
concrete categories, rather than allowing for changes and new categories to emerge is that 
important and unexpected thematic patterns may be lost.  The analysis requires a reflexive 
process and constant comparisons and contrasts to relevant situations, settings, styles, images, 
meanings and nuances.  The approach also views individual news stories as part of a continuing 
storyline, which fits well with the idea that the epidemic narrative will emerge from the total 
news coverage of the pandemic. 
4.4 Protocol 
Following the approach described by Altheide (1996), an initial protocol was developed to 
guide the analysis.  The protocol is divided into three main sections: (1) reference information, 
(2) focus and summary of the article, and (3) themes & discourse.  Each section is described in 
the following sub-sections. 
4.4.1 Protocol: reference information 
Basic reference information (see Table 4-1) was collected for each article, which included the 
electronic file name, author (if available), date, title of article, newspaper, page, section, 
document type (i.e. news, column or opinion, letter) word count, and whether an image was 
included with the article.   
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Reference Information 
File name name of the pdf file 
Author if available 
Date  
Title of Article  
Newspaper  
Page  
Section  
Document Type i.e. news, brief, business, sports, column, 
opinion, editorial, letter, series, etc 
Length word count 
Image yes or no 
Table 4-1: Protocol – Reference Information 
 
4.4.2 Protocol: focus and summary article  
The second section is concerned with the main topic and focus of the article (see Table 4-2.  
Since all of the articles that mentioned H1N1 or swine flu were included in the study, it was 
important to note whether or not H1N1 was the main topic of the article.  Examples of articles in 
which H1N1 was not the main topic but was still mentioned were sports or businesses articles 
that referenced the disease.  These articles were still analyzed for the way the flu was referenced 
and discussed since they are part of the epidemic narrative.  The primary focus of the articles was 
noted and used to group articles into broad categories.  In addition, the regional focus of the 
article (i.e. local Saskatoon, specific provinces or territories, national or international) was noted.  
To assist with developing a broad overview of the coverage and a timeline of events, a brief 
summary of the article and specific events that were mentioned in the articles were recorded. 
Focus and Summary 
H1N1 Main topic yes or no 
Primary focus  
Brief summary 2-3 sentence summary 
Regional focus Saskatoon, Province or territory, 
National, International 
Specific events and dates Used to develop a timeline of events 
Table 4-2: Protocol – Focus and Summary of Article 
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4.4.3 Protocol: themes and discourse 
The third section of the protocol focuses specifically on the content and language of the 
articles and looks for common themes and discourse.  The third section of the protocol was 
initially divided into five broad categories: defining the outbreak, beliefs about causes and 
responsibility, impact of the outbreak, public health policy and response, and sources of 
information.  See Table 4-3 for a description of each category and sub-categories. 
Themes & Discourse 
1) Defining the outbreak   
Disease name  swine flu, H1N1, others 
Use of anchors define anchor and how it is used 
2) Beliefs about causes and responsibility 
Who/what is responsible 
may range from directly causing it, responsibility for 
spreading it, or providing protection from it 
Blame, criticism, mistrust 
who or what is blamed is closely linked to ideas about 
responsibility and cause 
3) Impact of Outbreak   
Human impact 
severity (# sick/death; symptoms), risk factors, 
personalization (human face) 
Social impact 
changes or disruption in behavior, human interactions, 
and social events 
Emotional impact reported fears or anxiety 
Economic impact 
economic consequences on individuals, businesses, 
governments, etc. 
Political impact political consequences, changes, or influence 
4) Public Health Policy and Response 
Medical approach 
stockpiling and use of medical supplies, drugs, 
vaccination 
Behavioural approach 
changes in personal behaviour through persuasion, 
inducement, coercion 
Ecological approach changes in disease-promoting environment 
Further research or action research, preparedness and planning, lessons learned 
5) Sources of information who or what is cited within the article 
Table 4-3: Protocol – Themes and Discourse 
 
The third section of the protocol was developed based on the three conceptual frameworks 
(epidemic narrative, framing, and anchoring) and was also influenced by the findings of the 
media representation studies discussed in the previous chapter.  The conceptual frameworks and 
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media studies have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, however, they will be briefly 
described in this section as they related to the protocol.  Table 4-4 provides a full illustration of 
the linkages between the protocol, research questions, and the conceptual frameworks and 
associated studies.  As an example, I will highlight how the research questions and protocol links 
to the epidemic narrative, anchoring, and framing based on Blakely’s (2001) study of the 1918, 
1957, and 1968 flu pandemics. 
The first research question, “what are the main themes and how are they discussed?”, 
corresponds with the five broad categories of the protocol.  These categories also correspond 
with the common elements of an epidemic narrative (refer to Table 4-4).  The specifics of an 
epidemic narrative depend upon the impact of the outbreak which corresponds with the impact 
category of the protocol.  The specificity also depends upon the time and place, which 
correspond with the second and third research questions, respectively.  The conceptual 
framework of anchoring corresponds with anchor sub-category of defining the outbreak 
category. 
The most influential media framing study in the development of the protocol was Blakely’s 
(2001) examination of the social construction of the 1918, the 1957, and the 1968 flu pandemics 
in a single newspaper.  For the study, Blakely focused on three aspects: the narrative discourse, 
the sources of information and the public health policy and response.  The protocol includes all 
three of these aspects, however, the category of the narrative discourse has been expanded based 
on the epidemic narrative.  In my protocol, Blakely’s public health policy frame would be 
considered part of the narrative.  The identified frames and themes in the other previously 
discussed studies (see previous chapter) also correspond with the categories in the protocol (refer 
Table 4-4). 
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Table 4-4: Development of Protocol 
 
For the purpose of this work, the overall news coverage represents the overall epidemic 
narrative in which individual news articles are part of this broader narrative.  The assumption is 
that individual news articles would focus on specific aspects of the epidemic narrative rather than 
the overall narrative.  The concept of framing provided a useful way to understand how news 
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articles report on an issue.  Media framing is concerned with the emphasis and meaning of a 
news story.  An individual frame used by a news story can be considered one piece of the overall 
epidemic narrative.  For example, an article might focus on a way that the outbreak is affecting 
the community such as the social, economic, or political impact.  As another example, an article 
might discuss the role and responsibilities of the government, health organizations, or individuals 
in preventing and controlling the outbreak.  When the articles are viewed collectively, the main 
themes or frames would help to form the overall narrative.  Also, by examining the news 
coverage chronologically or regionally, differences in the narrative over time or regional 
differences may be evident.   
Part of the epidemic narrative is to define and develop a representation for the outbreak.  
Within media framing, the use of metaphors, symbols, and comparisons when defining and 
discussing an issue is well recognized, however, little is said about the specific role they play in 
developing a representation (Gamson & Modigliami, 1989; Pan & Kosicki, 1993).  Social 
representation theory and the process of anchoring address this issue.  Representations develop 
through the process of anchoring, in which the new phenomenon is linked or anchored to known 
historical events, metaphors, and symbols in order to make it understandable in familiar term.  
Based on this framework, it is important to note comparisons to other events, metaphors, 
symbols that are used by the media but also to examine how they are used in the narrative.  
Depending on the perspective of given article, a specific anchor may be used to provide a 
specific meaning.   
4.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
4.5.1 Description of newspaper sources 
Newspapers were chosen as the data source since they are widely available in the community 
and they have a local focus (i.e. the local newspapers), but also include national and international 
stories.  There are a wide range of media sources from which people obtain information, 
however, a specific media source was required for the study which was easy to collect and would 
yield a manageable set of data.  In addition, compared to other media sources, newspapers may 
provide a “better measure of media coverage of an acute risk event” compared to chronic health 
risks (Driedger, 2007, p. 784).  Print media, compared to televised media, can provide more 
detailed analysis and commentary on an event and may contain multiple stories on any given day 
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that highlight different aspects of the event.  The primary constraint with print media is space 
rather than time (Driedger, 2007). 
The data sources include four local Saskatoon newspapers, the StarPhoenix, Saskatoon Sun, 
Planet S, and The Sheaf, and two national newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the National 
Post.  The StarPhoenix is Saskatoon’s primary local newspaper, which is published daily 
(Monday – Saturday) and they also publish the weekly Saskatoon Sun, both available for home 
delivery.  The StarPhoenix is also available online (http://www.thestarphoenix.com/).  The 
Planet S is a free bi-weekly tabloid that focuses on news, arts, and entertainment in Saskatoon.  
The news section of Planet S focuses on relevant issues rather than the day-to-day news.  The 
Sheaf is a free weekly (during the academic year) student newspaper at the University of 
Saskatchewan.  The paper focuses on relevant issues to the university student population.  Both 
the Planet S and The Sheaf are available in print and online (http://www.planetsmag.com/ and 
http://www.thesheaf.com/).  The majority of the Saskatoon newspaper coverage is from the 
StarPhoenix.  Given the limited number of articles in the Saskatoon Sun, the Planet S, and The 
Sheaf, their presence in the results section is minimal.   Nevertheless, the other three papers were 
read during the analysis to capture the range of newspapers that were be read by Saskatoon 
residents.   
The two national newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the National Post, are the second and 
third most widely circulated English-language newspapers in Canada.  The Toronto Star has the 
highest circulation but the print edition is distributed almost entirely within Ontario so it was not 
relevant for a Saskatoon-based focus.  The Globe and Mail and the National Post, both based in 
Toronto, were chosen to provide an overview of the national-wide news coverage, irrespective of 
any political perspective of the news organization.  The Globe and Mail is available for home 
delivery and online (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/).  The print edition of the National Post 
is not available for home delivery in Saskatchewan but the print edition is available in stores and 
also online (http://www.nationalpost.com/).   
The National Post and StarPhoenix are part of the same news organization, initially CanWest 
and sold to Post Media Network in October 2009.  As part of the same news chain, articles may 
be republished from one to the other as well as from other localized newspapers across Canada 
published under the same umbrella network.  The result is identical articles appearing in both the 
National Post and StarPhoenix.  Articles in the StarPhoenix may originate from the local level 
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(i.e. StarPhoenix), the national level (i.e. National Post), or from other localized newspapers in 
the chain.  For example, articles focused on the provincial level may be sourced from the Regina 
Leader-Post.  While the StarPhoenix is considered the local newspaper as opposed to the 
national newspapers for this study, articles in the newspaper are not geographically limited to 
Saskatoon. 
4.5.2 Selection criteria 
Articles were identified and collected using a key word search for “swine flu OR H1N1 OR 
pandemic” after April 24, 2009, the date of the first outbreak notice issued by the WHO, until the 
end of August 2010.  The end of August was chosen to include the official end of the pandemic, 
(August 10), and to capture content-relevant articles published in weeks that followed.  An 
additional search was done for potential articles published during the week prior to April 24, 
with the key word search of “Mexico AND (flu-like OR influenza-like)” to identify articles that 
mentioned the Mexican outbreak prior to the WHO’s announcement.  The text of the articles 
from the StarPhoenix, Saskatoon Sun, Globe and Mail and the National Post were collected 
using the key word search though the ProQuest Newsstand database.  Articles from Planet S and 
The Sheaf were collected from their respective websites: http://www.planetsmag.com/ and 
http://thesheaf.com/. 
With the selection criteria, a total of 1692 articles were identified.  H1N1 was the main topic 
in 70% (1196) of the identified articles.  A breakdown of the number of articles by newspaper is 
listed in Table 4-5.  Relevant articles include all news stories, news briefs, editorials, and letters 
to the editors that mention H1N1 or swine flu regardless of whether or not it is the main topic of 
the article. Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 respectively contain a breakdown of the type of newspaper 
article (i.e. news, editorial, letters, etc.) and number of articles by section of the newspaper.  This 
was done to examine the full range of discussions in which the pandemic is mentioned.  For 
example, articles in the business and sports section may mention H1N1 and its impact in those 
respective areas and are therefore part of the epidemic narrative.   
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Newspaper Main Topic Mentioned Total 
StarPhoenix 373 141 514 
Saskatoon Sun 10 3 13 
The Sheaf 14 4 18 
Planet S 2 0 2 
Globe and Mail 474 228 702 
National Post 323 120 443 
Total 1196 496 1692 
Table 4-5: Total Number of Articles by Newspaper, April 23, 2009 
– Aug 31, 2010 
 
 
Newspaper Globe 
& Mail 
National 
Post 
StarPhoenix Saskatoon 
Sun 
Business - 67 66 - 
Caption - 2 8 - 
Column - 29 42 3 
Correction - - 1 - 
Editorial 37 6 12 - 
Letter - 38 26 - 
News 665 197 288 10 
News, brief - 72 33 - 
Obituary - - 1 - 
Opinion - 10 4 - 
Series - 1 2 - 
Sports - 20 29 - 
Statistics - 1 2  
Table 4-6: Type of Article by Newspaper 
(Note: Information on article type was not available for The Sheaf 
and Planet S.) 
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Globe and Mail  National Post  StarPhoenix  
Book Review 2 Arts & Life 19 Arts & Life 9 
B.C. News 18 Business 2 Bright Side 2 
Business 75 Canada 133 Business 35 
Column 14 Cold & Flu 10 Forum 63 
Comment 25 Column 1 International News 3 
Editorial 37 Comment 1 Local 75 
Focus 20 Editorial 18 Local/Regional 1 
Globe Life 82 Financial Post 52 National 101 
Globe Review 23 Issues & Ideas 15 News 103 
Globe Toronto 3 Letter to the Editor 38 Personal Finance 1 
Health 4 National 6 Religion 1 
International News 41 News 80 Special Section 2 
Letter to the Editor 63 Post Homes 2 Sports 29 
National 229 Sports 19 Third Page 44 
National News 11 Toronto News 20 Weekend Extra 15 
News 1 Weekend Extra 5 World 30 
Obituaries 1 World 22   
Report on Business 8   The Sheaf  
Science 1   Classified 1 
Sports 25 Saskatoon Sun  News 10 
Toronto News 12 Health 1 Opinion 6 
Travel 7 News 12 Sports 1 
Table 4-7: Number of Articles by Newspaper Section. 
 
All identified articles from the time period were included for analysis rather than a smaller 
sample.  This is for two related reasons.  First, the analysis is concerned with the media 
representation and possible changes over the course of the pandemic.  Second the rhythm of the 
news coverage often differs from the rhythm of an outbreak.  For example, increases in news 
coverage tend to correspond with key events during the outbreak, such as the recognition of the 
outbreak, identification of the causes, development and availability of a cure, rather than the 
epidemic curve
1
 (Drache, Feldman, & Clifton, 2003).   
During the 2009 pandemic, peaks in the number of articles corresponded with the recognition 
of the outbreak (April 2009) and the vaccination campaign (Nov 2009) in Canada (see Figure 
5-1).  If a smaller sample is selected, periods with less coverage may potentially be missed.  Due 
to the volume of the text, images that accompanied the articles were not included in the analysis.   
                                                 
1
 An epidemic curve is the distribution of cases over time (AFMC, 2011). 
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4.5.3 Analysis 
The analysis of the newspaper articles followed the qualitative content analysis approach 
outlined by Altheide (1996).  The analysis, which focused on the emphasis and meaning implied 
in the data, was guided by the protocol.  To assist with the initial organization and analysis, the 
data were entered into database set up in Microsoft Access.  The database was useful for keeping 
track of the individual articles and their associated data, however, as the analysis progressed, the 
database became cumbersome.  This experience is elaborated below.  Following the protocol, the 
basic reference information for each article was entered along with summary information from 
the second section of the protocol.  The bulk of the results came from the third section of the 
protocol.  The data entered for this section included a code word (elaborated below) to assist 
with organizing the data within each category, along with direct quotes and summary description 
of the text.   
For defining the outbreak, the specific names (swine flu, H1N1, others) that were used in the 
article were noted, along with any anchors that were used to define or described the outbreak.  
Anchors included comparisons to other events, metaphors, or symbols.  For beliefs about causes 
and responsibility, any references to the cause or responsibility were noted.  This ranged from 
things, individuals, or organizations that were seen as responsible for directly causing the 
disease, spreading the disease, or providing protection or prevention.  Since blaming and 
criticism is closely linked to beliefs about causes and responsibility, any blaming, criticism, or 
mistrust were noted in terms of who or what was blamed or criticized and why.  Potential 
impacts of the outbreak included the human impact, social impact, emotional impact, economic 
impact, and political impact (refer to Table 4-3 for a description of each).  For the public health 
response, any control or prevention actions were recorded and broadly categorized as medical, 
behavioral, ecological, or for future research or action.  Finally, the sources of information article 
drew upon, such as types of individuals or organizations that are quoted, were noted.   
Once all of the articles had been read and entered, the data from the third section of the 
protocol was extracted from the database, organized by the pre-existing categories of protocol 
and associated sub-categories.  This was done because the database was too rigid to expand, 
combine, and revise the predefined categories.  There was also significant overlap and linkages 
between many of the pre-defined categories.  This has been noted before in media studies and 
was a criticism of quantitative content analysis.  Rigid categories can simplify the issues and 
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ignore the complexity of the data.  Take for example the name swine flu.  Relevant data was 
categorized under defining the outbreak as H1N1 versus swine flu, pigs as a symbol (i.e. anchor) 
for the outbreak, pigs and pork produce as something to blame, and the economic impact on the 
pork industry.  Due to the setup of the Access database, it was difficult to link these pieces of 
data.  Attempts to make changes after the data had been entered might have deleted pieces of 
information or corrupted the database.  For this reason, the data for this study was exacted from 
the database for further analysis.  
The resulting text was read through again, summarized, and reorganized, based on the 
similarities, differences, and linkages between categories.  Many of the initial categories were 
divided and merged with others due to linkages between them.  For example, some data that was 
categorized under economic impact was linked to data regarding the name of the disease (i.e. the 
economic impact on the pork industry due to the name swine flu) or with the public health 
impact (i.e. the economic impact on the travel industry and travel advisories).  As a result, there 
are differences in the final organization of the results from the initial protocol, which was 
expected.  Table 4-8 indicates approximately how the initial categories in the protocol were 
reorganized into the categories presented in the results chapters.  Some of the initial categories 
from the protocol are still used while others have been merged.  The final organization of the 
results can be grouped into four broad themes: 1) naming the disease; 2) the affected population 
(labeled as human impact in Table 4-8); 3) efforts to contain the outbreak (consists of the list of 
public health policies and responses in Table 4-8); and 4) lessons learned (labeled as the post-
pandemic assessment and lessons Table 4-8).  The themes of anchoring, beliefs of causes and 
responsibility, social impact, economic impact, political impact, emotional impact, and sources 
of information are interwoven with the final four themes.  The organization of the results 
chapters will also be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Article Protocol Themes/Discourse Result Sections 
Defining the Outbreak Defining the Outbreak 
 Defining a pandemic  (category added 
during analysis) 
Defining a Pandemic 
^ Criticism of the H1N1 pandemic 
◊ Anchoring to seasonal flu and past pandemics 
Disease name  (H1N1/swine flu/others) Naming the Disease 
# Impact on pork industry 
◊ Anchoring to Mad Cow Disease 
^ Criticism of term 
Anchors ◊   
Beliefs of causes and responsibility   
Who or what is defined as responsible * 
INTERMINGLED IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
RESPONSES 
  
Blame, criticism, or mistrust ^   
Impact of Outbreak   
Human Impact (severity, risk factors, 
personalization) 
Influenza Activity and Spread (Human Impact) 
○, #, @ Absentee rates at schools and workplaces 
Social impact/disruption @   
Emotional impact - INTERMINGLED 
WITH VARIOUS CATEGORIES 
Economic impact # 
Political impact ● 
Public Health Policy and Responses   
Medical approach 
Quarantine and Isolation 
Antiviral Drugs 
Vaccination ^, * 
Behavioral approach 
Handwashing and respiratory etiquette 
○, @ Handwashing Concerns 
Social Behavior 
@, ^ Concerns about changes 
Facemasks ^ 
Ecological approach 
Travel Restrictions and screening travellers 
^ Criticism of travel advisories 
# Impact on travel industry 
Cancellations and Closures 
○, ^, @  Criticism of cancellations/closures 
Surface Cleaning 
Further research or action needed 
Pandemic Preparedness and Response 
* Pandemic Preparedness in the community 
◊ SARS and pandemic preparedness 
^ Criticism of pandemic planning and response 
^, ● Political criticism 
*, ● Jurisdictional issues (including FN) 
Post Pandemic assessment and lessons 
^ Criticisms 
Sources of information Multiple voices in the epidemic narrative 
Table 4-8: Linkage between protocol categories and results 
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4.6 Summary 
To summarize, the main purpose of this study is to construct the overall 2009 H1N1 
pandemic narrative from newspapers distributed within Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.  To do so, an 
approach referred to as qualitative content analysis was adapted.  Following the analysis 
technique, a protocol was developed that was informed by the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks of the study.  Relevant articles were collected from four local newspapers 
(StarPhoenix, Saskatoon Sun, Planet S, and The Sheaf) and two national newspapers (Globe and 
Mail and National Post).  Articles were identified and collected using a key word search within 
the following time frame: April 24, 2009 to Aug 31, 2010.  Each article was analyzed based on 
the developed protocol.  As the analysis progressed, the categories based on the protocol were 
reorganized.  The resulting data was summarized and will be presented in the results chapters.   
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CHAPTER 5  
OVERVIEW OF THE 2009 H1N1 PANDEMIC NARRATIVE 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic narrative.  The overview is a 
very broad and gives a general description of the narrative in the newspapers.  Additional details 
on specific themes and events are provided in the individual result chapters (Chapters 6 through 
11).  The chapter also outlines the organization of the results chapters. 
5.2 Overview of 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Narrative 
The media coverage of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic can be divided into three periods: (1) Pre-
Pandemic/First Wave, (2) Second Wave/Vaccination Campaign, and (3) Post-Second Wave (see 
Table 5-1 for the total number of articles by time period).  These periods correspond 
approximately to the initial spread of the virus and influenza activity in Canada.  The Pre-
Pandemic/First Wave period began in April 2009 and lasted until the end of August 2009.  The 
Second Wave/Vaccination Campaign period started at the end of August 2009 lasted until late 
January 2010.  The Post-Second Wave started in late January 2010 and lasted until the end of the 
pandemic in August 2010.   
 
Pre-Pandemic/First 
Wave: April 23 - 
Aug 29, 2009 
Second Wave/Vaccination 
Campaign: Aug 30, 2009 - 
Jan 27, 2010 
Post-Second Wave: 
Jan 28 - Aug 31, 
2010 
StarPhoenix 172 309 33 
Globe & Mail 267 367 68 
National Post 191 210 42 
Total 630 886 143 
Table 5-1: Total Number of Articles by Time Period 
 
There were two peaks in the media coverage during the first and second time periods (see 
Figure 5- for a weekly count of the newspaper articles).  The first peak in media coverage 
occurred in April and early May 2009.  This peak corresponded with the coverage following the 
WHO’s initial announcement of the outbreak.  The second, larger peak occurred in late October 
and early November 2009, which corresponded with the mass vaccination campaign in Canada.  
According to Rosenberg (1989), an epidemic narrative follows a characteristic pattern.  
Initially, an outbreak may not be noticed until it reaches a point where it is unavoidable and must 
be acknowledged.  Once the outbreak is acknowledged, explanations emerge in order to identify 
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and contain the outbreak.  The explanations serve to identify the causes and responsibility for the 
outbreak, to help regain control over the crisis, and to attempt to minimize society’s sense of 
vulnerability to the outbreak.  As the disease spreads, it may be accompanied by panic, disorder, 
desperation, and the presence of an apocalyptic worldview.  If control efforts fail or an 
immediate solution is not discovered, then those seen as responsible for the outbreak may receive 
criticism or become scapegoats.  As the epidemic gradually subsides and disappears, society 
looks back for the lessons that can be learned.  This narrative pattern is evident in the media 
coverage and loosely corresponds with the three identified periods.  These observations will be 
elaborated in the sections that follow. 
 
Figure 5-1: Weekly Total Number of Articles 
 
5.2.1 Period 1: Pre-Pandemic/First Wave 
The first period, Pre-Pandemic and First Wave, started in April 2009 and lasted until August 
29, 2009.  The time frame began with the initial media coverage of the outbreak and ended with 
official end of the first wave in Canada.  Media coverage during the first period included the 
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initial recognition of the outbreak and the development of explanations to identify and contain 
the outbreak.  The time period began with the initial identification of the outbreak in Mexico.  
Issues that were discussed included who was affected by the disease, the Mexican public’s 
reaction to the outbreak, and Mexico’s public health responses.  Media discussions regarding the 
identification of the outbreak focused on whether to call the disease swine flu or H1N1 and 
whether or not the outbreak was a pandemic.  The coverage also documented the uncertainty, 
fear and panic as the virus spread.  Articles documented the global spread of the virus as well as 
the spread within Canada.  As the virus spread, initial containment efforts focused on travel-
related measures.  The focus eventually shifted to measures to contain community-based 
outbreaks.  These measures included preparation for the anticipated second wave, efforts to limit 
social contact (e.g. closures, isolations, etc.) and individual methods (e.g. hand washing, 
respiratory etiquette).  In the media, there was the perception that the control efforts (e.g. travel-
related measures) failed to prevent the spread, and the solutions (i.e. pandemic preparation and 
vaccination) were too slow to materialize, both of which contributed to criticism and blaming.  
Public health officials, politicians, and public health measures (i.e. travel advisories, 
quarantine/isolation, cancellations and closures) also received criticism during this time.  
Throughout this period, social, economic, and political influences on the public health response 
and impacts from the outbreak were discussed. 
5.2.2 Period 2: Second Wave/Vaccination Campaign 
The second period, Second Wave and Vaccination Campaign, started on August 30, 2009 
and lasted until January 27, 2010.  The second period began with the official start of the second 
wave and ended with the end of the second wave.  The period included the second wave in 
Canada and included extensive coverage of the status of the vaccine campaign.  Coverage 
focused on the status of vaccine production, the initial set-up of vaccination clinics, the vaccine 
roll-out, and eventually, the good and bad of the vaccine campaign.  Perceptions about and 
criticism of slow and ineffective efforts were prevalent during this period.  Media accounts also 
focused on the level of flu activity and the social and economic impacts of the second wave.  
5.2.3 Period 3: Post-Second Wave 
The final period, Post-Second Wave, started on January 28, 2010 and lasted until the end of 
the pandemic in August 2010.  The media coverage had significantly decreased by this period 
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and articles were infrequent compared to the previous period.  This drop in coverage 
corresponded with the end of the vaccination campaign and the drop in flu activity.  During the 
final period, media focused on the decline of the pandemic and the lessons that could be learned 
from the pandemic and public health responses. 
5.3 Organization of Results 
Rather than a chronological presentation of the results, findings have been divided into broad 
themes of the pandemic narrative.  Many of the themes of the narrative overlap chronologically 
and intertwine with each other which would make a clear chronological presentation of the 
results difficult.  The results are divided into six chapters and are organized by the four broad 
themes: 1) naming the disease (Chapter 6); 2) the affected population (Chapter 7); 3) efforts to 
contain the outbreak (Chapter 8 through 10); and 4) lessons learned (Chapter 11).  The four 
themes are based on the reorganization of the protocol.  Table 4-8 indicates approximately how 
the initial categories in the protocol were reorganized into the categories presented in the results 
chapters.  Some of the initial categories from the protocol are still used while others have been 
merged with others.  For example, naming the disease, the affected population (labeled as human 
impact in protocol), efforts to contain the outbreak (labeled as public health policies and 
responses, and lessons learned (labeled as post-pandemic assessment and lessons) are categories 
in the protocol.  The themes of anchoring, beliefs of causes and responsibility, social impact, 
economic impact, political impact, emotional impact, and sources of information are interwoven 
with the final four themes. 
The following is a brief description of each chapter.  Chapter 6: Defining the Outbreak 
focuses on the theme of defining and naming the outbreak.  Chapter 6 examines how the terms 
pandemic, H1N1 and swine were defined and applied to the outbreak.  Chapter 7: Influenza 
Activity and Spread discusses how the media discussed the spread of the virus and the flu 
activity.  Indicators of flu activity included confirmed and suspected cases and deaths and 
absentee rates in schools and workplaces.  Chapter 7 also discusses how personal stories were 
presented and highlights the associated societal impacts.  Chapter 8: Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response examines the coverage of the pandemic planning and preparedness efforts.  It also 
presents criticisms of the preparations efforts and public health difficulties due to different 
jurisdictions.  Chapter 9: Public Health Measures presents the representation of specific health 
measures, their criticisms, and associated social impacts.  Chapter 10: Vaccination focuses on 
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issues regarding the vaccination campaign.  Vaccination was put in a separate chapter due to the 
extensive media focus on the issue.  Chapter 11: Post Pandemic Assessment and Lessons 
presents the stated lessons from pandemic and assessments of the public health response.   
For ease of citation throughout the result chapters each article was assigned an ID# which 
includes an abbreviation of the newspaper name and a number based on its order chronologically 
as well as by page number.  See Appendix A for a list of the ID# and associated article.  This 
was done to shorten the in-text citation of the articles and to separate the citation style of the data 
set from the references used in the dissertation.   
5.4 Summary 
In summary, this chapter provides a brief chronological overview of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic narrative.  The overview and media coverage was divided into three periods: the pre-
pandemic/first wave, the second wave/vaccination campaign, and the post-second wave.  The 
chapter also outlines the organization of the results chapters.  
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CHAPTER 6  
DEFINING THE OUTBREAK 
6.1 Introduction 
The first of the result chapters focuses on how the terms pandemic, H1N1 and swine flu were 
used in the media to define the outbreak and the associated discourses regarding the labels.  The 
first section focuses on how the term pandemic was presented in the media and how it was used 
to define the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  Initially, the outbreak was identified as an extended flu 
season in Mexico.  The outbreak eventually shifted to a potential pandemic and finally was 
labeled as a pandemic.  A common discussion over the course of the outbreak was whether or not 
H1N1 was a pandemic, since the term is understood from various perspectives.  The section 
examines the conflicting definitions of the term pandemic, resulting criticism, and the anchors 
that were used to define the term pandemic.  The second section focuses on the names that were 
used for the disease: H1N1 and swine flu.  Both terms were applied to the disease, however, 
there was disagreement over their usage.  The term swine flu was frequently criticized due to the 
perceived link to pigs and the resulting economic impact on the pork industry.  The second 
section also presents the media discussions and criticism associated with the use of the names 
H1N1 and swine flu.  
6.2 Defining a Pandemic 
6.2.1 Declaration of the 2009 Pandemic 
On April 24, 2009, the World Health Organization announced the outbreak in Mexico.  
Mexican health officials released a media statement blaming “the surge in illnesses...on an 
extended flu season” (GM87).  The first known cases of the outbreak started around March 18, 
although cases may have occurred earlier (GM87).  Mexican officials insisted that the outbreak 
was not an epidemic and that they were taking measures to reduce the risk of transmission 
(GM1).  Following the 2003 SARS outbreak, health officials paid close attention to these types 
of health alerts based on the assumption that eventually one would be the “beginning of the next 
pandemic” (GM1).  On the day of the initial health alert, the WHO said that there was no 
evidence that the pandemic alert level should be raised (GM2). 
The following day, April 25, news articles included more speculation about whether the 
outbreak was a potential pandemic after “health officials around the world went on high alert for 
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a potential global flu pandemic...there have been three flu pandemics in the past century and 
experts say another could happen at any time” (GM3).  In anticipation of a possible pandemic, 
the WHO activated a global epidemic operations centre (NP5).  While health officials were on 
alert for a possible pandemic, they also emphasized the unknowns of the situation.  For example, 
Dr. Butler-Jones, the Chief Medical Officer of Canada, stated 
What it will lead to is impossible to predict...We do not know whether this swine 
influenza virus, or some other influenza virus, will lead to the next pandemic.  
Scientists and public health agencies around the world, though, remain on high 
alert (SP2).  
On April 27, the WHO declared that “the likelihood of a pandemic has increased” and 
“raised its alert level to match” from level 3 to level 4 (see Table 2-1 for the definition of the 
pandemic alert levels). The WHO emphasized that a pandemic was “possible” but it was “not 
inevitable” (GM9, GM16, GM25).  On April 29, the pandemic alert was raised to level 5.  The 
increase to level 5 “signaled that a pandemic is imminent and [the WHO] urged countries to 
implement their pandemic plans” (GM43, SP15, SP17).  During the month of May, the WHO did 
not raise the pandemic alert to level 6, which would officially signal a pandemic, since there was 
no evidence of sustained community-level spread outside of North America (GM86).  Dr. Keiji 
Fukuda, a WHO official, stated, “We are not certain when we will go to Phase 6.  There’s not a 
timetable.  There’s no timetable for how viruses like this spread out” (SP36).  
On June 10, the day before the WHO declared the outbreak a pandemic, Dr Keiji Fukuda, 
WHO’s acting assistant director general, emphasized the importance to understand what a 
pandemic means during a press conference.    
It means the virus continues to spread and infections are occurring in at least two 
regions of the world.  It does not mean the virus has become more lethal or that 
people are getting seriously sick at higher numbers or higher rates than they are 
now (SP78). 
On June 11, 2009, the WHO raised the pandemic alert to level 6, officially declaring a 
pandemic (GM147, NP119).  Level 6 indicated that there was community-based spread of the 
virus in more than one WHO region of the world.  At the time, there was community-based 
spread in North America and Australasia.  Europe, South America and Asia were also on the 
verge of broad community-based spread (GM144).  In Canada, “health authorities tried to calm 
nerves by indicating that the long awaited pandemic was largely technical scientific criteria” 
(GM145).   While health officials emphasized that the definition of a pandemic was “technical 
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scientific criteria,” news reports described the increase to Level 6 as a “full-blown pandemic” 
(GM9, GM81, GM118, GM139, NP31, SP78).  Following the declaration of the pandemic, the 
media focus during the summer and early fall shifted to the expected second wave which was 
expected to intensify in the winter and could become “more sinister,” however, this message was 
accompanied with one that pointed out that it was impossible to predict what would happen 
(GM142, GM183, GM211, GM228, GM231, GM255, GM259, GM265, GM269, SP113, SP149, 
SP151, SP160, SP164, SP166, SP169, SP170, SP172, SP178, SP179, SP180).  In Canada, the 
second wave officially began at the end of August 2009 and increased by October 2009.   
By December 2009, there were inquires about whether the pandemic could be declared over, 
however, the WHO stated that it was too early to decide.  In the US and Canada, the number of 
cases and deaths were decreasing and the Canadian second wave was officially declared over in 
January 2010 (SP 482).  However, the decrease in the number of cases was not occurring in the 
entire Northern Hemisphere.  There was still the possibility of a third wave in the spring (SP63), 
however, one was not expected in Canada by health experts due to nation’s mass vaccination 
campaign (GM525, SP434, GM615).  In one article, an Ontario health official pointed out that 
conflicting interests, such as political or financial pressures, can influence the decision to 
prematurely declare that an outbreak has peaked or has ended.  As an example, the health official 
referred to the 2003 SARS outbreak in Toronto.  Due to the economic impact of the outbreak, 
“experts and government authorities were under ‘tremendous pressure’ at the time to announce 
the demise of that outbreak...but no sooner had they predicted the end was nigh than another 
deadly wave of the virus unexpectedly erupted inside a city hospital” (NP366).   
The WHO’s emergency committee waited until February 2010 to determine whether the 
pandemic’s peak has passed (GM648).  The emergency committee waited several more months, 
until August 2010, to meet and to determine whether the pandemic could be declared over 
(SP513; GM697, GM698).  On Aug 10, the WHO officially declared the pandemic over, 
however, as an article in the StarPhoenix noted the “announcement received little fanfare, with 
health headlines already focused on other emerging stories, such as research identifying a 
‘superbug’ in hospitals in India that’s resistant to antibiotics” (SP514). 
6.2.2 Criticism of the H1N1 Pandemic and the pandemic alert system 
The news coverage was filled with mixed messages on the definition of a pandemic and 
about the inability to predict an outbreak versus the potential severity of a pandemic.  A common 
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criticism that appeared in the media was that H1N1 was not a pandemic as the term was 
commonly understood, as opposed to the official definition used by the WHO.  The term 
commonly understood refers to the definition of the term as the general population would 
understand it.  In other words, it is the mental representation of the term pandemic from the 
perspective of the general population.  In articles that suggested that H1N1 was not a pandemic, 
the term pandemic would be in quotes or phrases such as “so-called pandemic” or “flu scare” 
would be used (NP382, NP427, SP153, SP490).   
The main issue regarding whether or not H1N1 was a pandemic was whether it fit the 
definition of a pandemic, however, there were at least two conflicting definitions presented in the 
media that were used interchangeably and without a clear distinction between the two.  The first 
definition was the WHO’s definition based on the alert system and second was the “common 
understanding” of the term, in other words, the social representation of the term.  The criticism 
was based on an underlying assumption that pandemics always result in high number of deaths 
and are more severe than seasonal flu.  These assumptions are based on comparison to past flu 
pandemics and to the impact of seasonal flu.  This aspect of the media reporting will be 
discussed in more detail in the next sub-section on anchoring.  The alert system used to declare a 
pandemic was based solely on the geographical spread of the virus and made no reference to the 
severity. 
One source for the criticism and confusion was the fact that the WHO originally included 
severity in their pandemic definition but later dropped it.  The original version of the alert scale, 
developed in 1999, defined a pandemic as involving “serious morbidity and mortality.”  The alert 
system used during the H1N1 pandemic made no explicit reference to the deadliness of an 
outbreak (GM631, NP441, SP78).  Several editorials in the National Post claimed that the WHO 
changed the definition of a pandemic to “fabricate” a pandemic as a cover for a predicted avian 
flu pandemic that had not happened and for political and financial gains.  The editorials also 
claimed that the change “render[ed] the term ‘flu pandemic’ essentially meaningless – risking 
lethal public complacency if a bona fide one hits” (NP243, NP123, NP428).  Additional 
editorials criticized the lack of a severity indicator on the pandemic alert system claim that it is 
not relevant for the general public (GM626, SP83, SP509).  Without a severity indictor, it did not 
“articulate a real sense of gravity of the flu outbreak, and how much a public danger it really is” 
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(SP173).  An article published in June 2010 that focused on the lessons of the pandemic made a 
similar statement:  
We’ve heard this bad word pandemic, but this is about the same as we would see 
in a bad influenza season or it’s less than that, or it’s more.  We don’t have a yard 
stick.  There was no context (SP509). 
For future changes to the alert system, the WHO planned to include an assessment of the severity 
as well as the geographical spread (SP76).  
The WHO and other health officials continued to emphasize that a pandemic can be either 
mild or severe and that the definition of a pandemic is based on the geographical spread of a 
virus rather than its severity (GM87, GM143, NP31, SP86, SP106, SP268).  However, there are 
many examples in the media that suggested otherwise.  When there was an increase in the 
pandemic alert level, the media linked it to an increase in the severity of the disease and to the 
worst case scenarios.  For example, a National Post article suggested that the pandemic alert 
system sent the wrong signal to the public since it “can reach its top level in a mild pandemic so 
it appears to foretell doomsday even if people around the world have only the sniffles” (NP84).  
Another example was a quote in a StarPhoenix article which asked “Six is what, the bubonic 
plague?” (SP27).  A Globe and Mail article suggested that the increase from phase 3 to 4 was a 
“sign of increasing severity of the outbreak” (GM41).  Another Globe and Mail article stated, “If 
this flu can cause serious illness and death, this is more ominous, and makes it more likely it 
could become a pandemic strain” (GM39).  A National Post article defined a pandemic as a 
“global outbreak of a serious new illness” (NP22).   
There were efforts in the media coverage to correct the perception.  A Globe and Mail article 
addressed common reader comments and questions about H1N1.  One of the reader comments 
was “I keep reading about ‘epidemic’ and ‘pandemic’ which implies imminent threat but I don’t 
see an epidemic or pandemic out there, just fear-mongering.”  The article addressed the comment 
by stating that pandemic refers to geographical spread of a virus, not its severity (GM357).  
However, the reader comment also highlighted another perception about pandemics that was not 
mentioned in the Globe and Mail article.  It is the perception that during a pandemic, there must 
be widespread illness and death, a perception that does not recognize the variable nature of a 
pandemic.  A pandemic tends to occur in waves and can affect different locations or the same 
locations at different times with varying severity (WHO, 2009b).  
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Other articles emphasized the difference between the technical definition by the WHO and 
the common understanding of the term with quotes such as “a real pandemic – at least in the 
sense of the word that most people understand intuitively: a great many people dying or 
becoming seriously ill” (NP350), "a pandemic in the layman's sense of that word (infecting a 
high percentage of a population and killing a high percentage of those infected)" (NP428), and  
"ordinary pandemics kill at least a million people worldwide" (GM380).  The assumption that 
pandemics are deadly is partly based on the comparisons that are used to define how a pandemic 
should be.  The comparisons or anchors that were used will be discussed in the next section. 
One issue that was not raised in the media coverage regarding the criticism is how severity 
should be used to determine if a pandemic exists.  If mortality is a defining factor, at what point 
would one declare a pandemic?  Also, mortality rates can be difficult to determine while an 
outbreak is in progress.  Another issue has to do with the purpose of the alert system.  The alert 
system is used to determine when an outbreak has turned into a pandemic and “allows 
governments and public health agencies to respond appropriately to protect people” (SP173).  
Ideally, the impact (i.e. the mortality rates) would be less due to the public health response.   
6.2.3 Anchoring to seasonal flu and past pandemics 
The main comparisons or anchors used in the media were past pandemics, particularly the 
1918 Spanish flu, and seasonal flu.  H1N1 was continually compared and contrasted to seasonal 
influenza and as more information about the virus emerged, the messages changed to reflect that.  
However, those changes can lead to confusion.   
Early in the outbreak, when cases were generally mild in Canada, H1N1 was described as 
behaving like seasonal flu in terms of its severity (SP64, GM77, SP50, SP53, SP54, SP60, SP68, 
SP71, SP80, SP106, SP439).  There are potential issues with using severity as a point for 
comparison such as the different ways in which severity can be defined.  For example, severity 
can be defined by the number of serious cases, by the mortality rate, or by the demographics of 
those affected.  Different media messages were presented depending on which characteristic of 
severity was used to compare and contrast H1N1 to seasonal flu.  When serious cases or deaths 
of H1N1 were reported, it was compared to seasonal flu in terms of the average number of deaths 
and hospitalizations that occurred yearly due to seasonal flu (GM43, GM67, NP10).  The general 
message was that the initial serious cases and deaths from H1N1 were no cause for alarm since 
they occur every year with seasonal flu and were expected (GM43, SP6, SP21, SP27, SP47, 
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SP100, SP101, SP103).  Though over time, a different picture emerged in Canada in terms of the 
affected age groups.  Individuals tended to be younger, sicker and needed more time on 
ventilators than was the case with seasonal influenza (GM168, GM176, GM268, GM273, 
GM277, GM386, GM631, NP366, NP430, SP136, SP166, SP172, SP178, SP273, SP303, SP430, 
SP448).   
Various health officials emphasized that a pandemic could be "no more serious than a regular 
seasonal strain" (NP31, NP32).  For example, Keiji Fukuda, WHO’s acting assistant director 
general, said "it's possible an outbreak could technically be labeled a pandemic but not be much 
deadlier than the seasonal flu" (SP78).  This reflected the absence of a measure of severity in the 
WHO’s definition of a pandemic.  Similarly, Dr Butler-Jones, the chief medical officer in 
Canada, stated that “the big difference between an ordinary influenza and a pandemic is not the 
severity of the disease but the numbers of people who could become ill" (GM55).  Messages 
from the WHO generally did not refer to the number of people who are ill as a defining factor, 
however, one of the main differences between pandemic flu and seasonal flu is that the 
population has little to no immunity to a pandemic flu.  Since the virus is a novel strain, more 
people are susceptible to it and can become ill (GM39, NP269, SP101).  The difference in the 
number of sick individuals was frequently overshadowed by a focus on the total number of 
confirmed deaths compared to the estimates for seasonal flu (GM599, GM671, NP191, NP251, 
NP296, NP355, NP422, SP153, SP372, SP380, SP439, SP508).   
There are potential issues with using seasonal flu as an anchor because of pre-existing 
perceptions of seasonal flu.  Seasonal flu tends to fall into the catch-all phrase of colds and flu.  
As one article put it, “cold and flu, the pair are so often mentioned tandem it’s as though they’ve 
become one all-encompassing term in the popular vernacular: coldandflu” (NP413).  There was 
also evidence of confusion between and lumping together colds, flu, stomach flu, and allergies in 
the media coverage (GM115, GM201, GM577, SP153).  For example, an article referring to the 
first known case of H1N1 in Mexico referred to the illness as a "cold" (GM48).  Survey results 
published in the Globe and Mail in Oct 2009, reported that 59% of respondents believed the 
virus was “not more worrisome than a common cold” (GM368).  A letter to the editor in the 
National Post described the symptoms as "similar to spring allergies" (NP20).  The catch-all 
phrase “colds and flu” consists of a group of illnesses that people have yearly experience with, 
which can make people wonder “what's the big deal, it is just the flu.”  Seasonal flu occurs every 
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year and does not receive the same amount of media attention (GM94, GM230, GM357, GM285, 
GM544, NP123, NP428, NP434, SP83, SP86, SP153, SP274, SP364, SP488). 
Due to the emphasis in media on the number of deaths from H1N1 (see next chapter for a 
detailed discussion), there were questions raised in the media about why H1N1 was considered a 
pandemic drawing on the number of reported deaths compared to seasonal influenza and other 
pandemics.  For example, an editorial published in Oct 2009 in the National Post questioned 
how H1N1 could be declared a pandemic when it was “11 weeks into the outbreak and swine flu 
had killed 144 worldwide – the same number who die of seasonal flu worldwide every few 
hours” (NP243).  Another example was a letter to the editor in the National Post published in 
April 2009 that criticized the warnings of a potential pandemic:  
I'm sure that someone will shortly be able to explain to me how the World Health 
Organization can warn of a 'flu pandemic' on the basis of less than 200 deaths.  A 
pandemic is described as a situation when a flu such as the so-called Spanish flu 
of 1918, which killed millions, takes hold...if this was a pandemic, then thousands 
would already be dying (NP20).  
Past pandemics, particularly the 1918 Spanish flu, were commonly cited as a defining example 
of what a pandemic would be like.  The most common defining feature was the large number of 
deaths that should occur during a pandemic, as reflected in the previous quote.  Another example 
was an editorial in the National Post which stated, "pandemics were far deadlier than the yearly 
outbreaks of seasonal flu…what other distinguishing feature should a flu pandemic have other 
than severity [defined as mortality]?" (NP380).  Of the 3 pandemics during the 20th century, 
1918 was most frequently used for comparisons.  Comparisons between H1N1 and past 
pandemics emphasized the number of deaths that occurred (GM3, GM16, GM144, GM298, 
GM602, GM615, NP84, SP8).   
Similarities between H1N1 and 1918 Spanish flu were also noted, such as the age 
distribution of severe cases and deaths (GM39, GM46, GM87, GM574, GM600, NP11, NP233, 
SP238), and the mild first wave of Spanish flu followed by a more severe wave in summer and 
fall.  The first wave of H1N1 was
 described as “mild” and was expected to become more severe 
in the second and third waves based on the experience of 1918 (GM29, GM32, GM67, GM139, 
GM140, GM174, GM183, GM228, GM247, NP22, NP62, SP417).  Another noted similarity was 
the disproportionate impact on First Nation reserves during the 1918 pandemic and H1N1 
pandemic.  Poverty, poor nutrition, overcrowding, and a lack of clean water in reserve 
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communities contributed to the rapid spread of the disease (GM188, GM189, GM280, NP113, 
SP220).     
In addition to the similarities between H1N1 and the 1918 pandemic, several articles also 
highlighted the differences in medical technology and improved general social conditions 
between 1918-1919 and 2009 (GM11, GM44, GM77, GM99, GM206, GM544, NP24, NP32, 
NP71, NP227, NP251, NP252, SP22, SP27, SP338).  Nevertheless, 1918 was still treated as the 
standard for pandemics or as the "worst-case scenario" (GM38, GM597, NP94).  As a 
StarPhoenix article stated:  
Horror fantasies about the flu are always about the possibility of a repeat of the 
1918 Spanish flu...images of people dropping dead in the street have become 
somehow iconic in our thinking about the flu (SP27).  
A National Post article had a similar statement along with a reassurance about H1N1: 
…public perception is tainted by images from the devastation of the 1918 Spanish 
flu...calm down and take some reassurance...the chances of living were far better 
than the chances of dying (NP51).  
Compared to 1918, there were few references to the 1957 Asian and 1968 Hong Kong flu 
pandemics
1
 (GM3, GM44).  Some comparisons were made to 1957 in terms of the pattern of 
spread (SP189, SP195, SP405, SP440) and a few comparisons were made to 1968, which like 
H1N1 had reported cases of transmission to pigs (SP29).  There also were references to number 
of deaths during 1968, approximately 1 million, since that was the last pandemic (GM145, NP8, 
NP12, SP86).  However, the main focus was on the number of deaths during the 1918 pandemic.   
Based on the comparisons to seasonal flu and past pandemics, there are two media 
assumptions that emerge about the definition of a pandemic.  The first assumption is that 
pandemics result in high number of deaths based on to the linkage with 1918 Spanish flu. This 
comparison can overestimate and exaggerate the potential impact of a pandemic, leading to 
undue alarm.  Media anchoring to 1918 was not unique for 2009 H1N1. Previous pandemics 
(1957 Asian flu and 1968 Hong Kong flu) and the recent fear of avian influenza were also 
anchored to it (Blakely, 2001; Herring, 2008).  In comparisons, media focus on the high number 
of deaths, which overshadowed other features of 1918, such as the variations in mortality rates.  
The second assumption is that pandemics are worse than seasonal flu.  However, comparisons to 
                                                 
1
 The estimated number of deaths for the two pandemics is 2 million deaths in 1957 and 1 
million deaths in 1968 (WHO, 2005b). 
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seasonal flu can underestimate the risk.  Seasonal flu is a known health risk that people 
frequently underestimate and can confuse with other respiratory (i.e. cold) and even non-
respiratory (i.e. stomach flu) illnesses that vary in severity (Health Canada, 2009c). 
6.3 Naming the Disease: H1N1 or Swine flu 
6.3.1 Initial name of the disease 
Initial newspaper reports in the Globe and Mail and the StarPhoenix on April 24, 2009 
reported "Mexican illness" that was described as a "deadly flu-like" illness, a "mysterious 
respiratory infection" of "unknown cause", and "severe cases of seasonal flu" (GM1, SP1). Over 
the next few days, reports attributed the Mexican outbreak to a new strain of influenza A/H1N1.  
The virus was a mixture of swine, human and avian viruses, which the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention in Atlanta was quoted as describing as an "unusual combination” (SP2).  
Despite the genetic makeup of the virus, the disease was officially named swine flu by the World 
Health Organization because it was structured like a virus that usually infects pigs (GM2, GM3, 
GM5, GM11, GM25, NP5).  Following that announcement, newspapers began referring to the 
disease as swine flu and would use images of pigs in reference to the disease (NP82, NP188, 
NP205, SP18, SP29).  
6.3.2 Impact on the pork industry  
With the name swine flu pigs became stigmatized, which negatively affected the global pork 
industry (GM96, GM312, NP35, SP42).  There were false impressions that the disease could 
spread through contact with pigs or through pork products despite evidence that showed 
otherwise and the repeated reassurances from health and agriculture officials that pork products 
were safe (GM2, GM54, NP8, NP9).  A Globe and Mail article stated the name swine flu created 
“pork backlash even though a human can't get the flu by eating pork” (GM54).  During the 
spring and into the summer, news articles reported on the global reaction to the name with 
actions such as import bans on pork products, decreased prices and demand of pork, and cases 
where pigs were quarantined or slaughtered. 
At the end of April and into May 2009, several countries banned pork imports from countries 
with reported cases of H1N1 (GM4, GM31, GM33, GM82, GM86, NP22, NP35, NP64, SP29, 
SP37, SP41, SP108, SP186).   At the time, the three countries that were most affected by the 
pork bans were Mexico, US, and Canada, nations which were also among the world's top pork 
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exporters in global trade (NP64).  In May, a report of infected pigs at a central Alberta hog farm 
triggered "dozens of countries" to ban pork either from Alberta or from all of Canada (SP29, 
SP36, SP299, NP62, NP64).  The newspaper coverage of the event focused on the overall impact 
on the pork industry in Alberta and in Canada but it also put a human face on it by focusing on 
the farmer and the "family business" that was affected.  A Globe and Mail article described the 
event as a "dream turned into nightmare" for the farmer and his family (GM99, GM106).  In 
another article from the Globe and Mail, the farmer said "this entire event has been extremely 
stressful for my family” (GM135).  The infected pigs were eventually slaughtered (GM135).  
Several months later, in August 2009, pigs on several hog farms in Manitoba also had confirmed 
cases of H1N1.  The Manitoba pork industry expected "another blow" due to the infected pigs 
(SP176).  There were no follow up news articles on the infected pigs in Manitoba.  
In addition to import bans that affected the Canadian pork industry, articles also focused on 
the reaction towards pigs in other countries.  For example, one Globe and Mail article reported 
that in the United Arab Emirates supermarkets pulled pork from the shelves as "a precautionary 
measure" (GM71).  In Egypt, a nationwide pig slaughter was ordered (SP27) and in Baghdad, 
Iraq officials killed wild boar due to fears of swine flu (GM61).  Afghanistan, a country with "no 
pig farms," quarantined the sole pig in the Kabul zoo.  At the time, the country had no confirmed 
cases and "no direct civilian flights between Kabul and Mexico," however, the pig was 
quarantined because "people worried it could infect them” (GM95, SP40).  
Due to the stigma for pigs and the bans on pork imports, the value of a pig dropped to the 
point where it cost more to feed a pig than what a farmer would receive for one (GM112, 
GM121, SP99, SP115, SP152).  The financial impact was reported as “prompting about 1,000 
hog farmers, or 11 per cent of Canada’s total, to leave the industry” (SP253).  A Globe and Mail 
editorial titled “Pig farmers are victims of a swinish disregard for the truth,” stated that, “by 
using the adjective ‘swine’ when describing this H1N1 influenza A human pandemic, we 
[Canadians] have effectively bankrupted many Canadian pork producers.”  The author of the 
editorial, also a veterinarian, encourages Canadians to continue eating pork from Canada 
(GM112).  However, the term ‘swine flu’ was not the sole factor impacting the industry in 
Canada.  Others factors included the high feed prices, the rising Canadian dollar, and trade 
restrictions due to new U.S. meat labeling laws (GM181, GM200, GM696, GM148, GM336, 
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NP180, NP228, SP129, SP161, SP162, SP383, SP390, SP455, SP463, SP501, SP503)  However, 
the impact of the swine flu name received a great deal of attention in the news media 
6.3.3 Anchoring to Mad Cow Disease and fear of animals 
The reaction towards pigs was described as a “largely unfounded fear” (NP62) and “without 
scientifically justifiable evidence” (NP141).  However, the reaction is not uncommon for 
illnesses that have a real or perceived connection with animals.  An article in the StarPhoenix 
pointed out that, “people respond with panic in terms of connecting illness with animals” (SP18).  
In a few articles, the impact on the pork industry was anchored to the effect of Mad Cow Disease 
on the Canadian beef industry in 2003
2
 (GM82).  An article published in the National Post on 
April 30, 2009, stated that pork producers were "bracing for a market collapse along the lines of 
what happened to Canadian beef exports after an Alberta cow tested positive for Mad Cow in 
2003” (NP35).  On the same day, an article in the StarPhoenix described the term swine flu as 
"misleading" and that the "moniker could have a similar effect as Mad Cow Disease [had] on the 
beef industry earlier in the decade” (SP18).  Another National Post article published on May 11, 
2009, described economic situation as a "human flu emergency turned into a mini Mad Cow-type 
crisis" (NP84).  While most articles focused on the negative impact that the name swine flu had 
on the pork industry, one National Post article in the Arts and Life section took advantage of the 
fear of illnesses that had a perceived linked to animals by stating “we’ve had mad cow disease, 
and foot and mouth, and bird and now swine” as a way to promote beans rather than meat as a 
source for protein (NP67).  
6.3.4 Name changed to H1N1  
There was international pressure from politicians and the pork industry to change the official 
name of the disease due to the incorrect connection with pigs and resulting economic impact 
(GM82, SP21, SP26, SP36, SP242).  In addition to H1N1, at least two other names were 
suggested: Mexican flu and North American flu (GM17, GM28, GM46).  For example, Israel’s 
                                                 
2
 In May 2003, a single case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or Mad Cow Disease, was 
reported in Alberta.  The case resulted in a worldwide ban on Canadian beef products.  Prior to 
the ban, Canada was the third largest exporter of beef with a market value of $4.1 billion  
(Boame, Parson, & Trant, 2004; Forge & Frechette, 2005; Poulin & Boame, 2003) 
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deputy health minister stated that Israel “would use the term Mexico flu rather than swine flu” to 
indicate that it has nothing to do with pigs (GM11).  In Canada, Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
referred to the illness as “Mexican flu” at a news conference.  However, Mexican officials 
reacted to the name by pointing out that the virus was present worldwide.  The spokesman for the 
Mexican embassy in Ottawa stated that, “it’s pointless to try to blame a county, a whole country, 
for the dissemination of a virus (SP21).  Another name that was suggested by pig farmers was 
“North American flu” in order to “dissociate it from perceptions that it was spread through 
contact from animals and animal products (GM31, GM54, NP22).  The geographic names, 
Mexican flu and North American flu, were discouraged due to the potential stigma of a 
geographical location. 
Initially, the WHO stated that they planned to stick with the name “swine flu” (GM31), 
however, they changed their stance in May "over worries the name [swine flu] was causing 
people to avoid pork" and to clarify that the illness primarily affected humans (NP43, SP27, 
GM11, SP268).  There were some objections to the name H1N1 from scientists that were noted 
in a Globe and Mail article.  The name “influenza A/H1N1 was already taken by the virus that 
caused 1918 Spanish flu and still exist[ed] as a type of common flu” (GM54).  The challenge 
was finding “a catchy name that [was] easy to remember and [did not] assign blame to an animal 
or region” (GM54). 
After the WHO officially dropped the name swine flu for H1N1, Canada officials made an 
effort to emphasize and promote the name change.  For example, Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
"adopted the new terminology for the swine flu, calling it the 'H1N1' virus while speaking to 
reporters" in Regina.  According to Harper:  
This is obviously a medical condition so it makes sense to refer to it that way. 
And I gather that is a standard the World Health Organization is now trying to 
encourage...One of the reasons we are encouraging people to move away from the 
term swine flu, it's because the fact is that this does not in any way impact upon 
pork products (SP26). 
Following the name change, health officials, the pork industry and politicians reassured 
consumers that pork was safe to eat and that H1N1 was not a “food safety risk” but rather a 
“human flu” (SP107).  They also took measures to counter-act the negative perception either 
through words or their actions reported in the media (GM75, GM81, GM96, GM97, GM112, 
GM242, NP75, NP79, NP82, SP57, SP165, SP176, SP268, SP514).  For example, a joint 
statement signed by delegates from Canada, the U.S. and Mexico urged that the “the flu virus be 
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referred to as H1N1, not swine flu, as it was originally dubbed” (SP165).  In an effort by federal 
politicians to show Canadians that pork was safe to eat, “MPs and staffers wolfed down pulled-
pork sandwiches served by federal cabinet ministers” (GM82).  In Saskatchewan, the Agriculture 
minister issued a press release assuring that pork is safe and “encouraged residents to pack a few 
more ham sandwiches for lunch or throw a pork roast on the barbecue” (SP57). 
6.3.5 Continued criticism of the term “swine flu” 
Despite the name change from the WHO, the new name, H1N1 did not "immediately catch 
on" (GM249).  Many newspaper articles used both terms “swine flu” and "H1N1" in their 
reporting, however, they frequently preferred the use of one or the other.  H1N1 was frequently 
referred to as the "scientific" or "official name" and swine flu was described as "dubbed," 
"popularly known as," "also known as," "otherwise known as," "widely known as," "previously 
known as," "once known as," "formerly known as," "commonly known as," or articles used 
quotations around the term swine flu.   Articles that focused on the impact to the pork industry 
and were explicitly critical of the term, used phrases such as "so-called swine flu," 
"inappropriately labeled," "originally dubbed,” “the moniker," or "re-branding of the swine flu" 
(SP115, SP165, GM124).  Other articles used a combination of the two terms such as "swine 
influenza A/H1N1", "human swine flu", "human swine H1N1 influenza", or "H1N1 swine flu."  
The continued usage of the term “swine flu” in the media drew criticism and was seen as 
disrespectful to the pork industry.  The Saskatchewan agriculture minister, for example, referred 
to the usage of “swine flu” as “name-calling [that] needs to stop” (SP165).  Readers of the 
StarPhoenix and the Globe and Mail also expressed their displeasure with newspapers 
continuing to use the term “swine flu”.  Two letters to the editor in the StarPhoenix requested 
that the newspaper “show some respect for Canadian farmers” and refer to the virus as H1N1 
(SP48, SP61).  In the Globe and Mail, a reader criticized an article that “acknowledge[d] on the 
inside page that pigs have little to do with swine flu, but front-line presentations belie[d] that” 
(GM47).  A Globe and Mail news article described the entire situation as a “semantic debate” 
where  
…different names [were] favored by different countries and top health officials.  
WHO originally went with swine flu but then junked the evocative name in favor 
of the more prosaic A/H1N1 [and]...the media stuck to the term swine flu 
(GM220). 
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The debate was not a simple matter of semantics.  The name that was used for the disease carried 
implicit meanings which had broader economic and political implications.  The term H1N1 had 
the least damaging implications. 
6.4 Summary 
There were two naming issues in the media coverage of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  The first 
was defining the outbreak as a pandemic and the second was defining the disease as H1N1 or 
swine flu.  In both cases, anchoring was influential in creating a representation of the name.  The 
common anchors for the term, “pandemic,” included past pandemics and seasonal influenza.  
With these anchors, the number of deaths was the primary characteristic that was emphasized 
and influenced the perception of the severity of a pandemic.  Pandemics were assumed to be 
worse than seasonal flu and cause high rates of mortality.  This was in contrast to the official 
definition of a pandemic, which makes no reference to severity. The term swine flu was 
anchored to pigs and incorrectly assigned blame to the animals.  The connection to pigs drove 
the response against pigs and pork products.  Some may call the naming issues a semantic 
debate, however, this dismisses the importance of the implicit meaning of the names applied to a 
disease.  The names, and their associated anchors, created certain expectations about the disease 
and influenced how people responded to the disease.   
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CHAPTER 7  
INFLUENZA ACTIVITY AND SPREAD 
7.1 Introduction 
The second chapter of the results focuses on the newspaper reports regarding the global and 
national spread of the disease and the reported flu activity in various locations.  In the initial 
months, news reports focused on the confirmed number of cases and deaths.  As the method of 
disease surveillance changed from counting confirmed cases to tracking absentee rates in schools 
and workplaces, media reports reflected the change.  To personalize the experience, news media 
also focused on individual stories.  
7.2 Human Impact of Pandemic 
7.2.1 Reported flu activity – cases and death 
Pre-pandemic period   
Following the announcement of the Mexican outbreak, newspaper coverage was filled with 
reports of confirmed and suspected cases and deaths.  The first report of Mexican cases with 
“relatively high case-fatality rate” was published in the National Post on April 23, 2009 (NP1).  
Over the next few days, additional articles in the Globe and Mail and the StarPhoenix provided 
more details of the outbreak in Mexico and the related cases in the United States (GM1, GM2, 
GM3, NP4, NP5, SP1, SP2).  There were reports of clusters of flu-like cases in Mexico and the 
United States (California and Texas) and several reported deaths in Mexico.  Most of the cases in 
Mexico involved healthy adults with no known record of prior illnesses.  Initial reports of the 
number of deaths published on April 24 and 25 ranged from 20 to 58 confirmed deaths while 
other articles reported 60 to 70 possible deaths and at least 800 severe cases (GM1, GM3, NP6, 
SP3).  
On April 27, the first Canadian cases were reported in Nova Scotia and British Columbia. 
These cases occurred among travelers returning from Mexico.  The Nova Scotia cases were 
among a group of students and teachers returning from a school trip.  The cases were “so mild” 
that it took a several days for anyone to report them.  They were described as “cases of allergies 
or sniffles dating to just after the trip return” (NP7).  A Nova Scotia school official stated that “if 
there wasn’t the Mexican backdrop,” the students would be “wondering what the big deal was” 
about their illnesses (NP7).  On an international scale, there were more reports in the Canadian 
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newspapers of confirmed cases and a possible death in the United States.  Possible cases were 
also reported in parts of Europe, Israel, and New Zealand (GM4, GM12, NP8, NP9, NP16, SP4, 
SP6). 
By April 28 (five days after the first news report), some news articles began to question the 
severity of outbreak and the “early hype” of a potential pandemic.  Conflicting reports on the 
number of cases in Mexico added to the confusion.  Some articles suggested that there were 1900 
cases and 149 possible deaths.  However, the data was still “sketchy” and the full scope of the 
outbreak was not fully known.  Also, it was possible that many mild cases had gone unnoticed 
and the rate of severe cases and deaths was an over estimation (GM39, NP11, NP13, NP24, 
NP23).  One article noted that there was “very little hard data on who [had] been infected” and 
reported that there were only 26 confirmed cases and 7 deaths, which was far less than the 149 
suspected deaths reported in other reports.  Another potential issue that likely skewed the data 
was that flu-related deaths among young adults tended to stand out while deaths among the very 
young and old might have been attributed to other respiratory illnesses (GM46).  While it was 
difficult to assess the situation in Mexico, cases outside of Mexico had been mild in the initial 
month.  The initial Canadian cases were reported as “more mild even than the regular seasonal 
flu” (NP23).  Despite concerns about the quality of the data and suspected severity of disease 
from health officials, media continued to focus on the number of confirmed and suspected cases 
and deaths over the next few weeks (GM46). 
On April 29, 2009 eight countries had confirmed cases and the number of confirmed 
Canadian cases increased from 6 to 13.  Cases had been confirmed in Alberta, Ontario, British 
Columbia and Nova Scotia (GM27, GM32, GM33, GM41, GM40, NP18, NP21, SP7, SP9).  All 
of the confirmed cases were among travelers returning from Mexico (GM29).  In Saskatchewan, 
health officials initially stated that they would only report the number of confirmed cases and 
would not include suspected cases in order to avoid confusion, however, they reversed the 
decision a few hours later and announced that they would report confirmed and suspected cases.  
At the time, there were no confirmed cases but there were 10 possible cases “under 
investigation” in Cypress, Five Hills, Prince Alberta Parkland and Prairie North health regions 
(SP10, SP16).   
The first death outside of Mexico was reported in the United States on April 30 (SP17).  New 
cases were also confirmed in Canada, bringing the total to 19 confirmed cases.  While media 
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described the increase in the number of confirmed cases as “climbed,” “jumped,” “rose,” or 
“soared,” health officials continually stated that the increase in cases was “expected” and “not 
surprising at all” (GM43, NP31).  Among the new cases, there were two individuals who had not 
travelled to Mexico but had been around people who had recently returned (NP31).  By the end 
of April, nine countries had confirmed cases (GM44).   
Newspapers reports of the confirmed cases and deaths were common during the month of 
May.  Due to the frequency of the reports, critics feared that “swine flu hysteria [could] spread 
faster than the virus itself” (SP27).  At the same time, health officials emphasized that the 
increase in the number of cases and deaths were expected while also stressing that virus has been 
mild (GM74, GM80).  In Canada, the first cases in Quebec and New Brunswick were reported 
on May 1 and May 2, respectively (SP21, SP26).  The first case in Manitoba and the first 
hospitalized case in Alberta were reported on May 4.  At the time, health officials were not “yet 
ready to classify the [hospitalized] case as severe and suggested that other factors could have 
contributed to the girl’s hospitalization” (GM86, NP64, NP72, SP29, SP36).  By early May, 
there was also evidence of community-based spread in Canada (SP36, NP64).   
Internationally, the virus did “not seem to be spreading aggressively outside of North 
America” (NP88, SP41).  In Mexico, the outbreak was reported to be on the decline despite the 
increase in the number of confirmed cases.  The increase in cases was due to the backlog of 
testing (GM55, GM81, GM106, NP41, NP42, NP48, NP86, SP21, SP23, SP52, SP59).  Mexican 
officials originally estimated that there were 176 possible deaths due to the virus but later 
changed the estimation to 100.  Of those suspected deaths, only 26 were confirmed in a lab 
(GM88, SP31, SP40, NP52, NP62, NP71).  The second US death, which was the second death 
outside of Mexico, was reported on May 6.  The woman was reported to have “chronic 
underlying health conditions” (GM93, NP72, SP38, SP41).  
On May 8, the first two cases were reported in Saskatchewan.  One was a high school student 
in Saskatoon and the other was a woman in her 20s from Regina Qu’Appelle Health Region.  
The same day, a possible death was reported in Alberta (NP80, SP46).  The next day, the death 
was confirmed in the newspaper. The Alberta woman had died at the end of April and “had a 
mild form of H1N1 with chronic pre-existing medical conditions.”  Due to her mild symptoms 
and pre-existing health conditions, the physicians that were taking care of her did not think about 
the flu as a possibility at the time of her death.  The connection between H1N1 and the woman’s 
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death was made when the woman’s mother had a confirmed case and health authorities tracked 
down her recent contacts (GM103, NP83, SP47).   
On May 11, a third US death and hundreds of more cases were reported in the United States 
(GM106).  The same day, two more cases were confirmed in Saskatchewan, one in the Heartland 
Health Region and the second in Prince Alberta Parkland Health Region (SP50).  Six more cases 
were reported the following day, May 12, in the Saskatoon Health Region (SP53).  Confirmed 
cases among employees at Toronto’s University Health Network also caught the media’s 
attention, however, due to privacy reasons, hospital officials would not reveal at which hospital 
the employees worked (GM107, NP87, SP53). 
On May 15, additional cases were reported in the Saskatoon Health Region bringing the total 
to 17 confirmed cases in the region.  Two articles published in the StarPhoenix on May 15 and 
May 16 reported that two thirds of the confirmed cases in Saskatchewan were from the 
Saskatoon Health Region.  The two articles also pointed out that confirmed number of cases 
underreported the total number of cases.  Many of the individuals with confirmed cases had 
family members who were also ill but the family members had mild symptoms and were not 
tested.  The reporting was also skewed since some health regions were sending more samples 
than others to be tested (SP60, SP62).  Despite the acknowledgement of potential issues that 
could distort the flu activity reports, the title of the May 16 StarPhoenix article was “Saskatoon 
area proves hotspot for H1N1 virus.”  The article title could give the false impression that the 
Saskatoon area was harder hit than other areas in the province.  The number of cases in 
Saskatchewan continued to be reported in the StarPhoenix until the end of May (SP66, SP68, 
SP71).  By mid to late May, a Globe and Mail article suggested that the worst of the outbreak 
was over (GM118).  Although, in another Global and Mail article, two influenza experts pointed 
out that it was still above normal flu activity for the time of year (GM117).  At the end of May, 
there were over 8,500 confirmed cases in 39 countries and 75 confirmed deaths in 4 countries 
(GM117).   
Media reports of flu activity continued into the summer months, although with less 
frequency.  Two more Canadian deaths were reported in late spring and early summer.  A 
Toronto death was reported at the end of May and a second death was report at the beginning of 
June in Ottawa.  Both individuals had several “underlying medical conditions” and it was unclear 
what role H1N1 played in the deaths (NP99, NP105).  During the late spring and early summer, 
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there were also reports of flu activity in several schools (refer to the next section for an overview 
of the reporting of absentee rates).  The media reports of school outbreaks included several 
Ottawa area schools and a Regina elementary school (SP72, SP73, SP75).  Out of 400 students at 
the Regina school, over 150 students were reported to be ill, however, only one student was 
tested and confirmed to have H1N1.  Since the majority of the students were not tested, this was 
an example where the confirmed number of cases did not provide an accurate measure of the 
extent of the illness.  There were also suspected cases in several Saskatoon schools but the 
schools did not experience the same level of illness as the Regina elementary (SP73, SP79).  
Later in the summer, the flu was spreading in summer camps and in several First Nation 
communities in northern Manitoba.  Throughout June, the newspapers reported on the 
disproportionate number of severe cases in Nunavut and among First Nation communities in 
Manitoba and northwest Ontario (GM131, GM136, GM139, GM158, NP110, NP132, NP138, 
SP72, SP74, SP76, SP77, SP78, SP82, SP87, SP98).  St. Theresa Point, Manitoba was the first 
FN community reported in the news with a severe outbreak.  Initially, there were only 2 
confirmed cases of H1N1, though “hundreds more” reported being ill in the community of 3,200 
individuals.  Other affected communities in Manitoba included Garden Hill and those in the 
Island Lake region.  Sick individuals from the Manitoba communities were flown to Winnipeg 
for hospitalization and many were put on ventilators.  A Globe and Mail article claimed that 
several provincial health officials in Manitoba tried to “play down Manitoba’s growing numbers 
of severely ill flu patients,” while at the same time, “the World Health Organization was 
highlighting” the severe cases among Canada’s Aboriginal population (GM139).  In mid-June, a 
reserve in Northwest Ontario reported a similar outbreak.  They only had 10 confirmed cases, 
however, they eventually stopped testing and treated everyone as though they had H1N1 
(NP120, SP87).  It was not clear if the First Nation population in Saskatchewan was similarly 
affected since cases were broken down by health region and not by ethnicity (SP79).  
The severe outbreaks in several First Nation communities appeared to be “unique in the 
country” and many other FN communities were concerned that they would be similarly affected 
(GM141).  Leaders of the communities were concerned about the potential impact of the virus in 
the impoverished reserves.  Many lacked the infrastructure to deal with a severe outbreak and 
residents lived in overcrowded housing, with some lacking running water. These were 
recognized as conditions under which the virus could quickly spread (GM131, GM136, NP110, 
 92 
 
NP113, NP121, NP134, SP72, SP74, SP76, SP77, SP78, SP89, SP97).  Several articles focused 
on why First Nation communities were likely to be severely affected.  Most cited overcrowding, 
poor living conditions, and complications from other illnesses as contributing factors.  Genetics 
was also identified as a potential factor but was mentioned less frequently than the others 
(NP113, SP79). 
Pandemic period   
By the second week of June, the fourth Canadian death and first death in Quebec was 
reported.  Cases were also confirmed in every province and territory except for Newfoundland 
and Labrador (GM136, NP109).  Worldwide, over 70 countries had confirmed cases including 
140 confirmed deaths (GM140, GM145, SP78).  Due to the number of confirmed deaths, some 
questioned why H1N1 continued to make headlines.  It was viewed as a “pesky little virus” and 
not a “killer” (GM682).  Despite the media criticism, the WHO declared H1N1 a pandemic on 
June 11, 2009 based on their official definition.  H1N1 was unique in the fact that the majority of 
severe cases occurred in people under 25 and about half of the cases were among previously 
healthy individuals (SP80).  Four days later, two more deaths, both in individuals with chronic 
health conditions, were reported in Quebec and the first death outside of North America was 
reported.  The first confirmed cases in Newfoundland and Labrador were reported as well 
(GM149, NP119).  On June 17, four more deaths were reported in Manitoba and Quebec, 
bringing the total to 11.  One of the deaths was “an apparently healthy Winnipeg man in his 40s” 
and the youngest Canadian to die so far.  The death was described as “premature...by anyone’s 
test” (GM152).  The second death in Manitoba and the two deaths in Quebec were individuals 
with underlying health problems (GM152).  The second death in Manitoba gained additional 
media attention after it was reported that the woman had been turned away from the hospital 
twice before being put on a ventilator (NP124). 
Around this time, Ontario made changes in their testing policy.  Health officials 
recommended not to test sick individuals unless they were pregnant, hospitalized, or had 
underlying health conditions (NP121).  In Saskatchewan, health officials were no longer 
reporting the number of cases by health region since it could give the wrong impression that the 
risk of infection is greater in certain regions.  A higher number of cases in certain health regions 
were likely due to increased testing in those areas (SP91).  It was also noted that the total number 
of confirmed cases was “difficult to interpret...because testing is largely...discouraged in the 
 93 
 
main centres” (SP100).  Saskatchewan health officials advised doctors to discontinue testing for 
mild symptoms since resources were needed elsewhere (SP91, SP100, SP106, SP170).  Despite 
the changes in testing and the previous acknowledgements that many cases were not tested, the 
newspapers continued to emphasize the number of confirmed cases. 
In late June, several more Canadian deaths were reported, including a six year old and a 
teenager in Ontario.  The news reports noted whether the individuals had pre-existing health 
conditions (GM156, NP130, NP133, SP95).  The first serious cases and deaths in Saskatchewan 
occurred in late June.  Two individuals were hospitalized in intensive care, though the medical 
officer would not identify where the individuals were from or where they were being treated due 
to privacy concerns (SP100, SP101).  One of these individuals was the first reported death in 
Saskatchewan and the second death was reported the next day on June 30.  Other than the sex 
and age range of these individuals, no other information was provided due to privacy reasons 
(SP101, SP103).   
By July, more than 100 countries had confirmed cases (GM170, GM172).  One study, which 
was not identified but was referred to two Globe and Mail articles, suggested that Canada was 
the hardest hit county based on the per capita estimates (GM171, GM172).  The study estimated 
that there were 100,000 infected, which was “far and above the 7,983 lab-confirmed cases” 
(GM171).  Identified “hotspots” included Saskatchewan and Manitoba (GM171).  Dr. Butler-
Jones, the country’s chief public health officer, “warned reporters to be very suspicious” about 
using these kinds of estimates to guide their impressions of the severity of the outbreak 
(GM172).  He suggested that it was more likely that Canada tested a larger percentage of the 
total number of cases and was therefore not a reflection of actual severity (GM172).   
Confirmed cases in Canada and worldwide were reported but with decreasing frequency 
during the month of July.  At the beginning of July, the first reported death of a child occurred in 
Saskatchewan.  Other than the fact that the child had “serious underlying health problems,” no 
other information was available in the news report, presumably due to privacy issues (SP106).  
Two other deaths, one in Manitoba and one in Alberta gained some media attention.  The first 
was a Winnipeg pastor (GM201, NP143) and the second was a Calgary woman in her mid-20s 
who had ties to Saskatchewan.  It was believed that she became ill following a recent trip to 
Saskatchewan.  She was the first person in Alberta to die with no pre-existing medical conditions 
(GM205, SP110).  In eastern Canada, Nova Scotia reported an increase of serious cases but no 
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deaths (GM182).  Also during July, flu activity at Ontario summer camps was reported.  The 
outbreak had been expected to wane during the summer months but it did not follow 
expectations (GM192, GM196, GM203, NP149).  In mid-July, the WHO stated that H1N1 was 
too widespread to make counting cases possible and advised countries to stop spending resources 
tracking the illness, though this did not stop the newspapers from reporting updates on the 
number of confirmed cases and deaths when they were available (GM224, GM244, NP154, 
SP127). 
In August and September, there was less coverage of the number of confirmed cases due to 
changes in testing, however, the confirmed deaths were reported (NP205).  It was commonly 
noted that H1N1 was not as deadly as originally feared (GM223, GM241, GM247, GM697, 
GM698).  Coverage focused on the reported deaths and the number of hospitalizations (SP178, 
SP179, GM277, GM279).  In September, the first Tamiflu drug-resistant case was found in 
Alberta, however, officials stated that Canadians should not be alarmed by it (GM289, NP201).   
British Columbia was the first province to experience an increase in flu activity for the fall 
flu season (GM335, NP223, SP261).  In late September, a First Nation reserve in British 
Columbia was identified as the site of the first outbreak of the fall flu season (GM292).  There 
was also a report of an outbreak in several Vancouver elementary schools (GM301).  Flu activity 
was increasing elsewhere in the country but was still considered low, in contrast to the flu 
activity in the United States.  Flu activity in the U.S. was high at the time (GM337, SP231, 
SP232).  While flu activity was still low in Canada outside of British Columbia, new cases were 
identified in other provinces.  One case included the death of a high school student in 
Saskatchewan in early October (GM353, NP232, SP247, SP249, SP251, SP253, SP263, SP267).  
Near the end of October, federal health officials declared that Canada was in the second wave of 
H1N1 after a significant level of sickness was present in the rest of the country.  By then, there 
were at least 4,800 known deaths worldwide, including 80 in Canada (GM374, SP271).  The 
number of confirmed cases during the second wave was infrequently mentioned since the 
majority of cases were not tested (SP306).  However, outbreaks in schools and high profile 
deaths were noted in the newspapers (refer to the next two sections for an overview of these 
issues).  In Saskatchewan, there were a number of schools, including the University of 
Saskatchewan, with reported outbreaks.  Some of the schools and communities were identified in 
the newspapers but not all of them (SP293, SP279, SP297, SP301).  Health officials stressed that 
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people should not panic since these types of outbreaks were expected and the majority of cases 
were mild (SP288).  Nationally, several more deaths were reported including a preteen and 13-
year old from Ontario.  Both of these deaths gained a great deal of media attention since they 
were both young and apparently healthy (GM375, GM386, GM381, GM382, GM395, GM415, 
GM422, NP260, NP269, NP266, NP286, NP293, SP291, SP292, SP300, SP326, SP319).  While 
the two deaths were reported as rare, news reports alternated between cautioning against panic 
over the two deaths and using them as an example of the risk from H1N1.  News reports in 
November commented on the spike in the number of cases and the higher than normal flu 
activity in many locations.  There were also updates on the number of confirmed deaths and 
hospitalizations (GM472 GM485, GM492, GM524, GM525, GM529, GM537, GM539, GM546, 
NP298, NP317, NP322, SP327, SP337, SP341, SP350, SP352, SP358, SP362, SP363, SP370, 
SP374, SP375, SP382, SP389, SP395, SP397); though, some articles suggested that relying 
solely on the deaths and hospitalizations did not paint a true picture of the current flu activity 
(NP351).   
By mid-November, reports suggested that the peak of the second wave was nearly done, 
however, it did not mean that the second wave was over and flu activity was still high for the 
time of year (NP361, NP366, NP367, SP400, SP404, SP405, SP406, SP409, SP413, SP418).  By 
the end of November and beginning of December, the activity was leveling off in most locations 
in Canada and some article mentioned the potential for a third wave (GM533, GM576, GM579, 
GM581, NP379, NP381, SP426, SP430, SP429, SP432, SP440, SP445).  By this time, most 
coverage summarized the number of deaths and hospitalizations over the course of the second 
wave (GM602, NP394, SP448, SP449, SP450, SP514).  In Canada, there were nearly 400 
reported deaths and more than 11,000 deaths worldwide (GM607, GM615, SP466).  
During January, there were fewer people diagnosed with H1N1 and overall the flu activity 
was well below normal (GM615, GM646, SP472, SP478, SP479, SP481, SP495).  Due to the 
low levels of flu activity for the time of year and the number of confirmed deaths from H1N1, an 
article published in February suggested that the 2009/2010 flu season was the “wimpiest one yet” 
(GM646).  This assessment and many like it seemed to ignore the level of flu activity in previous 
months and relied solely on the number of confirmed deaths to assess the impact of H1N1.  The 
flu activity in Canada ended abruptly in January and Canada did not experience a third wave.  
There were very few news reports of flu activity after December except for occasionally reports 
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of flu activity in other parts of the world.  The H1N1 pandemic was declared over in August of 
2010.  
7.2.2 Reported flu activity – absentee rates at schools and workplaces 
In additional to the confirmed cases and deaths, absentee rates at schools and workplaces 
were used as indicators of flu activity and were reported in the media.  The absentee rates at the 
schools are reported in the media as they occurred, since schools are required to report absentee 
rates of 10% or more to local public health.  Work absenteeism during the pandemic was 
reported after the fact with survey data (SP279, SP292). 
During the first wave in June, there were some areas reporting a high number of absent 
students at schools (SP72, SP73, SP75) while other locations were reporting no noticeable 
absenteeism at the schools (GM152).  Once the schools were closed for the summer, news 
reports shifted to the impact in summer camps, particularly in Ontario (GM155).  Reports about 
school absentee rates began again in October during the second wave.  In Saskatoon, six local 
schools reported greater than 10% absenteeism, which was “akin to peak flu season” (SP279, 
SP292).  In Saskatchewan, schools on two First Nation communities closed due to high absentee 
rates (SP306).  Similar reports of high absenteeism in schools came from other parts of Canada.  
In Ottawa, 20% of the city schools had rates of 10% or higher (SP292).  Montreal reported eight 
schools with high absentee rates, which was “double the number of schools that have been hit in 
the past” (SP301).  Some schools in Alberta reported that more than 30% of the students were 
staying home (GM415).  A school in New Brunswick was described as “almost deserted, with 
340 of 640 absent” (GM421).  News reports of high school absenteeism continued into 
November.  By the beginning of November, ten public schools in Saskatoon reported high 
absenteeism (SP323) and many other schools around Canada were still reporting 10% or more 
absentee rates (SP351).  Some schools in British Columbia and in New Brunswick ended up 
closing due to the high rates of absent students (GM485, GM513).  One thing that was noted 
about the absentee rates was that it couldn’t be assumed that the absent students had H1N1 but it 
was considered a strong indicator (SP292).   
Workplaces were expected to experience similar rates of high absenteeism and many articles 
during the first wave and the beginning of the second wave focused on how businesses should 
prepare for the pandemic.  Possible business impacts included the possibility of a quarter to a 
third of their staff sick, the potential for lost productivity, and business interruptions (GM78, 
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GM198, GM526, GM464, NP94, NP219, NP308, SP239, SP241, SP250, SP256, SP284, SP460).  
One article on pandemic preparedness for businesses referred to labor laws that required 
companies to take steps to protect employees, and employers’ obligation to prevent the spread of 
the flu in workplaces.  It also stated that businesses needed to be aware of privacy laws and the 
need to protect confidential medical information of employees in the event that they become sick 
(NP94).  Despite the emphasis on the need to be prepared, survey results reported in a Globe and 
Mail article found that the majority of small businesses (8 out of 10) did not consider preparing 
for disruptions during a pandemic as a high priority (GM356).  While many of the articles 
focused on the financial impact on businesses due to absenteeism, some also noted the impact on 
employees and families due to missed wages (GM556). 
The extent of the national workplace absentee rates was not reported until January and 
February 2010, well after the peak of the second wave had passed.  A Globe and Mail article 
published in December noted that by December, H1N1 was not considered a “common cause of 
sickness for employees” (GM587).  One of the few articles that reported on the impact in 
workplaces during the pandemic was from a First Nation reserve.  Small work places were 
having trouble staying open, such as the community store, which was the only place in the 
community that sold food.  Half of the staff was reported to be absent and the store struggled to 
stay open (SP87).   
Locally, a two part series in the StarPhoenix published on June 1 and June 2, 2010 reported 
on the impact of H1N1 on public health workers and education workers at Saskatoon Public 
Schools (SPS) and Greater Saskatoon Catholic Schools (GSCS).  The first part reported the 
absentee rates on various “days of interest” from Sept 2008 to Nov 2009 and included the 
weather for the day and notable events (i.e. concerts, sports events) that occurred.  The second 
part focused specifically on the impact of the H1N1 outbreak.  The absentee rates started to rise 
above average every day in the last week of Sept 2009, peaked around late October/early 
November and continued to be high until mid-November which coincided with the level of flu 
activity in the city (SP504, SP505).  
National workplace absentee rates were reported in January and February 2010.  The reports 
were the first results of Statistics Canada’s survey to assess the impact of the flu on the 
workforce.  The PHAC asked Statistics Canada to assess the impact of flu on the workforce over 
a three-month period, although there were no numbers from previous years to compare the 
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impact.  The first survey results reported by the newspapers examined the absentee rates during 
the month of November.  More than one million, or 9% or the workforce, missed work due to the 
flu. Whether it was due H1N1 or seasonal flu is unclear.  Flu-related absenteeism was highest in 
Newfoundland and lowest in Quebec.  On average, 1.5 million people lost about 20 hours of 
work because they were sick or an immediate family member was ill.  Workers aged 30 to 44 
had the highest absenteeism rates, women missed more work than men, and twice as many 
employees with children missed work.  About 600,000 people put in 8.6 million extra hours of 
overtime with health care workers most likely to have extra hours (GM628, NP405, NP406, 
SP478).   
One issue that was highlighted in the Statistics Canada figures was influence of on absentee 
rates during a pandemic.  Finding childcare was an issue when schools were closed or when the 
children were sick (GM4, GM556).  One Globe and Mail article published in November pointed 
out that many families have two working parents, though it is still mainly the mothers that stay 
home with sick children leading to a “bias [that] still had an impact on the role of mothers in the 
workforce” (GM556).  Two other articles in the StarPhoenix focused on the impact of a 
pandemic on working mothers and the workforce in general (SP135, SP241).  The first article 
suggested that a “critical component of flu plans” should focus on “the role of women, who are 
often the caregivers of their families” (SP135).  The other article suggested that social impacts of 
closing schools and “imposing no sniffles or cough rules has to be seriously considered” 
(SP241).  Similar issues regarding childcare occurred in Mexico when the restrictions were in 
place.  Due to the lack of childcare and concerns about missed work and wages, some workers 
took their children to their workplaces.  Though, this was considered “a joke because they’ll be 
at risk of infection” at work as well (GM72, NP13). 
The last quote highlights an issue that would affect absentee rates which is the perception of 
safe and unsafe places.  Some people may stay home from work or school due to the fear of 
illness.  It was not clear how many absent students at schools were actually due to H1N1 and 
how much was due to parents keeping children home due to fears of becoming sick (GM301, 
GM513, NP335).  During the pandemic, some workplaces continued the bring-your-kid-to-work-
day.  A perceived “fringe benefit” of the practice was that children would “skip the sniffling, flu-
ravaged classrooms and hang out in offices stocked with hand sanitizer and adults, who know 
how to cough into their sleeves.”  In regards to bring-your-kid-to-work-day, two parents stated “I 
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think he’s more exposed at school” and “I certainly don’t think keeping her in school is going to 
keep her safe” (GM434).  In both cases, the school was perceived as an unsafe place. 
Another issue that influenced absentee rates was school and work policies regarding 
absenteeism.  Some schools suspended their perfect attendance prizes to encourage students to 
stay home when sick (GM383).  Many colleges and universities also changed their absentee 
policies and no longer required a doctor’s note.  Instead they allowed students, staff and faculty 
to self-diagnose and stay home for a week.  While they did suspect that some would abuse the 
system and pretend to be sick, the potential abuse was considered minor compared to the health 
benefits, which included not requiring medical personnel to spend their time writing notes 
(GM567).  Some workplace policies were thought to discourage employees from staying home 
when sick.  Some workers feared for their job security if they stayed home, or would not be paid 
if they did not show up (GM78, GM147 GM466, SP184, GM326).  For example, a survey of US 
workers found that 72% feared that they would lose their job or fall behind if they didn’t show 
up to work (GM147).
 
 Another survey from Quebec found that about a quarter of employees 
planned to show up to work even if they were sick (GM363).  An employer’s effort “to set limits 
on sick leave could backfire by leading to increased ‘sickness presenteeism’ and inadvertently 
increase sick leave” by spreading the illness to others (GM147).  There were reports of 
businesses that addressed these issues by becoming more flexible with their sick policies and 
making arrangements for workers to work at home while ill (GM383, GM466).  There were 
other businesses though, that tightened their policies to avoid unnecessary absenteeism.  For 
example, workers with the Alberta government had “to swear a legal oath that they had the swine 
flu if they miss[ed] more than three days of work,” however, they did not require a medical note 
to ease the pressure on doctors (SP352).  There was also a report about a law firm that had 
“tough H1N1 laws for its employees” and still required a medical note.  This was “contrary to 
urgings from medical communities for employers to avoid bothering doctors with requests for 
sick notes” (GM572).  
7.2.3 Personal Stories 
Personal stories of individuals who were ill or died from H1N1 were also included in the 
news reports.  Some of these individuals became profile news stories and were used as examples 
of the risk posed by H1N1.  Not all of these individuals were identified by name in the media; 
some reports only included the age, sex and location due to privacy concerns.  Family members 
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named some individuals.  Health officials did not provide information or gave limited 
information due to privacy issues.  In Saskatchewan, health officials did not disclose the names, 
ages, and locations of those who tested positive or died from the virus as a way to maintain 
privacy and patient confidentially (SP54). 
One of the earliest identified cases was a five-year old boy in Mexico, initially referred to as 
“patient zero1.”  When he was sick, his illness was described as a “brief cold.”  During late April 
and early May 2009, the five-year-old boy’s picture was “all over the news,” and he became the 
“face of a disease.” It was later determined that he was not “patient zero” when cases were 
confirmed from March 2009, prior to when the boy was ill (GM27, GM56, GM106).  There was 
some criticism of the coverage that labeled the boy as “patient zero.”  For example, one article 
stated that the boy “had his 15 minutes of infamy” as “patient zero” (GM27).  Another article 
suggested that while the news media “didn’t directly blame [the five-year old] it certainly singled 
him out in the hunt for the flu’s origin.”  The article stated that the case raised questions about 
privacy and that “patients’ names should not be revealed, particularly children’s” (GM56). 
Within Canada, some of the individuals who died or who became sick were identified and 
received a great deal of attention in the media as examples of the risks from H1N1.  The first 
identified death was the first known Canadian death, a woman from a northern Alberta Métis 
community in May 2009.  News coverage provided her name, age, and location (SP55).  As an 
example of the impact on young individuals, a Globe and Mail article included the story of a 
young boy from Brampton, Ontario who died a day after complaining of symptoms in June 2009 
(GM170).  Another highlighted story included the July death of a 6-year-old girl.  She was the 
third H1N1 death in Saskatchewan.  The girl contracted the virus while at the hospital for a bone 
condition and died within a week.  The father of the child stated that, “what they say about H1N1 
is very true, that it certainly has an effect on the sick...an awful lot faster than it does on you and 
me.”  Family members did not speak to the media about her death until October 2009.  They 
chose to share her story as a way to advocate for prevention methods such as hand washing and 
vaccination (SP284).   
The October deaths of two healthy youth, a preteen girl and a 13 year old boy from Ontario, 
gained a great deal of media attention, especially the death of the young boy (SP300).   Both 
were used as examples of the risks of H1N1 and the importance of vaccinations.  For example, a 
                                                 
1
 Patient zero is the initial case in disease outbreak. 
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National Post editorial, critical of the anti-vaccine messages, stated that, “every parent who 
believes [anti-vaccine] nonsense – should note the case of a seemingly healthy young girl from 
Cornwall, Ontario, who came down with the flu and shortness of breath last Friday and was dead 
by Sunday” (NP256).  The death of the “otherwise healthy” 13-year-old boy received a great 
deal of media attention.  The teenager “seemed otherwise healthy” and “died suddenly after 
showing only minor symptoms” (GM381, GM384, SP292).  Coverage focused on the wide-
spread impact of the boy’s death and how he became the “human face” of H1N1 (GM451, 
NP299).  As his father noted, his son’s “death has captured a nation trying to find answers to a 
disease that is currently wearing the face of our beautiful son” (SP326).   
Personal stories of pregnant women were also highlighted as examples of the risk.  One story 
was about a Quebec mother who died after giving birth in August (GM251, SP209).  Other 
stories highlighted individuals who died after being turned away from the hospital.  One example 
was a Manitoba woman who died in June after being turned away twice from the hospital 
(NP124).  Another story was about a Calgary woman with ties to a Saskatchewan First Nation 
community who passed away in July.  She became ill after a recent trip to Saskatchewan and was 
the first person in Alberta with “no pre-existing medical conditions to die from the virus” 
(GM184, GM185, GM187, SP110, SP112).  The woman was described as “mid-20s” with “no 
history of health problems,” “healthy,” and “a mother of four.”  Alberta Health Services did not 
identify the woman but family and friends provided her name to the media.   Reports stated that 
she was sent home from the hospital and later died, which “rais[ed] questions about medical 
vigilance and readiness” (GM184, GM186, GM193). 
Other deaths profiled included a Toronto educator who was working at a Canadian school in 
Hong Kong (GM315) and an Ottawa Chemistry professor who was raised in Saskatoon (GM549, 
NP346, SP388).  The professor was described as a “rising academic star and healthy father of 
three young children” (GM549).  Articles noted that the professor’s spouse was an MD and that 
he was “as lucky as you can be in the Canadian system of having a highly qualified and loving 
person right there.  And still, there’s just some things you cannot control” (GM549).  Another 
personal story included a February 2010 story of a 21-year-old Toronto rapper who died “in a 
matter of days” before Christmas from H1N1.  His mother had urged him to get vaccinated but 
he refused.  The article focused on how his death saved several lives since he donated his 
kidneys, liver, eyes and other tissue” (NP415). 
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In addition to the news reports on specific individuals, there was also a feature article 
profiling the “victims of H1N1.”  It was initially published in the National Post on Oct 28, 2009 
(NP264), appeared in the StarPhoenix a few days later on November 2, 2009 (SP321) and 
focused on the 96 known deaths to date.  The article noted that “the names of many had not been 
released for privacy reasons but some have been made known.”  The article begin with the 
following quote:  
They lived in Canada’s small towns and big cities, from coast to coast.  They 
were children, parents, friends and neighbours.  Some had health problems before 
the virus struck them down, but many were young and vital (NP264, SP321).  
 Of the 96 deaths, 96% had “pre-existing health conditions.”  The article gave an overview of the 
known deaths broken down by province with the sex, age, and whether they had a pre-existing 
health conditions with descriptions such as “otherwise healthy,” “no previous medical issues,” 
“healthy, friendly,” “healthy child whose death sparked a wave of concern,” “relatively healthy,” 
“history of asthma and diabetes,” “many health problems,” and “history of asthma and was 
overweight” (NP264, SP321).  In many cases, the term underlying or pre-existing health 
condition was not defined which makes the term difficult to interpret.  The term provides an 
explanation for the death and thus carries an emotional meaning: it provides a reason for the 
death.  In contrast, the death of a “healthy” individual may appear more shocking.    
While many of the publicized deaths were used as examples of H1N1’s risks, there were also 
words of caution about over emphasizing certain deaths, particularly deaths among healthy 
individuals.  For example, a column questioning the benefit of the anticipated vaccine suggested 
that, “healthy people have little to fear” since two thirds of “serious illness and deaths” occur in 
individuals with “serious underlying health problems.”  Deaths in healthy individuals are likely 
to occur as more people become sick but those “individual tragedies will be blown out of 
proportion by the media” (GM391).  As previously stated, deaths in healthy individuals are more 
shocking since they are unexpected.  
One story that tried to counter the fear of healthy individuals dying from H1N1 was that of a 
pastor in Manitoba.  The death of an “apparently healthy pastor of a church in rural Manitoba” 
occurred in July (GM176).  Initially, the family declined to comment and asked friends and the 
congregation not to comment (NP143).  A few days after his death, there was a Globe and Mail 
article that contained an extensive biography of the pastor and recounted his last days.  In the 
article, his wife wanted “people to understand that her husband was the rare, random case: most 
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patients with H1N1 get better.” She did not want “the pastor’s story to make people hide from 
life for fear of the flu” (GM201).   
Another editorial, critical of the highly publicized deaths of healthy youths, commented that 
there has been “scant reporting…about the one specific group of children who have suffered the 
most fatalities…disabled children” (NP302).  The editorial also noted the difference in reporting 
on “healthy” children and those who “had an underlying medical condition” pointing to the 
example of the “healthy Ontario teen” who “captured front-page headlines in newspapers across 
Canada” and the death of a child with a “underlying medical condition” which “merit[ed] less 
than five lines of press in Minnesota newspapers.”  The author refers to the phrase “underlying 
medical condition” as 
…a mantra that we’ve heard repeated so often in the new reports of H1N1 deaths.  
It’s almost expected, so let’s sweep his death under the rug and not panic.  In fact, 
the term underlying medical condition is deliberately used to reassure the public 
that it wasn’t one of their healthy children (NP302). 
Not all of the stories were of individuals who died, some included survival stories.  These 
included a November story of a “mother of two young children” who emerged from a “medically 
induced coma after complete respiratory failure.”  The woman “went from being perfectly 
healthy to ridiculously sick in a very short period of time and the doctors [weren’t] even sure 
why.”  Her case was described as a “miracle” by family members.   Alberta Health Services did 
not comment on the cases due to privacy issues (SP376).  Two other cases included the stories of 
two pregnant women.  One case was described as a “happy ending” and “quintessential non-
story of the H1N1 pandemic” (GM608).  Another as a “tale of survival – and that of her baby – 
comprise one of the remarkable stories to emerge from Canada’s battle with the swine flu.”   The 
baby, delivered by C-section after the mother went into premature labor, was described as a 
“miracle baby” (SP497).  
7.3 Summary 
The newspaper coverage of the influenza activity and spread included reports on the 
confirmed number of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths.  Once surveillance methods changed 
from counting confirmed cases to tracking absentee rates in schools, the media reports reflected 
the change.  The media tended to emphasize the number of confirmed cases and deaths which 
did not give a clear picture of the outbreak.  At times, the surveillance data was incomplete and it 
was also possible that many mild cases went unnoticed or were not tested due to testing 
 104 
 
guidelines.  Reliance on only the number of confirmed cases and deaths did not give represent 
the full scope of the outbreak. 
To personalize the experience, there were also stories of individuals who died or were sick 
but recovered.  The terms underlying or pre-existing health conditions and healthy were 
frequently used when describing an individual who died.  In many cases, the term underlying or 
pre-existing health condition was not defined which made the term difficult to interpret.  It was 
unclear what would be defined as an underlying health condition which may distort the 
perception of what it means to be healthy.  Cases of young and healthy individuals also gained a 
great deal of media attention, which can further distort the perception of the disease.   
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CHAPTER 8  
PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the print media coverage of Canada’s pandemic planning and 
preparedness over the course of the pandemic.  The first section examines the coverage of the 
planning and preparedness activities by health officials, health organizations, and the broader 
community.  The second section discusses media emphasis on the role of SARS in pandemic 
preparedness.  The third section focuses on the criticism of the preparedness activities and the 
speed with which they occurred.  The section also includes media criticism of the general 
pandemic response due to jurisdictional issues.   
8.2 Pandemic Preparedness in Canada 
News reports about pandemic planning and preparedness were common during the spring 
and summer months.  When the WHO raised the pandemic alert level to 5 on April 29, the WHO 
urged countries to increase their preparations for a possible pandemic (GM9, GM27, GM32, 
GM43, SP17).  The increase in alert level was “a signal to governments…to the pharmaceutical 
industry and the business communities, that certain actions should be undertaken with increased 
urgency and an accelerated pace” (GM43, SP17).   
8.2.1 Canada’s pandemic preparedness during first wave 
In Canada, the common message about pandemic preparedness was that Canada was “well-
prepared” for a possible pandemic and was “among the most prepared countries in the world” 
(GM6, GM195, GM199, GM206, GM216, NP84, SP2, SP6, SP7, SP8, SP21).  Health officials 
and scientists had “long been preparing for a new flu virus that could cause a global pandemic 
[and] Canada was among the first to start preparations for a pandemic” (GM3).  Canada’s 
pandemic influenza plan, revised in 2006, contained “a range of measures that could be 
implemented in the event a pandemic arrives” (GM43, SP17).  Canada and many provinces, 
including Saskatchewan, had their pandemic plans in place as a precaution by late April and 
early May (SP16).  The initiation of the pandemic plans and continuing preparation during the 
summer months was needed not only for the spring and summer but to prevent “a bigger problem 
when and if [H1N1] comes back in October or November” (GM55, GM132, GM229, NP176, 
SP26).  The overall goal was to “try to minimize the spread in the community, and blunt the 
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epidemic long enough for people to develop immunity in a natural way, or for the global 
community to develop a vaccine” (SP72).   
The perception that Canada was well prepared was reflected in public opinion surveys that 
were reported in the media.  In early May, a public opinion survey, commissioned by the 
Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions, asked respondents if they felt that Canada was well 
prepared to deal with a major pandemic.  The majority of respondents (60%) said that the 
country was prepared, while 33.5% said Canada was unprepared (GM137).  In June, after the 
pandemic was officially declared, health officials continued to remind the public of the need to 
be prepared for the fall wave.  A common phrase was to “remain as vigilant as possible” (SP80).  
The declaration of the pandemic did not change the direction of Canada’s preparations since 
preparations had been ongoing since early May (GM144, GM145).   
During the summer months, news article reported on the various preparation efforts, which 
included stockpiling supplies and equipment (GM211, NP174, SP166, SP169, SP179, SP197, 
SP242, SP251, SP268), plans to increase medical personnel (SP82, SP135, SP181), and plans to 
prioritize who would receive access to scarce resources.  These plans also included legal, clinical 
and ethical issues and outlined the number of resources that were available (GM183).  In July, 
several articles focused on the number of ventilators available nationwide which was identified 
as a need during the first wave.  The PHAC was ordering more ventilators to increase the 
national stockpile in case provinces did not have enough (GM173, GM174, GM176, GM194).  
Many of the articles focused on the number of ventilators that were available, the associated 
costs for needed ventilators and their difficulties with finding that information.  The PHAC told 
the Globe and Mail that there was no point in counting the number of ventilators that were in 
stockpile when trained personnel were still needed to operate them (GM273). 
In August 2009, the newspapers focus on national preparations shifted to the Council of the 
Federation
1
 meeting held in Regina, Saskatchewan.  The provincial and territorial premiers met 
to discuss a range of issues and among the issues were preparedness for H1N1.  Pandemic 
preparedness was added to the agenda after Aboriginal leaders met with the premiers to 
emphasize the importance of pandemic planning for First Nation communities and the need for 
                                                 
1
 The Council of the Federation is a meeting of the provincial and territorial premiers to 
encourage collaborative intergovernmental relations. 
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co-operation between aboriginal groups, the federal government, and provincial governments 
(NP167, SP136).  The Premiers refrained from criticizing Ottawa but said more work was 
needed to improve the preparations.  Discussions included ways to “beef up education programs, 
co-operate on vaccine purchases and prepare hospitals” (GM235).  The premiers also suggested 
that discussions with Ottawa needed to go beyond the cost of vaccine and who was responsible 
for the costs and include discussions on the broader costs for services and supplies.  Other 
discussions included co-operation between provinces in order to move medical professional and 
equipment to help harder hit areas (GM235, NP169, SP140). 
8.2.2 Pandemic preparedness in the community 
Newspaper reports on pandemic preparedness also focused on efforts that were underway in 
the broader community, such as within schools and workplaces.  During the summer months, 
schools, daycares, and universities across the country used the time to revise and implement their 
pandemic plans (GM192).  Reported efforts included setting up locations to isolate sick children, 
setting up cleaning protocol and adding more hand washing stations.  Protocols were also 
established for reporting above average absentee rates, which was used as an indicator for 
influenza activity within the community (see section 7.2.2  for a discussion on how absentee 
rates were reported in the media).  Within public schools, the plans required flexibility to deal 
with the unknowns and to avoid drastic interruptions to the school year (GM197, GM260, 
GM301, NP179, SP293, SP146).  The StarPhoenix reported that the Saskatoon school divisions 
already had pandemic plans and were distributing copies to schools administrators, students and 
parents.  The University of Saskatchewan was also working “very closely” with the Saskatoon 
Health Region on their pandemic plan (SP24).   
In addition to schools, articles reported on pandemic planning in workplaces.  Most of the 
preparations occurred during the first wave in anticipation for the second wave.  Many business- 
related articles outlined the importance for workplaces to have a plan in place and suggested 
ways in which employers could do so (GM37, NP73, SP39, SP226, SP234, SP241).  Some 
articles also reported on the lack of planning in workplaces, for example, a Globe and Mail 
article reported that 87% of companies did not have a contingency plan in place and suggested 
that they were more preoccupied with immediate financial challenges than a distant 
hypothetical” (GM198).  To help workplaces prepare, Federal Health Minister Aglukkaq 
announced in August that nearly $1 million in funding would be available to help small 
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businesses prepare pandemic plans and to deal with increased absenteeism and other effects of 
the pandemic (SP146).  In Saskatchewan, the provincial government distributed pandemic 
planning guides to workplaces (SP223, SP226).  In Saskatoon, the city also prepared for the 
second wave of the pandemic by implementing “education, policy, and procedure to make sure 
city work continue[d] and employees [were] prepared,” though, the city would not take some of 
the “extreme measures” that a few US cities had implemented such as setting up quarantine for 
sick employees at work (SP160). 
Health officials were also encouraging individuals to consider pandemic planning and to 
think about what they would do if they or family members became sick or if H1N1 became 
widespread in their local community (GM25).  Recommendations for individual pandemic 
planning included following public health measures and warnings, to have a personal plan, and 
to maintain an emergency kit of supplies at home (GM39, SP239).  An additional suggestion 
from the PHAC was for everyone to have a “flu buddy,” someone who would be willing to help 
care for them if they are sick.  Canadians were recommended to “talk with family, friends and 
neighbors” and to figure out how they might help each other during the H1N1 pandemic (NP170, 
SP197). 
8.3 SARS and Pandemic Preparedness 
The 2003 SARS outbreak was commonly mentioned in discussions regarding pandemic 
planning and preparedness.  The outbreak was “as close to the H1N1 pandemic as Canada had 
experienced in recent years” (GM321) and was the “last major threat of a global pandemic” 
(GM235, NP34).  The media also used SARS as a comparison for the H1N1 response in Canada 
and China.  The two countries had been affected by SARS and received criticisms for their 
responses.  Some media reports focused on how Canada and China were making a point to 
quickly respond to H1N1 as a way to prove that they had learned the lessons from SARS and 
would not make the same mistakes.  For example, an April 28 editorial published in the 
StarPhoenix described Canada’s response as “calm” as compared to the “mistakes that bedeviled 
the fight against SARS” (SP8).  Similarly, two Globe and Mail articles published in late April 
and early May, reported that the Chinese government was “taking pains to show that it [had] 
learned from its bungled handling of the SARS outbreak.” The Chinese government “vowed 
transparency” during H1N1, and was “making a point of being seen as responding swiftly to any 
potential H1N1 outbreak” (GM33, GM83). 
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The lessons of SARS were commonly mentioned in relation to pandemic planning and 
preparedness.  The SARS outbreak highlighted the importance of planning when dealing with a 
disease outbreak.  Many of the lessons learned from SARS were applied to the pandemic plans 
used for H1N1 and changed the way that Canada and many countries approach disease outbreaks 
(GM16, GM78, GM84, NP7, NP155, SP8, SP20).  In addition, the SARS outbreak encouraged 
“the development, adoption, and updating of pandemic plans in health-care institutions, 
businesses, and non-profit organizations such as schools and places of worship” (GM6, GM16, 
SP484).   
The SARS outbreak also highlighted the need for investment and improvement in the public 
health infrastructure in order to respond quickly (GM17, GM28, SP76).  In Canada, one lesson 
was the importance of leadership at the national level during a disease outbreak.  In 2004, the 
Public Health Agency of Canada was established and the position of Chief Public Health Officer 
was created (GM6, NP84).  During the H1N1 pandemic, Dr Butler-Jones was a prominent figure 
in communication with the public and media.  Another lesson and noted change was the 
improvement in communication between jurisdictions, nationally and internationally.  Effective 
and steady communication among various agencies and health care providers was necessary 
during a disease outbreak (NP4).  An early warning system was put in place in Canada and 
around the world after the SARS outbreak (GM146).  Prior to SARS, it was likely that “Mexico, 
like other countries, would have investigated [the outbreak] but not alerted other nations” 
(GM1).  While many the criticism and lessons from SARS were used to prepare for H1N1, the 
H1N1 pandemic response had its own set of criticisms. 
8.4 Criticism of Pandemic Planning and Response 
While media coverage focused on the ongoing pandemic preparations, there was also 
ongoing media criticism of the preparation.  This section focuses on media criticism of  
pandemic preparations and the general public health response.  Criticisms of specific public 
health measures are included in their respective sections in the next chapter.  Some of the 
criticisms were that guidelines were general and vague, efforts were slow, and communication 
was poor.  For example, one article referred to Canada as “the tortoise” since health officials 
boasted of being first with a plan but was not the first to receive the vaccine, had not released a 
priority list, and was not among the nine developed countries that agreed to donate vaccine to the 
Third World (GM331).  There was also criticism about how the federal leadership was 
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communicating with the public, with comparisons drawn to the US.  In the US, the Obama 
administration had communicated to the public about the risks from H1N1 while Canada’s 
federal leaders failed to express the same.  Also in the US, there was a televised town hall 
session with governors, health officials, school leaders, and President Obama where they 
addressed questions from the public.  In comparison, Canadian health officials’ communication 
was described as “spoon-feeding to the public at news conferences” with discussions and 
decisions done “behind-the-scenes” without public input (GM186, GM460).  With the perceived 
“poor communication” from the federal government, some critics claimed that it allowed 
misinformation to spread (GM417). 
Inconsistent communication was another criticism that could be linked to differences 
between jurisdictions and with scientific uncertainty.  For example, in an article regarding safety 
measures for frontline workers and the effectiveness of the N95 mask to prevent the spread of 
influenza, the president of the Canadian Federation of Nurses Union noted: 
We can have a battle of the words and, let me tell you, we've been having it: 
Researcher X said this, researcher Y said that. What we all agree on is that the 
evidence is not clear. What we learned from SARS is that it's too dangerous to 
wait for conclusive science before deciding on protective measures. Therefore, 
while scientific debate persists, we have to exercise the precautionary principle: 
Be safe and not sorry (SP228). 
While this quote was in regards to N95 masks, the same observation could be applied to many 
other public health measures that were or were not taken during the H1N1 pandemic.  It can 
become problematic when the information from health professionals, especially when presented 
in the media, “seem[ed] inconsistent at best and contradictory at worst” (SP223, SP302).  
Another criticism was the perceived communication gap between public health officials and 
front line health care workers.  Newspapers reported that doctors and nurses did not feel prepared 
for the second wave and wanted a clear statement of recommendations.  The preparedness 
guidelines were vague and did not take into account their clinical reality. (SP228).   
8.4.1 Political criticism 
Political blaming and criticism of the pandemic preparations and response was also reported 
(GM191, GM244, NP164, SP179, SP183, SP197, SP212, SP237).  As one article pointed out, in 
addition to difficulties in delivering health services and cost, “there’s always the complicating 
factor of the politicians inserting themselves into the debate on health care delivery” (SP302).  
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The official opposition frequently criticized the government’s response, going as far as to refer to 
the H1N1 pandemic as Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s “Hurricane Katrina2” (GM491, NP300).  
Hurricane Katrina is used as an example of a slow and poorly handled government response to a 
disaster.  The Liberals claimed that the federal government was not well-prepared, lacked 
leadership, and had poor communication with the public.  A cited example of poor 
communication was the almost daily press conferences held by Dr. Butler-Jones and the Health 
Minister during April and May which decreased to about one a week by the summer months.  
The Liberal and NDP health critics claimed that the Health Minister was “too silent” during the 
summer (NP149, SP145).  This raises the question of how frequently health officials should 
communicate with the media and public during a public health emergency, especially when it 
can lasts for months.  In response to the criticism, Health Minister Aglukkaq was quoted in the 
media as stating that opposition members were “playing politics with an important health issue” 
(SP145, SP146).  She also met with the opposition critics in August at a House of Commons 
health committee meeting to assure the MPs that the pandemic planning for the fall was well 
under way (SP146).  
8.4.2 Jurisdictional issues 
Inconsistencies between jurisdictions were another source of media criticism.  Critics focused 
on the inconsistencies with practices and policies (SP149) and the lack of clear messages from 
municipal, provincial and federal health officials (GM403).  Jurisdictions can overlap which 
creates “a cacophony of voices” (GM460) and can leave “cracks for things to fall through” 
(GM491).  The problems were attributed in the newspapers to the lack of strong federal 
leadership.  In response to the jurisdictional criticism, federal officials cited the legal reason for 
jurisdictional differences.  For example, the Health Minister argued that the delivery of health 
care was the constitutional responsibility of the provinces and territories, however, critics argued 
that the constitutional argument was a poor substitute for the lack of federal leadership.  They 
argued that Canada should “not limit itself to a patchwork of regional pandemic responses…only 
the federal government can provide the leadership and co-ordination required to achieve this 
                                                 
2
 Hurricane Katrina hit the U.S. Gulf of Mexico coast (Mississippi and Louisiana) in August 
2005 and was one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history.  The U.S. federal government 
was criticised for their mismanagement and lack of leadership in the response to the disaster. 
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objective” (GM219).  One article pointed out that, “the problem with viruses is they don’t 
understand borders very well.  Since they don’t understand borders very well, you need a 
uniform approach to tackling them” (GM255). 
In mid-August, a Globe and Mail article reported on an editorial published in the Canadian 
Medical Association Journal that suggested Canada needed a “health czar,” a “powerful, 
independent health officer to co-ordinate country wide response” rather than the chief public 
health officer who was limited in what he can do.  The public health officer “provides guidance 
[and] no directive” (GM255).  The limitations of the position, they argued, create a flawed 
system, especially during a pandemic since “too much time could be spent wrangling over how 
provinces want to do things differently” (GM255).  When the Public Health Agency of Canada 
was created and Dr. Butler-Jones was appointed in 2004, the CMA recommended that federal 
legislation that would give him clear legal powers in a time of a crisis, but the recommendation 
was not followed.  At the time, Dr. Butler-Jones said that his role would be to act as a national 
facilitator (SP151).  A collaborative approach was preferable over a “one-size-fits all directive” 
which could also present problems due to variation between locations (NP178).  The reported 
arguments against a “health czar” centered on ideas on which level of government was 
responsible for health and the need to balance national consistency in practices and the ability 
adjust for local needs. 
8.4.3 Pandemic response in First Nation communities  
Concerns about pandemic planning and jurisdictional responsibility for First Nations health 
care and services were first highlighted in June 2009 after several communities in northern 
Manitoba were hit hard by H1N1.  Print articles noted that jurisdictional issues with First 
Nations’ health care and services are common since the federal government holds the 
constitutional responsibility for “Indians and lands reserved for Indians,” which includes the 
delivery of health care on reserve.  In contrast, the provinces hold responsibility for health care 
within their jurisdiction (GM189, SP89).  Print media described health care on reserve as a 
“jurisdictional minefield” (SP220), “jurisdictional battle” (SP82), and “political football between 
the federal and provincial governments” (NP110).  “It is common for First Nations people to 
“fall through the cracks, with the two governments blaming one another for the failure to deliver 
proper services” (GM189, SP89, SP135).  Media cited H1N1 as another example of the 
jurisdictional difficulties with health care delivery in reserve communities.   
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The federal response to the outbreaks in the northern Manitoba communities raised concerns 
about the state of pandemic planning for First Nation reserves and the speed with which the 
federal government responded (NP110, SP102, SP97).  One article brought forward concerns 
expressed by the chiefs of the region that the federal government had not delivered flu masks, 
respirators, and hand sanitizer, items they were obliged to supply in accordance with the 
Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan (GM158).  First Nation chiefs in Manitoba wanted the 
provincial and federal governments to declare a state of emergency as an attempt to “speed up 
efforts to stop the spread of the deadly virus on reserves” (GM189, NP134, SP97).  Health 
Canada claimed that their response occurred in a “timely manner” and that there were “logistical 
challenges for identifying sufficient sources for supplies and making arrangements for 
shipments” (NP134).  Supplies had to be flown into the community due to the remote location of 
the northern reserve  
Native leaders accused health officials of ignoring the outbreak on the reserves and pointed 
to flaws in the pandemic plan regarding First Nation communities (GM139).  For example, 
Garden Hill First Nation, one of the heavily affected communities, had no masks, hand 
sanitizers, or new equipment (GM142).  Media pointed out that Canada’s pandemic preparedness 
plan did not include specific protocols for aboriginal communities and was in need of revision 
(GM142).  Aboriginal leaders were reported stating that they had tried to work with federal 
officials to develop a pandemic plan but nothing was done until the virus was spreading in the 
northern Manitoba communities (SP82). 
There was also reported conflict between the Manitoba government and the federal 
government regarding pandemic planning on First Nations.  The Manitoba health minister, 
Theresa Oswald, expressed frustration at the federal government’s response and said that the 
province was prevented from doing more because it didn’t have jurisdiction.  The problem with 
strict jurisdictions and limiting the province’s ability to help during a pandemic, according to 
Oswald, was that the virus “does not see culture….[it] does not see whether you’re First Nation, 
Inuk, a white person and so on” (SP76).  The frustration expressed by Manitoba’s health minister 
led to dispute between the provincial health minister and the federal health minister in the media.  
The federal health minister replied that Manitoba’s health minister never offered to help Ottawa 
with the pandemic flu planning on First Nations. Oswald claimed that the Manitoba government 
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had offered to help with pandemic planning on First Nations at least 13 times since May 4 but 
was repeatedly turned down (SP76). 
An event that was used to illustrate the slow response by the federal government and had 
extensive media coverage during the summer months was the hand sanitizer debate.  Health 
officials spent “precious time debating the wisdom of sending hand sanitizer, which can contain 
up to 70% alcohol, to the communities” (GM158).  An editorial described the response as “an 
appalling case of bureaucratic bungling that not only insulted residents of stricken communities 
but also place[ed] their lives at risk” (GM162).  Other editorials and articles described it as 
“patronizing” and the “latest scandal du jour” (GM162).  An editorial about the incident asked 
why First Nation chiefs could not make their own decisions on whether or not to obtain hand 
sanitizer based on the advice of public health specialists.  It did not seem necessary for the 
government to be “checking off on the shipping list” (NP135).  According to another editorial, 
the debate “boils down to the paternalism directly built into the Indian Act.”  It pointed to the 
need to “update the relationship between Canada’s First Nations and the rest of the country” 
(SP102).  A National Post editorial claimed that the debate about hand sanitizers was not as 
“paternalistic” as others had claimed but were based on contractual obligations not to supply 
alcohol-based products to reserves.  The focus, according to the editorial, should be on 
improving pandemic planning rather than using the event to “renew the eternal, tiresome debate 
over exactly who is to blame for First Nation poverty and living conditions” (NP137).  Similarly, 
a Globe and Mail editorial said that the event pointed “gaping holes in Canada’s pandemic 
preparedness” and in defense of Health Canada, that the communities were dry communities3.  
The writer was less dismissive of the poverty issues stating that “it is a travesty” that there has 
not been more attention to the “link between poverty and pandemic influenza (and illness more 
generally)” (GM171).  In July, print media reported that the Senate Committee on Aboriginal 
People met to discuss the federal government’s handling of the outbreak on Manitoba reserves 
(GM158, GM162).   
In September, an unusual number of body bags were sent to First Nation communities from 
Health Canada along with medical supplies.  The shipment gained a great of deal of media 
attention.  Coverage of the incident varied between calling the shipment insensitive, outrage over 
the shipment, and saying that the incident was blown out of proportion (SP201, SP205).  Some 
                                                 
3
 A dry community prohibits the use and sale of alcohol. 
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coverage stated that it was evidence that the federal government devalued aboriginal lives and 
likened it to “sending smallpox contaminated blankets” or “fears of 1918 all over again” 
(GM294, SP204, SP205, SP206).  One article used the incident to criticize the Conservative 
party in power (SP206).
 
 There were also reports that the opposition Liberal party health critic 
published flyers stating “no vaccine, just body bags” as a way to criticize the Conservatives 
(NP283). The media reports on the total number of body bags were unclear.  Two articles 
indicated that 30 were sent to Wasagamack First Nation, 20 were sent God’s Lake First Nation, 
and a shipment was expected in Red Sucker Lake First Nation (GM290, SP200).  However, an 
editorial expressing outrage over the shipment commented “that it didn’t occur to anyone at 
Health Canada that it’s a numbskull notion to toss 200 body bags into shipments of gloves, hand 
sanitizers, and masks is nearly incomprehensible.”  The anonymous editorial does refer to the 30 
that were sent to Wasagamack, however, there was no indication where the figure of 200 came 
from (SP201).  It appears that the editorial exaggerated the number of bags that were sent to 
increase the outrage.  Whether or not it was an intentional exaggeration, it misrepresents the 
situation.   
The government apologized for the shipment and admitted that it was “unacceptable” and 
“insensitive to send body bags in a shipment of medical supplies to First Nation communities 
awaiting help to prepare for the fall flu season.”  The shipment in “no way reflected how 
severely they expected the H1N1 virus to hit native communities.”  Health Minister Aglukkag 
ordered an investigation into shipment (SP200).  Despite the amount of coverage when the 
incident occurred, very little was subsequently reported about the results of the investigation, 
which revealed that the nurse-in-charge had ordered the shipment.  One of the few articles that 
reported the results of the investigation used the lack of coverage as a way to criticize the initial 
outrage against the federal government (NP229). 
8.5 Summary 
News reports about pandemic planning and preparedness was part of the media coverage of 
the pandemic response.  Stories on pandemic planning and preparedness were common during 
the spring and summer of 2009.  These stories focused on efforts by health officials, health 
organizations, and the broader community.  The role of SARS in Canada’s pandemic planning 
and preparedness was also emphasized in the media.  In the newspaper coverage, there was a 
shift in the perception regarding Canada’s pandemic preparedness.  In the initial months of the 
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outbreak, media reports highlighted health officials commenting that Canada was well prepared.  
The Canadian experience of SARS was used as a contrast to illustrate how well Canada was 
responding.  As the months passed, there was increasing criticism regarding the speed with 
which the preparation activities occurred.  Preparedness efforts were seen as slow and there was 
concern about whether measures would be in place in a timely manner. 
Another focus of criticism of the general pandemic response was jurisdictional issues that 
were seen as hampering an effective national and regional response to H1N1, particularly with 
regard to First Nation reserve communities.  There were jurisdictional inconsistencies with 
practices and policies and a lack of clear messages from municipal, provincial and federal health 
officials.  In health care, jurisdictions can overlap and leave gaps in services as was evident in 
the pandemic response in First Nations reserve communities.   
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CHAPTER 9  
PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses the news coverage of specific health measures that were used during the 
pandemic.  The discussions include the perceptions of each measure, the measure’s social and 
economic impact, and associated criticism.  The first section examines the coverage of the travel 
related measures included travel advisories and screening of travelers.  These measures were 
prevalent in the initial months of the pandemic.  The second section focuses on quarantine and 
isolation.  Coverage of these measures overlapped with travel restrictions.  In the initial months, 
the focus was on preventing the geographical spread of the virus.  The third section focuses on 
cancellations and closures in Mexico, Canada, and around the world.  The fourth section 
examines the media discussions about hand washing and respiratory etiquette and the fifth 
section examines changes in social behaviors as way to prevent the spread of influenza.  The last 
three sections examine the media coverage of facemasks, surface cleaning, and antiviral drugs.  
Given the significant media coverage of the vaccine and vaccination campaign, this topic  is 
presented on its own in the next chapter. 
9.2 Travel Restrictions  
9.2.1 Travel advisories and screening travelers 
Following the WHO’s announcement of the Mexican outbreak on April 24, 2009, Canadian 
health officials did not issue a travel advisory to Mexico.  At the time, the virus had not yet been 
identified and instead they told travelers to take the “usual travel precautions” (GM1, GM3, NP7, 
SP2).  The PHAC did, however, inform quarantine services to be on the alert for ill travelers 
returning from Mexico (NP1, NP2).  Additionally, travelers were provided information about the 
symptoms of the illness as a public service announcement on the airplanes (SP9).  If travelers 
became ill after returning from Mexico and required medical attention, they were advised to 
inform their doctor that they had travelled to Mexico recently (GM1).  In Mexico, travelers with 
flu symptoms were advised not to fly and all travelers had to fill out health questionnaires (NP5).   
The WHO repeatedly advised against closing borders and restricting travel since those 
measures would not stop the spread of the virus and would cause economic harm.  Some 
countries, including the United States, issued advisories about travel to Mexico.  The European 
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Union advised against non-essential travel to Mexico.  The EU also advised against non-essential 
travel to parts of the United States and Canada where cases had been confirmed (GM4, GM9, 
GM15, GM32, GM40, GM83, NP11, NP44, SP6, SP21, SP67).  Numerous countries, including 
Canada were screening passengers from Mexico for flu-like symptoms (GM10, NP8, SP9).  
Some countries used thermal cameras to screen passengers.  A few days later, on April 27, the 
PHAC issued an advisory against non-essential travel to Mexico (GM15, GM32, GM45, NP11, 
NP22, SP6, SP9, SP10, SP11).  The travel advisory was lifted three weeks later on May 18, 
although the Canada Border Service Agency was still assessing travelers for signs of illness 
(GM118).  By that time, the outbreak appeared to be leveling off in Mexico and it was already 
spreading throughout Canada and elsewhere in the world (GM118, GM120, GM125, NP92, 
SP64).   
9.2.2 Criticism of travel advisories and screening travellers 
There was criticism of both the delayed decision by the PHAC to issue a travel advisory and 
the necessity of the travel advisories.  For example, a Globe and Mail editorial was critical of 
Canada’s delay in issuing a travel advisory for non-essential visits “to the epicenter of a swine 
flu outbreak.”  According to the editorial, the delay in the decision spoke “poorly of Canada’s 
ability to stay on top of an emerging health threat” (GM15).  The World Health Organization 
advised against travel bans but left the decision up to individual countries.  The editorial was also 
critical of the WHO’s recommendation since “both the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and the European Union’s Health Commissioner warned against non-essential travel” 
(GM15).  On the other hand, there was also criticism regarding the usefulness of travel 
advisories.  Critics pointed out that past travel advisories did not seem to prevent the spread of 
outbreaks and have the potential to cause fear and anxiety (GM39, SP23).  For example, an 
editorial in the StarPhoenix described the travel-related actions such as checking temperatures or 
issuing travel advisories as “panicky reactions” that were ineffective and “only serve to 
discourage vulnerable countries from identify the threat of similar outbreaks, or announcing it 
when they occur, for fear of the economic fallout” (SP8).  Another article suggested that travel 
bans were political and allowed “political people to be able to say ‘we did something’” rather 
than implementing a measure based on “good science or medicine” (NP44). 
Some of the criticism was likened the response to the SARS outbreak in 2003 (GM15).  In 
one case, parallels were drawn between SARS and H1N1 since cases of both diseases spread via 
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air travel (SP301).  Other articles used SARS as an example of why travel advisories were not 
useful and pointed to the economic damage that they can cause. For example, a National Post 
article questioned Canadian authorities’ decision to issue a travel advisory since it went against 
the advice of the WHO and against Canada’s “remonstration when [Canada was] at the receiving 
end of the travel advisory during SARS” (NP84).  The owners of a travel tour operator also 
likened the Mexican travel advisories to the SARS outbreak.  It was seen as the “same sort of 
move [that] decimated travel to all parts of Canada with SARS in 2003....they painted the whole 
thing with the same brush, and the same thing happen[ed] in Mexico” (NP18, NP44).   
9.2.3 Impact on travel industry  
The initial outbreak in Mexico and resulting travel advisories had a negative economic 
impact on the travel industry (GM157, GM518).  The travel advisories prompted many airlines 
and other travel tour operators to cancel flights and other travel-related services to Mexico 
(GM4, GM17, GM20, GM27, GM32, GM41, GM45, GM52, GM70, GM85, GM125, GM138, 
GM150, GM177, GM243, GM249, GM531, NP7, NP17, NP18, NP36, NP49, NP74, NP78, 
NP97, NP111, NP115, NP118, NP122, NP125, NP140, NP150, NP165, NP198, NP440, NP218, 
NP321, NP395, SP9, SP12, SP468, SP118, SP124, SP126, SP272, SP273).  Tourism to Mexico 
decreased during the initial outbreak period.  Other countries with confirmed cases, including 
Canada, also experienced a decrease in travel and tourism during the pandemic (GM295, 
GM318, GM494, GM612, GM641, GM661, GM683, GM691, NP58, NP107, NP401, NP435, 
SP235).  Some countries such as Jamaica, Egypt and the Dominican Republic experienced an 
increase in tourism due to the avoidance of Mexico (NP89).  To encourage travel again, some 
resorts in Mexico offered a “flu-free guarantee” with a free vacation to any tourist who became 
sick with flu while on holiday (GM120, SP56). 
9.3 Quarantine and Isolation 
Quarantine is used to separate healthy individuals who have been exposed and may become 
ill and isolation is used to separate sick individuals from those who are healthy (AFMC, 2011).  
Articles frequently did not distinguish between the terms quarantine and isolation and used them 
interchangeably.  For example, there were some articles that used the term quarantine in 
reference to the separation of sick individuals from healthy (GM65, SP52, SP253).   
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During the first and second wave, there were a few reports of quarantine and isolation.  The 
majority of the media reports on this topic came shortly after the outbreak was announced.  
Canadian health officials advised recent travelers from Mexico who became ill or individuals 
who had been in contact with an ill traveler to go home and isolate themselves from others or to 
go to a hospital (SP9).  There were also reports of some employers advising their employees to 
stay home after returning from Mexico regardless of whether or not they were ill.  For example, 
in Saskatchewan, Crown corporation employees (i.e. SGI, SaskEnergy) who had returned from 
Mexico were told to spend a week at home with pay before returning to work.  This advice was 
slightly different from the advice of Saskatchewan Ministry of Health, which was to stay home 
only if they were ill (SP32).  Once there were confirmed cases in Canada, it was reported that 
these sick individuals were placed under “medical isolation” (NP4) or under “self-imposed 
seclusion in their homes at the requests of health officials” (GM8).  As additional cases were 
confirmed in Canada, the newspapers reported that the sick individuals were isolated (SP84, 
NP144). 
There were mixed opinions about using quarantine and isolation to prevent the spread of 
H1N1.  Some sources suggested that the two measures are not effective public health measures 
on a large scale since they do not substantially reduce the risk of spread and can increase fear and 
panic among the public (GM39, GM382).  The negative perception of the two measures, along 
with the positive perception, were reflected through the words that were used to describe the 
measures.  For example, articles that presented a more positive or neutral view described 
quarantine and isolation as “self-imposed” (GM8, SP267).  A negative view used words such as 
“locking sick people inside” (SP171), “forced” (GM83), and “draconian” (GM423).   
There was also a media example of the inconsistent use of quarantine.  An article about 
Canadians who became ill while vacationing in Mexico gave an account of a family who 
returned home while sick.  They returned on a Friday, went to the hospital and were 
subsequently sent home.  The mother of the sick children stated “I fully expected they would 
keep them in quarantine because they had come from Mexico and they were sick.”  On the 
following Monday, laboratory tests confirmed that they had influenza A and on the next day it 
was confirmed that they were infected with the H1N1 strain.  The family was placed under 
quarantine after the test results, however, they had already “come into contact with dozens of 
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friends and relatives since their return.”  The mother thought that “they [health officials] should 
have told them right away to stay in quarantine” (GM65).  
Quarantine was also criticized when specific groups were targeted regardless of exposure.  
There were reports of countries that would quarantine travelers from countries with confirmed 
cases (GM77 GM83, GM86, NP64, SP36).  For example, in some countries, Mexican citizens, 
who showed no signs of being ill or in contact with ill individuals, were kept in quarantine 
“solely because of their passports” (GM83).  The Mexican President condemned countries that 
quarantined Mexican travelers based on their country of origin as a discriminatory measure 
(SP41).   
One instance of quarantine that was highly publicized in the newspapers occurred at the 
beginning of May.  Chinese officials quarantined a group of Canadian students as a precaution 
(GM86, NP64, SP36).  Canadian officials questioned China about why the students had been 
quarantined and why the Canadian consular officials were granted limited access to the students.  
The Canadian officials did not believe that there was any reason to quarantine the students.  
According to China, the quarantine was “in line with international and domestic law and the 
students had agreed to the quarantine” (GM93, NP72, SP38).  While the WHO stated that 
quarantine was up to the discretion of individual countries, they did contact countries that 
imposed a quarantine to ask “about the public health justification for their action” (GM93).   
An editorial in the Globe and Mail criticized China for the quarantine claiming that they did 
so “for no other reason than they are Canadian and that Canada has an outbreak of the swine 
flu.”  The measure was viewed as “no more justified than rounding up Chinese visitors to 
Canada would have been after SARS broke out in 2003 in China.”  The author called the 
measure a “nonsensical method of disease control” and that “quarantining smacks of a 
totalitarian approach to public health.”  The writer also questioned the effect on foreign relations, 
stating that it was “not a terribly friendly practice to single out healthy foreigners for a useless 
method of control” and that “foreign visitors should not bear the brunt of China’s anxiety 
without sound medical cause” (GM92).  On May 7, 2009, newspapers reported that the 
quarantined students had been released since none of the student had recent contact with a flu 
victim (NP77, SP43).  The decision to release the students was made after the Canadian 
government and the WHO raised questions about the necessity of the quarantine (NP75).  This 
was not the only instance in where China quarantined international travelers. They also 
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quarantined travelers from the other countries and checked temperatures of arriving international 
passengers (GM208).   
9.4 Cancellations and Closures 
9.4.1 Cancellations and closures in Mexico 
During the initial outbreak in Mexico, the Mexican government imposed a nation-wide 
closure of all schools and restricted the opening of bars, restaurants and other venues (e.g. 
cinemas, churches, museums, and libraries) where people congregate.  Many events were 
cancelled or postponed and several sporting events were closed to fans (GM3, GM4, GM15, 
GM16, GM26, GM30, GM40, GM42, GM53, GM72, GM101, GM108, GM111, GM257, NP5, 
NP9, NP13, NP29, NP59, NP63, SP11, SP14, SP30).  Newspaper accounts described the 
shutdown in Mexico City as “life under lockdown” and “virtual shutdown mode.”  The streets 
were described as “eerily bereft of traffic,” “eerily quiet,” and “as empty as the Saskatchewan 
plain” (GM15, GM72, GM105, SP31, SP44).  The five-day shutdown in Mexico ended on May 6 
(GM85, GM88, SP44).  According to a senior analyst with the Pan-American Health 
Organization the “the draconian measures taken by the Mexican government... have dramatically 
curtained the spread of swine flu.”  According to the analysis, the measures prevented more than 
8,000 deaths and 30,000 hospitalizations (GM103). 
9.4.2 Cancellations and closures in Canada 
There were also closures and cancellations in Canada due to H1N1 but not to the same extent 
as in Mexico.  In Canada, there were reports of some school closings, though very few schools 
around the country actually closed.  There were also reports of social events that were cancelled 
or postponed.  In addition, there were discussions and criticism about the usefulness of these 
measures during an influenza pandemic.  A common discussion in the news was whether or not 
to close schools due to influenza.  The main issues with school closures were the need to balance 
the social disruption with the health benefits and the potential for this measure to prevent or slow 
the spread of the flu.  The pandemic guidelines called for schools to close when transmission was 
widespread and severe but by then school closures might do little to slow the spread.  Also, 
students may go elsewhere in a community such as the mall or movies while schools were closed 
(GM58).  There were Canadian schools that closed but many school districts decided against it.  
During the first wave, the first school closing occurred in British Columbia after an elementary 
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school student was diagnosed with H1N1 (GM55, GM80, GM152, SP21).  Also, several First 
Nation communities in northern Manitoba closed their schools during the community outbreaks 
(GM141, SP72).  Not all school districts decided to close when there were cases confirmed 
among the student body, as was the case in Alberta after a student was diagnosed with H1N1 
(SP36).  Once the school year was over, the newspapers’ focus shifted from schools to summer 
camps, particularly in Ontario.  Most camps sent sick children home rather than closing since the 
majority of the cases were mild.  Only one camp closed due to a high number of cases (GM192, 
GM196, NP147).   
During the second wave, there were a few reports of school closings.  Two First Nation 
communities in Saskatchewan closed their schools after a number of students had flu-like 
symptoms.  The schools were closed as a precaution, allowing school officials to clean the 
schools (SP306).  Schools were also closed in a New Brunswick community and a school district 
in British Columbia closed all their schools due to a high absentee rate.  School officials noted 
that it was unclear whether the high absentee rate was due to people staying home because they 
were afraid of becoming sick or if they were actually sick (GM421, GM485). 
In addition to school closings, there were reports of other events that were cancelled or 
postponed due to the pandemic.  In the spring, before H1N1 was declared a pandemic, there was 
concern about the potential impact of a pandemic on summer entertainment such as concert 
tours, movies, theatre, and festivals.  A pandemic was viewed as a “threat to attendance” 
(GM109, SP30).  Over the course of the pandemic, there were several newspaper reports of 
sporting events and other activities that were cancelled due to flu concerns.  For example, a 
breastfeeding challenge in Montreal was cancelled in October as a precautionary measure since 
babies under six months of age were too young to be vaccinated (NP220).  Locally, there were 
sporting events and others events such as conferences there were postponed or cancelled (SP150, 
SP249, SP253, SP262, SP281, SP297, SP334, SP470).  
There were also concerns about how the pandemic would affect holiday events during 
Halloween and Christmas, with more about the potential impact on Halloween since that was 
during the peak of the second wave (GM583).  During Halloween, fewer trick-or-treaters were 
expected due to H1N1 fear.  The PHAC did not caution against participating in Halloween 
activities, which was described as an “extreme” reaction.  Rather they encouraged people to take 
precautions such as washing hands and staying home if ill (NP240, SP264, SP301).  Due to the 
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suggested precautions, a StarPhoenix article described the upcoming Halloween activities as 
“very clinical” (SP264).  Despite the suggestions from the PHAC, there were some communities 
in New Brunswick and Newfoundland that postponed Halloween events due to level of flu 
activity in those areas (GM421, GM434). 
The potential impact of H1N1 on the winter Olympics was also a concern in the media, 
however, by the time the Olympics started in February 2010, the flu was less of a concern.  
Organizers of the Olympics did not expect the games to be cancelled due to the pandemic.  They 
stated that “the Olympics [were] going to take place no matter what.”  The impact was expected 
to be “felt in smaller ways, [such as] absence of athletes, cluster of fever and chills, [and] 
paranoia over coughs and fevers.”  Cancelling the games or closing events to spectators was not 
seen a “necessary or wise.”  Olympic organizers also pointed out that the 1968 summer and 
winter Olympic Games took place during the last pandemic (GM179, NP191). 
9.4.3 Cancellations and closures around the world 
There were also reports of cancellations, closures, and the resulting difficulties from other 
parts of the world.  It was reported, for example, that during the spring in Britain, organizers of 
events tried to obtain insurance in case of cancelation due H1N1.  However, no insurers were 
offering coverage for the impact of the virus (NP69).  During the second wave, there were 
reports of schools closures, a ban on public gatherings, and restricted travel for a three-week 
period in Ukraine.  The response in Ukraine was described as the “most draconian measures 
taken by any country since the flu first appeared in Mexico” in the spring (GM524, NP298, 
NP371, SP318).  Other reports included hospitals under quarantine in Romania, and schools 
closures in Afghanistan, Japan, China, and India, and other countries (GM33, GM117, GM246, 
NP298). 
9.4.4 Criticism of cancellations and closures 
The main reasons given for the cancellations or closures were “as a precaution,” “concerns 
about contagion,” and to “safe guard health,” although there were just as many reasons given for 
not cancelling events or closing places along with criticism of the existing measures (GM26, 
GM30, GM42, GM53, NP26, NP220, SP249).  Some criticisms of the measures included that 
they were “aggressive,” “ridiculous,” “irresponsible,” and “didn’t make sense to do” (GM30, 
GM81, GM102, SP84, SP170).  The main reason for these comments was that the social and 
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economic impact was viewed as more important than the potential health benefit (GM9, GM30, 
NP186, SP139).  Another issue was that people should not fear the flu virus.  Cancellations and 
closures were likely to lead to unnecessary panic (GM130, GM279, SP139).  
It was also suggested that these measures were not likely to stop the spread of the virus.  
Other measure such as hand washing and vaccination were suggested as more effective against 
the virus.  This was a common view regarding school closures in Canada.  The WHO did 
recommend closing schools at the start of a community outbreak to slow the spread but 
according to Saskatchewan’s deputy chief medical health officer, Dr Saqib Shabah, this advice 
applied more to developing countries where schools were crowded, have poor air quality, have 
no running water, and there was limited access to medical services.  Schools in Canada were 
viewed as well equipped to deal with a flu outbreak (SP193).  The usefulness of closing schools 
once the virus was spreading in the community was also questioned.  Schools were viewed as a 
controlled situation while closing schools created an uncontrolled situation with students out in 
the community where the virus can spread (GM43, GM260, SP323).  Another issue was the 
impact that school closures would have on the absentee rates in the work force due to parents 
needing to stay home with their children.  The resulting absentee rate among health care workers 
was a concern during a pandemic (GM208, NP154).  
9.5 Hand washing and Respiratory Etiquette 
9.5.1 Hand washing and respiratory etiquette as prevention 
Prevention methods were frequently mentioned in articles.  Common prevention methods 
included hand washing, respiratory etiquette (i.e. coughing and sneezing into sleeves), staying 
home when sick and avoiding those who are ill, consistent surface cleaning, and vaccination.  
Hand washing and coughing or sneezing into one’s sleeve rather than hand were two measures 
that were commonly mentioned together and were described as “personal actions” that 
individuals can take to protect themselves (SP23).  The use of alcohol based hand sanitizers was 
also coupled with hand washing.  These measures were promoted as the “best line of defense” 
against H1N1 (SP35, SP306) and as “key in stopping the spread” (GM170).   For example, one 
editorial stated the following: 
…slowing the disease’s spread…means obeying the common sense rules of 
infection control we all learned from our mothers when we were four: washing 
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our hands, covering our faces when we sneeze and generally avoiding 
unnecessary contact between fingers and eyes, noses and mouths (NP32).  
 Other common descriptions of the measures included “simple,” “effective,” “common sense,” 
and “sensible” (GM16, GM206, GM218, NP84,  SP35, SP179, SP274).   The messages about 
hand washing and respiratory etiquette continued even after the vaccination was available in the 
fall since the public “still need[ed] to use precautions” (SP406). 
In addition to the frequent mentions in the news, several articles reported that the measures 
were being taught in schools and in the broader community (SP24, SP46, SP323).  For example, 
a StarPhoenix article published in May 2009 stated that “lessons in cough and sneeze etiquette 
are on the agenda for Saskatoon students in the wave of the swine flu outbreak” (SP24).  Another 
StarPhoenix editorial noted, “like classes across the nation, my son’s kindergarten class is 
learning proper hand washing techniques.  It’s a bit like hand washing for anarchists, mind you, 
but it’s a start” (SP241).  Other StarPhoenix articles reported that similar messages were taught 
in Regina schools (SP62) and at the University of Saskatchewan (SP293).  By the fall, many 
local schools had increased the number of hand-washing stations and had hand sanitizers 
available for students (SP286).  The lesson of the importance of hand washing among school 
children was evident in some of the children’s Christmas stories that were published in the 
StarPhoenix in December 2009.  In one story, Santa Claus failed to wash his hands and became 
sick with H1N1.  He was not able to deliver presents until he “washed [his] hands in warm water, 
for like, five minutes” (SP453).  There were also public campaigns targeting the broader 
Saskatoon community such as an inner-city BBQ held in the summer.  At the event, 
“volunteers…mingled with the crowd, showing them how to use hand sanitizers when soap and 
water aren’t available” (SP202).  
With the campaign to promote hand washing and respiratory etiquette, there was a noted 
increase in both.  In terms of hand washing and hand sanitizers, several articles noted that there 
was an increase in hand washing and in the use of hand sanitizers (GM30, GM155, GM192, 
NP151, SP241, SP286, SP293).  As one article put it, “hand washing hasn’t been this de rigueur 
since the 2003 SARS outbreak” (SP241).  Another article pointed out that hand sanitizer 
dispensers were “now almost everywhere.  They’re in the office, in schools, in the gym, in 
people’s homes, in public buildings, in women’s purses…I just hope we don’t find out someday 
that the stuff causes cancer” (SP246).  Manufacturers had to increase production to keep up with 
increased demand of hand sanitizer (GM72, GM425, SP407, SP485).
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With the messages about sneezing and coughing into ones sleeves, it also became “unusual to 
see someone use their hands” when coughing or sneezing (GM602).  By the spring of 2010, Dr. 
Butler-Jones, Canada’s Chief Public Health Officer, commented that, “in international airports 
you could always spot the Canadians because they were coughing into their sleeves…to see that 
behavior change in a matter of months is really quite amazing” (NP431).   There were also 
suggestions that rates of seasonal flu and other viral diseases had decreased during the first 
months of 2010 from improved hand washing and respiratory etiquette (GM647, GM682). 
9.5.2 Hand washing and hand sanitizer concerns 
One reported concern about hand washing was whether people would do it correctly.  For 
example, one article regarding hand-washing instructions in schools said that “instructions are 
fine as far as they go, though children, and frankly, many adults are not terribly committed, by 
nature, to following them” (GM528).  Another article took issue with calling hand washing 
“common sense” since “many…still aren’t doing it correctly” (NP406).   
Another concern was the effectiveness of the measures.  In October, there were reports in the 
StarPhoenix and National Post about a “controversial Canadian study” that argued that there was 
“no evidence” that frequent hand washing prevented the spread of influenza.  The PHAC 
commissioned 2007 study was commissioned by the Council of Canadian Academies (Low, et 
al., 2007).  In response to the media coverage of the study, the PHAC stated that there was 
“substantial evidence to support hand hygiene as a basic premise of infection prevention and 
control measures” (SP222).  An editorial in the National Post noted that it was a “tad strange” 
that health officials, including Dr. Butler-Jones, were emphasizing hand washing when there was 
a study that concluded that, “it didn’t do much to prevent an outbreak” (NP227). 
There were also concerns about the misuse of hand sanitizers.  One such incident, which was 
widely criticized, occurred in the summer when federal officials spent days debating whether or 
not to send hand sanitizers to aboriginal communities, due to concerns of alcohol abuse (GM158, 
NP132, SP94).  This incident was part of the criticism regarding the slow response by the federal 
government to help First Nation communities that were hit hard by H1N1 covered in the 
previous chapter.  The Grand Chief, the representative for Manitoba’s northern reserves, and the 
chiefs of the affected communities demanded an apology and an explanation for the debate.  
According to the Grand Chief, the hand sanitizer debate was “partly racism and partly 
ignorance” (NP134).  Hand sanitizers were necessary in several communities since many of the 
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homes lacked running water so hand washing was not an option (SP94).  Two other reported 
concerns about hand sanitizers occurred in Vancouver and Winnipeg.  During the second wave, 
Vancouver schools banned hand sanitizers, despite recommendations, due to concerns about 
students either drinking or setting the gel on fire (GM344, NP230).  At the beginning of 2010, 
workers at Winnipeg’s main homeless shelter confiscated sanitizer bottles and stopped leaving 
table salt on tables after addicts used salt to separate the alcohol from the hand sanitizer (SP485). 
9.6 Social Behavior 
9.6.1 Reported changes in social behavior 
As one article stated, “an early symptom of the swine flu pandemic is the change it brings to 
social behavior” (GM383). Changes in social behaviors such as greetings that involved direct 
physical contact (i.e. handshakes, kiss on the cheek, hugging) were also discouraged as ways to 
prevent the spread of H1N1 (GM25, NP114, SP131, SP185).  Maintaining a “social distance” of 
one meter was also recommended (GM25).   The behavioral changes were commonly linked 
with proper etiquette.  The media was full of “H1N1 etiquette tips and stories” and phrases such 
as “H1N1-friendly rules,” “swine flu behavior,” and “new era of etiquette” (GM309). 
Two areas of life where behavioral changes were commonly noted by the media were 
religious settings and sports.  In religious settings, “close contact is part of worship in many 
faiths, but...are ways to spread the flu” (GM64).  Reported changes in religious services included 
suspending communion, refraining from hand shaking, not participating in a receiving line at the 
end of service, emptying water fonts and baptisms, and wearing protective gloves when picking 
up collection plates (GM64, GM451, GM305, NP215, NP352, SP27, SP216, SP258).  Locally, 
the Roman Catholic Diocese of Saskatoon suspended the communion cup portion of the 
communion
1
 in October 2009 based on recommendations from the Saskatoon Health Region.  
They continued sharing bread to ensure that they were “doing [communion] as a faith-based 
community” (NP239, SP259).  The practices were restored in January 2010 after the threat of 
H1N1 had passed (SP477).  
Behavioral changes associated with sporting events and among team interactions were also 
noted in the media.  The mostly commonly mentioned sport was hockey and the changes were 
                                                 
1
 Communion is a Christian ritual in remembrance of the Last Supper in which the blood (wine) 
and body (bread) of Christ is consumed.  In some Christian denominations, such as the Catholic 
Church, the wine is served in a common cup. 
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encouraged widely from pro leagues to local youth leagues.  The changes included not sharing 
water bottles, towels, clothing or soap, washing hands after handling equipment, and handshakes 
or high fives between players replaced by fist bumps (GM372, GM383, GM407, GM447, 
GM448, SP216).  Evidence of the changes included an image that accompanied a National Post 
article which showed the hockey player’s numbers on the bottle (NP 232). 
Prior to the winter Olympics in Vancouver, athletes were told to use an “elbow bump” or 
“fist bump” when greeting fellow competitors rather than handshakes, high-fives, or cheek-to-
cheek kisses to prevent the spread of the virus (GM383).  However, during the Olympics 
(February 2010), there were no mentions of these changes in the newspapers.  By February, the 
second wave had passed in Canada. 
In other areas of life, greetings were the most commonly reported change, however, other 
changes include measures to increase social distance.  In regards to handshakes, reported 
examples included a Quebec mayor who banned handshakes during a municipal election 
(NP177), a minister who asked those at a funeral for an H1N1 victim to refrain from handshakes 
(SP326),
 
and graduating university students forgoing handshakes and instead “curtsied, winked, 
saluted, nodded, and fist bumped” (SP275).  A poll conducted in October for media sources, 
found that 30% of those who responded were shaking hands less that before the pandemic.  The 
poll also found that about a quarter of respondents were using public transit less often due to 
fears of the flu (SP271).
 
 A decrease in the use of public transit had been reported in Mexico 
during the initial outbreak.  It was also reported that family and friends avoided visiting one 
another and stayed in touch by phone, e-mail, and text message (GM72, NP13).   
When complete avoidance was not possible, physically distancing oneself from others was 
suggested.
  
An example of this included a Saskatoon city policy.  In order to prepare for the 
second wave, the city of Saskatoon developed a number of policies for city employees, including 
a social distancing policy which encouraged employees to stand six-feet apart when talking.  
According to the city’s emergency measures coordinator, employees needed to know that “it’s 
not acceptable to share pencils or be a close talker” (SP160, SP364).  Another example of social 
behavior included party advice for the upcoming holiday season, such as tips on how to serve 
food to prevent the spread of the disease (GM285).  At Christmas time, there was advice on 
whether or not to use the mistletoe tradition.  To address and encourage the use of mistletoe, a 
British etiquette entity issued a press release saying that a handshake was more likely than a kiss 
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on the cheek to transmit H1N1.  The release stated that “kissing under the mistletoe is probably 
okay...as long as you don’t touch the person otherwise, except on the shoulder or upper arm” 
(GM592). 
9.6.2 Concerns about changes in social behavior 
There were concerns about how the behavioral changes would impact how people socialize 
within their community, how the changes interfere with traditions, and criticism by those who 
thought the changes unnecessary.  Also, advice on appropriate behavior change was not always 
consistent (GM309).  An article focusing on the potential psychological impact of an epidemic 
noted that during a crisis, people “count on community cohesion” but “when you have something 
that’s invisible, when you have something that’s contagious, it raises a different sort of fear – a 
fear that often divides people instead of bringing them together” (SP184).  A similar sentiment 
was noted in an article regarding the changes in religious ceremonies.  There were concerns 
about the “breakdown of community because people [were] terrorized by the possibility they 
might come down with something when they [came] to church” (GM305).   
Changes in social greetings were seen as interfering with how people interact with one 
another.  For example, two Globe and Mail articles focused on the importance of social greetings 
and how the pandemic has impacted them.  One article noted that social greetings “have a lot of 
do with one’s own identity – and how to acknowledge others” (GM89).  The other article noted 
that “showing a vulnerability is the whole point of the custom...flesh-to-flesh contact is a sign of 
trust” and that avoiding shaking hands could be seen as rude.  The writer suggested that if he 
avoided greeting his friends due to fear of the flu, he might as well stay home (GM431).  To 
counter the perception of rudeness, a conference in Saskatoon used posters to remind delegates 
to wash or sanitize hands frequently and not to be “offended if someone declines to shake hands” 
(SP295). In regards to social greetings, there were greeting suggestions that did not require 
physical contact (NP246, SP367).  An example includes an account from the StarPhoenix:  
When leaders of the First Baptist Church [in Saskatoon]...told their 1,300 
members that, because of the flu, they would share smiles instead of handshakes 
during the service, some parishioners grumbled. Then, they got creative. People 
stood in the aisles and waved. Others danced, bumped fists or knocked 
elbows...they know it's temporary. But the need for human connection is real and 
no flu can stop it (SP258). 
 131 
 
Some criticisms of the behavior changes were that they were unnecessary and an 
overreaction.  Changes in religious ceremony were viewed as an overreaction especially 
considering that H1N1 had not killed as many people as seasonal flu.  There were also some who
 
thought that the behavior changes did little prevent the spread of the flu and could actually 
increase the risk of spreading the flu (GM305).  For example, a letter to the editor commented on 
the change in communion where the bread was placed in the individual’s hands instead of on the 
tongue by the priest.  The writer of the letter believed that the change was more of a risk of 
transmitting the flu since it required hand to mouth contact (NP359).  Regarding the changes in 
sports, an infectious disease specialist was not in favor of suspending hand shaking after the 
game because “physical contact [is] a natural consequence of most team sports [so] there is little 
to be gained by forgoing shaking hands” (SP385).  The main challenge with the changes in social 
behavior was identifying what was reasonable prevention and what was “over the top” (GM309). 
 
There were also news reports of efforts to continue with traditions while still preventing the 
spread of the flu.  For example, some churches served communion bread with toothpicks, put 
bleach in holy water, and used electronic holy water dispensers” (GM542).  An Italian inventor 
developed an electronic holy water dispenser that worked like an automatic soap dispenser.  The 
inventor made it “out of concerns that fear of H1N1 was eroding traditions (NP341, SP378).  
These efforts were contrasted to the response during the 1918 Spanish flu.  At the time, churches 
were closed, however, “this time...churches have 21st century technology at their disposal.”  
Church closures were not seen as necessary as long as certain precautions were taken (GM305).
 
  
9.7 Face masks 
During the outbreak in Mexico, facemasks were widely used and were mentioned in news 
reports (GM72, GM88, GM102, GM105).  The Mexican government advised residents to wear 
face masks as a precaution.  In Mexico City, soldiers handed out face masks at checkpoints 
(GM108, NP8).  There were additional media references to the use of face masks in other parts 
of the world (GM89).
 
 For example, a Globe and Mail article about the response in China 
mentioned that Chinese daily newspapers were running photographs of people around the world 
wearing face masks (GM33).  In Canada, face masks were not widely used by the general public.  
There were occasional references to their usage in airports (GM4), among suspected cases at 
hospitals (GM32), and among health care workers.  Health care workers were advised to use a 
“proper type of mask,” namely the N95 masks (SP8, SP171, SP228).  Among the general public, 
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the use of face masks was discouraged by the Chief Public Health Officer, Dr. Butler-Jones, and 
other health officials (GM25, GM29).  Dr. Butler-Jones advised against wearing face masks 
except in a hospital setting since they provided little protection and can a false sense of security 
(GM43, NP31, SP17).   
9.8 Surface Cleaning 
Consistent surface cleaning was promoted as a prevention measure.  Advice on how to 
properly clean when someone was sick was provided in some articles (NP410, SP385).  Other 
articles noted the increase in extra cleaning in various locations including hospitals (SP84, 
SP172), schools (GM55), and workplaces (GM78).  In Saskatchewan, the pandemic 
preparedness guide sent to employers included instructions on proper cleaning and recommended 
frequent cleaning of common surfaces such as doorknobs and computer keyboards (SP234).
  
Several StarPhoenix articles during the first wave reported that the local Saskatoon schools had 
“instructed their caretakers to increase cleaning and disinfecting in places where germs are easily 
spread” (SP24).  Additional instructions were given to Regina schools (SP62).  Again in the fall, 
the University of Saskatchewan increased “cleaning and disinfection procedures” after several 
students became sick (SP293). 
9.9 Antiviral Drugs 
Early in the outbreak, H1N1 was found to be susceptible to two antiviral drugs, Tamiflu and 
Relenza.  Some news coverage focused on the use of the drugs, though Tamiflu was primarily 
mentioned, in the pandemic response.  Antivirals, along with other measures, were used to “buy 
time” until the vaccination was ready (SP164).  In late April and early May 2009, articles 
focused on how much of the drugs were in stockpiles and the distribution of the drugs (GM3, 
GM9, GM33, NP10, SP23).  Internationally, the WHO had a stockpile of antivirals, which they 
distributed to developing countries, although, not in a sufficient amount.  In response, the World 
Bank and private companies, which were not identified, expressed a willingness to help with 
needed doses (GM43, SP21).  Canada was reported to have a sufficient amount of the drugs in 
stockpile (GM4, GM43). 
 
On May 1, an article reported that the antivirals had been distributed to 
the provinces and territories on a per-capita basis and were stored in “undisclosed secure sites.”  
An additional amount was kept in the national stockpile as a backup.  In preparation, 
Saskatchewan was the first province to distribute some of the stockpile to regional health 
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authorities and pharmacies.  There were no confirmed cases of H1N1 at the time but there were a 
few suspected cases (GM55). 
 
An article in the StarPhoenix mentioned that the province would 
cover the cost of drug for anyone who became ill (SP10).  Other provinces and territories did not 
distribute the drugs at that time but reported that pharmacies within their jurisdiction had 
supplies (GM55). 
Early concerns about the antivirals included individuals stockpiling the drug, which would 
decrease the availability, lead to the potential for overuse of the drug, and subsequent 
development of drug resistance in the virus.  Articles reported that individuals who were not sick 
were filling prescriptions for Tamiflu and that the drug was “flying off the shelves” (SP23, 
SP35).  In an April article about how to prepare for a possible pandemic, individuals were 
advised not to “run out and fill a prescription” since “augmenting individual stockpiles [was] not 
all that useful as a national plan to combat a possible pandemic” (GM25).  The article also stated 
that “without professional guidance, people may not use…the right dosage or for the specified 
length of time.”  Instead social distancing measures and behavioral changes were recommended 
as precautionary measures (GM25).  Various health officials, including Canada’s Chief Public 
Health Officer, warned healthy individuals not to take the drugs as a precautionary measure 
against the flu since it could cause the virus to become resistant (GM43, GM174).  To prevent 
the overuse of Tamiflu, the WHO recommended that only at risk groups be treated with 
antivirals and healthy individuals with mild illness did not need the drugs (NP367, SP409).
 
 
Reports on antivirals continued into the summer months as part of discussions on preparation 
for the second wave.  Reports focused on provincial and territorial plans for costs and 
distribution of the antivirals, improved access to remote communities and from pharmacists and 
improving surveillance to make the best use of the drugs (GM224, SP140, SP171).  Another 
issue that was raised during the summer was the use of Tamiflu in children.  In July, the Health 
Minister signed a temporary order allowing doctors to prescribe Tamiflu in children under the 
age of one, despite limited safety data in that age group.  The measure was justified due to the 
risk that H1N1 posed to infants and insufficient treatment options for sick babies (GM212, 
NP158, SP121).
  
In August 2009, a Globe and Mail article reported on a study that raised 
questions about the effectiveness of Tamiflu in treating symptoms from H1N1 and potential side 
effects for children under 12.
 
 However, the Public Health Agency assured that Tamiflu had a 
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“strong safety profile” and did not make any changes regarding the use of Tamiflu in children 
since other studies have shown that the drug was effective for seasonal flu in children (GM241).   
There were fewer mentions of antivirals by the time the vaccination arrived, however a 
November article reported that there were more prescriptions for Tamiflu than in April.  There 
was also a worldwide shortage of children’s doses of Tamiflu so pharmacists were remixing 
adult doses “the old-fashioned way – with a mortar and pestle.”  The shortage of Tamiflu for 
children was identified as “a lesson for preparing for the next one” along with ensuring that there 
are adequate supplies of antivirals for the length of a pandemic (GM560).  In July 2010, another 
Globe and Mail article reported that the leftover stockpiles of Tamiflu in federal and provincial 
warehouses were about to expire which raised questions about how large the stockpile needs to 
be and the “value of spending public dollars to restock…in case of a future pandemic” (GM688). 
9.10 Summary 
The chapter provides an overview of the news coverage of specific health measures that were 
used during the pandemic.  These included travel-related measures, quarantine and isolation, 
cancellations and closures, hand washing and respiratory etiquette, changes in social behavior, 
and the use of facemasks.  Some measures were viewed negatively while others were viewed 
more favorably.  Measures that were viewed positively were one that were not forced or 
mandatory, did not target specific groups, and were individually-based measures (i.e. hand 
washing).  Conversely, interventions that were deemed arbitrary or invasive were portrayed as 
ineffective, unnecessary, and an overreaction.  There were a range of social, economic, political 
and emotional factors that influenced the perception of each measure.  There was a need to 
balancing the social, economic, and emotional impact of a measure with the perceived health 
benefit.   
The following summarizes the perceptions of each measure, the measure’s social and 
economic impact and the associated criticism.  News reports on travel-related measures such as 
travel advisories, bans, and screening travelers were common in the initial months of the 
outbreak.  These measures were seen as ineffective and caused more harm than good, however, 
there was also criticism of Canada’s delay in issuing a travel advisory to Mexico.  Even though 
travel advisories were viewed as ineffective, they provided the appearance of responding to the 
outbreak.  Reports about quarantine and isolation were also common in the initial months but the 
newspapers were unclear with the distinction between the two measures.  There were also 
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different perceptions about the measure depending on whether it was viewed as forced or 
voluntary.  Quarantine, along with travel-related measures, was also criticized when it targeted 
specific groups regardless of exposure to H1N1.  During the initial outbreak in Mexico, 
cancellations and closures were common measures to contain the spread of H1N1.  In Canada, 
there were mixed opinions about its use.  There was a need to balance the social and economic 
impact from cancelling events or closing locations such as schools with the health benefit.  Hand 
washing and respiratory etiquette were promoted as personal actions that individuals could take 
to protect themselves from H1N1.  These measures were viewed positively and commonly 
referred to as easy common sense measures.  Changes in social behaviors to prevent the spread 
of H1N1 were also promoted, however, there were concerns about the impact on social 
relationships.  Facemasks were another measure that was commonly mentioned or used in 
images within the media, however, Canadian health officials discouraged their use since they 
could provide a false sense of security against H1N1.  These measures were all viewed as ways 
to “buy time” for the vaccination.   
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CHAPTER 10  
VACCINATION 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the media coverage of the vaccination campaign.  The print media 
vaccination narrative was pulled out as a separate topic from the other public health measures 
due to the extensive focus it received.  The layout of this chapter closely follows the 
chronological media coverage of vaccine development, the vaccination campaign, and post-
campaign commentary.  
10.2 Vaccination Campaign Planning Stage 
10.2.1 Vaccine production and campaign planning 
When the outbreak was first announced, there was no specific vaccine for the strain and 
seasonal flu vaccines were noted to be unlikely to offer any protection against H1N1 (GM11).  
Efforts to develop a vaccine quickly began with the identification of the virus and negotiations 
with drug manufactures (GM9, GM16, GM76, NP5, NP31, SP6).  Initial negotiations included 
an international meeting about how samples of the virus would be shared, who would use the 
samples to develop vaccine, and ensuring that vaccines were available, either by donation or at 
affordable prices, for poorer countries (GM153).  Restrictions were placed on drug makers to 
prevent them from patenting the virus samples and then offering the vaccine at unaffordable 
prices (SP65).  During the “height of fears of bird flu,” Indonesia refused to share H5H1 virus 
samples without a guarantee that the vaccine would be provided to poorer countries at affordable 
prices (SP63).  In late April, Canada began discussions for a vaccine with GlaxoSmithKline, the 
sole vaccine manufacturer for the country, in case one became “necessary” (GM55).   
While efforts were underway to develop a vaccine, there were some questions about the 
necessity of a vaccine.  For example, an editorial in the National Post, which was critical of the 
hype and panic over the outbreak in Mexico, suggested that a vaccine was not necessary (NP71).  
The author wrote:  
It’s true we have no vaccine for this flu.  But two years ago, two of the three 
strains in the seasonal flu were mismatched against the actual viruses in 
circulation.  There was no appreciable increase in cases or deaths. 
The WHO proceeded with vaccine development stating that it was better to be cautious and have 
a vaccine available regardless of how the disease develops. WHO’s early estimates suggested it 
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would take three to six months to produce a vaccine in large enough quantities.  Ideally, the 
vaccine would be ready by the fall, in time for the anticipated second wave (SP31).   
During the month of May, the newspapers reported that vaccine production had not started 
(GM117).  Drug manufacturers were waiting on guidance from the WHO about when to start 
mass producing vaccine for H1N1.  There were concerns that producing the vaccines would 
cause some companies to cut production of seasonal flu vaccine.  Drug companies were urged 
“to work to boost production for seasonal vaccines while developing an injection for possible use 
against” H1N1 (SP65).  Following the declaration of the pandemic in June, the pharmaceutical 
companies began production (GM145).  The increase in the pandemic alert level to 6, an official 
pandemic, allowed the WHO to free up money and sign contracts with drug companies to move 
ahead with the vaccine production (GM145). 
During the summer months, newspaper articles focused on when the vaccine would be ready 
and provided updates on the planning stages of the campaign nationally and within the provinces 
and territories.  There were many reports about when the vaccine would be ready and whether it 
would be in time for the second wave.  Estimates suggested that the vaccine would be done by 
August or September but not available for the public until several weeks later, around November, 
due to clinical trials (GM174, GM183, NP146, SP113).  In July, WHO officials stated that a 
fully licensed vaccine “may not be ready until the end of the year, months after a second wave of 
flu is expected to hit Canada.”  If that was the case, the WHO suggested that countries might 
have to use the vaccine with limited safety data (SP113).  Due to the potential use of the H1N1 
vaccine with limited safety data, there were some references to the rushed distribution of the 
1976 swine flu vaccine and the resulting cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome
1
 (GM74, GM665).  
However, WHO officials gave reassurance that vaccines are “much better purified than the way 
they were in 1976” so it was unlikely that the side effect would occur again (SP113).   
                                                 
1
 In 1976, the United States carried out a nation-wide immunization campaign due to fears of a 
possible swine flu pandemic.  The vaccine increased the risk of developing Guillain-Barre 
syndrome (GBS).  As a result, the vaccine program ended.  GBS is a rare disorder in which the 
immune system damages the nerve cells leading to muscle weakness and paralysis.  Most people 
recover from GBS while some have permanent nerve damage.  In rare cases, death can occur   
(CDC, 2009; 2011; Sencer & Millar, 2006)  
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The PHAC was planning for a universal H1N1 vaccination program to start by November.  
Initial vaccination would be based on a developed priority list with the rest of the public 
immunized before Christmas, which ideally would be before the “worst of a potential winter flu 
season” (GM145, GM168, SP88).  In Canada, immunization would not be mandatory and it was 
expected that not all Canadians would want a vaccine, however, everyone was encouraged to be 
vaccinated (SP128).  Along with the federal plans, individual provinces and territories were 
developing their vaccination plans during the summer months.  In Saskatchewan, the vaccination 
plans included a province wide campaign to encourage everyone to get vaccinated, based on the 
recommendations of the federal government (GM146, SP79). 
Along with updates on when the vaccine would be available, there were also reports about 
potential issues with the supply due to production problems.  In July, there were reports that drug 
companies were having trouble growing the virus, which was delaying production.  As a result, 
countries might only get half of what they need.  There was no guarantee that Canada would 
receive their full supply in time (GM185, GM195).  One advantage that Canada had was the 
domestic capacity for developing the vaccine.  Since the vaccine was being produced in Canada, 
they did “not have to fight other countries to guarantee their supplies” (GM195).  In August, it 
was reported that the drug company in Canada was waiting for syringes and were producing the 
vaccine quicker than they could package it (GM259).  In August, the federal government placed 
their order for 50.5 million doses of vaccine.  The order was made based on the assumption that 
75% of the Canadian population would want a vaccine and that two doses would be required.  
There were concerns about ordering vaccine that had not been tested but the “alternative of not 
ordering them [was] not acceptable” (SP140).   Clinical testing was still required to determine 
whether one or two doses would be needed (GM259, SP172).   
During this time, there was criticism regarding the speed in which Canada’s “sole supplier” 
was developing and testing the vaccine.   Clinical tests were already underway in other countries.  
In response to the criticism, Dr. Butler-Jones was reported as being “unfazed” providing 
assurances that the vaccine would be ready by November (GM230).  Ideally, the vaccine would 
be available before the second wave but estimates suggested that the second wave could hit early 
in the fall instead of in December.  Antivirals and other measures were in place to “buy time” 
until the vaccine was ready (NP183, SP164, SP169, SP189).   
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In September, most reports were suggesting November for the vaccine rollout, however, Dr. 
Butler-Jones suggested that Canada could speed up delivery if the virus became more severe.  He 
stated that if a reasonable amount of data on the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine became 
available and the disease became worse, Canada could move up the vaccination schedule.  This 
was “contrary to the federal government’s insistence that Canada should not expect the vaccine 
until mid-November.”  Canada would have the vaccine by October but it was not clear if there 
would be enough safety information to start vaccination.  Health Canada wanted time to review 
clinical trial data and to follow the regulatory process for approving the vaccine.  Canada was 
currently reviewing clinical trial data from Europe and was set to begin clinical trials in Canada 
in October (NP235, SP244). 
By September, other countries, such as the US, China and Australia, had already started their 
vaccination campaigns (GM274).  The federal government again received criticism for being 
behind.  Newspapers reported on an editorial in the Canadian Medical Journal (CMJ) that 
claimed that Canada’s vaccination plan was flawed and could “leave high-risk groups 
unprotected from the H1N1 virus.”  The CMJ editorial questioned why “Canada is first with a 
plan but last with a  vaccine.”  The editorial claimed that a different approach was needed to fast 
track the vaccine for the most vulnerable and further claimed that the vaccine could be available 
a month earlier.  In the newspapers, Dr Butler-Jones responded to the CMJ editorial criticism.  
He said that a different approach would not lessen the vaccine development time since the 
vaccine order was done at the end of July while countries there were currently vaccinating placed 
their order in late May (GM268, GM269, GM271, NP203, SP175, SP198, SP232, SP178, 
SP179).  Federal health officials insisted that there was “no delay” in Canada’s vaccine 
campaign and that they would be ready for large-scale immunization programs by the first week 
of November, if not sooner (NP235, SP244).   
Reports of the ongoing planning during September included the organization of facilities and 
personnel to administer the vaccine (SP179, SP183).  Nationwide, there were not enough health 
workers to deliver the shot.  In many locations, health regions planned to hire student nurses, 
recall retired nurses, and reassign public health nurses from their regular duties.  In British 
Columbia and Alberta, they were considering enlisting pharmacists to administer the vaccine 
(GM263, SP236).  Local reports for Saskatchewan stated that the province would fully prepare 
for the vaccination campaign by November.  In a survey conducted for the Regina Leader-Post 
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and published in the StarPhoenix, the majority of respondents, two-thirds, were “confident that 
they would be able to get vaccinated in a timely way,” though only 59% said that they would be 
willing to get vaccinated (SP183).  Vaccine doses had been ordered based on the estimation that 
three fourths of the population would want to be vaccinated and two doses would be needed.  In 
Saskatoon, the SHR was planning on 75 to 80 percent of the population being vaccinated.  
Normally, 25 percent of the population receives a vaccine for seasonal flu (SP230).  By the end 
of September, studies had shown that one dose of the vaccine would be enough, however, 
children may still need two doses (GM300).  One dose would likely increase the chance of 
getting a higher percentage of the population vaccinated since people would not have to line up 
for multiple shots (SP195).  Canada had ordered 50 million doses based on the assumption that 
two doses would be needed.  At that time, it was unclear whether the federal government would 
change its order or donate the extra doses to developing countries (GM288).  Other rich countries 
were pledging to share extra vaccines with developing countries (SP199).
 
 
Coverage during October included information about the preparation, estimates on when the 
vaccine would be available, and continued criticism of the preparations of the vaccination 
campaign.  National health officials continued to defend Canada’s vaccination strategy against 
criticism that it was slow and would be too late for the fall wave (GM345, SP261).  In early 
October, it became apparent that the two versions of the vaccine, one with an adjuvant for 
general use and one without
2
, which was recommended for pregnant women, might not be 
available at the same time.  Messages about when the non-adjuvant vaccine would be available 
were mixed.  The Federal Health Minister said at a press conference that the vaccine was on 
track to be released by the first week of November.  However, provincial health officials warned 
that there may be a two-week delay between the general vaccine with an adjuvant and the one 
without an adjuvant. Additionally, the Chief Public Health officer, Dr. Butler-Jones, said that he 
was not certain when the vaccine without an adjuvant would be available.   There were concerns 
                                                 
2
 An adjuvant is a substance added to a vaccine to increase the immune response.  Without an 
adjuvant, more antigen, the active ingredient, is needed in the vaccine for an effective immune 
response.  The non-adjuvant version of the H1N1 vaccine was recommended for pregnant 
women, due to the lack of clinical data on the safety of the adjuvant for that group (Health 
Canada, 2009b; 2009e). 
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about the safety of the adjuvant for pregnant women; though, some health officials believed that 
both versions of the vaccine would safe to use (GM350, GM418).  The decision to order the non-
adjuvant vaccine for pregnant women was a “precautionary measure…that most other countries 
were not taking” (SP261).  The overall safety of adjuvant was also questioned.  There were 
conflicting messages from public officials and “conspiratorial websites” about the safety record 
of the adjuvant (GM418, SP280).  For example, there were concerns reported in the newspapers 
that it could cause Gulf War syndrome
3
 but there was no scientific evidence to support it 
(GM408). 
In terms of preparation, the Saskatoon Health Region announced in early October that it 
would scale back public health services in order redirect resources toward the mass 
immunization.  A similar reduction in programs and services was previously announced for the 
Regina Qu’Appelle Health Region.  Due to the scale back in public health services, the 
opposition NDP health critic said that she was concerned that the provincial government was not 
doing enough to provide assistance to health regions.  Other provinces had recruited retired 
nurses to assist with the campaign, which did not occur in Saskatchewan.  One of the noted 
difficulties in planning for human resources was the uncertainty about how many people would 
want to be vaccinated (SP230, SP233).  In order to operate the vaccine campaigns, many health 
regions had to disrupt other health programs and services.  There were some who questioned 
why the service disruptions were necessary since seasonal flu clinics are done without the same 
disruptions (NP245). 
On October 19 and 20, articles reported that the vaccines had been shipped to the provinces 
and territories in preparation for the rollout.  Health Canada was reviewing the data and approval 
was expected within a week.  In the meantime, health regions were continuing with preparations.  
Also, health officials emphasized the safety of the vaccine and encouraged everyone to get 
                                                 
3
 Squalene is an adjuvant used in several vaccines including seasonal flu vaccines and the 2009 
H1N1 vaccine.  The adjuvant was used in an experimental anthrax vaccine given to soldiers in 
the 1991 Gulf War.  It was thought to be the cause of the Gulf War syndrome in many veterans 
due to the presence of antibodies to squalene in most patients affected by the syndrome.  
However, evidence has been inconclusive on the linkages between the two (Lippi, Targher, & 
Franchini, 2010). 
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vaccinated once the vaccine was available, while reminding people to wait their turn (GM353, 
GM355, GM358, SP261, SP263).  Two days later, reports stated that Health Canada had 
authorized the vaccine and the vaccine campaigns would soon be underway (NP244).  Health 
care workers were the first in line for immunization, followed by high-risk groups based on a 
released priority list.  Mass immunization for the general public was expected to begin in 
November.   
10.2.2 Priority lists 
The initial work on the vaccine priority list began in July and with the expectation that the 
list would be released in September (GM227, SP128).  There was criticism of Canada’s delayed 
release since the United States released its priority list in July 2009 (NP163).  The US priority 
list included pregnant women, those who lived with infants under 6 months, health care workers 
and emergency medical services personal, children and young people between 6 months and 24 
years, non-elderly adults with underlying risk factors or medical conditions (SP128).
 
 To counter 
the perceived “lack of urgency” about the priority lists that was presented in the media, the 
PHAC responded that there would be “enough vaccine for all Canadians” and the PHAC wanted 
to develop a list “based on scientific and epidemiology evidence” (GM227, SP128).   
Until the PHAC released the priority list, media coverage focused on who should be included 
and often mentioned “expert opinions” and studies.  Health care workers were commonly 
mentioned (GM194).  The WHO recommended that all countries immunize health care workers 
first “in order to maintain a functional health system as the pandemic evolves.”  The WHO did 
not make recommendations on other groups to include and instead left the decision up to 
individual countries (SP113).  While health care workers were recommended to be first in line 
for the vaccine, there was concern about whether the health care workers would agree to take “an 
unproven vaccine for an uncertain threat.”  Normally, 40 to 60 percent of health care workers opt 
out for the flu vaccine each year.  In Saskatchewan, fewer than half of nurses get a flu shot 
(GM209).  The PHAC had no plans to force health care workers to be vaccinated due to the need 
for informed consent and the right to refuse a vaccine.   But there were fears that “sensitivity 
towards the rights of health care workers could undermine efforts” (NP157, NP216, SP210).  
Health care workers who are unwilling to get vaccinated could lead to high absenteeism when 
they are needed most (GM209). 
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Pregnant women were a second group that was mentioned for inclusion on the priority list 
since they were at high risk of complications.  Health officials and doctors were urging all 
pregnant women to be immunized (NP212).  A special campaign that targeted pregnant women 
included posters, fact sheets, and mail outs.  Pregnant women tend to avoid vaccinations due to 
fears of a possible side effect to the “unborn child” (SP209).  To alleviate concerns about vaccine 
safety, health officials, including Canada’s Chief Public Health Officer, said it was a matter of 
“balancing risk” of immunization and becoming sick.  Influenza during pregnancy was a “nasty 
disease” while immunization was a “small theoretical risk of something that might happen” 
(NP163, SP128).  
Children were a third group that was frequently mentioned since they are known to be a 
significant transmission risk (NP129).  The results of a US study, published in both the 
StarPhoenix and the National Post, suggested that the best way to contain a flu pandemic was to 
vaccinate school children and parents but to skip most adults since schools were the “main 
breeding ground.”  The results of the study were counter to the priority groups set by the CDC in 
the US.   The study argued that it was best to vaccinate those mostly likely to transmit the virus 
rather than those at highest risk of complications, which was basis of the priority list (NP184, 
SP157).  Following the report, the media continued to focus on the need to include children as a 
priority group and suggested that public health authorities should not ignore those outside of high 
risk groups when establishing a priority list (GM654, NP197, SP189).  However, the PHAC did 
not say whether school children would be among the first immunized.  One health official 
suggested that the opportunity for maximum benefit will have passed by the time the vaccine is 
available (SP189).  
Other suggestions for a priority group included those age 5 to 40 years old, though, the 18 to 
30 year old may be a challenge to convince since they may not see themselves as being at risk 
(NP129).  Aboriginal and remote communities were suggested as priority groups by candidates 
for the national chief of the Assembly of First Nations.  Remote communities were suggested as 
a priority group due to the “fear that major urban centres [would] get [the vaccine] first 
and….poor people in the remote communities will be the very, very last to get it but the first to 
get the disease” (GM188).  Additionally, the chief doctor for the winter Olympics wanted 
athletes to be treated as priority group since he did not believe that the vaccine would be 
available in a “timely manner” (GM343). 
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In September, the PHAC released the list, which included children, pregnant women, health 
care workers, those in remote communities and adults with chronic conditions.  The list was 
developed based on those at greatest risk of complications and designed to decrease sickness and 
death and to “maintain the smooth function of society” (NP203).  Provinces and territories could 
use the list for guidance for planning purposes and interpret it “based on local circumstances and 
realities” (GM291).  There were some noted regional variations on additional priority groups, 
which gained some criticism.  For example, Vancouver Coastal Health included residents of 
Downtown Eastside due to pre-existing medical conditions and addictions (GM360).  
Additionally, prisoners were included as a priority group in British Columbia due to the fear of 
prisons becoming a “breeding ground.”  Correctional officers were upset about the decision to 
give prisoners priority over prison staff (GM373, GM393).  Regardless of who was “first in 
line,” health officials continually recommended that everyone should get the new shot when it 
becomes available to them.  
10.2.3 Seasonal flu vaccine and H1N1 
In September, there were news reports about a controversial unpublished Canadian study that 
suggested that the seasonal flu vaccine increased the risk of H1N1.  However, similar studies in 
Australia, the UK, the US, and Mexico concluded that the seasonal flu vaccine had no effect on 
immunity (SP239).  The results of the unpublished led to additional confusion surrounding the 
vaccination campaigns (GM306, GM319, GM324, NP217, SP211).  While the study was still 
under peer review, many provinces, but not all, were reconsidering when to do their seasonal flu 
vaccine campaigns due to the study results (GM316).  Quebec, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario 
and Nova Scotia decided to suspend seasonal flu shot for anyone under 65 years of age until after 
the H1N1 vaccine campaign (GM306, GM310, SP211, SP214).  Alberta decided to offer the 
seasonal flu vaccine to high-risk people until the H1N1 vaccine was available and Manitoba 
dropped health care workers from the priority list for the seasonal flu vaccine (NP224).  In 
October, Saskatchewan changed their decision to limit the seasonal flu vaccine to seniors and 
people in long-term care homes, though the seasonal flu vaccine campaign would stop once the 
mass H1N1 immunizations began (SP263).  Other countries and the WHO chose not make any 
changes or recommendations based on the study (GM316).  The inconsistencies in the changes 
and recommendations lead to “public confusion and…questions about whether the safest options 
were being offered” (GM319).  It also raised concerns about whether people would show up for 
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either vaccine (GM319).  As one article pointed out the study “confused things very badly…and 
certainly cost [public health] credibility from the public because of conflicting 
recommendations” (GM310). 
10.3 Vaccine Campaign 
Canada’s “largest immunization campaign” began on October 22, 2009 (GM375, SP277).  
By the time the vaccine campaign began, the second wave of H1N1 was already underway and 
critics questioned whether it would be too late to vaccinate most people.  There was also concern 
that “healthy people may feel a sense of urgency to jump the queue.”  While health officials 
encouraged everyone to be vaccinated, they also asked that everyone wait their turn (GM359).  
Immunization for the general public nationwide was expected to begin in November.  The first 
few weeks of the campaign were limited to those on the priority list (GM381, GM432, SP276, 
SP279, SP288, SP295, SP306).  When the vaccine campaign began, there was a massive increase 
in news coverage focusing on a range of issues including safety and risk information about the 
vaccine, clinic locations and times, who was next in line for the vaccine, and the problems and 
complaints about the vaccine campaign. 
10.3.1 Vaccine supply and demand 
In the initial weeks of the vaccine campaign, problems from across the country were reported 
in the news.  These included a limited supply of vaccine doses, long line ups, clinics closing or 
turning people away either due to limited supply or for not being on the priority list, and 
variation between provinces, which increased the confusion.  An initial concern with the 
campaign was the inconsistency between provinces for distributing the vaccine.  For example, in 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Quebec the vaccine was initially available through public clinics.  
Ontario and British Columbia used physicians and family health care practices as well as public 
clinics.  Most jurisdictions opted for a phase-in approach with health care workers the first to be 
vaccinated, followed by the high-risk groups (i.e. groups likely to develop complications) 
identified by the priority list.  Alberta originally opened the clinics to the general public based on 
“voluntary compliance,” however the clinics became overwhelmed and nationwide supply issues 
soon became a problem.   
Early on in the campaign, it became apparent that there would be vaccine shortage that was 
expected to last over the first few weeks (GM395).  The shortage was due to a delay in 
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production due to a brief switch from adjuvant to non-adjuvant vaccines for pregnant women, 
and to quality testing of the vaccines before shipping.  The supply limitations provided further 
support to the argument that Canada should have more than one vaccine manufacturer for future 
pandemics.  Many other countries had more than one supplier.  One advantage that Canada did 
have was a domestic manufacturer since there were concerns that countries with vaccine 
manufacturers would close their borders and hoard the vaccine supplies (GM499). 
The federal government warned the provinces and territories that they would receive less 
vaccine than expected (GM412, NP282, NP286, SP307, SP311, SP315).  With the shortage, 
articles frequently reported how many doses were delivered and the shortfall from expected 
amount.  Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta governments issued warnings about the vaccine 
shortage.  Saskatchewan had originally planned to vaccinate all high-risk groups but changed 
plans to focus on those aged 6 months to 5 years and pregnant women due to the limited supply 
(GM412, NP282, NP286, SP293, SP302, SP307, SP311, SP315, GM452).   
Along with the shortage of vaccine, demand for the vaccine was well above what was 
expected.  Butler-Jones said that health officials did not expect the long lineups that were the 
norm for the first week of the campaign.  The demand was “in sharp contrast to earlier polls that 
said few Canadians planned to get the vaccine” (GM393).  The increased demand was linked to 
the highly publicized death of a healthy 13-year-old Ontario boy.   The common messages from 
health officials was for “Canadians to remain patient” and wait their turn so that those in the 
priority groups could get their shots first (SP301). 
With the limited supply and high demand, there were many news reports about how clinics 
around the country were doing.  The common focus of articles was on experiences at clinics with 
long line ups, clinics that canceled due to limited supplies, ones that extend their hours or 
expanded the number of locations to meet demand, or ones that turned people away that did not 
meet eligibility requirements or due to long wait (GM468, GM529, NP259).  In British 
Columbia, clinics had long lineups during the first few days of the campaign and had to turn 
people away near closing time.  In response, many clinics extended their hours to deal with the 
long lines.  There was also confusion about the priority group process.  British Columbia health 
officials had to appeal to healthy British Columbia residents “to step aside and let those with 
chronic health problems move to the front of the line.”  They insisted that immunization would 
still be useful in mid-November, despite what was quoted by some experts in the media (GM393, 
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GM396).  The day before, Richard Schabas, a former Ontario chief medical officer of health and 
Neil Rau, an infectious disease specialist, wrote an opinion column in the Globe and Mail 
suggesting that vaccination would be pointless by the time that it is available for the general 
public (GM391).   
Ontario clinics, most notably in Toronto and Ottawa, had to turn people away shortly after 
opening due to the long lines and limited supplies (NP281, NP289, NP327, SP283).  Toronto had 
originally planned to open vaccination for the general public during the first week of November 
but cancelled due to the shortage of the vaccine.  Instead the focus would be on priority groups.  
News articles about the experience in Toronto included quotes from individuals waiting in lines 
that were mostly critical of the clinics.  For example, despite the defined priority groups, one 
individual stated that, “everybody feels like they’re a priority.” Another woman who was noted 
to be 7 months pregnant and waited three hours in the rain stated that she did not “believe it 
[was] as organized as it could be.”  Similarly another article questioned why the clinics weren’t 
better prepared when “they’ve known about the swine flu and they’ve been warning us about an 
outbreak for months.”  A third article questioned why more locations weren’t available (NP281, 
NP289).  Alberta originally offered the vaccine to all residents but “clinics were unable to keep 
up.”  They opened more locations after the “massive lineups and limited the vaccine to high risk 
groups (GM374, NP260, SP292, SP319, SP344).    
Among the reports of problems, there were some articles that focused on clinics that did not 
have issues or on efforts that were put in place to address the problems.  In Saskatchewan, the 
vaccine rollout “seemed to be working very well” compared to the experience in other provinces.  
The province did not experience clinic shutdowns like in other provinces.  While there were long 
lines, the vaccination was limited to the highest risk groups and adjustments were made based on 
the available supplies.  Efforts were also put in place to speed up the process, including consent 
forms available online and the use of video presentations about the vaccine and process for those 
waiting (SP322, SP325, SP340, SP358).  Two articles in the Globe and Mail reported on a clinic 
in Sault Ste Marie, Ontario that did not experience long lineups.  To prevent the lineups, the 
clinic used a call centre to book appointments (GM398, GM415).  Another clinic in Quebec, 
which originally had lineups, adapted a “Disney-inspired” coupon system that allowed people to 
come back at a later time when the lines exceeded an hour.  Other cities in Canada used 
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wristbands or time tickets.  Clinics in Toronto, Ottawa, and Vancouver adapted tickets or 
bracelets to reserve a place in line (GM553).   
In addition to the supply and demand issues, there were reported issues with communication 
between the federal and provincial government regarding the amount that would be shipped 
every week.  This made it difficult for provinces to plan for the week.  One miscommunication 
that was reported on occurred when the Prime Minister announced that 1.8 million doses were 
expected to be delivered during the second week of November.  The National Post article noted 
that Ontario’s chief medical officer appeared to be “caught off-guard” by the announcement and 
stated that they had not “received any confirmation from the federal government” concerning the 
number of doses to be delivered.  Other premiers voiced similar concerns about the lack of 
information regarding the vaccine supplies.  In response, federal officials stated that the 
provinces would receive speedy updates on the vaccine deliveries (NP317, SP337). 
Despite the problems, one assurance given in the media was that Canada’s vaccination 
campaign was doing better than other countries’ campaigns.  The Prime Minister stated at a press 
conference that the vaccination program was “better than those of many other countries” 
(GM536).  As one article stated “Canadians can take solace in one generally overlooked fact.  
Most other industrialized countries have considerably less of the vaccine on hand” (NP348).  The 
article also pointed out that “those places [were] not seeing the same kind of controversy and 
saturation of media coverage around the availability of vaccine” (NP348).  Similarly another 
article pointed out that “patience [was] needed with the vaccine program, there have been 
glitches but [when] examined dispassionately the mass immunization has hardly been a disaster” 
(GM495). 
In the Canadian print media there were a few reports of the supplies problems in other parts 
of the world.  At the end of October, reports stated that there were also supply problems in the 
U.S. despite having four vaccine suppliers.  The shortage caused some individuals to “beg or lie 
about being pregnant or having underlying health conditions” (GM366, GM408).  Additionally, 
there was also controversy about employees of financial companies receiving the vaccine while 
community clinics had none.  Supplies were also low in Mexico after “most vaccines were 
snapped up by wealthy countries.  In contrast, coverage from Britain had “no pictures of long 
line-ups, no cries of injustice that vaccines were going to the wealthy.”  Britain’s campaign was 
done by invitation to those at high risk of complications (GM524). 
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10.3.2 Queue jumping 
During the first week of November, there was outrage over several publicized cases of queue 
jumping.  These occurred at the same time as the vaccine shortage was being reported.  The 
cases raised issues regarding the ethics of defining priority groups, the definition of “high risk,” 
and the presence of a two tier health care system in Canada.  The coverage turned into a debate 
about private versus public health care and who is responsible (and who to blame) for health care 
(GM502, GM504, GM508, GM510, NP323, SP357). 
Several of the cases involved hockey teams, including the Calgary Flames, the Toronto 
Maple Leafs and Abbotsford Heat (a British Columbia team).  Players, coaching staff, 
management, and family members of the Calgary Flames were given “special H1N1 
vaccinations” which were arranged through Alberta Health Services.  The case gained a great 
deal of public outrage given the fact that “high risk groups…stand in line for hours to get the 
shot while a small elite group received it with little effort.”  The Flames released a statement 
regarding the incident but never acknowledged any wrong-doing: “The players did not believe or 
even realize that they were “cutting in front of high risk groups.”  The medical staff for the team 
thought that the players should receive the vaccine “given the risk associated with frequent 
physical contract, extreme exertion and busy travel schedule.”  Also, the team was vaccinated a 
day before the limited vaccine supply led the Alberta government to restrict the vaccine to those 
on the priority group.  Alberta had originally opened the vaccination to the general public.  Two 
Alberta Health Authority employees were fired for the decision (GM486, GM517, NP309, 
NP311, NP318, NP319, NP329, SP332, SP344).  A spokesman for the Alberta Union of 
Provincial Employees called the fired employees “scapegoats” for the “government blunders” in 
connection with the vaccine rollout (GM517). 
In the case of the Abbotsford Heath, the British Columbia pro hockey team returned from a 
road trip with five members showing symptoms of the flu.  A doctor decided that the rest of the 
team were “at high risk of getting the disease” and instructed to team members to go to his clinic 
to get vaccinated.  The doctor defended his decision stating that, “doctors should be able to 
interpret the guidelines to decide who is eligible.”  At the time, the vaccine was in short supply 
and only those on the priority list were eligible for the vaccine.  The doctor in the case was 
spoken to but did not face punishment for his decision (GM497).  The players of the Toronto 
Maple Leafs were also given access to the vaccine after two players from an opposing team 
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contracted the virus.  The team insisted that they did not receive the vaccine outside of the “usual 
channels” and did not jump any lines at medical clinics, though it was unclear where they 
received the vaccination. Being at high risk of becoming ill due to close contact between players 
and heavy travel schedules was used as justification (GM498, GM511, NP318).  
These cases are examples of the confusion regarding the meaning of “high risk.”  While the 
term “high risk” was interpreted in the creation of the priority lists as “high risk of 
complications,” some interpreted it as “high risk of getting sick” which was used as justification 
for the sports teams to receive the vaccine.  In response to the cases, Dr Butler-Jones stated that 
there is a difference between being “at high risk of getting the flu and of it causing serious illness 
and death…if this was the case, school-age children would be a priority” (GM488).  Around this 
time, there was a debate about whether school aged children should be considered as the next 
priority group (GM528).   
In addition to the sports teams, newspapers reported that private clinics in Toronto and 
Vancouver had access to the vaccine during the shortage with patients of the private clinics 
jumping the queue. In response to the reports about private clinics having access, Ontario stated 
that it would review Toronto Public Health’s decision to give a private clinic access to the 
vaccine during the supply shortage.  The clinic in Toronto intended to offer the vaccine only to 
its patients but decided to provide the vaccine to non-members who are at risk of complications 
(GM432, GM476).  The founder and CEO of the Vancouver clinic submitted a letter to the 
Globe and Mail, about the issue, stating that the clinic followed the guidelines for the vaccine 
and had an advantage over public clinics.  According to the CEO, it was “well organized” and 
“there were no lineups.”  The clinic only vaccinated members who were in the high-risk groups 
identified through their medical records, which was information not available to public clinics 
(GM500).  Some used this as an example of why private health care is better than public, while 
others criticized the use of private health care as an unfair advantage of the wealthy (GM462, 
GM475, GM478, GM479, GM510, NP284, NP290, SP348).   
Two other reported incidences included the vaccination of board members at a Toronto 
hospital and top donors at a Montreal hospital (GM516, NP326, SP352, SP363).  Locally, there 
was a report about businesses in Saskatoon and Regina, “including a number of provincial 
Crown corporations” that hired a private company to vaccinate employees and families.  The 
initial report stated that the private company would wait until the vaccine was available to the 
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general public (SP328).  However, Saskatchewan deputy chief medical officer quickly refuted 
the story, stating that the vaccine was “not being provided to private companies” and was “only 
being provided to public health.”  Once the vaccine was available for everyone, “there may be a 
role for organizations who give seasonal vaccinations to employees in large corporations” to help 
with the vaccine campaign.  The deputy chief medical officer insisted that there was no queue 
jumping occurring in Saskatchewan (SP341). 
The reporting on the vaccination activities of private clinics became part of the debate about 
the problems of a two tier health care system.  The stories contributed to the outrage over 
wealthy individuals receiving quicker care through the use of private clinics.  Dr. Butler-Jones 
emphasized that wealth should not determine who has access to health care in the Canadian 
health care system.  He stated, “wealth nor celebrity should not buy…special access to life-
saving care.  Those who use their wealth or celebrity to jump the queue are thus attacking one 
the most fundamental values of Canadian society and are legitimately reviled” (GM488).  Also, 
in contrast to the reported outrage over the queue jumping, one article suggested that: 
The taint of scandal surrounding the program may be more media-generated than 
a reflection of widespread public unease…most people aren’t jumping the line, 
most people aren’t freaking out.  That’s the other side to the story.  It’s not that 
everything is becoming unhinged (NP348). 
10.3.3 Open to general public 
Opening the vaccine campaign to the general public was delayed due to the problems with 
vaccine production (NP293).  On November 19, Ontario and Manitoba to opened their vaccine 
clinics to the general public.  Alberta and Saskatchewan were expected to expand the campaign 
to the general public within a week.  In Saskatchewan, the rollout to the general public was 
expected to vary across the province (GM564, NP357, NP361, SP397, SP400, SP406).  The 
mass vaccination clinics for the general public in Saskatoon began on November 25, by which 
time over 20% of the population of the health region had been vaccinated.  To avoid long lines, 
health officials asked people to “take their time” since the clinics would remain open until 
December (SP413, SP416).  Ongoing local coverage of the vaccination campaign focused on 
how many people were vaccinated daily and what percentage of the population had been 
vaccinated (SP429, SP431, SP434, SP442, SP445). 
By the time the vaccine was available to the general public, the second wave had passed its 
peak, however, health officials still urged everyone to get vaccinated.  As one health official 
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stated, “the flu season lasts all season long.  The flu virus does not take a holiday” (NP361, 
NP366, SP430).  Some critics, in particular Ontario’s former chief medical officer, were vocal 
about the necessity of the vaccine the second wave had reached its peak (GM581). 
During December, clinics around the country were wrapping up their vaccine campaigns 
(SP440).  In early December, clinics in Ontario began to shut down as the demand for the 
vaccine decreased.  Clinics in other provinces were running and planned to stay open until mid-
December or longer depending on need (GM578).  On December 17, mass clinics in the 
Saskatoon Health Region closed after a 5-week operation, though people were still encouraged to 
get vaccinated at public health offices and drop-in clinics (SP442, SP449, SP450).  Quebec and 
British Columbia closed their mass vaccination centres in mid-December but still had vaccine 
doses at regular medical clinics (GM598). 
10.4 Assessment of Vaccine Campaign 
As the vaccination campaigns ended around the country and the second wave came to an end, 
provincial and federal health officials shifted their focus to assessing the vaccine campaign.  
Newspaper articles beginning in December until early summer 2010 reported on the assessment 
lessons from the vaccination campaign.  One of the identified lessons from the campaign was the 
need to have more than one vaccine supplier in Canada (GM607, GM658).  In March 2010, the 
federal government was reviewing contract options since the 10-year contract with 
GlaxoSmithKline was set to expire in a year.  One potential option was to include a backup 
supplier for pandemic flu vaccines (GM658, NP420, SP489).
  
The main focus of the vaccine assessment was the vaccination rates.  During May and June 
2010, articles reported on the regional vaccination rates.  While the national average was 40%, 
the vaccination rates varied regionally (NP406). Alberta immunized about 33% of the 
population, about 40% population were vaccinated in British Columbia, nearly 60% in Quebec, 
more than 50% in Saskatchewan, the Atlantic provinces and territories vaccinated more than half 
of their populations, and Newfoundland vaccinated 70% of the population (GM674, GM675, 
SP514).  Some reports claimed that the vaccine campaigns “failed dramatically” in parts of 
Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta.  For example, in Toronto, the overall rate was less than 29% and 
fewer than 60% of health care workers were vaccinated (NP433).
  
These rates mirrored a poll 
from January 2010 in which 30% said that they would get vaccinated (GM673).  The rate in 
Toronto was below the national average and lower than the 40% that are typically immunized 
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against seasonal flu (GM674).  In response to the criticism surrounding the vaccination rates, the 
Health Minister said that vaccination was a provincial matter, however the delivery of the 
vaccine was a joint responsibility of Ottawa and the provinces and territories (GM676). 
There were many reasons given for the lower vaccination rates, including inconsistent and 
confusing communication about vaccine availability, priority lists, safety of the adjuvant, 
problems with vaccine supplies, anti-vaccine advocates, public perception of the risk from H1N1 
and the vaccine, and news reports that “the worst was over” by the time that vaccine was 
available  Also, not all provinces followed the federal guidelines, which caused confusion among 
the public (GM670, GM673, GM674, GM678, GM694, GM670).  One challenge that was not 
frequently mentioned was the media’s role in creating confusion.  For example, in a letter to the 
editor, a medical doctor said that “many patients were quoting TV, internet, and newspapers 
regarding the theoretical risks of the vaccine…The same weight was often given to the vaccine’s 
theoretical risks, frequently voiced by non-experts, and the real risk of infection.”  According to 
the doctor, “most physicians I know supported the use of the vaccine, yet this message was 
overshadowed (GM677).
 
 
While several articles and critics claimed that the campaign was a failure based solely on the 
vaccination rates and the amount of money invested,  others pointed to additional factors that 
should be consider when measuring campaign’s success (GM671, GM680, GM682, GM688).  
Some articles were less specific about these factors and made statements such as “it was 
impossible to estimate how far the disease would have spread without the immunization” 
(GM602) and “countless lives were saved by the mass vaccination programs in Canada” 
(NP430).  Other articles gave more specific examples, such as two Globe and Mail articles that 
reported on a study of the Ontario program.  Based on mathematical modeling to predict what 
would happen if no intervention was used, the study concluded that the campaign prevented 
nearly 1 million cases, as many as 50 deaths, an additional 420 hospitalizations, 28,000 ER 
visits, and 100,000 doctor visit.  As one article pointed out, “suddenly the $180 million cost is 
not an outrage to the public finances, but a very sensible expenditure.”   The study ran counter to 
the criticism that Ontario’s and much of Canada’s vaccine program “failed dramatically, because 
of low vaccination rates” (GM693, GM694).  The majority of the criticism focused too much on 
cost and not on the overall health benefits. 
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Another focus of the post campaign coverage was what to do with the leftover vaccine doses.  
At the time there was no national plan on what to do with leftover doses.  Alberta sent their 
leftover doses to the federal government while most provinces, including Saskatchewan, waited 
for advice from the federal government (NP387, SP465).  At the end of the vaccine campaign, 
Canada was one of several countries that donated extra vaccines doses to Ukraine, which was 
heavily affected by the pandemic and was unable to afford the vaccine (NP371, NP373).  In 
January, Canada lent, rather than donated, extra doses to Mexico (GM616).  Canada also donated 
5 million doses to the WHO to distribute to developing countries that couldn’t afford their own 
supplies (GM635, NP402, SP482).  However, there was one issue that was not mentioned in the 
newspapers about the timing of the donations.  There had been ongoing concerns that Canada 
would not have the vaccine in time for the second wave, but by the time the donations were 
made to developing countries, the second wave was well underway or coming to an end in many 
locations.   
Several months later, in April 2010, there were reports that British Columbia would discard 
2.5 million expired doses or “$20 million worth down the toilet.”  British Columbia, like most 
provinces, had purchased enough for the entire population but only 40% of the population got 
vaccinated and the province was left with a stockpile.  Due to the amount of leftover doses, 
British Columbia would ask Ottawa to reconsider the pandemic plan which requires provinces to 
purchase enough vaccine for every individual (GM666, NP431). 
10.5 Summary 
Vaccination had extensive media coverage and there were a range of perceptions about the 
measure.  Early in the outbreak, there were some who questioned the necessity of the vaccine.  
The early critics questioned whether the time and money need to develop a vaccine was 
necessary.  During the spring and summer months, the coverage focused on the production of a 
vaccine and the campaign planning stages.  The newspapers provided updates on status of the 
vaccine production and planning activities such as the development of the priority list.  Concerns 
during planning stages included the safety of the vaccine, whether the vaccine would be ready in 
time, and the necessity to make decision with incomplete and contradictory evidence.  For 
example, a Canadian study that indicated a possible link between seasonal flu vaccine and an 
increased risk from H1N1 while similar studies found no linkage between the seasonal flu 
vaccine and immunity to H1N1.  The study result led to inconsistent practices and 
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recommendations from different provinces.  Criticism during this time included the speed in 
which the vaccine was developed and the length of time it took to develop and release the 
priority list.  Prior to PHAC’s release of the priority list, media coverage focused on who should 
be included and relied on various expert opinions and studies. 
Once the vaccine was released, the media focused on how well the nationwide vaccine 
campaign was going.  During this period, there were mixed messages and opinions about the 
effectiveness of the campaign.  Inconsistent policies between provinces and problems with the 
rollout were highly publicized in the media.  Stories about vaccination clinics with few problems 
were minimal.  Stories about queue jumping were also highly publicized and illustrated 
confusion over the term “at risk.”  Medically, the term refers to those at greatest risk of 
complications, however, there was evidence in the newspapers that some interpreted the phrase 
as at risk of becoming sick.    
At the end of the campaign, the media focused on the assessment of the vaccine campaign.  
Most reports focused on the cost and vaccination rates as the measure of success, rather than the 
health benefits of the campaign, which can be difficult to measure.   
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CHAPTER 11  
POST-PANDEMIC ASSESSMENT AND LESSONS LEARNED 
11.1 Introduction 
This final results chapter presents the media narrative from articles published when the 
public health responses and pandemic were nearing the end.  At that time, the media focus was 
on the pandemic response assessment and lessons learned.   
11.2 Lessons from the Pandemic 
By December 2009, the overall newspaper coverage of the pandemic had decreased.  
Newspaper articles that were published focused on the lessons of the pandemic.  Near the peak 
and the end of the second wave, a few references began to emerge in the newspapers to the 
potential lessons, or as some articles called it, the “post-mortems” (GM510, GM671, NP431), of 
the H1N1 pandemic for future pandemic preparedness.  Articles on this topic increased by April 
2010 and continued until August 2010, aligned with the period when the WHO committee met 
for their post pandemic assessment (NP425, SP495).  Similarly, researchers and governments 
were examining various issues of the overall response during the spring and summer 2010.  The 
results of these assessments were reported in the newspapers (GM688). 
A column in the Globe and Mail regarding the lessons of H1N1 was critical of using too 
much judgment over the pandemic response since “hindsight is no way to judge a potential 
public health disaster” (GM682).  Globe and Mail health reporter, Andre Picard suggested that 
the “real question” when assessing the pandemic response was “if the same situation were to 
arise today – what would we do?”  Overall, the author praised the response and stated that, 
“unlike SARS, we don’t need public inquiries to expose the failures” (GM671). 
11.2.1 Identified lessons and criticisms 
Some of the identified lessons mentioned in the newspaper articles included an improved 
definition of pandemic and severity, improved communications and collaboration with the 
public, and improved vaccination strategies (GM682, GM693, SP509, SP461).   
Improved definition of pandemic 
During the pandemic, one of the main criticisms in the newspapers was that public health 
officials overreacted to the threat of H1N1.  There was criticism in the newspapers that H1N1 
was not a pandemic based on the common understanding of the term (see section 6.2).  The main 
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argument was that H1N1 did not kill many people which was based on the assumption that 
pandemic flu would be far deadlier than seasonal flu.  This assumption was based on the 
anchoring to seasonal influenza and the 1918 Spanish flu (see section 6.2.3).  However, one 
editorial pointed out, “when the most persistent complaint in the wake of a potential disaster 
is…there was hardly any death and destruction, then public health officials should feel good at 
the end of the day” (GM671).  Along with the criticism, a lesson that was pointed out throughout 
the pandemic and afterwards was the need to “rethink...the assumption that a pandemic strain of 
influenza would be far more deadly than a seasonal flu strain” and develop a “better definition of 
‘pandemic’ – not the bureaucratic one that exists now” (GM671).   
There was also the suggestion from a roundtable discussion with “key leaders representing 
doctors, nurses, hospitals and first-responders” that a severity index is needed “to put future 
outbreaks into context” (SP509).  Additionally, there is a need for flexibility in the pandemic 
planning and response to deal with different and changing situations (GM631, GM671, GM697, 
GM698, SP514).  A suggestion that was put forward by Dr. Margaret Chan, director general of 
the WHO, was to plan with best-case, intermediate, and worst case in mind and provide 
“flexibility to move up and down the scale” (GM697).   
Improved communication and collaboration with public 
There were mixed opinions about how well health officials communicated with the public.  
According to the federal health minister, communication during the pandemic went well.  Others 
disagreed and suggested that communication could be improved.  A challenge during the 
pandemic was that little was known about H1N1 and health officials were uncertain about how 
the pandemic would unfold and there was uncertainty and confusion regarding the vaccine 
(SP498).  Many of the so-called “scandals” during the pandemic were actually communication 
failures (GM671).  Much of the “conflusion1,” according to one Globe and Mail editorial, was 
                                                 
1
 Andre Picard, the Globe and Mail public health reporter, first used the term “conflusion” in an 
October 9, 2009 article.  He described “conflusion” as “what the public is feeling in response to 
the seemingly endless stream of contradictory news about H1N1 influenza.  He borrowed the 
term from Urban Dictionary which defines it as “the aggregation or streaming together of 
multiple confusing items, as in a confluence of confusion” (GM338) 
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due to the “reluctance on the part of public health officials to utter the words: We don’t know” 
(GM682).  However, the newspapers also played a role in the “conflusion” by insisting on 
answers when health officials didn’t have them.  During an uncertain and changing situation, it 
can be difficult to provide answers without appearing incompetent or inconsistent.  Another 
editorial pointed out that the “biggest challenge for public health in the 21st century is 
communication.”  With the internet age and 24-hour news cycle, public perceptions of risk are 
changed and expectations for information are increased (GM671).  To improve communication, 
the Globe and Mail public health reporter suggested that “the traditional once-a-day press 
conference featuring talking heads” needs to be changed due to the 24-hour news cycle.  Social 
media such as Twitter, YouTube should supplement the press releases and conferences.  The 
writer also suggests that the “public needs to be engaged in conversations and debates about 
issues of public health, they don’t need to be lectured to” (GM682).  Appreciation of the multiple 
sources with which to communicate and the increased demand for information, does not, 
however, change how quickly information and evidence can be gathered and analyzed in order to 
make an informed decision.  
Improved vaccination strategies 
Some articles focused on the lessons from the vaccination campaign (see Chapter 10 for the 
media coverage of the vaccination campaign).  One editorial suggested the “mass campaigns 
don’t really work in the 21st century.”  Mass clinics should have supplemented rather than 
supplanted normal health care operations.  The Globe and Mail public health reporter also 
suggested that public health officials need to “stop behaving like vaccination is an opiate for the 
masses” (GM682).  Another Global and Mail editorial focused on improvements to the approval 
process, roll-out of the vaccine, and the prioritized high-risk groups, referring to the “mysterious 
decision to keep older children off the list of high-risk groups” in many jurisdictions (GM693).  
Despite the criticism of the vaccine campaign, one column suggested that “the unprecedented 
pandemic response worked so well that Canadians will become complacent about immunizations 
when the next outbreak strikes” (NP431).   
An additional criticism related to the vaccine was the accusation that the WHO “allegedly 
colluded with pharmaceutical companies and overstated the threat of the H1N1 virus” (GM626).  
Some “in Europe” believed that the WHO was influenced by the pharmaceutical industry into 
declaring a pandemic so that they could make money from the vaccine (GM626).  Two reports 
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released in Europe claimed that the WHO failed “to disclose possible ties with the 
pharmaceutical industry” and of “pushing countries to waste millions of dollars by overstating 
the threat” (GM680).  These accusations were brushed off as “conspiracy theories” and that “in 
the grand scheme of things, it was a trifling amount” of money that was made from the vaccines 
(GM671).  Additionally, the WHO had systems in place to prevent any attempts of undue 
influence from the pharmaceutical industry (GM681).  
11.2.2 Lessons for the next pandemic 
Just as lessons from SARS were used in pandemic planning prior to the H1N1 pandemic, the 
lessons from H1N1 will be used for future pandemics.  A common message in the media was 
that H1N1 was a test or trial run for the inevitable next pandemic; some even suggested the 
inevitable “big one.”  However, referring to H1N1 as a test or trial run ignores that fact that it 
was a pandemic and contributes the assumption that pandemics have high mortality rates.  For 
example, a Globe and Mail article published in December, as the second wave was ending, 
suggested that H1N1 was a “test run” that will help health officials and governments prepare for 
“the pandemic that does turn out to be ‘the big one” (GM602).  Similarly, an article in the 
StarPhoenix focused on the response in Saskatchewan, suggested that the lessons from H1N1 
could be applied to future influenza and other types of disease outbreaks.  In the article, Dr. 
McKinnon, Saskatchewan’s chief medical health officer, described H1N1 as “a very valuable 
event to go through because we’re going to have another one like it. There’s no doubt.”  She also 
suggested that some of the lessons from H1N1 could be used to address the HIV crisis in 
Saskatchewan
2
 (SP461).  In April, an article in the National Post stated, “pandemic post-
mortems are being carried out because, inevitably, there will be another” pandemic and 
suggested that health officials would “use this pandemic’s finish line as the starting gate for 
coping with the next one” (NP431). 
                                                 
2
 Saskatchewan has the highest rates of HIV in Canada, which is twice the national average (20.8 
vs. 9.3 per 100,000).  In 2009, 75% of new cases were associated with injection drug use which 
differs from the rest of Canada.  A disproportionate number of cases occur among the Aboriginal 
population and the majority of new cases occur in Saskatoon, Regina, and Prince Albert 
(Saskatchewan Ministry of Health, 2010) 
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11.3 Summary 
To summarize, the focus of the newspaper coverage after the second wave was on the 
pandemic response assessment and lessons learned from the pandemic.  The main lessons 
included the need to improve communication and public health strategies, the need to actively 
communicate (i.e. two-way) with the public during the pandemic planning and response phases, 
and the need to improve the definition of the term pandemic.  There were mixed opinions about 
the success of the pandemic response.  The primary criticism of the response was a perceived 
overreaction to a minor threat.  This was due to confusion regarding the term pandemic and 
highlights the need to reassess public and media expectations of a pandemic.  Two other 
concerns were with communication and the vaccination campaign.  According to federal 
officials, communication went well, however, others disagreed and suggested that 
communication could be improved.  Factors that contributed to poor communication included 
mixed messages from health officials due to jurisdictional differences and the fact that health 
officials have to respond to a changing and uncertain situation.  There were also mixed opinions 
about the success of the vaccination campaign.  Several articles criticized the use of mass 
vaccination and were critical of the intense focus on the vaccine.  One the other hand, at least one 
article complimented the public health response and pointed out that it worked so well that 
Canadians may become complacent about immunizations in the next outbreak.  As the response 
to the 2009 pandemic wrapped up, the media focus also shifted to the inevitable next pandemic 
and how the lessons from this pandemic can be applied to the next one.   
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CHAPTER 12  
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
12.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this study was to reveal the overall 2009 H1N1 pandemic narrative in 
the local and national newspapers distributed within Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.  An epidemic 
narrative follows a common pattern, however, the details vary depending on the disease and the 
broader socio-cultural context.  To examine the epidemic narrative for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, 
this study was guided by the following research questions:  
1. What are the main themes that are discussed in the newspapers in relation to the H1N1 
pandemic? How are they discussed?  
2. How do the themes and discourse change over time, and how do these changes relate to 
the timeline of the pandemic?  
3. How do the themes and discourse compare between the local and national newspapers? 
This chapter summarizes the 2009 H1N1 pandemic narrative produced in the newspaper 
coverage by addressing the research questions in the order they are presented above.  The main 
points that are based on the findings include 1) the importance of meaning and how meanings are 
constructed within the narrative; 2) understanding the narrative within the broader socio-cultural 
context; and 3) communication challenges that occurred during the 2009 pandemic.  These points 
are being raised now for the reader to keep in mind while reading this summary chapter. They 
are addressed in the discussion chapter that follows.  
12.2 Main Themes and Discourse of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Narrative 
Construction of the print media epidemic narrative of 2009 H1N1 was guided by three 
conceptual frameworks: epidemic narrative, anchoring, and framing.  In turn, the epidemic 
narrative was found to be comprised of a number of the common elements which include: 
identifying and defining the disease; the impact of the disease; beliefs about causes and 
responsibility; the public health responses; and lessons learned. These aspects are interrelated 
and influence one another.  Anchoring refers to pre-existing ideas about, and experiences with, 
other diseases and epidemics that influence the perception and response to the current crisis.  
Framing refers to how information is presented, in the case of this research, by the newspapers.  
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This is important because what is emphasized or omitted can influence the common narrative 
that is constructed and emerges from a situation such as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. 
Figure 12-1 highlights key aspects of the H1N1 pandemic narrative that emerged in this 
study as well as illustrates the connections (arrows) between them.  In the figure, the components 
include influenza (brown bold text), societal factors (blue underlined text), the public health 
response (red italicized text), anchoring (green text in clouds) and responsibility and blaming 
(text in circles).  The brown text captures themes such as naming of the disease, sickness and 
death, and the spread of illness.  Blue text captures the cultural, social, economic, political, and 
emotional influences and impacts. 
The diagram illustrates the complex relationships between the multiple themes of the 
pandemic narrative.  To explain the overall diagram, I will highlight a few of the connections.  
The affected population, represented by “sickness and deaths” in the diagram, is linked to 
“absentee rates in schools and work,” “schools & work policies,” and “fear of contagion.”  
During the pandemic, the high number of sick individuals and fear of becoming ill led to an 
increase in absentee rates in schools and work places.  School and workplace policies on 
absenteeism were also related to absentee rates and an increase in illness.  In some cases, 
workplace policies discouraged individuals from staying home when sick and as a result, may 
have contributed to the spread of the disease.  However, there were reports of schools and 
workplaces that changed their policies to encourage people to stay home when ill.  The summary 
of the newspaper coverage regarding this relationship is in section 7.2.2.  In the diagram, 
“sickness and deaths” is also linked the “public perception of pandemic.”  The number of 
confirmed deaths that was reported in the newspapers was less than the estimated number of 
from seasonal flu and past pandemic.  Seasonal flu and past pandemics were anchors used by the 
newspapers to define the term pandemic (see section 6.2.3).  Since the confirmed number of 
cases and deaths of H1N1 was less than what was reported for seasonal flu and other pandemics, 
H1N1 was considered not to be a real pandemic.  In turn, this contributed to criticism of the 
overall public health response.   
The sections that follow draw on this illustration, and are organized by four broad themes 
used to organize the results chapters (Chapters 6 to 11): 1) naming the disease; 2) the affected 
population; 3) efforts to contain the outbreak; and 4) lessons learned.  Naming the disease 
corresponds with top section of Figure 12-1, which includes “Names of the Disease” and 
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“Defining a Pandemic.”  The affected population is represented by “Sickness and Deaths” on the 
right hand side.  Efforts to contain the outbreak are shown in the middle of the diagram (red 
text).  The section regarding lessons learned is represented by “Lessons for the Next Pandemic” 
at the bottom of Figure 12-1.  As the diagram illustrates, themes regarding societal factors (blue 
underlined text), anchoring (green text in clouds), and responsibility and blaming (text in circles) 
are interwoven with these four broad themes.   
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Figure 12-1: Diagram of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Narrative 
 165 
 
12.2.1 Naming the disease 
In the media coverage of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, there were two naming issues: 1) 
defining the outbreak as a pandemic, and 2) defining the disease as H1N1 or swine flu (refer to 
the top section of Figure 12-1).  In both cases, anchoring was influential in creating a 
representation of the name.  The common anchors for the term pandemic included past 
pandemics and seasonal influenza (illustrated by arrows from “past pandemics” and “seasonal 
influenza” to “public perception of pandemic”).  The anchoring influenced the perception about 
the severity of a pandemic.  The term swine flu was anchored to pigs and incorrectly assigned 
blame to the animals (illustrated by the term “pigs” next to the term “swine flu” and arrow from 
“pigs” to measures against pigs).  The names, and their associated anchors, created certain 
expectations about the outbreak and influenced how people responded to the disease.  Some may 
call the naming issues a semantic debate, however, this dismisses the importance of the implicit 
meaning of the names applied to a disease.  
Defining a pandemic 
Whether or not H1N1 was a pandemic was a common debate in the newspaper coverage.  
Within the newspaper coverage, there were two conflicting definitions of the term pandemic: the 
official definition and the common understanding of the term.  Despite meeting the official 
criteria set by the WHO, there was widespread criticism that H1N1 was not a pandemic based on 
the common understanding of the term.  The common understanding of the term pandemic was 
anchored to past pandemics and seasonal influenza.  Based on the anchoring, there were two 
main assumptions about the severity of a pandemic.  The WHO’s official definition made no 
reference to severity, however, the anchoring focused on severity of the past pandemics and 
seasonal influenza compared to H1N1.  Before discussing the two assumptions, it is important to 
point out that severity can be defined in different ways.  Severity can be based on the number of 
serious cases (e.g. hospitalizations), the mortality rate, or by the demographics of those most 
affected (e.g. vulnerable populations).  The different ways in which severity can be defined only 
complicates the matter.   
The first assumption was that pandemics result in high mortality.  This was based on 
anchoring to the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which was presented as a worst-case scenario.  In 
the newspaper coverage, there was considerable focus on the potential health impact of a 
pandemic.  While health officials did mention that a flu virus was unpredictable, predicting the 
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possible severity of a flu pandemic became a central focus in the newspaper coverage.  Possible 
scenarios based on previous pandemics were discussed with 1918 as the most commonly 
mentioned scenario.  There was also confusion about the difference between a scenario and a 
prediction since the two terms were often used interchangeably in the newspapers.  Instead of 
1918 being seen as a possible scenario, it was seen as a prediction for what should happen.  Early 
on in the media coverage, there was also speculation about whether the H1N1 would be “the big 
one” which was commonly viewed as a repeat of the 1918 pandemic.  Emphasis on the worst-
case scenario produced a particular set of expectations about what a pandemic looks like that 
proved confusing and problematic for interpreting the 2009 H1N1 experience as it was 
unfolding. 
It is important to note that anchoring to 1918 was not unique for H1N1.  Previous pandemics 
and the fear of an avian influenza pandemic in recent years were commonly anchored in the 1918 
Spanish influenza pandemic (Blakely, 2001; Herring, 2008).  Certain features of the 1918 
pandemic have been stressed, such as the death of 50 to 100 million people, while other features, 
such as the considerable variability in death rates, have received less attention (Herring, 2008).  
Emphasizing the high number of deaths of one specific pandemic gives the false impression that 
pandemics always result in high mortality rates.  There are other pandemics that could be used as 
comparisons, such as the 1957 Asian flu pandemic and the 1968 Hong Kong flu pandemic, but 
these are not commonly referred to in media and scholarly discussions.  Instead, the 1918 
Spanish influenza pandemic is seen as "the gold standard" for pandemics (Herring, 2008).  This 
type of comparison can overestimate and exaggerate the potential impact of a pandemic leading 
to undue alarm.  If the impact is significantly less, as was the case in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, 
then people may be left underestimating the potential risk of an influenza pandemic.   
The second, and related, assumption was that pandemic flu would be worse than seasonal flu.  
H1N1 was compared and contrasted to seasonal influenza, which caused confusion over the 
differences between the two.  There are potential issues with the public’s perception of seasonal 
flu.  Seasonal flu is commonly lumped together with the term cold and flu, which is a group of 
illnesses that people have yearly experience with and frequently underestimate their potential 
risk.  Comparing a pandemic to seasonal flu can underestimate the risk that a pandemic poses.   
In addition, the official definition of a pandemic was interpreted differently among the 
experts, which also added to the confusion.  There are multiple factors that influenced the 
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identification of the start or the end of an epidemic.  For example, Mexican officials initially 
claimed that the outbreak was an extended flu season rather than an epidemic.  When the 
outbreak was first recognized, health officials in Mexico released a media statement blaming 
“the surge in illnesses...on an extended flu season” (GM87).  There are different perceptions 
regarding the two, and they can have different economic and social consequences for affected 
population or region.  Within the literature on risk perception, it is known that there is a lower 
perception of risk for endemic disease and for risks that are familiar, such as seasonal influenza 
(CDC, 2007; Slovic, 2000).  An epidemic of a new strain of influenza, which is unfamiliar, 
would appear more threatening than the seasonal influenza, which people experience every year.    
Additionally, influenza scientists and public health experts argued that the criteria for a 
pandemic had been met several weeks earlier and that the WHO postponed the decision 
unnecessarily.  Many epidemiologists believed that the UK, Spain and Japan were experiencing 
community-based outbreak by mid-May which would have met the criterion for community-
bases spread in one country in a second WHO region (Cohen & Enserink, 2009).  The WHO 
claimed that they waited to ensure that countries were well prepared in order to prevent an 
overreaction (Cohen & Enserink, 2009).  Prior to H1N1, there were years of build-up and 
preparation for an anticipated pandemic.  Many pandemic plans were developed with a much 
deadlier strain (i.e. avian influenza) in mind.  Declaring an epidemic or pandemic has broader 
social, political and economic implications, which are linked to the expectations about what an 
epidemic or pandemic should look like.  It is important to examine these expectations since they 
influence considerably our reaction and response. 
Naming the disease: H1N1 or swine flu 
The second naming issue dealt with the name of the disease: swine flu or H1N1.  Since the 
disease was originally referred to as swine flu, due to its structural similarity to the virus that 
usually infects pigs, pigs became a symbol for the disease.  Symbols can be an important way to 
define the cause of a disease and, directly or indirectly, assign blame.  Defining a cause of the 
disease also directs the response (Davis, 1992).  With the name swine flu, the disease was seen as 
a food safety issue, and pigs were incorrectly blamed for the disease.  There was a false 
impression among the public that the disease could spread through contact with pigs or pork 
products despite evidence that showed otherwise.  As a result, the pork industry was negatively 
affected.     
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The reaction is similar to other diseases with real or perceived connection to animals.  “Mad 
cow disease” (Bovine spongiform encephalopathy) was used as an example in the Canadian 
newspaper coverage due to its impact on the Canadian beef industry in 2003.  Surprisingly, avian 
influenza was not referred to in the same context.  This is likely due to the fact that the economic 
impact due to a possible avian flu pandemic has not noticeably impacted Canada.  The economic 
impact from the massive slaughter of chickens due to fears of avian influenza often occurs in 
Southeast Asia (Lockerbie & Herring, 2009).  It would be interesting to note whether or not the 
H1N1 pandemic was compared to avian influenza in those locations.   
Referring to the disease as H1N1 on the part of government officials was due to economic 
and political pressures from the pork industry.  Other names that were suggested included 
Mexican flu or North American flu.  These names were dismissed due to the potential economic 
fallout of blaming a geographical area.  This was a break from the pattern for the past three 
pandemics, which were named after a geographical area.  The impact on the pork industry due to 
the common use of the name swine flu illustrates how important a name is in influencing 
perceptions about an illness.  The labeling that people use for a disease is just as important as 
scientific evidence.   
12.2.2 Affected population 
Media stories about the impact of a disease tend to focus on how many people are affected 
and who they are.  Reporting the numbers and personalized stories are common ways to illustrate 
the impact.  The numbers are used to create a perception of the risk posed by the disease while 
personalization provides examples of real life victims (Davis, 1992).  The newspaper coverage of 
the H1N1 pandemic included the numbers and personalized stories of H1N1 victims.  However, 
overemphasis of specific features or characteristics of the victims and numbers without context 
can misrepresent the risk. 
Reporting the numbers 
There were numerous media reports about the global and national spread of the disease.  In 
the initial months, the newspaper coverage reported the number of confirmed cases and deaths as 
the disease spread to multiple countries and within Canada.  The primary focus was on the global 
and national spread of H1N1, and whether or not the outbreak would be declared a pandemic.  
During the summer months, the testing policies and methods of surveillance changed from 
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counting individual cases to other methods of influenza surveillance, such as tracking absentee 
rates.  The media coverage reflected the change.  By the second wave, reports about the number 
of cases were noticeably absent despite the higher levels of flu activity.  There were reports 
about the number of hospitalizations and deaths but not to the same extent as during the first 
wave.  The primary indicator of flu activity was absentee rates in schools, which were reported to 
health officials when the rate was high (greater than 10%).   
The indicators for flu activity that were reported in the media are useful from a public health 
perspective when tracking a flu outbreak, however, the interpretation can be problematic in 
newspaper reporting.  Often the limitations and methods used gather the indicators are missing in 
the newspaper reports, which are important for accurate interpretation of flu activity and 
perceived severity.  There are many ways to measure the severity of a disease, such as the 
number of serious cases, number of hospitalizations, the morbidity rates, the number of deaths, 
mortality rates, and demographics of those affected. The numbers could be estimations or limited 
to confirmed cases and deaths.  These numbers (i.e. cases and deaths) can be further stratified by 
age or other factors for susceptibility.  There are many factors that can influence the severity and 
its variability. The WHO (2009b) has additional guidelines that outline this dimension of an 
outbreak of disease. 
Throughout the coverage, there were examples of cases where the numbers were 
misinterpreted and used to question the severity of H1N1.  The newspaper coverage of the 
number of confirmed cases and deaths did not give a clear picture of the overall impact of the 
outbreak.  For example, the total number of deaths was used as evidence that H1N1 was not a 
pandemic based on the estimated number of deaths from previous pandemics and from seasonal 
influenza (illustrated by arrows from “sickness and deaths” to “seasonal flu” and “past 
pandemics” in Figure 12-1).   
There were several problems with this type of comparison.  For one, the World Health 
Organization stated that the comparison of confirmed deaths of H1N1 to estimated deaths from 
seasonal flu was both unreliable and misleading.  Confirming a death required specific testing for 
the virus. Testing may not be done for a number of reasons, such as a death where influenza is 
not suspected (WHO, 2009d).  For example, one of the first deaths in Canada was not originally 
attributed to H1N1.  The Alberta woman had a mild case of H1N1 with chronic underlying 
medical conditions.  Due to the mild flu symptoms and pre-existing health conditions, her 
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doctors did not consider influenza as a contributing to her death.  The connection between H1N1 
and her death was made after the woman’s mother tested positive with H1N1 and health 
authorities tracked down people she was in contact with (GM103, NP83, SP47).  The estimated 
number of deaths from seasonal flu is based on statistical models to calculate the excess 
mortality that occurs during a flu season.  It is assumed that the majority of seasonal influenza-
related deaths is not tested and instead is usually attributed to an underlying medical condition 
(WHO, 2009d).  Comparing the confirmed number of deaths and cases to the estimated values 
ignores the fact that some deaths and cases would be missed in the testing.  It does not take into 
account that not every case of H1N1 was tested and there were changes in testing policies over 
the course of the pandemic.  The numbers were used without proper context.   
  Another problem with the comparison was that the total number of deaths, rather than 
demographics of those affected, was the common focus in the newspapers.  There were frequent 
reports about the total number of cases and total number of deaths.  The total numbers do not 
give an accurate appraisal of the situation.  There is a need for additional details and context to 
give an accurate picture of the impact.  The demographic characteristics of the cases and deaths 
(i.e. age, underlying health conditions versus healthy) were mentioned in the newspaper 
coverage, however, this information was frequently overshadowed by the total numbers.   
Even when demographic information was present, there can be potential problems in the 
interpretation.  For example, severe cases and deaths among healthy youth and young adults 
stand out more in the media and the public’s mind while cases and deaths among the very young 
and old may be attributed to other causes (e.g. underlying health conditions).  In Mexico, for 
example, it was likely that mild cases went unnoticed which did not give an accurate picture of 
the outbreak.  As a result, the initial rate of severe cases and deaths was overestimated and the 
outbreak was perceived to be more severe than it was.   
Regional differences in testing policies can also lead to incorrect interpretation of the 
surveillance data (i.e. number of cases and deaths).  For example, the StarPhoenix deemed 
Saskatoon a “hotspot” for H1N1 based on the number of confirmed cases compared to the rest of 
the province.  The Saskatoon Health Region had two thirds of the confirmed cases in 
Saskatchewan.  The newspaper did note that data might be skewed due to regional differences in 
testing, however, Saskatoon continued to be referred to as a “hotspot.”  The language used can 
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give the wrong impression that certain areas were more heavily affected despite the fact that at 
least part of this differential could be attributed to differences in testing methodologies. 
Personalized stories 
In addition to the numbers of cases and deaths, newspaper coverage included profiles of 
H1N1 victims.  Stories about individuals provide a way to “grab the audience” (Davis, 1992, p. 
28)  Personalized stories make the event more relevant to the audience and show how people, 
who could be their family and friends, are being affected and reacting to the illness. The 
literature on risk perception points out that identifiable victims increase the perception of risk 
more than statistical abstractions (Slovic, 2000).  It is not unusual for individuals to become the 
human face of a disease.  A personalized story can be easier to relate to than numbers.  However, 
the impact on the public perception of risk of identifying specific cases is not consistent with all 
individual victims. Slovic (2000), a psychologist who studies the perception of risk, further 
points out that when children are affected by disease, the perception of risk increases.  Adults 
worry about children’s safety and go to great efforts to ensure that the environment is safe for 
them.  There were two individuals that were referred to by the media as the human face of H1N1, 
both of whom were children. The first case was a five-year-old boy in Mexico who was initially 
identified as patient zero.  A few newspaper articles criticized the identification of the boy as 
patient zero, claiming that it indirectly blamed the child for the disease (GM27, GM56).  The 
second case was the highly publicized death of a 13-year-old boy in Ontario who was described 
as “otherwise healthy.”  The death of the Canadian teenager was used as an example of the risk 
posed by H1N1 and the importance of vaccination within the media.  The death occurred just 
prior to the vaccination campaign and was used as example of why everyone, including healthy 
individuals, should be vaccinated.  Many of the personalized stories were used to provide lessons 
about the illness by showing the risk posed by H1N1 and the importance of prevention methods.  
Other deaths were used as a way to question the readiness of the medical system, which included 
stories of individuals who were turned away at a hospital and later died from the illness.  
Overemphasizing specific deaths can distort the perception of risk.  There were a few articles 
that cautioned against the extensive coverage of the deaths of healthy and young individuals such 
as a column in the Globe and Mail (GM391) and an editorial in the National Post (NP302).  
However, healthy and young individuals are cases that gained the most media attention because 
they were seen as unique and unusual for influenza. 
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12.2.3 Efforts to contain the outbreak 
Pandemic preparedness 
Efforts to contain the 2009 H1N1 pandemic began prior to the event, with pandemic planning 
and preparedness due to fears of avian influenza (refer to “pandemic planning” in Figure 12-1).  
Despite the fact that officials utilized existing programs designed for an anticipated avian 
influenza pandemic, little mention of this disease was made in the newspaper coverage. Instead 
the 2003 SARS outbreak was commonly referenced (illustrated by connection between SARS 
and “pandemic planning” in Figure 12-1).  This is likely due to the fact that, unlike avian 
influenza, SARS was an outbreak that Canada had recently experienced.  The SARS outbreak 
was considered the closest to a pandemic Canada had experienced in recent years. It had revealed 
critical problems with the Canadian public health system that were responded to with intensified 
pandemic planning efforts and the creation of a public health agency at the national level. 
As the pandemic progressed, the newspaper’s portrayal of Canada’s preparedness shifted 
from well-prepared to unprepared.  In the initial months, newspaper reports described Canada as 
well-prepared (reflecting a message from Canadian public health officials) and the years of 
planning were emphasized.  Canada’s response to the SARS outbreak was compared to the initial 
response to H1N1, highlighting how well Canada was reacting to H1N1 and how the public 
health system had improved since SARS.  During the summer months, newspaper reports 
focused on the efforts to prepare for the second wave, most notably the preparation for the 
vaccination campaign.  As time progressed, coverage became more critical and there were 
questions and criticism about whether or not Canada was actually prepared.  The efforts were 
seen as taking too long.  It is not unusual for criticism to occur during an epidemic if control 
efforts fail or an immediate solution is not discovered.  This behavior has been noted in other 
epidemic narratives (Rosenberg, 1989).  
Although such media criticism is not uncommon, it is not necessarily fair, or was not fairly 
presented, as health officials are required to operate in an environment of uncertainty during a 
pandemic.  It is difficult to prepare for hypothetical situations with a consistent and all-
encompassing program.  As the outbreak progresses and changes, so does the knowledge and 
public health response.  The uncertainty of a public health emergency can heighten fear and 
anxiety.  Communication advice suggests that the resulting fear and anxiety can be mitigated by 
acknowledging the uncertainty and highlighting what is known and unknown (CDC, 2007).  
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However, the journalists’ responses may vary to health officials’ admission of uncertainty.  
Some journalist may perceive it as an indicator of trustworthiness on the part of the health 
officials.  Others may view it negatively and seek out other sources who are willing to provide 
greater certainty regardless of the evidence (WHO, 2005).     
Public health measures 
Specific public health measures were identified and critiqued in the newspaper coverage, 
with different perceptions presented in the media about each measure.  Some measures were 
viewed negatively while others were viewed more favorably.  Broader social, economic, and 
emotional factors influenced the opinion of the measures in addition to their effectiveness (refer 
to Figure 12-1 for examples).  Measures that were viewed positively were ones that were not 
forced or mandatory and did not target specific groups.  People are more willing to accept 
something when they have a choice rather than something that is imposed upon them (Slovic, 
2000). 
Conversely, interventions that were deemed arbitrary or invasive, such as travel advisories, 
quarantines were often portrayed in an unpopular light and were portrayed as ineffective, 
unnecessary, and an overreaction.  Travel related measures and quarantine were frequently 
mentioned in the initial weeks of the outbreaks and viewed negatively, and for inconsistent 
reasons.  There were mixed opinions about travel advisories.  Some criticized Canada’s delay in 
issuing the travel advisories while others criticized the necessity of the advisories.  In Canada, 
criticism of the travel advisory was anchored to SARS and the economic impact that SARS had 
on Canada.  There were also mixed opinions about quarantine and isolation depending on 
whether it was forced or voluntary.  Forced quarantine was described in the media as totalitarian 
and draconian while voluntary efforts, described as medical isolation or self-imposed seclusion, 
were portrayed more favorably by the media. Uses of quarantine that targeted specific groups, 
such as the case of Canadian students quarantined in China, and countries that quarantined 
Mexican travelers were viewed negatively.    
Changes in social behaviors and cancellations or closures were seen as effective but there 
was debate about whether the health benefit justified the social and economic impact.  Changes 
in social behaviors, such as social greetings (i.e. hand shaking, kissing on cheek), religious 
practices (i.e. communion) and sharing of sports equipment (e.g. water bottles, towels), were 
encouraged in order to prevent the spread of the flu.  However, there were mixed opinions due to 
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the perceived potential impact on social relationships.  There were concerns that changes would 
impact how people socialize within their community and the changes would interfere with 
traditions.  For example, two Global and Mail articles highlighted the importance of social 
greetings in creating and maintaining relationships (GM89; GM431).  Another article in the 
Globe and Mail and one in the StarPhoenix noted the potential breakdown of the community due 
to fears of contagion (GM305, SP184).  The StarPhoenix article, which focused on the 
psychological impact of an epidemic, noted that during a crisis, people:  
…count on community cohesion…when you have something that’s invisible, 
when you have something that’s contagious, it raises a different sort of fear – a 
fear that very often divides people instead of bringing them together (SP184). 
Cancellations and closures of schools and other social events were suggested as another way 
to prevent the spread of influenza.  These measures were common in Mexico during the initial 
outbreak and were a primary focus in the initial newspaper coverage.  Cancellations and closures 
did happen in Canada but there were discussions about whether the measures were really 
necessary.  Criticisms of the measure emphasized the social and economic impacts, which were 
viewed as equally important as the potential health benefits.  These measures were also seen as a 
fearful reaction to the disease.  A common justification in the newspapers against their use was 
that people should not fear the flu but instead should continue to live their lives.   
In contrast, measures that required individual actions, such as hand washing, respiratory 
etiquette and staying home when sick, were portrayed positively in the papers.  These measures 
were promoted as easy personal actions and common sense.  The positively viewed measures 
were seen as effective and had the least social and economic impact.  They also provided a sense 
of individual control over the disease.  
Vaccination had extensive coverage and there were a wide range of perceptions about the 
measure.  Early in the outbreak, there were some who questioned the necessity of a vaccine. The 
early critics questioned whether the time and money needed to develop vaccine was worth it.  
However, given the uncertain situation of a developing pandemic, the WHO thought it would be 
better to be cautious and go ahead with one.  During the vaccine production stages, the common 
focus in the newspapers was on when the vaccine would be ready and whether it would be ready 
in time.  Vaccination was viewed as the most effective measure and the other measures were in 
place to buy time for the vaccine.  However, impatience was expressed about the time needed to 
develop a vaccine.  It is common for people to become critical in an epidemic when efforts are 
 175 
 
viewed as too slow (Rosenberg, 1989).  It is important to communicate and create realistic 
expectations about the time needed to develop a vaccine.  Despite repeated communications 
about the length of time needed to develop a vaccine, there were criticisms about it being too 
slow.  These criticisms were tied to the progress of other countries (e.g. U.S.) and concerns about 
whether the vaccine would be ready in time.   
Another concern during the production stage was regarding the safety of the vaccine, such as 
whether or not the vaccine would be properly tested.  The concerns were also influenced by a 
general distrust of vaccines and of the pharmaceutical companies.  As an example, the WHO 
faced accusations in January 2010 that they conspired with pharmaceutical companies and 
overstated the threat of the H1N1 virus for financial gain.  International differences in the 
production stages were also noted in the newspaper coverage.  Canada was criticized for being 
slower with the release of the priority list and the vaccine rollout than other countries.  This was 
in contrast to the initial month of the outbreak, when Canada was described as being better 
prepared in terms of their pandemic planning than other countries by health officials and by the 
media.   
Once the vaccine was released, the newspapers focused on how well the nationwide 
campaign was running.  Mixed public health messages about vaccine availability, inconsistent 
policies between provinces, and problems with the rollout were highly publicized in the 
newspapers.  Clinics that experienced problems were emphasized more than locations that ran 
smoothly.  Saskatchewan was cited as a province that had few problems, however, the problems 
in other provinces such as Ontario and Alberta were highly publicized.  The overall coverage 
would suggest that the rollout was problematic and ineffective.  Another noted issue was the 
mixed interpretation of the term “at risk.”  Medically, the term refers to those at greatest risk of 
complications, however, there was evidence in the media coverage that some interpreted the 
phrase as at risk of becoming sick.  This was evident in the coverage regarding the queue 
jumping.  Once the vaccination campaign was over, the newspapers focused on whether or not 
the campaign was successful. Success was commonly measured by the vaccination rate and 
money spent.  The media largely defined the campaign as unsuccessful, citing inconsistent and 
confusing communication about vaccine availability, priority lists, and safety of the adjuvant, 
problems with vaccine supplies, anti-vaccine advocates, public perception of the risk from H1N1 
and the vaccine, and that “the worst was over” by the time that vaccine was available.  The 
 176 
 
majority of the criticism of the vaccination campaign focused too much on cost and not on the 
overall health benefits. 
12.2.4 Lessons learned 
As the second wave ended, the newspapers’ attention shifted to the assessments of the public 
health response and on lessons that could be learned from the pandemic.  To summarize, the 
main lessons included the need to improve communication about public health strategies (e.g. 
vaccination, isolation/quarantine, travel advisories), the need for two-way communication with 
the public during the pandemic planning and response phases, and the need to improve the 
definition of the term pandemic.  The assessment and lessons from the 2009 pandemic will shape 
the response to and perceptions of the next outbreak.  It is interesting to note the continuation of 
the discourse regarding the inevitable next pandemic.  Prior to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, there 
had been years of pandemic planning due the fear that avian influenza could trigger a pandemic.  
When H1N1 was first acknowledged in April 2009, the discourse focused on whether it would 
become the next feared pandemic.  As the pandemic neared its end, the focus shifted again to the 
inevitable next pandemic.  The 2009 H1N1 pandemic is a potential anchor for the next epidemic 
or pandemic but to what extent and in what context is unknown at this time.  For example, the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic could be used as example of a non-pandemic by those who would 
question the definition of the term, or it could be used to emphasize the variation in a pandemic.  
It will be important to reexamine the assumptions of a pandemic and the strategies used to 
address one in light of the lessons from the H1N1 pandemic.  
12.3 Temporal and Geographical Differences 
This section discusses the finding in relation to the last two research questions regarding 
changes over time and geographical differences.  There were two factors that influenced the 
temporal and geographical differences in the newspaper coverage available to Saskatchewan 
residents: the spread and impact of the disease, and changes in public health measures as the 
disease progressed.  The geographical focus of the newspaper coverage changed as the disease 
spread from the initial outbreak in Mexico to the rest of the world.  Once H1N1 was established 
within Canada, the primary geographical focus was on the impact within Canada.  The main 
temporal changes corresponded with changes in the public health measures.  The following 
sections highlight the primary focus of the newspapers during the three periods: 1) Pre-
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Pandemic/First Wave, 2) Second Wave/Vaccination Campaign and 3) Post- Second Wave.  The 
fourth section includes the timeline of key events organized by geographical location.  The Pre-
Pandemic/First Wave period began in April 2009 and lasted until the end of August 2009.  The 
Second Wave/Vaccination Campaign period started at the end of August 2009 lasted until late 
January 2010.  The Post-Second Wave started in late January 2010 and lasted until the end of the 
pandemic in August 2010.   
12.3.1 Period 1: Pre-Pandemic/First Wave 
The first period began with the initial coverage of the Mexican outbreak and lasted until the 
end of August 29, 2009.  Table 12- details the timeline of key events of the first wave.  During 
the first period, the geographical focus was split between the international and national spread of 
the disease and the public health response.  In the initial months, the coverage included the 
outbreak and response in Mexico, travel-related measures and quarantine as the disease spread, 
naming the disease and defining the outbreak as a pandemic.  The newspaper articles 
documented the global spread of the virus as well as the spread within Canada.  The focus 
eventually shifted to the Canadian preparation efforts and measures to contain community-based 
outbreaks within the country.  As time passed and the disease continued to spread, there was a 
perception that the control efforts were too slow.   
12.3.2 Period 2: Second Wave/Vaccination Campaign 
The second period consisted of the second wave of flu activity and the vaccination campaign 
in Canada.  The period began on August 30, 2009 and ended on January 27, 2010.  Table 12-2 
details the timeline and events of the second wave.  During this period, the geographical focus of 
the newspaper coverage was primarily in Canada.  The primary focus of the coverage during this 
period was on Canada’s vaccination campaign.  In the first two months of the period, the focus 
was on the status of the vaccination production, the initial set-up of the clinics and the eventual 
vaccine rollout.  Once the vaccination campaign began, the newspapers provided extensive 
coverage of status of the campaign in various Canadian locations.  As the campaign neared the 
end, the coverage decreased. 
12.3.3 Period 3: Post Second Wave 
The third and final period began at the end of the second wave in Canada and lasted until the 
end of the pandemic in August 2010.  The WHO declared the end of the pandemic (i.e. post-
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pandemic period) on August 10, 2010 (see Table 12-2).  By this time, the newspaper coverage 
had significantly decreased. This corresponded with the end of vaccination campaign and the 
drop in flu activity in Canada.  There was still evidence of flu activity in other locations around 
the world (WHO, 2010), however, there was no coverage of this in the print media available in 
Saskatchewan.  By this time the pandemic was considered over in Canada (PHAC, 2010).  The 
primary focus in the newspapers was on the assessment of the Canadian public health response 
and lessons that could be learned from the pandemic. 
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12.3.4 Timeline of key events for each period 
 
Table 12-1: Period 1 Timeline of Key Events 
Week of International National Saskatchewan
01-Mar-09 Detection of severe respiratory infections in Mexico
08-Mar-09
15-Mar-09
Mar 17 - First known Mexican case
22-Mar-09
Mar 28 - First known US case
29-Mar-09
05-Apr-09
12-Apr-09
19-Apr-09
Apr 23 - WHO announces outbreak
Apr 25 - Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern 
26-Apr-09
Apr 27 - WHO raises Alert to 4
Apr 29 - WHO raises Alert to 5
Apr 29 - First death outside of Mexico in US
Apr 26 - First Canadian cases in NS & BC
Apr 27 - PHAC issues travel advisory
Apr 28 - Cases confirmed in AB and ON
Apr 30 - Case confirmed in QB
03-May-09 May 1 - WHO drops name "swine flu" & 
negotiations with vaccine manufacturers
May 3 - China quarantines Canadian & Mexican 
students
May 2 - Virus found at Alberta hog farm
May 4 - First severe case in Canada reported; Case 
in PEI
May 7 - First Canadian death confirmed in AB
May 8 - Community outbreaks confirmed in Canada
May 9 - Case confirmed in MB
May 7 - First SK cases in Saskatoon and Regina 
areas
10-May-09
May 12 - Case confirmed in YT
17-May-09
May 22 - Mexico relaxes restrictions
May 18 - PHAC lifted Mexican travel advisory
24-May-09
31-May-09 First Wave Peaks in June
June 1 - Case confirmed in NT; Severe outbreaks in 
northern Manitoba FN communities
June 6 - Hand sanitizer shipment to FN debate
07-Jun-09
June 11 - WHO declares pandemic, raises alert to 6
June 13 - Case confirmed in NL
14-Jun-09
21-Jun-09
June 27 - First death reported in SK
28-Jun-09
June 29 - First known Tamiflu-resistant case
05-Jul-09
12-Jul-09
July 16 - WHO changes reporting requirements
19-Jul-09
July 21 - First Canadian case of Tamiflu-resistance
July 23 - SK stops counting individual cases
26-Jul-09
02-Aug-09 Aug 6 - Report that Canada orders 50.4 million 
vaccine doses (Ordered in late July)
09-Aug-09
16-Aug-09
23-Aug-09
Aug 29 - First wave officially ends in Canada
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Table 12-2: Period 2 and 3 Timeline of Key Events 
 
12.4 Summary 
In summary, this chapter pulls together the main points from the results chapters and relates 
the findings to the research questions.  This chapter outlines the overall 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
narrative produced in the newspaper coverage.  The summary of the narrative was organized by 
key narrative themes that included naming issues, the reported impact of the outbreak, efforts to 
contain the outbreak and the lessons learned from the pandemic.  Temporal and geographical 
Week of International National Saskatchewan
30-Aug-09 Aug 30 - Second wave officially begins
06-Sep-09
13-Sep-09
Sept 16 - Vaccine priority list released
Sept 17 - Body bag shipment to FN reserves
20-Sep-09
27-Sep-09
04-Oct-09
11-Oct-09
18-Oct-09 Oct 19 - Shipment of vaccines to P/T
Oct 21 - Health Canada authorizes adjuvanted 
vaccine
Oct 22 - Canada's vaccine campaigns begins
25-Oct-09
Oct 26 - Highly publicized death of 13-year-old boy Oct 26 - Saskatoon begins vaccination campaign
01-Nov-09 Second Wave Peaks in November
08-Nov-09
Nov 12 - Health Canada authorizes unadjuvanted 
vaccine
15-Nov-09
22-Nov-09 Mid Nov - Vaccine campaigns expand to general 
public
Nov 25 - Mass vaccination in Saskatoon
29-Nov-09
06-Dec-09 Early to Mid Dec - Mass clinics close down
13-Dec-09
Dec 17 - Mass vacciantion clinics closed in 
Saskatoon
20-Dec-09
27-Dec-09
Jan 1 - PHAC and Health Canada scale back 
response
03-Jan-10 WHO addresses allegations of improper influence by 
pharmacetuical companies
10-Jan-10
17-Jan-10
24-Jan-10
Jan 27 - Second Wave declared over by PHAC
31-Jan-10
Feb 
Mar
April
May
June
July
Aug Aug 10 - WHO declares "Post-Pandemic Phase"
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changes in the newspaper coverage were based on two factors: the spread and impact of the 
disease, and changes in public health measures as the disease progressed.  
  Naming the disease and defining the outbreak as a pandemic were important because they 
shaped the perception of the outbreak and response.  In both cases, anchoring was influential in 
shaping the perception.  The names, and their associated anchors, created certain expectations 
about the outbreak and influenced how people responded to the disease.  The newspaper 
coverage of the impact (i.e. reports on the confirmed cases and deaths, personalized stories) also 
shaped the pandemic narrative of the severity of the pandemic.  The number of confirmed cases 
and deaths were used to create a perception of the risk posed by the disease while personalization 
provided examples of real life victims.  However, overemphasis of specific features or 
characteristics of the victims (i.e. healthy versus underlying health conditions) and emphasis on 
the number of deaths without proper context misrepresented the risk.  Efforts to contain the 
outbreak were also included in the newspaper coverage.  Social, economic, and emotional 
considerations influenced media perspectives on the measures and their effectiveness.  Finally, 
lessons learned from outbreak rounded out the narrative of 2009 H1N1 pandemic in the 
Canadian newspapers.  The overall narrative of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic closely followed the 
common epidemic narrative described by Rosenberg (1989), though the specifics of the narrative 
were shaped by the nature of the disease and socio-cultural context.  Meaning within the 
pandemic narrative was also shaped by anchoring and framing.  This will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 13  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
13.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses issues that emerged from the pandemic narrative, outlined in the 
previous chapter, and connects them to the broader socio-cultural context.  The discussion will 
focus on three interrelated points that emerged from the findings: 1) the importance of meaning 
and how it is constructed and reflected in the narrative; 2) understanding how the broader socio-
cultural context influences the narrative; and 3) communication challenges that occurred during 
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  The first point relates to the role of framing and anchoring within a 
narrative.  Framing creates meaning through the presentation of the information.  Anchoring 
creates meaning through linkages to pre-existing beliefs and values.  The second point is based 
on the idea that epidemic narratives are shaped by the broader context.  The communication 
challenges highlight potential opportunities for further research and lessons for health 
communicators.  The chapter also discusses the theoretical and methodological contributions and 
the limitations of this study.  It concludes with recommendations for future research and 
communications.   
13.2 Discussion of Results 
The theoretical perspective of this study maintains that representations of health and illness 
are socially constructed and based on the broader socio-cultural context.  The following 
discussion highlights the importance of meaning and how it is constructed and conveyed within a 
narrative.  A narrative, and the meanings that are conveyed in a narrative, reflect the broader 
context.  These meanings cannot be separated from the broader socio-cultural context.   Meaning 
is conveyed in a narrative by the way it is presented or framed and by linking a new narrative to 
old narratives.  Narratives are important ways in which people understand health concerns and 
can often be  problematic for health research, policy and communication (Panter-Brick & 
Fuentes, 2008).  This is because of the tendency to focus on a “strictly biomedical and 
epidemiological approach while epidemics play out…with a host of social cultural, economic, 
political and religious concerns (Atlanti-Duault & Kendal, 2009, p. 208).   
To illustrate the importance of meaning and the influence of the broader context, four points 
will be highlighted with examples drawn from the findings.  The first point is the importance of 
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implicit meanings within a narrative.  Underlying assumptions are conveyed in a narrative 
through, for example, language, or emphasis on or absence of topics, which shape the nature of a 
disease narrative. Second, further complexity is introduced with the recognition that the same 
message may be interpreted and reflected differently in a narrative by different individuals.  
Multiple or conflicting meanings drawn from a common word or phrase lead to communication 
challenges.  The first two points relate to framing of the narrative.  A frame is the perspective of 
a story which influences how the information is presented and how it interpreted (Altheide 1996; 
Goffman 1974).  Third, the important role of anchoring in creating meaning within a narrative 
will be discussed.  Finally, societal values shape narrative details, such as the perception and 
acceptance of public health measures for H1N1 reflected in the media narrative.  The discussion 
concludes by highlighting characteristics of media that influence the nature of the narrative being 
produced by them. These characteristics may challenge the efforts of public health officials to 
convey a particular health message. 
13.2.1 Implicit meaning 
Meaning is seldom straightforward.  There are often underlying assumptions that are 
conveyed in a word or phrase that accompanies the explicit and more intentional message.  The 
naming issue that surrounded the disease is an example of implicit meanings.  The name that is 
used invokes different messages about a disease (Visgo, 2010).  Naming the disease is one way 
in which outbreak was framed.  A name defines the problem, points to potential causes and as a 
result, suggests solutions.  These messages have been illustrated by this study’s findings.  For 
example, naming the 2009 flu pandemic “swine flu” was based on explicit scientific knowledge 
about the structure of the particular influenza virus but implicitly invokes the message that 
“animals may carry disease” (Visgo, 2010, p. 236).  In this case the pork industry was negatively 
and erroneously affected.  This underlying message was also evident with the comparison to 
Mad Cow Disease within the Canadian media.  Swedish researcher Orla Vigso (2010) also 
highlighted a cultural and religious controversy that was based on the name swine flu.  Pigs are 
considered unclean animals by Jews and Muslims.  Israeli vice minister of health, Yakov 
Litzman, claimed that the term was degrading to Jews and Muslims and discouraged its use. 
Vigso (2010) also linked the slaughter of pigs in Egypt to cultural and religious concerns. Vigso 
argued that Egypt, a primarily Muslim country, used the naming of the disease to further 
persecute its Christian minority, who were the ones that raised pigs in the country. 
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With the name H1N1, the disease is implicitly reframed as a “variant of a scientifically 
established disease” which is spread by human behavior.  The popular message that is involved 
by this name is “science has analyzed and identified the disease, allowing treatment and 
diminishing [the] threat” (Visgo, 2010, p. 236).  An alternative name, Mexican flu, was 
suggested as an explicit reference to the geographic origin of the disease.  The implicit meaning 
here is that avoiding contact with Mexicans or travelers from Mexico can be interpreted as a way 
to prevent the spread.  The popular message that is invoked by the name Mexican flu is that 
“some areas of the world are dangerous” and “contact with strangers can be dangerous” (Visgo, 
2010, p. 236).   
When it comes to naming a disease, there is a need to find a name that is user friendly, easy 
to remember and say, and “less loaded” (Visgo, 2010).  Naming an outbreak is important from 
the very beginning.  Health officials need to quickly and carefully consider the implicit meanings 
conveyed in the name that is assigned.  Changing a name mid-way through an outbreak is 
problematic as was evident by the continued use of the term swine flu by the media and general 
public throughout the 2009 pandemic.  
13.2.2 Multiple meanings 
A standard piece of advice for communications strategies is to avoid jargon and use plain, 
everyday language (CDC, 2007; WHO, 2005), however, common words may have multiple 
meanings and interpretations depending on the context.  When new information is presented, it is 
interpreted based on what is already known.  A common approach in risk communication 
involves translating scientific knowledge into understandable concepts for a lay audience, 
however, people may misunderstand or misinterpret scientific information due to their pre-
existing beliefs (CDC, 2007; Glik, 2007).  It is important to understand the variation in 
interpretation due to deferent perspectives.  If common interpretations are understood, 
communication can adapt the messages and address potential misinterpretation.  
One example of this issue was the term pandemic.  There was an official definition and a 
common definition of the term.  Severity was the defining feature of the common understanding 
but was not present in the official definition.  As was presented in Chapter 6, the common 
definition was shaped through the use of anchors.  The two definitions of the term pandemic is 
also an example of role of framing.  Depending on perceptive, the term was interpreted in 
different ways and discussed in different ways.  The difference in meanings led to confusion and 
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criticism.  A lesson that was pointed out during the pandemic and afterwards with the newspaper 
coverage was the need for a better definition of pandemic.  One suggestion was the use of a 
severity index “to put future outbreaks into context” (SP509).  An issue not raised in the media 
coverage is how severity should be used to determine if a pandemic exists.  If mortality becomes 
a defining factor, at what point would one declare a pandemic?  Also, severity can be difficult to 
determine while an outbreak is in progress and ideally the public health response would lessen 
the impact.  Challenges with a severity-based pandemic definition include the global variation in 
public health infrastructure, variation with population vulnerability and variation in severity over 
time and place (Barnett, 2011).  Additionally, the identification of cases during an epidemic or 
pandemic may be delayed by inadequacies in a disease surveillance system such as the lack of a 
public health infrastructure, delays due to methodology, lack of resources, and health policies 
such as reporting requirements (Hitchcock, et al., 2007).  This issue needs to be addressed by 
stressing the range of variability that can occur during a pandemic.  Even during the iconic 1918 
Spanish flu, there was regional and temporal variation in morbidity and mortality.  In a global 
review of morbidity and mortality rates, Johnson and Mueller (2002) reported that some regions 
experienced mortality rates as high as 5 - 10% while others regions reported very low morbidity 
and mortality.     
Another example was the term “at risk” which was used to determine who should be 
vaccinated first.  Medically, the term refers to those at greatest risk of complications, however, 
there was evidence in the newspapers that some interpreted the phrase as at risk of becoming 
sick.  This was shown in the coverage regarding the queue jumping with sport teams. In the 
absence of clarification for this term, alternative and conflicting interpretations emerged as part 
of the media narrative of 2009 H1N1.   
13.2.3 Anchoring of narratives 
Anchoring is an important way that representations develop, and occurs when a new 
experience is linked to known historical events, metaphors, or symbols in order to make the new, 
unfamiliar event understandable.  The new experience takes on the characteristics and opinions 
of the anchors to which it appears similar. While anchors are useful for making a new epidemic 
understandable and seem less threatening, it can also remove what is specific and different about 
the event (Joffe, 2002).   
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During the 2009 pandemic, some anchors provided a positive perspective on the public 
health response while others led to criticism.  For example, the SARS outbreak was used as an 
anchor for the pandemic planning.  In the initial months of the pandemic, it was used as an 
example of the improvements in the public health system.  However, the main anchor for 
defining the 2009 pandemic was the 1918 Spanish flu.  As stated previously, the use of the 1918 
Spanish flu is not unique for this pandemic.  Previous pandemics, SARS, and the ongoing fear of 
an avian flu pandemic have been anchored to the 1918 Spanish flu (Blakely, 2001; Herring, 
2008; Washer, 2004).  The use of a deadly pandemic as an anchor heightens “the climate of viral 
panic” (Herring, 2008, p. 81).  Nancy Tomes (2000) describes viral panic as an obsession with 
killer germs.   
This type of comparison can overestimate and exaggerate the potential impact of a pandemic 
leading to undue alarm and increased anxiety.  It will be important for health officials to evaluate 
the references, or anchors, that they use in their official documents, such pandemic plans and in 
communication with the public and media.  The anchors that are used can be influential in 
shaping the public’s perception. 
13.2.4 Influence of broader context 
According to Rosenberg (1989), the specifics of an epidemic narrative are shaped by the 
broader context.  Wide-spread societal beliefs and values can also influence the public’s response 
and acceptance of public health measures.  How people respond to health communication 
messages depends on their broader belief system (Abrahma, 2009).  For public health officials, it 
is important to understand the role that cultural beliefs and values play in the perception and 
acceptance of public health communication and measures.   
  An example from this study of the influence of societal values is regarding the acceptance 
of and reluctance towards various public health measures.  Measures that were viewed positively 
tended to be individual actions such as hand washing, respiratory etiquette and staying home 
when sick.  Research on the perception of risk has recognized that people are more tolerant of 
measures that are personally controlled and voluntary (CDC, 2007; Slovic, 2000).  This 
perception may be linked to the prevalence of individualism and the preference for individual 
responsibility as opposed to communal responsibility.  A common narrative that seemed to 
emerge was that individual responsibility was good while efforts that required collective action 
were viewed negatively.  Individualism tends to view health problems as individual problems 
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rather than social problems and places the cause and prevention of health problems under the 
individual’s control (Raphael, Curry-Stevens, & Bryant, 2008).  This idea was also evident in 
reasons why people did not want to be vaccinated that were reported in the newspapers.  Those 
reluctant to be vaccinated focused their rationale on the personal benefit rather than the social 
benefit.  Individualism has been identified as a potential factor contributing to the increasing 
reluctance towards vaccination (Calandrillo, 2004; Reich, 2010). Raphael and colleagues (2008) 
have also identified this individualist ideology as a barrier to addressing the broader social 
determinants of health in Canada, despite the growing knowledge of their importance.  Related to 
the prevalence of individualism is the growing influence of a market orientation in Canadian 
society (Raphael, et al., 2008).  A market orientation toward health care was evident in the public 
versus private health care debate that emerged from the queue jumping by sports teams and 
private clinics.  The Canadian health care system is a publically funded system, however, there 
also exists a market and materialist perspective that prefers policies that serve the economic 
elites (Raphael, et al., 2008).  During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the conflicting point of views 
were evident in the promotion and criticism of sports teams and private clinics gaining early 
access to the vaccine based on their economic status.    
For health officials, it is important to understand the broader social and cultural factors that 
influence perception and acceptance of health care measures and policies.   There is a need to 
anticipate the response based on the broader context when communicating about pandemic 
preparedness and response.  This requires an examination of the socio-cultural dimensions that 
influence the perception of health (Atlanti-Duault & Kendal, 2009; Singer, 2009; Strong, 1990).  
Understanding how people can react based on the society in which they live is important when 
addressing and communicating about a crisis. 
13.2.5 Other communication challenges 
There are characteristics of the media that can contribute to communication problems during 
a public health emergency.  Specifically, the agenda and needs of the media can often conflict 
with the agenda of public health officials and it can be “difficult to convey complicated and 
contingent information to journalists who need to be direct and succinct – and also dramatic” 
(Kline, 2006, p. 51).  The news media need to tell a story that is simple, straightforward and 
interesting to a general audience (Davis, 1992).  Stories need to be brief and simple due to 
limited amount of space and time, however, limited space contributes to “disembodied facts 
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devoid of context often result[ing] in a misleading oversimplification of reality” (Davis, 1992, p. 
37).  There is also a preference for confirmed or conclusive answers that can be lacking in 
scientific understandings (Hu, 2010).  As a health issue becomes more complex, there is less 
likelihood that answers will be conclusive.  Additionally, journalists may lack an adequate 
background in science to understand complex and contradictory scientific information (Glik, 
2007; Hu, 2010).  News media are not reviewed in the same way as scientific literature (Glik, 
2007).  In an attempt to appear balanced, media may inappropriately present opposing points of 
view as equal when they are not, or without a critical analysis of the positions (Hilton & Hunt, 
2011).   
In addition, news sources are not geographically limited.  For example, the StarPhoenix and 
National Post are part of the same news chain.  Articles may be republished from one to the 
other as well as from other localized newspapers that are part of the same news network.  The 
lack of geographical limits in news reports compounded the confusion when health messages or 
the severity of the outbreak differed across jurisdictions.  During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, there 
were contradictory or slightly different messages that were communicated based on federal, 
provincial or territorial policy decisions and the media reported on the discrepancies between 
messages (PHAC, 2010). 
The characteristics of the media can make it difficult to effectively communicate a health risk 
that is not simple.  Health risks are complex and situated within a broader socio-cultural context.  
Due to these challenges, it is important for health communicators to work closely with and 
educate reporters on the issues to ensure that the information is clear, concise and presented with 
the proper context.  Also, given that communication is a two-way process, it is also important to 
examine the epidemic narrative that arises within the health field and consider the underlying 
assumptions that are within it.  The assumptions that shape meanings within the health field may 
not be present within the public and media and thus lead to miscommunication.   
One suggestion presented in the newspaper coverage was that health officials should adjust 
their communication strategies to suit the 24-hour news cycle, and use social media to 
supplement the traditional media channels.  While this is a useful suggestion to increase the 
amount of communication with the public, it does not change how quickly information and 
evidence can be gathered and analyzed in order to make informed decisions and provide 
effective communication during a public health emergency.  A public health emergency, such as 
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the 2009 pandemic, is a changing and uncertain situation.  This can be problematic since 
uncertainty can make a situation scarier (Slovic, 2000).  As the situation changes, the messages 
change.  The change may be perceived as inconsistent and confusing.  Health officials need to be 
able to admit when they do not know something without appearing incompetent.  This will be 
challenging to address due to the nature of the media and the public’s perception of what science 
is capable of answering.  There must be a balance between the media and public’s need for 
assurances with the time needed to gather those answers and put measures in place.   
13.3 Contributions and Limitations 
The following sections highlight the contributions of the results, of the theoretical 
perspective and conceptual frameworks, and of the methodology.  This section concludes with 
the limitations of this study. 
13.3.1 Contributions of Results 
The study provides an overview of the evolving newspaper coverage of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic in newspapers distributed within Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.  The study highlights the 
common themes and messages that were present in the newspaper coverage and how they shaped 
the overall media narrative of the pandemic.  The results highlight the importance of meaning 
and how meanings are reflected within a narrative.  It is important to understand the multiple 
meanings that words may have and how they may influence the interpretation of health 
messages.  The perception and reaction to an epidemic are shaped by the broader socio-cultural 
which is also shown by the results.  The results also illustrate the difficulties with communication 
during a fluid and uncertain situation such as a public health emergency.  Additionally, the work 
highlights potential areas for miscommunication such as various interpretation of the same term 
such as the term pandemic or at risk.   These findings can provide a basis for communication 
advice for future disease outbreaks. 
13.3.2 Theoretical contribution 
The study provides a theoretical contribution for understanding how people discuss and react 
to epidemics.  It draws together theoretical understandings from anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, and history.  The work builds upon the concept of an epidemic narrative 
(Rosenberg, 1989) and adds two more components: anchoring and framing. These concepts 
address three aspects of narratives which were highlighted in Chapter 3, which are: 1) common 
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stories for common experiences, 2) new stories relate to old stories, and 3) differing perspectives 
and interpretations for the same experience.  The concepts of an epidemic narratives, anchoring, 
and framing have been used individually or in pairs to examine the media coverage of disease 
outbreaks.  This study draws the concepts together into a combined framework.  The combined 
framework recognizes the broader context in which an epidemic narrative emerges and provides 
a way to understand the subtle differences and distinctions in meaning and response.   
An epidemic narrative is similar to an illness narrative but is at the societal level rather than 
the individual level.  An illness narrative, according to Kleinman (1988), includes the personal 
and social meanings attached to a disease.  It reflects an individual’s understandings of the 
illness, their lived experiences, and places the illness within the context of their daily life.   An 
epidemic narrative represents the collective experience.  In the same way that illness narratives 
have been applied to clinical practice and teaching to improve communication between patients 
and clinicians (Kleinman, 1988; Kleinman, Eisenberg, & Good, 1978), an epidemic narrative can 
improve communication within the public health and health communication fields.  The 
epidemic narrative provides an understanding of the common ways in which people react to an 
outbreak and it highlights the importance of the broader socio-cultural context.  The broader 
context and social representations influence how people would accept and interpret health 
messages.  
Anchoring provides a way to understand how multiple epidemic narratives relate to one 
another.  Anchoring occurs when a new experience is linked to known historical events, 
metaphors, or symbols in order to make the new, unfamiliar event understandable.  The new 
experience takes on the characteristics and opinions of the anchors to which it appears similar.  
In terms of an epidemic narrative, previous epidemics or diseases may be referenced in order to 
makes sense of the new epidemic.  Previous epidemic narratives shape the current epidemic 
narrative and vice versa.  While anchors are useful for making a new epidemic understandable 
and seem less threatening, it can also remove what is specific and different about the event.    
Since an epidemic narrative is a collective experience, there will be a range of perspectives.   
Narratives are not told from a single perspective, especially in the news media in which 
numerous voices are represented.  Framing addresses this issue and highlights how meanings are 
conveyed based on what is emphasized or omitted in the presentation.  A narrative may also be 
interpreted differently depending on the individual. The perspective of the storyteller, as well as 
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the audience, can influence the meanings that are conveyed and understood within an epidemic 
narrative. 
These conceptual frameworks have largely been applied elsewhere independent of each 
other.  However, this study combines the three to examine the construction, emphasis, and 
meaning conveyed in the news coverage of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. These combined 
frameworks provide a nuanced epidemic narrative.  
13.3.3 Methodological contribution 
In terms of methodology, a detailed description the protocol and its development is presented 
in chapter 4 (see Table 4-1, Table 4-2, Table 4-3, and Table 4-4).  This protocol can be used and 
adapted by other researchers for similar studies.  A complete list of data sources is also provided 
(Appendix A) if other researchers wish to conduct a secondary analysis of the work.  In terms of 
organizing and analyzing the date, a Microsoft Access database was constructed.  While the 
database was useful for keeping track of individual articles and their associated data, it became 
cumbersome as the work progressed.  Ultimately information was selectively extracted from the 
database via querying and subjected to further analysis (cut & paste, regrouping, and relabeling) 
in standard word processing software. The database was too rigid to expand, combine, and revise 
the pre-defined categories.  Other more flexible software or databases may be available and more 
adaptable to the iterative analytical approach that is required in this methodology.   
13.3.4 Limitations 
This study was limited to newspapers and did not include other sources of traditional or 
social media.  During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, there was a wide range of media sources that 
the general public could access to learn about the pandemic.  These included traditional media 
sources, such as newspapers, television, radio, as well as online through social media.  The 
examination of a single media source offers one, but still important and influential, media 
narrative of 2009 H1N1.   
A second limitation is the limited geographical focus of work.  The study examines the 
newspaper coverage within the Saskatoon context.  The study cannot be considered a 
comprehensive study of the Canadian narrative.  The inclusion of the two national newspapers 
reveals a common national narrative, but the narrative details would be expected to vary as local 
coverage varies.  This work can serve as a model for further examination of the 2009 H1N1 
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pandemic when using additional sources and locations. It would be interesting to compare details 
of a similar study of 2009 H1N1 in other Canadian communities. 
Additionally, it cannot be assumed that the perceptions presented in the media are equally 
shared among the general public in Saskatoon.  Additional work would be needed to examine the 
perceptions among the general public.  This work could be done through the traditional approach 
of interviews or survey, however, recent work has highlighted the potential use of social media 
sites, such as Twitter, forums, and users comments as a way to gauge public opinion (Chew & 
Eysenbach, 2010; Smith, 2011; Szomszor, Kostkova, & St Louis, 2011; Tauscizk, Faasse, 
Pennebaker, & Petrie, 2012).  Online data can provide a dynamic picture of the changes in public 
opinion compared to single or longitudinal surveys (Tauscizk, Faasse, Pennebaker, & Petrie, 
2012). 
13.4 Recommendations for Future Research  
As previously stated, this work can serve as a model for further examination of the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic when examining additional sources and locations, or to examine the epidemic 
narrative of other diseases.  The conceptual and methodological model can be adapted and 
applied to other forms of traditional media such as the radio, television, and to social media (e.g. 
Twitter, blogs, and forums).  Since the 2009 pandemic, there have been an increasing number of 
studies that have examined the coverage in various media sources including newspapers (Hilton 
& Hunt, 2011; Hu, 2010; Huynh, 2011; Rachul, Ries, & Caulfield, 2011; Tauscizk, Faasse, 
Pennebaker, & Petrie, 2012), television (Fogarty, et al., 2011), on-line blogs (Tauscizk, Faasse, 
Pennebaker, & Petrie, 2012), user comments on news sites (Henrich & Holmes, 2011), and 
Twitter (Chew & Eysenbach, 2010; Smith, 2011; Szomszor, Kostkova, & St Louis, 2011).  
These studies, in addition to this work, add to what is known about the media representation of 
the 2009 pandemic.  Additional studies will further contribute to this knowledge base.    
The epidemic narrative could also be examined in other sources such as documentation from 
health organizations or from the perspective of the general public.  Each of these sources 
provides a unique perspective on the overall epidemic narrative and is relevant for shaping public 
perception.   
In addition, there is room for further examination of the pandemic narrative within the 
Saskatoon newspapers.  The study provides a broad overview of the pandemic narrative, 
however, specific aspects could be re-examined in greater detail.  As an example, this study 
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focused on the changes in themes over time.  Additional research could focus on a specific theme 
and closely track the choice of language used over time.  Also, there were aspects of the 
newspaper coverage that were not considered, such as the story placement, length of the stories, 
and visuals.  Davis (1992) points out that the importance of a problem can be implied by the 
story placement, visual, and length.  These elements could also be examined to further 
understand the pandemic narrative within the media.  
Other potential research could compare the pandemic narrative between two or more 
localized areas such as cities, provinces, or countries.  The media coverage could be examined in 
relation to the differences in public health response and communication strategies and to 
differences in the impact of the pandemic.  These studies could point to differences in the 
pandemic narrative based on the broader social context.  The H1N1 pandemic narrative could 
also be compared to the media coverage of past outbreaks (e.g. SARS, seasonal influenza, past 
pandemics) in the same location.  This area of research could further explore the use of 
anchoring between individual narratives.  For example, it could highlight themes that carry over 
from one epidemic narrative to another.   
The increasing use of social media is changing how Canadians and the rest of the world 
receive their news, and represents another area of research.  According to the Canadian Media 
Research Consortium (2011), one in three Canadians, and one in two for young adults, value 
social networking sites as a valuable source for news.  However, there is a need to further 
understand how Canadians use social media to obtain their news before making 
recommendations for health officials to use it to their advantage.  Since the 2009 pandemic, there 
have been studies that examine this issue.  Chew and Eysenbach (2010), for example, conducted 
a content analysis of “tweets” as a way to provide snapshots of the public’s opinions and 
behavioral response over the course of the pandemic.  The researchers used an open-source 
infoveillance system, which Eysenbach (2009) developed to gather textual information from 
Twitter.  Szomszor and colleagues (2011) also examined how the pandemic was discussed on 
Twitter and analyzed the popularity of trusted sources, such as news outlets and official health 
agencies.  They found that reputable sources were more popular than untrusted sources but there 
was still the potential for misinformation to spread through social media.  In addition to 
analyzing the content of Twitter, Smith (2011) included a survey to examine how people 
determined the credibility of the information, and whether Twitter contributed to their decision to 
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be vaccinated.  These studies highlight the potential use of social media for communication. 
However, additional research is needed before recommending how health officials should use 
social media for their communication strategy. 
13.5 Implications for Communication 
Communication can be difficult given the complexity of meaning.  The findings of this study 
highlight several challenges and issues that need to be considered when developing 
communication strategies.  There is a body of literature that provides guidelines for risk 
communication such as Covello and Allen’s (1988) seven cardinal rules for risk 
communication.
1
  Similar lists can been found in documents on communication advice for public 
health emergencies and pandemic planning (e.g. WHO, 2004; 2005).  Despite the existence of 
these guidelines, there are still challenges with communication.  The findings of this study 
reinforce the importance of these guidelines but also highlight challenges and areas for future 
work. 
According to communication advice, communication strategies need to be carefully planned 
and evaluated.  Since the pandemic, the Public Health Agency of Canada and Health Canada 
have released a report which contains an evaluation of their communication efforts (PHAC, 
2010).  According to the report, there are two communication areas that need improvement: 1) 
the need for consistency in communication across jurisdictions, and 2) improved strategies to 
communicate uncertainty, risk and shifts in scientific knowledge (PHAC, 2010).  The results of 
this study highlight specific communication challenges and point to areas for further study that 
are relevant for these two issues. 
The first area for improvement is the need for jurisdictional consistency in communication.  
One noted challenge in this study is the lack of geographical limits of news sources.  The study 
examined newspapers that were available within Saskatoon; however, the geographical focus and 
sources of information in the coverage were not limited to the Saskatoon area.  This compounds 
                                                 
1
 The seven cardinal rules for risk communication include 1) accept and involve the public as a 
legitimate partner; 2) plan carefully and evaluate efforts; 3) listen to the public’s specific 
concerns; 4) be honest, frank, and open; 5) coordinate and collaborate with other credible 
sources; 6) meet the needs of the media; and 7) speak clearly and with compassion (Covello & 
Allen, 1988)  
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the confusion when health messages vary across jurisdictions as was illustrated by differences in 
the vaccination campaigns.  For example, several provinces had variation in the order of their 
priority groups.  This contributed to confusion about which groups were next in line.  Due to the 
nature of the news media, health messages can spread to unintended audiences.  Understanding 
how media information spreads is an important consideration when developing communication 
strategies for disseminating health messages that are location-specific and ones that are relevant 
for a broader audience. 
The second area for improvement is the development of strategies to communicate 
uncertainty, risk and shifts in scientific knowledge.  The report from PHAC and Health Canada 
recommends the development of “plain-language approaches to covey complex scientific 
findings, processes, uncertainties, risks and shifts for various audiences/purpose” (PHAC, 2010, 
p. 8).  However, developing a “plain-language approach” can be challenging when considering 
the complexity of meaning that is conveyed in language.  This study highlights the importance of 
implicit and multiple meanings in communication.  There are often underlying assumptions that 
are conveyed in common words or phrases, in addition to the explicit and more intentional 
meaning.  Common words or phrases can carry multiple, and sometimes conflicting meanings, 
depending on the audience’s perspective.  For example, the term pandemic had an official 
definition and a common understanding.  Severity was part of the common understanding of the 
term but not part of the official definition.  The difference in definition contributed to confusion 
and criticism.  Another example is the term “at risk.”  Medically, the term meant those at greatest 
risk for complications, however, there was evidence in the newspaper coverage that some 
interpreted the phrase as at risk for becoming sick.  The second interpretation was evident in 
coverage regarding queue jumping by sports teams and in debates about which groups should be 
included on the priority list.  When using common words or phrases, it is important for health 
communicators to emphasize the meaning that they wish to convey.  In addition, it would be 
important to avoid short hand versions of terms (e.g. “at risk”) that may be open to interpretation.  
Another communication challenge is the how pre-existing beliefs and values can influence 
the perception of a disease and the health care system.  For example, naming and references to 
previous events (i.e. anchoring) can influence the public’s perception and response.  Names and 
references can have underlying meanings and have broader implications.  An example that 
illustrates this point is the name swine flu.  Due to the name, pigs became a symbol for the 
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disease and were seen as responsible for the disease.  As a result, there was a negative economic 
impact on the pork industry.     
To develop communication strategies, it will be important to carefully evaluate and consider 
the explicit and implicit meanings in health messages, and how they may be interpreted from 
various perspectives.  These factors should be considered when evaluating the communication 
strategies for the various audiences.  It will be important to survey members of the various 
audiences to identify messages that cause confusion. 
13.6 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this research constructed a narrative of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic reflected in 
newspapers distributed within Saskatoon, Saskatchewan from April 2009 to August 2010.  The 
results illustrate the importance of meaning and how meanings are constructed within a narrative.  
They also illustrate how an epidemic narrative is shaped by the broader context in which it 
occurs.  The difficulties with communication during a fluid and uncertain situation such as a 
public health emergency are also illustrated.  The study also contributes to the theoretical 
understanding of how people discuss and react to epidemics and pandemics.  The work combines 
three frameworks: an epidemic narrative, anchoring and framing, to examine the construction, 
emphasis, and meaning conveyed in the newspaper coverage of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. These 
combined frameworks provide a nuanced understanding and analysis of an epidemic narrative.  
This study can serve a theoretical and methodological model for additional research.   
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APPENDIX A  
LIST OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
The following is a list of all of the identified newspapers articles based on the selection 
criteria previously outlined in the data collection section (see section 4.5 on page 58).  The 
articles are listed alphabetically by newspaper, followed by chronological order and page 
number.  For citation purposes in the results chapters, each article was assigned an ID# which 
includes an abbreviation of the newspaper and a number based on its order chronologically and 
by page number.  The abbreviation for the newspapers are the following: GM for the Globe and 
Mail, NP for the National Post, PS for the Planet S, SS for the Saskatoon Sun, SP for the 
StarPhoenix, and TS for The Sheaf. 
ID# Date Title Page Section 
GM1 24-Apr-09 Back from Mexico? Watch for flu-like illness A.3 National 
GM2 24-Apr-09 Swine flu outbreak A.3 International  
GM3 25-Apr-09 Pandemic in the making A.1 National  
GM4 27-Apr-09 Flu fear spreads as six cases confirmed in Canada A.1 National  
GM5 27-Apr-09 Never seen before A.6 National  
GM6 27-Apr-09 Public health still vulnerable after SARS A.6 National  
GM7 27-Apr-09 Flu outbreak leaves Mexican workers in limbo A.7 National  
GM8 27-Apr-09 Politicians confident in health officials S.1 B.C. News 
GM9 28-Apr-09 WHO raises alert level as virus spreads its reach A.1 National  
GM10 28-Apr-09 Mexican screened A.11 National  
GM11 28-Apr-09 This really has nothing to do with pigs any more A.11 National  
GM12 28-Apr-09 Rookie minister praised for quick, open response A.11 National  
GM13 28-Apr-09 Flown back from Cancun, 29-year-old woman 
dies 
A.13 National  
GM14 28-Apr-09 Keeping swine flu in perspective A.14 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM15 28-Apr-09 Few signs of the lessons of SARS A.14 Editorial 
GM16 28-Apr-09 Lessons from the last outbreak A.15 Comment 
GM17 28-Apr-09 Don't sell. Market's sniffles are temporary B.13 Business 
GM18 28-Apr-09 Markets take flu scare in stride B.13 Business 
GM19 28-Apr-09 Confidence in spotlight B.14 Business 
GM20 28-Apr-09 Tuesday's markets: What happened B.15 Business 
GM21 28-Apr-09 Bonds B.16 Business 
GM22 28-Apr-09 Commodities B.16 Business 
GM23 28-Apr-09 Foreign exchange cross rates B.16 Business 
GM24 28-Apr-09 Tending those 'green shoots of recovery' B.6 Business 
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ID# Date Title Page Section 
GM25 28-Apr-09 How to prepare for a pandemic L.1 Globe Life 
GM26 28-Apr-09 Pan Am bids delayed S.3 Sports 
GM27 29-Apr-09 The boy at swine flu's ground zero A.1 International  
GM28 29-Apr-09 Keep fear-o-meter on low for now A.11 National 
GM29 29-Apr-09 If use of masks is urged, get one that fits well A.11 Column 
GM30 29-Apr-09 Divers take plunge A.12 National 
GM31 29-Apr-09 Farmers complain A.12 International  
GM32 29-Apr-09 Canadian cases double as tourist come home A.12 National 
GM33 29-Apr-09 Shamed by SARS, China vows transparency A.13 International  
GM34 29-Apr-09 Tuesday's markets B.17 Business 
GM35 29-Apr-09 Commodities B.18 Business 
GM36 29-Apr-09 Dividend growth provides comfort amid turmoil B.18 Business 
GM37 29-Apr-09 The weekly web poll B.20 Business 
GM38 29-Apr-09 Rating a worst-case scenario for swine flu B.7 Business 
GM39 29-Apr-09 Pandemic puzzle: what to expect next L.1 Globe Life 
GM40 29-Apr-09 Flu outbreak diverts Wolverine from Mexico R.2 Globe Review 
GM41 29-Apr-09 Cancelling due to flu? Look to insurance R.8 Travel 
GM42 29-Apr-09 Cantour events postponed in Mexico S.5 Sports 
GM43 30-Apr-09 'All humanity' urged to fight swine flu pandemic A.1 International  
GM44 30-Apr-09 What the new swine flu might do A.12 International  
GM45 30-Apr-09 Canadian tourists scuttle Mexican vacation plans A.12 National 
GM46 30-Apr-09 Who flu hits hardest difficult to assess A.13 Health 
GM47 30-Apr-09 What ails flu reporting A.14 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM48 30-Apr-09 What ails flu reporting; (1) A.14 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM49 30-Apr-09 What ails flu reporting; (2) A.14 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM50 30-Apr-09 Pandemic panic attack A.15 Column 
GM51 30-Apr-09 The Berlusconi comic opera A.2 Business 
GM52 30-Apr-09 Seasonal factors will blunt Mexico economic 
effects 
B.10 Business 
GM53 30-Apr-09 Flu pokes hole in golf schedule S.4 Sports 
GM54 01-May-09 WHO's afraid of the big, bad pig? Agency 
declares new name for strain 
A.1 International  
GM55 01-May-09 Provinces release flu drugs as Canada ramps up 
response 
A.1 National 
GM56 01-May-09 'All humanity and the flu; (1) A.16 Letter to the 
Editor 
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ID# Date Title Page Section 
GM57 01-May-09 'All humanity' and the flu A.16 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM58 01-May-09 Schools of incubation A.16 Editorial 
GM59 01-May-09 The real pandemic is economic, with no vaccine A.17 Column 
GM60 01-May-09 A case for the three amigos A.17 Comment 
GM61 01-May-09 Baghdad boars must die, Iraqi government 
decrees 
A.8 International  
GM62 01-May-09 Biden goes off-message with plane, subway 
remark 
A.8 International  
GM63 01-May-09 Obama aid caught flu, but President not exposed A.8 International  
GM64 01-May-09 Religious leaders guard against spreading disease A.8 International  
GM65 01-May-09 From sunshine to sickness in three short days A.8 National 
GM66 01-May-09 Google searches were first indication of outbreak A.9 International  
GM67 01-May-09 How bad could the flu get? A.9 National 
GM68 01-May-09 Markets deciding flu too scary to think about B.13 Business 
GM69 01-May-09 30 second spot: Dispatches from the world of 
media and advertising 
B.8 Business 
GM70 01-May-09 Lufthansa forecasts cuts as industry braces for flu B.9 Business 
GM71 01-May-09 UAE says no ban on pork, but shops clear shelves B.9 Business 
GM72 01-May-09 Life under lockdown; no work, no school, no 
social visits, no end in sight 
L.1 Globe Life 
GM73 01-May-09 Sex, murder and the outbreak of moral panic R.21 Column 
GM74 02-May-09 Lessons of 1976: flu, fear, wasted millions A.1 National 
GM75 02-May-09 Wild pigs at Iraq zoo spared from flu cull A.20 International  
GM76 02-May-09 Too grave for clerical delay A.24 Editorial 
GM77 02-May-09 Health officials express cautious optimism A.8 National 
GM78 02-May-09 Getting the job done during a pandemic B.3 Business 
GM79 02-May-09 Flu level 4? Level 5? Well, just let me known 
when we get to the roof and I'll jump 
F.3 Column 
GM80 02-May-09 Expect some swine-flu deaths, Campbell warns S.2 B.C. News 
GM81 04-May-09 Human-to-swine transmission escalates mutation 
risk 
A.1 National 
GM82 04-May-09 Pork industry in panic as pigs catch flu A.1 National 
GM83 04-May-09 Life in four-star isolation 'getting to us' A.9 International  
GM84 04-May-09 The company: Infonaut Inc: Charting the right 
course through an outbreak 
B.5 Business 
GM85 04-May-09 Mexican stocks not immune to flu fallout B.8 Business 
GM86 05-May-09 Ottawa challenges China's ban on pork imports A.11 National 
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ID# Date Title Page Section 
GM87 05-May-09 Canada's 'flu hunters' track a will new virus A.11 Health 
GM88 05-May-09 The joke aporkalypse: tasteless or in good fun L.1 Globe Life 
GM89 05-May-09 Thinking twice about turning the other cheek L.2 Globe Life 
GM90 05-May-09 Spike TV promises show on surviving swine flu R.2 Globe Review 
GM91 05-May-09 Mexican player suspended for fake swine-flu 
cough 
S.6 Sports 
GM92 06-May-09 China overreacts A.18 Editorial 
GM93 06-May-09 China pressed to justify quarantine of Canadians A.7 National 
GM94 06-May-09 No, it's not all over. But the epidemic of fear of 
A/H1N1 virus is subsiding 
A.7 National 
GM95 06-May-09 The loneliest pig A.7 International  
GM96 06-May-09 Farmers find relief from 'perception issue' of 
swine flu virus 
B.12 Business 
GM97 07-May-09 Pork industry scrambles to prove meat is safe A.6 National 
GM98 08-May-09 Obama's choice of burger topping sparks cries of 
condiment cover-up 
A.12 International  
GM99 08-May-09 Worker at centre of pig-farm flu won't take blame A.6 National 
GM100 08-May-09 In final stretch 'every vote is going to count.' S.1 B.C. News 
GM101 08-May-09 Activity S.4 Sports 
GM102 08-May-09 Mask to join jerseys, scarves in fans' wardrobe S.5 Sports 
GM103 09-May-09 Tests confirm first flu-related death in Canada A.4 National 
GM104 09-May-09 Office designs B.16 Business 
GM105 09-May-09 Talking pictures F.3 Focus 
GM106 11-May-09 Pigs culled at quarantined Alberta farm A.5 National 
GM107 12-May-09 Four health workers test positive for swine flu A.12 Toronto News 
GM108 12-May-09 Clorox, Visa gets boost from flu-panicked 
shoppers 
B.12 Business 
GM109 12-May-09 National Gallery fears deficit, job cuts R.2 Globe Review 
GM110 12-May-09 Essential tracks R.3 Globe Review 
GM111 13-May-09 Canada to play U.S. After Japan pulls out S.7 Sports 
GM112 15-May-09 Pig farmers are victims of a swinish disregard for 
the truth 
A.15 Comment 
GM113 16-May-09 Swine flu from Alta farm matches human virus A.12 National 
GM114 16-May-09 Love in another time of cholera F.11 Book Review 
GM115 16-May-09 Verbatim/What was said this week, in public and 
in print 
F.2 Focus 
GM116 16-May-09 In brief: Cases of A H1N1 flu in province reach 
100 
S.4 B.C. News 
GM117 18-May-09 Flu not dwindling as fast as hoped, experts say A.2 International  
GM118 19-May-09 Worst of flu outbreak 'over' in Canada A.4 National 
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ID# Date Title Page Section 
GM119 20-May-09 Face time is crucial to morale and productivity B.14 Business 
GM120 20-May-09 Mexico/A 'flu-free guarantee' R.8 Travel 
GM121 21-May-09 Canadians make a 'shift to thrift' B.4 Business 
GM122 23-May-09 WHO warns more deaths likely from H1N1 flu A.18 International  
GM123 23-May-09 Verbatim/What was said this week, in public and 
in print 
F.2 Focus 
GM124 23-May-09 the gospel according to The Mark M.3 Globe Toronto 
GM125 23-May-09 Deals T.2 Travel 
GM126 26-May-09 School board to vote on censuring trustee A.13 Toronto News 
GM127 26-May-09 So, let's beat up on goodness? R.1 Globe Review 
GM128 28-May-09 2 performers, 4 first names, 1 Grand time R.1 Globe Review 
GM129 29-May-09 30-second spot/ Dispatches from the world of 
media and advertising 
B.5 Business 
GM130 02-Jun-09 Preparing for a pandemic B.9 Business 
GM131 05-Jun-09 Swine flu a wake-up call, says Manitoba native 
chief 
A.7 National 
GM132 06-Jun-09 H1N1 spreading across Canada, doctors warn A.9 National 
GM133 06-Jun-09 Images of the World this week/ Getting 
perspective 
F.2 Focus 
GM134 08-Jun-09 Poor nations desperate for cash: World Bank A.1 International  
GM135 08-Jun-09 Entire herd of 3,000 culled at farm where pigs 
tested positive for H1N1 virus 
A.6 National 
GM136 09-Jun-09 Manitoba probes spike in flu-like illnesses A.10 National 
GM137 09-Jun-09 Canadian rank health care higher concern than 
economy 
A.8 National 
GM138 09-Jun-09 Swine flu, recession erode Air Canada traffic B.8 Business 
GM139 10-Jun-09 Reserves hit hard by swine flu A.8 National 
GM140 10-Jun-09 Will swine flu mutation become vicious? L.8 Globe Life 
GM141 11-Jun-09 Severe flu prompts Manitoba to take emergency 
measures 
A.7 National 
GM142 12-Jun-09 A global pandemic, a local failure: flu outbreak 
sweeps reserves 
A.1 National 
GM143 12-Jun-09 Now it's a 'pandemic' What does it mean A.1 International  
GM144 12-Jun-09 WHO's pandemic 'phases' send a confusing signal A.15 International  
GM145 12-Jun-09 Swine-flu shots for Canadians ready 'in fall' A.15 National 
GM146 12-Jun-09 Remoteness allied to overcrowding A.18 Editorial 
GM147 12-Jun-09 Feeling sick? Booking off is better for your career B.15 Business 
GM148 13-Jun-09 I detest the fact that some vampire fiction has 
continued to perpetuate this shrine to eternal 
youth and beauty 
R.1 Globe Review 
GM149 15-Jun-09 Flu hits all provinces as Nfld reports its first case A.1 National 
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ID# Date Title Page Section 
GM150 15-Jun-09 The secrets of a hotelier's five-star success A.3 International  
GM151 15-Jun-09 Swine flu? That's so two months ago L.1 Globe Life 
GM152 17-Jun-09 Four more die of swine flu A.6 National 
GM153 18-Jun-09 Sanofi Aventis to donate flu vaccine to WHO B.9 Business 
GM154 19-Jun-09 Cancer free - smoother skin too L.1 Globe Life 
GM155 20-Jun-09 Summer camps on lookout for signs of H1N1 
virus 
A.12 National 
GM156 23-Jun-09 Six-year-old Ontario girl dies of H1N1 A.9 National 
GM157 23-Jun-09 Flu virus to cost Delta $250-million in revenue B.12 Business 
GM158 24-Jun-09 Alcohol fears lead Ottawa to withhold hand 
sanitizers from flu-ravaged reserves 
A.1 National 
GM159 24-Jun-09 Give Air Canada credit: It's become a much better 
airline 
A.19 Column 
GM160 24-Jun-09 How to keep a lid on investing stress B.10 Business 
GM161 25-Jun-09 Swine flu outbreak closes ward at St. Michael's A.13 Toronto News 
GM162 25-Jun-09 The symptom of swine flu delay A.16 Editorial 
GM163 25-Jun-09 Clear your worries with a click of the mouse A.2 Column 
GM164 26-Jun-09 News of Jackson's death slows Internet traffic A.13 International  
GM165 26-Jun-09 Hospital nursery closes after H1N1 exposure A.9 Toronto News 
GM166 26-Jun-09 In defence of sweaty armpits and clammy hands B.14 Business 
GM167 29-Jun-09 Olympic projects available for Canadians in 
Russia 
S.1 Sports 
GM168 30-Jun-09 Swine flu shots to be available by October A.8 National 
GM169 01-Jul-09 Social studies L.6 Globe Life 
GM170 02-Jul-09 Swine flu hitting young, healthy adults hardest A.4 National 
GM171 02-Jul-09 Time to draw up a better plan of attack against 
H1N1 
L.1 Globe Life 
GM172 03-Jul-09 Poorer countries asking for antivirals A.4 National 
GM173 04-Jul-09 Unready for the next wave A.18 Editorial 
GM174 06-Jul-09 Swine flu fears spur Canada to stock up on 
ventilators 
A.1 National 
GM175 06-Jul-09 Social studies L.6 Globe Life 
GM176 07-Jul-09 Swine flu kills healthy 43-year-old pastor A.1 National 
GM177 07-Jul-09 Hotel industry woes felt by REITs B.10 Business 
GM178 08-Jul-09 Updated H1N1 statistics hard to come by A.5 National 
GM179 09-Jul-09 Vancouver health authority to delay activity 
during Games 
S.1 B.C. News 
GM180 09-Jul-09 Where there's a bug, there's his blog S.2 B.C. News 
GM181 10-Jul-09 Barn blazes turn up heat on building codes A.3 National 
GM182 10-Jul-09 Nova Scotians warned of rising swine flu risk A.5 National 
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GM183 13-Jul-09 Ottawa boosts pandemic prep with new rules for 
treatment 
A.1 National 
GM184 13-Jul-09 25-year-old mother died from virus after seizures A.6 National 
GM185 14-Jul-09 Global vaccine shortfall looms for flu season A.1 International  
GM186 14-Jul-09 The missing sense of vigilance A.12 Editorial 
GM187 15-Jul-09 Flu forces a mother's loved ones to mourn from 
afar 
A.1 National 
GM188 15-Jul-09 Natives fear ending up last on list for vaccines A.11 National 
GM189 15-Jul-09 Conditions on reserves blamed for greater risk of 
flu 
A.11 National 
GM190 15-Jul-09 A sci-fi response to a futuristic pandemic A.11 National 
GM191 16-Jul-09 Pandemic hits, isotopes disappear and all eyes are 
on a rookie minister 
A.1 National 
GM192 16-Jul-09 Flu virus spreads rapidly through summer camps A.1 National 
GM193 16-Jul-09 A plan must engage the public A.16 Editorial 
GM194 16-Jul-09 A world of competing sorrows A.17 Comment 
GM195 17-Jul-09 Canada will have enough flu vaccines to share A.1 National 
GM196 17-Jul-09 H1N1 virus touches 10 Ontario kids camp A.7 National 
GM197 17-Jul-09 Universities abuzz with preparations for response 
to rapid spread of swine flu 
A.7 National 
GM198 17-Jul-09 Employers remain ill-prepared for flu B.1 Business 
GM199 18-Jul-09 Swine flu targets youth, figures reveal A.1 National 
GM200 18-Jul-09 Ottawa considers culling hogs A.6 National 
GM201 18-Jul-09 A pastor's final sermon leaves his flock with a 
message of love 
F.1 Focus 
GM202 18-Jul-09 Verbatim F.2 Focus 
GM203 18-Jul-09 Let's wash our hands of H1N1 hysteria M.3 Column 
GM204 20-Jul-09 The judge who judges herself A.11 Comment 
GM205 20-Jul-09 A death in Alberta A.5 National 
GM206 20-Jul-09 The man behind the pandemic plan L.1 Globe Life 
GM207 20-Jul-09 How to talk to your child about H1N1 L.1 Globe Life 
GM208 21-Jul-09 School closing, vaccinations and quarantines A.4 International  
GM209 21-Jul-09 Mass health-worker absenteeism feared A.4 National 
GM210 21-Jul-09 Deflation? Statscan obviously hasn't seen my bills B.9 Business 
GM211 23-Jul-09 Poor nations to get 20% of Canadian flu vaccine A.5 National 
GM212 24-Jul-09 Canada trailing in flu vaccine trials A.5 National 
GM213 24-Jul-09 Roche bullish on markets, raises flu drug capacity B.5 Business 
GM214 25-Jul-09 Verbatim F.2 Focus 
GM215 25-Jul-09 Muskoka's sodden summer of discontent L.3 Globe Life 
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GM216 27-Jul-09 Extra cash should buy Canadians access to 
vaccine, poll finds 
A.7 National 
GM217 27-Jul-09 In a pandemic surge, where's our moral ground? A.7 National 
GM218 27-Jul-09 Health agency to test link between flu, vitamin D A.7 Science 
GM219 28-Jul-09 Cities slam Ottawa for poor pandemic planning A.1 National 
GM220 28-Jul-09 A flu by any other name A.7 International  
GM221 28-Jul-09 Flu virus extends its reach A.7 International  
GM222 28-Jul-09 Isolated islands confirm first cases A.7 International  
GM223 28-Jul-09 Saudi Arabia, Israel report first deaths from swine 
flu 
A.7 International  
GM224 28-Jul-09 Track, treat cases quickly, study says A.7 International  
GM225 28-Jul-09 Cott frets as titans head down market B.4 Business 
GM226 30-Jul-09 Researchers in a race against onset of flu season A.7 Health 
GM227 30-Jul-09 Decision in September on who gets vaccine first A.7 Health 
GM228 31-Jul-09 Nova Scotia not ready for H1N1, province's 
auditor-general says 
A.4 National 
GM229 01-Aug-09 Council approves contracts 21-17 as services 
resume 
A.10 Toronto News 
GM230 01-Aug-09 The Canadian tortoise A.16 Editorial 
GM231 01-Aug-09 New flu guidelines issued for health workers A.9 National 
GM232 03-Aug-09 The sci-fi geek who knows how to rock R.1 Globe Review 
GM233 04-Aug-09 Swine's fin but a germ is v. Difficile A.13 Comment 
GM234 05-Aug-09 Premiers take on thorny issue of overhauling EI 
standards 
A.4 National 
GM235 06-Aug-09 Premiers sound alarm on imminent flu threat A.1 National 
GM236 07-Aug-09 The premiers and the flu A.12 Editorial 
GM237 08-Aug-09 PM likely to feel chill from Mexican amigo A.4 National 
GM238 08-Aug-09 Deck chairs moving amid election speculation A.5 Column 
GM239 08-Aug-09 Just add this to the growing list of the indignities 
of old age 
F.3 Focus 
GM240 10-Aug-09 Harper blames Canada for visa furor A.1 National 
GM241 11-Aug-09 Canada dismisses warning about flu drug A.1 National 
GM242 11-Aug-09 Pork producers struggling to bring home the 
bacon 
A.1 National 
GM243 12-Aug-09 BNN Market B.11 Business 
GM244 13-Aug-09 A summer of discontent over Ottawa's H1N1 plan A.3 National 
GM245 14-Aug-09 Health minister's hasty departure A.12 Editorial 
GM246 14-Aug-09 In India, cinemas darken, number of cases mounts 
and costs climb 
A.3 International  
GM247 14-Aug-09 Swine flu panic overblown, medical officer says A.3 National 
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GM248 15-Aug-09 Scholars put braaains together to thwart zombies A.10 National 
GM249 15-Aug-09 Toronto auditions for the industry in a bad year 
for tourism 
A.13 Toronto News 
GM250 15-Aug-09 For God's sake, get a Second Life (or not) A.19 Comment 
GM251 15-Aug-09 Swine flu patient dies weeks after giving birth A.6 National 
GM252 15-Aug-09 Images of the World, This Week on a wing and a 
prayer 
F.2 Focus 
GM253 17-Aug-09 Hog farmers feel betrayed by federal support 
package for ailing industry 
A.5 National 
GM254 17-Aug-09 Building the Artic A.7 National 
GM255 18-Aug-09 Flu czar needed to battle pandemic: CMA journal A.4 National 
GM256 18-Aug-09 Inuit fear impact of flu pandemic A.6 National 
GM257 18-Aug-09 Circuit looking to expand S.5 Sports 
GM258 19-Aug-09 I felt awful. I'm so embarrassed A.11 National 
GM259 19-Aug-09 Logjam in vaccine packaging to delay H1N1 flu 
shots 
A.4 National 
GM260 20-Aug-09 New school year could recharge unpredictable 
H1N1 virus 
A.4 National 
GM261 21-Aug-09 Harper stresses social welfare, economy in 
northern spending 
A.4 National 
GM262 21-Aug-09 Experts concerned about dangers of antibacterial 
products 
L.3 Globe Life 
GM263 24-Aug-09 The new flu challenge: Getting the vaccine out A.1 National 
GM264 24-Aug-09 Hockey titans air dirty laundry S.2 Sports 
GM265 25-Aug-09 Parents, health workers hesitant to get vaccine 
shots, study finds 
A.4 National 
GM266 28-Aug-09 Once the Liberals' top cause, EI is now just one 
file among many 
A.1 National 
GM267 28-Aug-09 Canada aims to put rush on delivery of flu 
vaccine 
A.2 National 
GM268 01-Sep-09 Canada urged to fast track flu vaccine delivery A.6 National 
GM269 02-Sep-09 Canada needs a sense of urgency A.14 Editorial 
GM270 02-Sep-09 Health premiums to go up 6 per cent A.6 National 
GM271 02-Sep-09 Doctors, Ottawa clash over flu vaccine A.9 National 
GM272 02-Sep-09 Old MacDonald's virtual farm L.1 Globe Life 
GM273 03-Sep-09 Pandemic prep A.6 National 
GM274 03-Sep-09 Canada will get flu vaccine by October, public 
health chief vows 
A.6 National 
GM275 03-Sep-09 With more than 500 aboriginal women missing, 
action is overdue 
L.1 Globe Life 
GM276 03-Sep-09 Plague alert/App maps illnesses L.3 Globe Life 
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GM277 04-Sep-09 H1N1 virus hits children 5 to 18 the hardest A.7 National 
GM278 05-Sep-09 Follow New York's lead A.20 Editorial 
GM279 05-Sep-09 H1N1 virus kills visitor to Calgary competition A.9 National 
GM280 05-Sep-09 Influenza has a cure - it's affluence F.1 Focus 
GM281 09-Sep-09 An off-putting air of entitlement A.16 Editorial 
GM282 09-Sep-09 Boost your immunity with these flu fighters L.1 Globe Life 
GM283 11-Sep-09 Peak of flu season may hit before widespread 
vaccinations 
A.5 National 
GM284 11-Sep-09 If only dancing in parks were an Olympic event, 
B.C. Would be in great shape 
S.3 Sports 
GM285 12-Sep-09 Flu-season fetes: How to avoid going viral L.2 Globe Life 
GM286 14-Sep-09 NDP hints at possible reprieve for Tories A.4 National 
GM287 15-Sep-09 France expects every Muslim to do his duty A.17 International  
GM288 15-Sep-09 One dose of H1N1 vaccine likely sufficient A.8 National 
GM289 16-Sep-09 Swine flu virus resistant to Tamiflu in Alberta 
case 
A.6 National 
GM290 17-Sep-09 Sanitizers, masks and dozens of body bags: 
Ottawa sends grim flu-fighting kits to reserves 
A.1 National 
GM291 17-Sep-09 Children, pregnant women among groups who 
need shots first, agency says 
A.4 National 
GM292 18-Sep-09 B.C. Reserve hit by first outbreak of the fall flu 
season, experts say 
A.1 National 
GM293 18-Sep-09 Native leaders reject apology for body bag 
blunder 
A.15 National 
GM294 18-Sep-09 Playing catch-up with H1N1 A.18 Editorial 
GM295 18-Sep-09 Daybook 09.18.2009 B.2 Business 
GM296 19-Sep-09 Jack Layton's caption F.5 Focus 
GM297 19-Sep-09 Fear of contagion is catching on L.4 Globe Life 
GM298 21-Sep-09 With swine flu fears on base, soldiers face a new 
invader 
A.12 International  
GM299 22-Sep-09 Ads that aren't graphic A.18 Editorial 
GM300 22-Sep-09 Two flu shots for tots, but just one for adults and 
older children 
A.8 National 
GM301 24-Sep-09 Hundreds stay home as flu hits B.C. schools 
before vaccine is ready 
A.1 National 
GM302 24-Sep-09 Obama's lesson in sharing A.13 International  
GM303 24-Sep-09 ABC's flashforward has 'hit' written all over it R.3 Globe Review 
GM304 25-Sep-09 Canada will give Gadhafi an earful over 
Lockerbie during his stop in St John's 
A.1 National 
GM305 25-Sep-09 Hand sanitizer at the high altar - a modern-day 
precaution 
A.4 National 
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GM306 25-Sep-09 Ontario delays fall flu shots over H1N1 threat A.4 National 
GM307 25-Sep-09 Word up L.1 Globe Life 
GM308 26-Sep-09 Radio's rude awakening M.3 Globe Toronto 
GM309 28-Sep-09 Don't worry, Dalai Lama.  I'll still shake your 
hand 
A.1 Globe Life 
GM310 28-Sep-09 Flu plans 'confused very badly' by study A.6 National 
GM311 28-Sep-09 Urine test may replace biopsies for cancer A.6 National 
GM312 28-Sep-09 Daybook 09.28.09 B.2 Business 
GM313 29-Sep-09 More flu programs suspended A.6 National 
GM314 30-Sep-09 Canada's flu crisis starts here A.1 National 
GM315 30-Sep-09 Toronto educator with H1N1 dies in Hong Kong A.12 Toronto News 
GM316 30-Sep-09 Public impact, no public access A.18 Editorial 
GM317 30-Sep-09 The courts need surge capacity A.19 Comment 
GM318 30-Sep-09 Tour rival merger pressures Transat B.3 Business 
GM319 01-Oct-09 'Epidemic of confusion' as flu strategies diverge A.1 National 
GM320 01-Oct-09 Faster, higher, stronger - but no hugs A.1 National 
GM321 01-Oct-09 The courts and the protocols A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM322 01-Oct-09 Researcher looks to 1918 for H1N1 treatment A.8 National 
GM323 02-Oct-09 Tories want to extend parental benefits to self-
employed 
A.1 National 
GM324 02-Oct-09 Seasonal confounders A.16 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM325 02-Oct-09 What protects best? Reports add to flu confusion A.2 National 
GM326 02-Oct-09 Workers unsure about flu B.13 Business 
GM327 03-Oct-09 Verbatim F.2 Focus 
GM328 03-Oct-09 These boots aren't made for walking L.1 Globe Life 
GM329 06-Oct-09 'Invisible' sodium think tank under fire A.2 National 
GM330 06-Oct-09 Your morning smile L.6 Globe Life 
GM331 07-Oct-09 the hare is likely to win this race A.16 Editorial 
GM332 07-Oct-09 Seasonal flu shots guard against H1N1: study A.9 National 
GM333 07-Oct-09 Leisure-stock gains prove consumers spending 
against 
B.17 Business 
GM334 08-Oct-09 Health-care bulletin A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM335 08-Oct-09 Milder flu leads Canada to hold off on vaccine, 
buying time for trials 
A.4 National 
GM336 08-Oct-09 Canada turns to WTO over U.S. Label law B.7 Business 
GM337 09-Oct-09 Blunder endangers H1N1 vaccine plan, health 
expert says 
A.5 National 
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GM338 09-Oct-09 Stop the conflusion: Here are the H1N1 facts L.1 Globe Life 
GM339 10-Oct-09 Social Studies L.8 Globe Life 
GM340 13-Oct-09 Severe flu strikes healthy, younger women A.1 National 
GM341 13-Oct-09 The office L.2 Globe Life 
GM342 14-Oct-09 Ottawa's plan to shelve flu vaccines breeds 
dissent in health ranks 
A.1 National 
GM343 14-Oct-09 Vaccine delayed, vaccine denied A.22 Editorial 
GM344 14-Oct-09 Vancouver schools forgo hand sanitizer in flu 
fight 
S.1 B.C. News 
GM345 15-Oct-09 Officials defend go-slow approach to inoculation A.7 National 
GM346 15-Oct-09 Flusploitation: Beware of H1N1 snake oil L.1 Globe Life 
GM347 15-Oct-09 Informal shelter seeks funds to buy beds S.3 B.C. News 
GM348 16-Oct-09 The duty to be vaccinated A.18 Editorial 
GM349 16-Oct-09 Chan sitting out to nurse injury S.5 Sports 
GM350 17-Oct-09 Pregnant women face delayed delivery of flu 
vaccine 
A.13 National 
GM351 17-Oct-09 Keep your channel, give me my ratty cardi L.3 Globe Life 
GM352 19-Oct-09 Clean hands, every day A.16 Editorial 
GM353 19-Oct-09 Approval for H1N1 vaccine expected this week A.6 National 
GM354 20-Oct-09 Upside-down priorities A.16 Editorial 
GM355 20-Oct-09 Mass flu-shot clinics being set up across the 
country 
A.7 National 
GM356 20-Oct-09 Who's a master of disaster? Not many business 
owners 
E.1 Business 
GM357 20-Oct-09 Your pressing H1N1 questions answered L.1 Globe Life 
GM358 21-Oct-09 Clinics ready to act once H1n1 vaccine approved A.4 National 
GM359 22-Oct-09 H1N1 vaccine rollout begins A.8 National 
GM360 22-Oct-09 Downtown Eastside 'high priority' for H1N1 shots S.3 B.C. News 
GM361 23-Oct-09 Pins and needles A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM362 23-Oct-09 If you're feeling hot, get a shot A.23 Comment 
GM363 23-Oct-09 People skills win out, survey finds B.15 Business 
GM364 23-Oct-09 Swine flu and the bottom line B.2 Business 
GM365 24-Oct-09 Health officials scramble to counter H1N1 myths A.12 National 
GM366 24-Oct-09 Verbatim F.2 Focus 
GM367 24-Oct-09 H1N1 goes from swine to hienie R.13 Globe Review 
GM368 26-Oct-09 Fewer Canadians interested in getting H1N1 shot A.1 National 
GM369 26-Oct-09 The flu bugs A.20 Letter to the 
Editor 
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GM370 26-Oct-09 The flu bugs (2) A.20 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM371 26-Oct-09 Obama declares swine flu emergency A.4 International  
GM372 26-Oct-09 Hockey Canada shuns sharing of water bottles A.4 National 
GM373 27-Oct-09 Historic vaccine rollout begins as flu ramps up A.1 National 
GM374 27-Oct-09 Historic vaccine rollout begins as flu ramps up (1) A.1 National 
GM375 27-Oct-09 The H1N1 vaccine: Six key questions A.12 National 
GM376 27-Oct-09 The duty to be informed A.22 Editorial 
GM377 27-Oct-09 The swine flu fuss A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM378 27-Oct-09 The swine flu fuss (1) A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM379 27-Oct-09 Refusing to get vaccinated is selfish A.23 Comment 
GM380 27-Oct-09 Help! I've come down with swine flu overkill A.23 Comment 
GM381 28-Oct-09 Provinces scramble to fight flu's second wave A.1 National 
GM382 28-Oct-09 Why panic is not the answer A.1 National 
GM383 28-Oct-09 No-flu rules: Smile, wave but no handshakes A.17 National 
GM384 28-Oct-09 Grieving father struggles with son's death A.17 National 
GM385 28-Oct-09 A week in the life of H1N1 A.17 National 
GM386 28-Oct-09 Some blunts words on the vaccine A.20 Editorial 
GM387 28-Oct-09 Swine flu feud A.20 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM388 28-Oct-09 Swine flu feud (1) A.20 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM389 28-Oct-09 Swine flu feud (2) A.20 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM390 28-Oct-09 Swine flu feud (3) A.20 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM391 28-Oct-09 Flu vaccine may come too late A.21 Comment 
GM392 28-Oct-09 Well-prepared navy took migrant ship A.7 National 
GM393 28-Oct-09 As prisons ready for flu fight, one inmate in 
hospital 
A.8 National 
GM394 28-Oct-09 The new National: All this standing is making me 
tired 
R.3 Globe Review 
GM395 29-Oct-09 Flu-shot clinics struggle to keep up with demand A.1 National 
GM396 29-Oct-09 The B.C. Response A.17 B.C. News 
GM397 29-Oct-09 No exceptions for the sick, travel firms say on 
rebookings 
A.17 National 
GM398 29-Oct-09 The town that lineups forgot: A success story in 
the Soo 
A.17 National 
GM399 29-Oct-09 Flu-shot skeptics weave a Web of lies A.17 Column 
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GM400 29-Oct-09 Swine flu and the messenger A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM401 29-Oct-09 Swine flu and the messenger(1) A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM402 29-Oct-09 Swine flu and the messenger (2) A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM403 29-Oct-09 Swine flu and the messenger A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM404 29-Oct-09 Swine flu and the messenger (4) A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM405 29-Oct-09 Swine flu and the messenger(5) A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM406 29-Oct-09 Faith in fighting the flu A.25 Comment 
GM407 29-Oct-09 Athletes change their habits in the locker room L.1 Globe Life 
GM408 29-Oct-09 Canada, US spark ethical debate with different 
approaches 
L.1 Globe Life 
GM409 29-Oct-09 Parents agonize over whether to vaccinate their 
kids 
L.1 Globe Life 
GM410 29-Oct-09 H1N1 v. Seasonal flu - How to tell the difference L.6 Globe Life 
GM411 29-Oct-09 Teenager's death hits Blake hard S.3 Sports 
GM412 30-Oct-09 The uncertain pandemic/ Hours in line/ 
Dwindling supply/ Shifting plans 
A.1 National 
GM413 30-Oct-09 Quebec hospitals warn against H1N1 'psychosis' A.15 National 
GM414 30-Oct-09 Another fine mess A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM415 30-Oct-09 Foreseeable demand is unmet A.18 Editorial 
GM416 30-Oct-09 CBC's new news is scaaary A.19 Comment 
GM417 30-Oct-09 In the battle against H1N1, these ads are different 
strains 
B.6 Business 
GM418 30-Oct-09 MDs dispel adjuvant concerns L.1 Globe Life 
GM419 30-Oct-09 H1N1 detected 13 days after fever onset L.4 Globe Life 
GM420 31-Oct-09 Apathy, anxiety, and acceptance A.1 National 
GM421 31-Oct-09 Flu haunted St George turns into ghost town A.1 National 
GM422 31-Oct-09 Why Canada's flu plan came up short A.1 National 
GM423 31-Oct-09 Fear's old struggle with vaccination A.25 Comment 
GM424 31-Oct-09 Weeding out the queue A.26 Editorial 
GM425 31-Oct-09 Crazy for cleansers A.4 National 
GM426 31-Oct-09 B.C. Torch team given priority access to flu shot A.4 National 
GM427 31-Oct-09 Race for Montreal mayor a three-way toss-up A.5 National 
GM428 31-Oct-09 Stars and dogs B.13 Business 
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GM429 31-Oct-09 Fifth of U.S. Workers spooked by their own 
workplaces 
B.18 Business 
GM430 31-Oct-09 Verbatim F.2 Focus 
GM431 31-Oct-09 If you cut out cheek kisses, flu season wins L.2 Globe Life 
GM432 02-Nov-09 Private clinic patients jump the line for flu shot A.1 National 
GM433 02-Nov-09 Family and friends mourn H1N1 victim’s loss A.14 Toronto News 
GM434 02-Nov-09 H1N1 impact/ most workplaces still taking part in 
take our kids to work day 
A.15 National 
GM435 02-Nov-09 Symptoms of sickness A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM436 02-Nov-09 Symptoms of sickness(1) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM437 02-Nov-09 Symptoms of sickness(2) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM438 02-Nov-09 Symptoms of sickness(4) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM439 02-Nov-09 Symptoms of sickness(5) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM440 02-Nov-09 Syptoms of sickness(6) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM441 02-Nov-09 Darlene Binette A.4 National 
GM442 02-Nov-09 The vaccination plan A.4 National 
GM443 02-Nov-09 Heir and there A.7 National 
GM444 02-Nov-09 The rec room/ A weekly look at modern parenting L.3 Globe Life 
GM445 02-Nov-09 Panic, pandemonium and perspective L.6 Globe Life 
GM446 02-Nov-09 Social Studies L.6 Globe Life 
GM447 02-Nov-09 Eric Duhatschek on the NHL S.3 Sports 
GM448 02-Nov-09 Raps still waiting on Turkoglu S.4 Sports 
GM449 03-Nov-09 The doctor will hear you now/ $11 A.1 National 
GM450 03-Nov-09 No buisness like flu business A.1 National 
GM451 03-Nov-09 A disease 'wearing the face of our beautiful son' A.10 National 
GM452 03-Nov-09 Panic and blame won't help cure the flu A.13 Column 
GM453 03-Nov-09 Data brings accountability A.18 Editorial 
GM454 03-Nov-09 The H1N1 problem is.. A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM455 03-Nov-09 The H1N1 problem is (1) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM456 03-Nov-09 The H1N1 problem is (2) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM457 03-Nov-09 The H1N1 problem is (3) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
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GM458 03-Nov-09 The H1N1 problem is (4) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM459 03-Nov-09 The H1N1 problem is (5) A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM460 03-Nov-09 Urgency from feds still lacking A.18 Editorial 
GM461 03-Nov-09 In Newfoundland, a welcome born of history and 
sacrifice 
A.4 National 
GM462 03-Nov-09 Private clinics offer opportunity for a few A.8 National 
GM463 03-Nov-09 B.C. Critical of other provinces' H1N1 vaccine 
approach 
A.8 National 
GM464 03-Nov-09 H1N1 sick days could hamper Canada's fragile 
recovery 
B.1 Business 
GM465 03-Nov-09 Purell maker tells hoarders to clean up their act B.2 Business 
GM466 03-Nov-09 Ill this fall? Don't be an office hero L.1 Globe Life 
GM467 03-Nov-09 Cable guys, broadcasters: Time to look at the big 
picture 
R.3 Globe Review 
GM468 03-Nov-09 Many may come, not all are served S.1 B.C. News 
GM469 03-Nov-09 Government to end paramedics strike S.1 B.C. News 
GM470 04-Nov-09 Canada's vaccine leftovers being shipped overseas A.1 National 
GM471 04-Nov-09 First in line, native communities still wait for 
shots 
A.10 National 
GM472 04-Nov-09 First in line, native communities still wait for 
shots (1) 
A.10 National 
GM473 04-Nov-09 A calm demeanour and a Mickey Mouse watch A.11 National 
GM474 04-Nov-09 Temperature rising on flu debate A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM475 04-Nov-09 Temperature rising on flu debate (2) A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM476 04-Nov-09 Temperature rising on flu debate A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM477 04-Nov-09 Temperature rising on flu debate A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM478 04-Nov-09 Temperature rising on flu debate A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM479 04-Nov-09 Temperature rising on flu debate A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM480 04-Nov-09 Temperature rising on flu debate A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM481 04-Nov-09 Whether terrorism, flu or earthquake, Canada 
lacks a plan, Fraser finds 
A.4 National 
GM482 04-Nov-09 Flu fears eat into buffet biz L.1 Globe Life 
GM483 04-Nov-09 H1N1 R.8 Travel 
 226 
 
ID# Date Title Page Section 
GM484 04-Nov-09 High fashion, high emotions R.8 Travel 
GM485 04-Nov-09 Kitimat closes schools after absenteeism 
skyrockets 
S.1 B.C. News 
GM486 04-Nov-09 Alberta in an uproar over Flames' special 
treatment 
S.3 Sports 
GM487 05-Nov-09 More than half of vaccine doses sitting in storage A.1 National 
GM488 05-Nov-09 Vaccination night in Canada A.1 National 
GM489 05-Nov-09 The doctor's in, the vaccine isn't (2) A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM490 05-Nov-09 By the numbers/ H1N1's costs A.4 National 
GM491 05-Nov-09 Federal system is what's really diseased here A.4 Column 
GM492 05-Nov-09 Ontario baby dies A.4 National 
GM493 05-Nov-09 Vote to kill gun registry exposes rural-urban split A.8 National 
GM494 05-Nov-09 Glitches fail to faze WestJet B.8 Business 
GM495 05-Nov-09 The shots will come: be patient L.1 Globe Life 
GM496 05-Nov-09 The artists have come down with a related virus R.1 Globe Review 
GM497 05-Nov-09 Doctor defends vaccination of pro hockey players S.1 B.C. News 
GM498 05-Nov-09 Leafs deny players received flu vaccine 
improperly 
S.1 Sports 
GM499 06-Nov-09 Canada needs two vaccine suppliers A.1 National 
GM500 06-Nov-09 Clinic stuck to flu rules A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM501 06-Nov-09 Keeping time on H1N1 A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM502 06-Nov-09 Keeping time on H1N1(2) A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM503 06-Nov-09 Keeping time on H1N1(1) A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM504 06-Nov-09 So Canadian, so America, eh? A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM505 06-Nov-09 Wrestling with the Chen case A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM506 06-Nov-09 In the next election, it's flu v. Crime A.25 Comment 
GM507 06-Nov-09 Alberta Premier faces mandatory leadership vote A.6 National 
GM508 06-Nov-09 The ethics of queue-jumping: for many, it's okay A.8 National 
GM509 06-Nov-09 30-second spot B.8 Business 
GM510 06-Nov-09 Stop the swining and swanning L.1 Globe Life 
GM511 06-Nov-09 Leafs seek vaccine for sickly starts S.1 Sports 
GM512 06-Nov-09 CFL/Lions cast their lot with Printers S.7 Sports 
GM513 07-Nov-09 Swine flu snafus A.27 Comment 
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GM514 07-Nov-09 Children are worried sick over H1N1's spread A.4 National 
GM515 07-Nov-09 Premiers want answers on vaccine supply A.4 National 
GM516 07-Nov-09 Regrets over hospital board's vaccinations A.4 National 
GM517 07-Nov-09 Second worker let go over Flames furor A.4 National 
GM518 07-Nov-09 Follow the leader? Not if he's named Ignatieff A.9 Column 
GM519 07-Nov-09 Air Canada sights recovery on its rada B.6 Business 
GM520 07-Nov-09 Vaccine conspiracy theories spring from a society 
so skeptical that it's actually gullible 
F.3 Focus 
GM521 07-Nov-09 Flu's clues F.5 Focus 
GM522 07-Nov-09 Peter Mansbridge: From anchor to buoy R.21 Globe Review 
GM523 07-Nov-09 On the stand R.9 Globe Review 
GM524 09-Nov-09 The ministry of misinformation: flu fears and 
rumours paralyze Ukraine 
A.1 International 
News 
GM525 09-Nov-09 For many, vaccine will be available after flu 
peaks 
A.7 National 
GM526 09-Nov-09 How to...work from home L.2 Globe Life 
GM527 10-Nov-09 Misinformation flu the coop A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM528 10-Nov-09 Schoolchildren are the next priority A.22 Editorial 
GM529 10-Nov-09 Vaccine shortage forcing many clinics to close A.8 National 
GM530 10-Nov-09 Fears of flu a cash cow for makers of sanitizers B.1 Business 
GM531 10-Nov-09 A shaky convalescence B.2 Business 
GM532 10-Nov-09 Social studies L.6 Globe Life 
GM533 11-Nov-09 Officials confirm 24 cases of severe reaction after 
H1N1 flu shot 
A.11 National 
GM534 11-Nov-09 The children still wait A.22 Editorial 
GM535 11-Nov-09 By election win revives Tory hopes in Quebec A.4 National 
GM536 11-Nov-09 PM soothes premiers' vaccine worries A.4 National 
GM537 11-Nov-09 It's a big day for...Shoppers Drug Mart B.2 Business 
GM538 11-Nov-09 National disaster? No such thing B.2 Business 
GM539 11-Nov-09 H1N1 killed eight in past week, province reveals S.1 B.C. News 
GM540 12-Nov-09 Vaccinating the nation: $1.5 billion and climbing A.1 National 
GM541 12-Nov-09 Who waits and who doesn't A.18 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM542 12-Nov-09 In hand sanitizer we trust A.7 National 
GM543 12-Nov-09 Shoppers targets growth in pharmacy-friendly 
provinces 
B.5 Business 
GM544 12-Nov-09 Forget poppies - vets deserve vaccine L.1 Globe Life 
GM545 13-Nov-09 When is it our turn? A.24 Letter to the 
Editor 
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GM546 13-Nov-09 Second H1N1 wave takes lethal toll on Canadians A.7 National 
GM547 13-Nov-09 Reality check R.18 Globe Review 
GM548 13-Nov-09 Reynolds injects a little jazz into his jumps S.4 Sports 
GM549 14-Nov-09 Flu linked to death of 'rising young chemistry star' A.5 National 
GM550 14-Nov-09 Unadjuvanted H1N1 vaccine approved for wider 
use 
A.5 National 
GM551 14-Nov-09 Mansbridge's new stance is a threat to chairs 
everywhere 
R.14 Globe Review 
GM552 14-Nov-09 By the numbers S.5 Sports 
GM553 16-Nov-09 The waiting A.1 National 
GM554 16-Nov-09 The wasting A.1 National 
GM555 16-Nov-09 Swine flu spurs soaring sales of orange juice A.7 International  
GM556 16-Nov-09 The new flu symptom: child-care negotiations L.1 Globe Life 
GM557 16-Nov-09 Dear Canada: Your opinion on the CBC is 
'pathetic' 
R.1 Globe Review 
GM558 17-Nov-09 Facebook's 'unfriend' defines 2009 A.2 National 
GM559 17-Nov-09 Flu battle cuts into other public-health services A.6 National 
GM560 17-Nov-09 Pharmacists remixing adult doses so kids can 
receive Tamiflu 
A.6 National 
GM561 17-Nov-09 We all love Rick. But how about Erica? R.3 Globe Review 
GM562 18-Nov-09 Patchwork of policies for children A.20 Editorial 
GM563 18-Nov-09 Adverse vaccine reactions trivial, except in B.C. A.5 National 
GM564 18-Nov-09 Clinics A.5 National 
GM565 20-Nov-09 B.C. Police crack down on Internet drug sales A.7 National 
GM566 20-Nov-09 Only democracy can clean up the planet B.2 Business 
GM567 21-Nov-09 Health or honesty: which takes priority B.16 Business 
GM568 21-Nov-09 Just wash your hands of the whole mess F.12 Book Review 
GM569 21-Nov-09 My next play will be about big lies R.12 Globe Review 
GM570 24-Nov-09 Deaths this month from H1N1 virus already 
exceed entire spring toll 
A.10 National 
GM571 24-Nov-09 Chickenpox no reason to keep kids home L.4 Globe Life 
GM572 25-Nov-09 Associates hardest hit as layoffs at U.S. Firms 
reach 30-year high 
B.14 Business 
GM573 27-Nov-09 Into China's smog, a green giant rises B.9 Business 
GM574 28-Nov-09 As flu deaths mount, scientists unravelling how it 
kills 
A.16 National 
GM575 28-Nov-09 Women are butter, men are guns A.5 Column 
GM576 30-Nov-09 No time to let things slip A.14 Editorial 
GM577 30-Nov-09 Bratty Backlash L.1 Globe Life 
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GM578 01-Dec-09 As demand for H1N1 vaccine wanes, clinics are 
starting to shut down 
A.16 Toronto News 
GM579 01-Dec-09 Few cases of H1N1 test positive A.2 National 
GM580 02-Dec-09 What were the hot topics of 2009? A.2 News 
GM581 02-Dec-09 H1N1 past peak, but don't get complacent, 
officials warn 
A.8 National 
GM582 02-Dec-09 Tariff on Chinese steel hot topic for Harper's visit B.9 Business 
GM583 03-Dec-09 Flu fears mean Santa Claus not coming to town A.6 National 
GM584 04-Dec-09 Oh-Ohs, nix the Noughties A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM585 04-Dec-09 For a greener future, innovation trumps regulation B.2 Business 
GM586 07-Dec-09 Life in a time of germaphobia L.6 Globe Life 
GM587 08-Dec-09 The office L.3 Globe Life 
GM588 08-Dec-09 Painkiller deaths double in Ontario L.4 Globe Life 
GM589 11-Dec-09 Playground politicans L.8 Globe Life 
GM590 12-Dec-09 The cost of a Christmas bargin? Just the economy 
as we know it 
F.5 Focus 
GM591 16-Dec-09 Scientists link moleculre to severe H1N1 L.1 Globe Life 
GM592 17-Dec-09 Hey kiss bully, try fist bumps in the time of swine 
flu 
L.3 Globe Life 
GM593 18-Dec-09 McGuinty madness A.20 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM594 18-Dec-09 This week R.21 Globe Review 
GM595 19-Dec-09 Supreme Court rejects herpes 'accident' claim; 
Paralysis 'tragic' but not within meaning of policy 
A.13 National 
GM596 19-Dec-09 $200,000 award to man paralyzed after 
unprotected sex is thrown out 
A.8 National 
GM597 19-Dec-09 High anxiety: What we can learn from our year of 
fear 
F.1 Focus 
GM598 21-Dec-09 The Lookahead A.4 National 
GM599 24-Dec-09 Good thoughts on this most optimistic of days A.19 Comment 
GM600 24-Dec-09 The fright before Christmas L.1 Globe Life 
GM601 26-Dec-09 2000-2009 Decoding the decade: The future so 
far 
A.16 National 
GM602 26-Dec-09 As second H1N1 flu wave passes, a sigh of relief A.9 National 
GM603 26-Dec-09 David Miller's summer of lovelessness M.4 Globe Toronto 
GM604 28-Dec-09 Slippery road ahead after a decade of fear A.17 Comment 
GM605 30-Dec-09 Flu inc. How vaccines became big business B.1 Business 
GM606 31-Dec-09 Canadians hopes third time will be the charm G.8 Sports 
GM607 31-Dec-09 The Obama effect and other lessons from the year 
in medicine 
L.1 Globe Life 
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GM608 02-Jan-10 How Canada's H1N1 plan delivered for mothers A.1 National 
GM609 02-Jan-10 Year In, Year Out F.2 Focus 
GM610 02-Jan-10 Doyle visits the Republic of Doyle R.1 Globe Review 
GM611 02-Jan-10 Bad Trips T.1 Travel 
GM612 02-Jan-10 2010: Ten great odysseys T.4 Travel 
GM613 04-Jan-10 Children's place in the queue A.14 Editorial 
GM614 05-Jan-10 Flu vaccine clinics re-opening A.10 Toronto News 
GM615 06-Jan-10 As flu cases drop, less benefit to vaccine, doctors 
say 
A.6 National 
GM616 07-Jan-10 Mexico to restock Canada's H1N1 flu vaccine by 
March 
A.7 National 
GM617 08-Jan-10 D is the new C: Sunshine vitamin is suddenly hot A.2 National 
GM618 08-Jan-10 It's time to break our fear addiction L.1 Globe Life 
GM619 08-Jan-10 Passengers in economy class have higher risk of 
catching H1N1 
L.4 Globe Life 
GM620 09-Jan-10 The fear A.16 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM621 09-Jan-10 The fear(1) A.16 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM622 09-Jan-10 Actress gets a jump on airport queue A.6 National 
GM623 11-Jan-10 The hurdle to leap in the next election A.12 Editorial 
GM624 14-Jan-10 Ted Morton nabs key Finance post as Stelmach 
shakes up cabinet 
A.7 National 
GM625 15-Jan-10 Meet the doc treating the frostbites and strains A.3 National 
GM626 15-Jan-10 WHO fights back over criticism that it 
exaggerated H1N1 threat 
A.5 International  
GM627 15-Jan-10 Talking to your kids about disaster L.1 Globe Life 
GM628 16-Jan-10 Recovery may have been slowed by H1N1 virus B.7 Business 
GM629 16-Jan-10 Experts say they may never be able to predict 
earthquakes the way they hurricanes. But we can 
be better prepared 
F.7 Focus 
GM630 18-Jan-10 Your morning smile L.6 Globe Life 
GM631 20-Jan-10 How the WHO overshot on H1N1 A.17 Comment 
GM632 23-Jan-10 Alberta's one-shot wonders A.21 Comment 
GM633 25-Jan-10 Traffic deaths, injuries an 'unnecessary epidemic' A.8 Toronto News 
GM634 27-Jan-10 Bidders frustrated by stalled HIV vaccine project A.6 National 
GM635 29-Jan-10 Canada to give WHO needed H1N1 doses A.10 National 
GM636 02-Feb-10 Before going for gold, Olympians gear up against 
germs 
A.10 Sports 
GM637 05-Feb-10 Deficit hysteria bogeyman A.15 Comment 
GM638 05-Feb-10 H1N1 injects a dose of earnings vigour B.7 Business 
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GM639 05-Feb-10 Social studies L.6 Globe Life 
GM640 06-Feb-10 Jobless rate dips to 9-month low B.6 Business 
GM641 09-Feb-10 Slump, flu, visas prompt AeroMexico to 
withdraw from Canada 
B.2 Business 
GM642 12-Feb-10 H1N1 patients were younger, and needed more 
care 
L.4 Globe Life 
GM643 12-Feb-10 I love Canada and Canadians because they like 
me 
R.17 Globe Review 
GM644 15-Feb-10 Striving to create an undisputed market leader B.7 Business 
GM645 19-Feb-10 With the return of affordable luxury, Wal-Mart 
wanes 
B.3 Business 
GM646 19-Feb-10 Seasonal flu virus takes a holiday: 'nothing, nada' L.1 Globe Life 
GM647 21-Feb-10 Achoo. No flu. Whew A.10 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM648 22-Feb-10 Q&A/ Gregory Harlt A.4 International  
GM649 22-Feb-10 Greece should face its own Olympian rules B.5 Business 
GM650 25-Feb-10 Online tool tracks health risks at the Games A.10 Sports 
GM651 06-Mar-10 Compassion fashion: For a good cause or just 
'cause it's cool?" 
L.1 Globe Life 
GM652 08-Mar-10 Jean Coutu stock on path to good health B.9 Business 
GM653 09-Mar-10 The funeral business shows a little life B.3 Business 
GM654 10-Mar-10 Move school-age kids to the front of the flu shot 
queue, research suggests 
L.4 Globe Life 
GM655 13-Mar-10 Up next for Ignatieff's Liberals? Tackling those 
nasty 10 per centers 
A.7 National 
GM656 15-Mar-10 Canadians back public-sector cuts as deficit-
fighting tool 
A.4 National 
GM657 15-Mar-10 Young guns find range on Leafs' first line S.5 Sports 
GM658 16-Mar-10 Officials look to overhaul vaccine supply model A.6 National 
GM659 27-Mar-10 Ottawa recovering lobby fees on vaccine contract A.13 National 
GM660 02-Apr-10 Liberals losing ground with House in session A.5 National 
GM661 07-Apr-10 Loonie's rise fuels travel boom B.7 Business 
GM662 07-Apr-10 It pays to give everyone a shot L.5 Globe Life 
GM663 08-Apr-10 He could laugh about anything - except not 
making it big in Hollywood 
S.8 Obituaries 
GM664 14-Apr-10 Marching to his own drummer B.8 Business 
GM665 14-Apr-10 Incidence of Guillain-Barre Syndrome was low 
with H1N1 vaccine, researchers report 
L.4 Globe Life 
GM666 21-Apr-10 B.C. To destroy expired H1N1 vaccine S.3 B.C. News 
GM667 24-Apr-10 Lights, camera, LOLcats: YouTube turns five A.3 International  
GM668 28-Apr-10 Hospital reacts to seniors' deaths S.2 B.C. News 
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GM669 04-May-10 Tenth victim dies in Victoria care-home outbreak S.3 B.C. News 
GM670 06-May-10 Fewer toddlers getting all their vaccinations L.1 Globe Life 
GM671 13-May-10 $2-billion, 428 deaths - and lessons for the future L.4 Globe Life 
GM672 20-May-10 It's time we broke the silence about hepatitis, the 
quiet killer 
L.2 Globe Life 
GM673 27-May-10 Only 28 per cent of Torontonians got H1N1 shot, 
study shows 
A.10 Toronto News 
GM674 28-May-10 Low H1N1 vaccination rate alarms health experts A.8 National 
GM675 03-Jun-10 The flu reality: Ottawa's mass immunization 
program failed 
A.1 National 
GM676 04-Jun-10 Ottawa blames provinces for low H1N1 vaccine 
turnout 
A.4 National 
GM677 05-Jun-10 Dissecting H1N1 A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM678 05-Jun-10 Dissecting H1N1 A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM679 05-Jun-10 Dissecting H1N1 A.22 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM680 05-Jun-10 WHO under fire over handling of flu pandemic A.4 National 
GM681 09-Jun-10 WHO defends its response to H1N1 outbreak L.4 Globe Life 
GM682 10-Jun-10 Lessons of H1N1: Preach less, reveal more L.1 Globe Life 
GM683 11-Jun-10 Transat enters Mexican market with tour operator B.3 Business 
GM684 15-Jun-10 A tool for redesigning LIFE itself A.21 Comment 
GM685 15-Jun-10 The Office/ A weekly look at work culture L.2 Globe Life 
GM686 17-Jun-10 A century of better health L.1 Globe Life 
GM687 26-Jun-10 Motherhood: the new oppression A.25 Comment 
GM688 02-Jul-10 Expiring Tamiflu puts health officials in a bind A.4 National 
GM689 06-Jul-10 Many lives, little cost A.14 Letter to the 
Editor 
GM690 15-Jul-10 Your morning smile L.6 Globe Life 
GM691 16-Jul-10 Shakeup in tourism agency A.6 National 
GM692 16-Jul-10 Keeping up with the ex-Joneses L.1 Globe Life 
GM693 20-Jul-10 Injection of good sense A.14 Editorial 
GM694 20-Jul-10 Ontario's H1N1 program was worth the money, 
study finds 
L.1 Globe Life 
GM695 27-Jul-10 Does coughing soften the prick of a needle? L.4 Globe Life 
GM696 05-Aug-10 Tomato crop puts pork prices on the run B.3 Business 
GM697 09-Aug-10 H1N1 pandemic coming to an end, WHO to 
announce 
A.2 International 
News 
GM698 10-Aug-10 The next pandemic A.14 Editorial 
GM699 12-Aug-10 Health Minister rides out Quebec cabinet shuffle A.7 National 
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GM700 14-Aug-10 Twenty detail-obsessed years in politics A.4 National 
GM701 27-Aug-10 GSK defends its pandemic performance L.4 Globe Life 
GM702 28-Aug-10 The genetic mystique of 'me' medicine A.17 Comment 
NP1 23-Apr-09 Officials warn of respiratory illness A.7 National 
NP2 23-Apr-09 Health officials warn travellers could be carrying 
severe respiratory illnesses 
A.8 National 
NP3 24-Apr-09 Officials warn of respiratory illness A.7 National 
NP4 24-Apr-09 Canadian medical officials keeping close eye on 
travellers returning from Mexico 
A.9 National 
NP5 25-Apr-09 Mexico, U.S. Scamble to contain swine flu; 
Outbreak sickens hundreds, kills at least 20 
A.16 World 
NP6 25-Apr-09 Mexico markets surge despite flu outbreak, hit to 
peso 
FP.14 Financial Post 
NP7 27-Apr-09 Six cases confirmed in N.S., B.C.; "Not the Last" A.1 National 
NP8 27-Apr-09 Flu sparks worldwide concern; U.S. Declares 
health emergency; 81 dead in Mexico; possible 
infections in Europe, Israel 
A.1 National 
NP9 27-Apr-09 Swine flu spreads to Canada, U.S.; Who declares 
health emergency; 103 dead in Mexico; possible 
infections in Europe, Israel 
A.1 News 
NP10 27-Apr-09 Catching up on contagion; In this occasional 
feature, the National Post tells you everything you 
need to know about a complicated issue. 
A.10 News 
NP11 28-Apr-09 'Not the killer pandemic strain'; Death toll at 149, 
but mild cases in U.S., Canada 
A.1 News 
NP12 28-Apr-09 WHO raises alert level as virus risks going 
worldwide; 'It could be mild or potentially severe 
A.10 World 
NP13 28-Apr-09 Mexico City shuts cinemas, schools as death toll 
rises; 'You hear someone cough, everybody gets 
paranoid' 
A.11 World 
NP14 28-Apr-09 Pandemic fears may complicate stock markets, 
tourism sector; 'The Last Straw' 
A.11 World 
NP15 28-Apr-09 Bay Street sinks on swine flu fears FP.10 Financial Post 
NP16 28-Apr-09 Flu concerns rattle Dow, S&P FP.10 Financial Post 
NP17 28-Apr-09 Swine flu sends airline stocks into a tailspin; 
Echoes of SARS 
FP.8 Financial Post 
NP18 29-Apr-09 Airlines, tour operators cancel flights to Mexico; 
Swine flu prompts travel advisory 
A.1 News 
NP19 29-Apr-09 Don't call it a pandemic A.17 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP20 29-Apr-09 Don't call it a pandemic A.17 Letter to the 
Editor 
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NP21 29-Apr-09 Swine flu cases rise in Canada, continue to spread 
around the world 
A.6 Canada 
NP22 29-Apr-09 Prepare for pandemic, WHO warns countries; 
New cases found 
A.6 Canada 
NP23 29-Apr-09 Scientists seek clues to flu in Mexico; Mild 
Canadians cases leave doctors puzzled 
A.6 Canada 
NP24 29-Apr-09 Early hyper-alarm misplaced; Latest flu not 
equivalent to past pandemics 
A.8 Column 
NP25 29-Apr-09 Flu fears kept ill Canadian in Mexico, husband 
says 
A.9 Canada 
NP26 29-Apr-09 Mexican premiere of Wolverine scrapped due to 
pandemic 
AL.3 Arts & Life 
NP27 29-Apr-09 Noveko boosted by swine flu concerns; 
Developer of Germ-killing masks up 450% in 
month 
FP.1 Financial Post 
NP28 29-Apr-09 Bank of America, Citi still short of capital: 
reports; Markets rattled 
FP.14 Financial Post 
NP29 29-Apr-09 Swine flu chills TSX for second day FP.8 Financial Post 
NP30 29-Apr-09 Bank, flu fears sink Wall Street FP.8 Financial Post 
NP31 30-Apr-09 Doubt cast on Mexican flu toll; WHO raises alert; 
Virus not to blame in all cases: analysis 
A.1 News 
NP32 30-Apr-09 Swine flu isn't so scary A.16 Editorial 
NP33 30-Apr-09 Toronto woman suffered asthma attack in Mexico 
dies in Ontario hospital 
A.8 Canada 
NP34 30-Apr-09 Lax conditions at ground zero of SARS crisis; 
Hong Kong hotel shows no signs of past infamy 
A.8 Canada 
NP35 30-Apr-09 Pork industry frets over 'swine flu' term A.8 Canada 
NP36 30-Apr-09 Proposed bill would prevent current airline 
frustrations: MP; Cancelled flights 
A.8 Canada 
NP37 30-Apr-09 Customers' frugality crimps Rogers profit; Swine 
flu travel limits cuold cut roaming revenue 
FP.4 Financial Post 
NP38 30-Apr-09 Positive profit reports lift Bay St FP.7 Financial Post 
NP39 01-May-09 Biden's flu advice: stay off planes, subways A.1 News 
NP40 01-May-09 An aide in Obama's delegation falls ill A.11 World 
NP41 01-May-09 Confirmed cases in Canada reach 32 A.11 World 
NP42 01-May-09 257 People Infected Worldwide A.11 World 
NP43 01-May-09 A name change A.11 World 
NP44 01-May-09 Travel bans not necessary, doctors say; Disease 
has already jumped borders, says Canadians 
speicalist 
A.11 World 
NP45 01-May-09 Not panicking A.13 Letter to the 
Editor 
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NP46 01-May-09 Not panicking A.13 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP47 01-May-09 Liberals should avoid election fever; A.7 Canada 
NP48 01-May-09 Mexican economy facing meltdown; Deep 
recession 
FP.1 Financial Post 
NP49 01-May-09 WestJet likely to doge effects as swine flu 
hampers airline recovery 
FP.6 Financial Post 
NP50 02-May-09 Swine flu 'is' scary.. A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP51 02-May-09 Hysteria seems to be spreading faster than swine 
flu itself; 'Not a crisis:' expert 
A.6 Canada 
NP52 02-May-09 Some perspective on the fear over a swine flu 
pandemic 
A.6 Canada 
NP53 02-May-09 Hot stocks of the week FP.11 Financial Post 
NP54 02-May-09 Buy America blowback FP.15 Financial Post 
NP55 02-May-09 Smart money is pushing away from the table; 
Jump in now and you may get stuck with the bill 
FP.8 Financial Post 
NP56 02-May-09 TSX ends week on positive note FP.9 Financial Post 
NP57 02-May-09 The price of preparedness FW.6 Weekend 
Extra 
NP58 02-May-09 Side Effect WP.13 Weekend 
Extra 
NP59 02-May-09 The Ampersand WP.2 Weekend 
Extra 
NP60 02-May-09 Vandemic: What is it about touring musicians that 
makes them so attractive to thieves? 
WP.4 Weekend 
Extra 
NP61 02-May-09 The Tarahumara 10K WP.6 Weekend 
Extra 
NP62 04-May-09 Swine flu on Wane: Mexico; Quarantined Alberta 
hogs likely infected by farm workers 
A.1 News 
NP63 04-May-09 Shooting from the Lip S.2 Sports 
NP64 05-May-09 Edmonton girl first severe flu victim A.1 News 
NP65 05-May-09 The doctor in your pocket A.15 Issues & Ideas 
NP66 05-May-09 Officials aim to hone disease surveillance; 
Canadians system first to detect flu while 
sweeping Internet 
A.6 News 
NP67 05-May-09 Harnessing the protein power pod. AL.4 Arts & Life 
NP68 05-May-09 Mexican banned after using hysteria over swine 
flu to intimidate rival 
B.12 Sports 
NP69 05-May-09 Liability a worry as organizers of big events can't 
get swine flu coverage 
FP.12 Financial Post 
NP70 06-May-09 Flu fears make life lonelier for Kabul pig A.1 News 
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NP71 06-May-09 Let's avoid a porcine panic A.20 Editorial 
NP72 06-May-09 'Concern' for quarantined students; Ottawa seeks 
explanation from China 
A.4 Canada 
NP73 06-May-09 It's time to audit crisis readiness; Swine flu 
highlights issues of employer rights 
FP.12 Financial Post 
NP74 06-May-09 WestJet lands a piece of the downturn; Profit 
dives 29%; Drop in air travel forces carrier to 
lower fares 
FP.5 Financial Post 
NP75 07-May-09 Don't eat pork from infected animals A.17 World 
NP76 07-May-09 Canadians crack gene code of flu virus; A World 
First 
A.4 Canada 
NP77 07-May-09 Lab matches flu samples; Canadians in China 
released from quarantine 
A.7 Canada 
NP78 07-May-09 Swine flu could delay Pacquiao's victorious 
homecoming 
B.11 Sports 
NP79 08-May-09 WHO changes tune, now says pork safe to eat; 
Industry still reeling 
A.5 Canada 
NP80 08-May-09 Dead Calgary woman tested for swine flu A.9 Canada 
NP81 08-May-09 Canada kicks off fight over meat labelling; U.S. 
Laws 
FP.4 Financial Post 
NP82 09-May-09 Pass the pork A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP83 09-May-09 Albertan first Canadian swine flu death A.5 Canada 
NP84 11-May-09 Grading a pandemic A.14 Issues & Ideas 
NP85 11-May-09 Press corps gets look at Obama's comic face; A.2 News 
NP86 11-May-09 Swine flu infections jump as 39 more Canadians 
test positive for virus 
A.4 Canada 
NP87 12-May-09 Four health workers carrying H1N1 flu virus A.11 Toronto News 
NP88 12-May-09 New cases for swine flu jump by 46 A.4 Canada 
NP89 12-May-09 Jamaica, Egypt and Dominican Republic benefit 
from Mexico's woes 
FP.14 Financial Post 
NP90 15-May-09 Flu hotline outsourcing draws ire A.2 News 
NP91 16-May-09 Stay between the bulls and the bears; Keep your 
views balanced lest you fall into a trap 
FP.14 Financial Post 
NP92 19-May-09 Chief health officer lifts H1N1 travel restrictions A.10 Canada 
NP93 19-May-09 Restrictions on travel to Mexico lifted A.4 Canada 
NP94 19-May-09 Don't panic, prepare; Employers have obligation 
to protect workers 
FP.7 Business 
NP95 20-May-09 New flu cases move beyond ties to Mexico A.14 Toronto News 
NP96 21-May-09 Germs - multiplying on a handrail near you A.17 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP97 21-May-09 'Care-antee' is no joke FP.13 Financial Post 
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NP98 25-May-09 The real causalities in a health panic are nerves; 
Stress & worry; People need to focus on 
behaviour they can change 
AL.8 Arts & Life 
NP99 26-May-09 Toronto man with H1N1 virus dies A.4 Canada 
NP100 27-May-09 Fellow trustees don't like his style A.12 Toronto News 
NP101 29-May-09 TDSB postpones decision on reprimanding 
trustee 
A.12 Toronto News 
NP102 29-May-09 The NDP's bill would create friendlier skies A.14 Editorial 
NP103 01-Jun-09 Unless you live in a cave, stuff happens; Plenty 
you can do now to prepare your firm for the worst 
FP.8 Financial Post 
NP104 02-Jun-09 Schools told they will no longer be notified of 
new swine flu cases 
A.10 Toronto News 
NP105 03-Jun-09 Dead man tests positive for H1N1 virus A.6 Canada 
NP106 08-Jun-09 Pandemic panic A.10 Editorial 
NP107 08-Jun-09 Drug-related shootout leaves 18 dead A.9 World 
NP108 08-Jun-09 Shooting from the lip S.2 Sports 
NP109 09-Jun-09 Woman dies after contracting swine flu A.4 Canada 
NP110 09-Jun-09 Manitoba likely to confirm 25 H1N1 cases; 
Health officer says most of the ill are aboriginal 
A.7 Canada 
NP111 09-Jun-09 Word airlines 'shaken' by meltdown; Revenue to 
fall more than after 9/11 
FP.4 Financial Post 
NP112 10-Jun-09 Raitt should get it over with and apologize; 
Controversy left lingering 
A.9 Canada 
NP113 11-Jun-09 H1N1 flu has parallel to 1918 Spanish pandemic; 
'A pattern' 
A.7 Canada 
NP114 12-Jun-09 'Moderate' pandemic, In this occasional feature, 
the National post tells you everything you need to 
know about a complicated issue. 
A.20 News 
NP115 12-Jun-09 U.S. airlines move slash capacity as demand stay 
low; Aim to hike fares to pay rising fuel prices 
FP.4 Financial Post 
NP116 12-Jun-09 Transat has to follow price-cutting giants; Profit 
sinks 
FP.4 Financial Post 
NP117 13-Jun-09 State as mother; Critics say it's time to rein in 
child-welfare agencies 
A.1 News 
NP118 13-Jun-09 Collateral Damage; WestJet's launch in 
Yellowknife sets off prices war 
FP.7 Financial Post 
NP119 15-Jun-09 Sixth Canadian swine flu death confirmed A.6 Canada 
NP120 16-Jun-09 Ontario reserve confirms 10 H1N1 cases A.8 Canada 
NP121 17-Jun-09 Natives demand to meet ministers over swine flu; 
"A Pending Atrocity" 
A.10 Canada 
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NP122 17-Jun-09 Turbulent times for plane makers; Paris Air 
Show; Strapped airlines forced to cancel or defer 
orders 
FP.16 Financial Post 
NP123 19-Jun-09 The Who's fabricated A.18 Issues & Ideas 
NP124 19-Jun-09 Hospital turned away swine flu victim: brother; 
'They didn't check here, they didn't test her" 
A.6 Canada 
NP125 19-Jun-09 Ticket discounts, cost cutting help cruise operator 
beat estimates 
FP.12 Financial Post 
NP126 20-Jun-09 Swine flu, by the numbers A.17 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP127 20-Jun-09 'One death is too many' A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP128 22-Jun-09 Report Card A.4 Canada 
NP129 22-Jun-09 Set priorities for swine flu shot A.5 News 
NP130 23-Jun-09 Ontario girl, 6, who had H1N1 virus dies A.4 Canada 
NP131 23-Jun-09 Public Health Agency seeks new 'visual identity' A.4 Canada 
NP132 24-Jun-09 Reserves nearly denied alcohol-based sanitizer; 
Swine Flu Measure 
A.1 News 
NP133 24-Jun-09 Deaths related to swine flu continue to climb as 
Ontario, Quebec record more cases 
A.8 Canada 
NP134 25-Jun-09 First Nations call for state of emergency; H1N1 
spread; Chiefs want state of emergency declared 
A.7 Canada 
NP135 25-Jun-09 Washing hands in the daddy state FP.11 Comment 
NP136 26-Jun-09 Mount Sinai closes nursery ward as precaution 
against H1N1 flu virus 
A.13 Toronto News 
NP137 26-Jun-09 No plan in reserve A.16 Editorial 
NP138 26-Jun-09 H1N1 among Aboriginals troubling: PM A.8 Canada 
NP139 27-Jun-09 One million Americans hit by swine flu, health 
officials say 
A.19 World 
NP140 27-Jun-09 Too much room at the inn; Hotels in Canada are 
sitting half empty, forcing the industry to offer 
huge rate discounts 
FP.7 Financial Post 
NP141 04-Jul-09 Russia lifts restrictions on Quebec, Ontario pork 
products 
FP.4 Financial Post 
NP142 08-Jul-09 Swine flu virus unpredictable, scientists warn; 
Life Threatening; Starts like regular flu, then 
lungs stop functioning 
A.10 Canada 
NP143 08-Jul-09 Winnipeg pastor, 43, believed to be H1N1 virus 
victim; Fifth in Manitoba 
A.10 Canada 
NP144 09-Jul-09 Swine flu outbreak hits Calgary hospital A.4 Canada 
NP145 09-Jul-09 Canada, U.S. take aim at websites offering 
questionable swine flu treatment 
A.6 Canada 
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NP146 14-Jul-09 No swine flu vaccine until Nov., who says; 
Second wave soon 
A.7 News 
NP147 16-Jul-09 Summer camp swine-flu policy upsets parents; 
Sending sick children home called excessive 
A.12 Toronto News 
NP148 17-Jul-09 Liberals accuse health minister of lacking 
leadership on swine flu issue 
A.4 Canada 
NP149 17-Jul-09 Liberals slam Tory 'silence' on swine flu; 'No 
leadership' 
A.4 News 
NP150 17-Jul-09 Airlines scramble to lure customers FP.2 Financial Post 
NP151 18-Jul-09 Over budget; Vancouver's Olympic finances melt 
down 
A.10 Canada 
NP152 20-Jul-09 British Airways starts H1N1 flu screening A.5 World 
NP153 21-Jul-09 Call for swine flu no-fault insurance A.6 Canada 
NP154 21-Jul-09 Closures do not prevent spread of disease; 
Pandemics; Shutting schools only delays the 
worst 
AL.5 Arts & Life 
NP155 22-Jul-09 Planning for H1N1 trumps worry and fears; 
Lessons from SARS 
AL.4 Arts & Life 
NP156 23-Jul-09 Fighting back: What the flu? A.4 Canada 
NP157 23-Jul-09 Flu shots not forced on nurses; Health agency has 
no guidelines on vaccine 
A.4 Canada 
NP158 24-Jul-09 Ottawa Oks Tamiflu for children under 1 A.8 Canada 
NP159 25-Jul-09 Tamiflu facts A.19 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP160 27-Jul-09 Don't spoil the tribes; 'Human safaris' pose deadly 
threat to the Jarawa 
A.3 News 
NP161 27-Jul-09 No deal in place to share swine flu data A.4 Canada 
NP162 29-Jul-09 Ottawa to release swine flu guidelines A.4 Canada 
NP163 30-Jul-09 Canada waits on swine flu vaccine priority list; 
Pregnant women among most vulnerable: U.S. 
A.4 Canada 
NP164 31-Jul-09 Liberals to attack Harper government over 
preparedness for H1N1 pandemic 
A.4 Canada 
NP165 01-Aug-09 Tourism sector hopeful A.12 Toronto News 
NP166 01-Aug-09 Do cardio, gab, do cardio, gap and repeat; The 
condo gym 
PH.8 Post Homes 
NP167 06-Aug-09 First Nations chief seeks H1N1 action plan A.5 News 
NP168 07-Aug-09 Kenney misplays his hand; slapping visas on 
Mexicans was misguided 
A.4 Canada 
NP169 07-Aug-09 Ottawa to order 50.4M doses of H1N1 vaccine; 
Will not squabble over pandemic scheme 
A.8 Canada 
NP170 08-Aug-09 Health Agency wants Canadians to adopt a 'flu 
buddy' during Pandemic 
A.6 Canada 
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NP171 12-Aug-09 Tamiflu for toddlers A.16 Editorial 
NP172 12-Aug-09 Health committee to discuss H1N1 plan A.4 Canada 
NP173 13-Aug-09 No need to 'play politics' with swine flu: Minister 
Press 
A.4 Canada 
NP174 15-Aug-09 Regina orders extra H1N1 medical supplies, 
including body bags 
A.9 Canada 
NP175 15-Aug-09 This summer sucks; and nowhere has it been 
more noticed than in Muskoka with heavy rains 
that have caused malaise - and much worse 
TO.3 Toronto News 
NP176 17-Aug-09 Swine flu will strike Canadians this fall: Minister A.4 Canada 
NP177 18-Aug-09 Quebec mayor bans election handshakes A.5 Canada 
NP178 18-Aug-09 Canada needs 'health czar' A.5 Canada 
NP179 20-Aug-09 Daycares, schools told to prepare for swine flu; 
Health Minister urges pandemic preparedness 
A.6 Canada 
NP180 20-Aug-09 Rescue plan unlikely to save Canada's hog 
industry, research centre says 
FP.5 Financial Post 
NP181 21-Aug-09 Swine flu protocol mystifies doctor A.13 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP182 21-Aug-09 Doctors treating H1N1 need financial incentive: 
association president 
A.7 News 
NP183 21-Aug-09 Swine flu spreads like SARS: study, Slow rate 
offers some reassurance 
A.7 News 
NP184 21-Aug-09 Vaccination program should skip adutls: study; 
School chief breeding ground for pandemic 
A.7 News 
NP185 22-Aug-09 Nurses 'stunned' by doctors' deal A.9 News 
NP186 25-Aug-09 B.C. Health officer rules out school closures to 
control H1N1 
A.8 News 
NP187 25-Aug-09 Plan B: Handling the unexpected FP.12 Financial Post 
NP188 26-Aug-09 Piglets left outside Ontario Premier's office to 
decry handling of 'swine flu' 
A.8 Canada 
NP189 27-Aug-09 Full Pundit A.17 Issues & Ideas 
NP190 27-Aug-09 40-year-old most at risk of developing severe 
h1N1 disease: Doctor 
A.6 Canada 
NP191 29-Aug-09 The flu factor; While the H1N1 virus is likely to 
cause havoc at the 2010 Games, precautions are 
being taken; How Bad is Bad? 
S.2 Sports 
NP192 31-Aug-09 Share spare flu vaccine, Ottawa told; WHO 
appeals for donations to poorer countries 
A.4 Canada 
NP193 03-Sep-09 What part of 'no' doesn't he understand? A.13 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP194 04-Sep-09 Winnipeg MD looks for H1N1 guinea pigs A.6 Canada 
NP195 08-Sep-09 Crime, not health, top issue for urbanites A.8 Canada 
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NP196 09-Sep-09 Complaint filed for not serving H1N1 patient A.5 News 
NP197 11-Sep-09 H1N1 to infect 32% of population: study A.4 Canada 
NP198 11-Sep-09 Transat files in face of price wars; Promises 
return to profitability is top priority 
FP.1 Financial Post 
NP199 14-Sep-09 Doctors protect pay from swine flu; New fees 
mulled; Some negotiated $518 an hour to treat flu 
patients 
A.1 News 
NP200 15-Sep-09 H1N1 concerns during voting raised A.6 Canada 
NP201 16-Sep-09 Drug-resistant H1N1 found in Alberta A.8 Canada 
NP202 17-Sep-09 Ottawa sends body bags to First Nations fighting 
H1N1 
A.1 News 
NP203 17-Sep-09 H1N1 vaccine priority list released A.11 Canada 
NP204 17-Sep-09 In a pandemic, doctors must be compensated A.23 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP205 18-Sep-09 Changed testing regime means swine flu likely to 
be under-reported 
A.13 Toronto News 
NP206 18-Sep-09 Pandemic preparedness A.17 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP207 18-Sep-09 PM touts country's 'bright future' A.4 Canada 
NP208 18-Sep-09 Officials, politicans slam delivery of body bags; 
Health Canada's flu outbreak plan in 'poor taste' 
A.4 Canada 
NP209 18-Sep-09 B.C. Official slams journal's report of H1N1 
outbreak; Inflammatory 
A.4 Canada 
NP210 21-Sep-09 Russia records first H1N1 death A.11 World 
NP211 22-Sep-09 Ignatieff slams Tory financial 'mess'; Toronto 
Speech 
A.4 Canada 
NP212 23-Sep-09 Doctors to urge all pregnant women be 
immunized against H1N1 flu 
A.4 Canada 
NP213 24-Sep-09 Canadians agree freedoms should be restricted 
during pandemic, poll finds 
A.4 Canada 
NP214 26-Sep-09 B.C. Medical group wants doctors paid for swine 
flu phone consulations 
A.14 Canada 
NP215 30-Sep-09 Blessing takes a back seat to flu fears A.1 News 
NP216 30-Sep-09 Mandatory flu shots rile health workers; "Invasive 
procedure' 
A.8 Canada 
NP217 30-Sep-09 Parsing H1N1; For the maelstrom of information 
about swine flu; Dr Yoel Abells prescribes clarity 
AL.4 Arts & Life 
NP218 30-Sep-09 Staying home and spending less; Travel industry 
hit 
FP.4 Financial Post 
NP219 30-Sep-09 Swine flu could cost U.S. Business up to US$20B 
in lost productivity 
FP.6 Financial Post 
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NP220 02-Oct-09 Swine flu concerns put end to Montreal's 
Breastfeeding Challenge 
A.7 Canada 
NP221 03-Oct-09 Surge in H1N1 vaccine demand foreseen A.22 News 
NP222 03-Oct-09 Oh, those wacky Aztecs and their ancient customs 
involving a common element 
PH.7 Post Homes 
NP223 05-Oct-09 H1N1 flu spreading quickly in B.C. A.7 Canada 
NP224 06-Oct-09 Health care workers off flu shot list A.5 News 
NP225 08-Oct-09 Reserve, Not Ministry, Ordered 100 Body Bags A.1 News 
NP226 08-Oct-09 Google flu trends to track spread of influenza in 
Canada in real time; Begins today 
A.2 News 
NP227 08-Oct-09 Political deaths if pandemic prevention fails; 
However, vaccine rollout may come early 
A.6 Canada 
NP228 08-Oct-09 Feds appeal to WTO over U.S. Meat labels; 
Country of origin 
FP.6 Financial Post 
NP229 09-Oct-09 The Liberals' body-bag farce A.14 Editorial 
NP230 09-Oct-09 Vancouver school board, ignoring H1N1 
recommendations, bans hand sanitizers 
A.5 News 
NP231 10-Oct-09 First Nations brace for new wave of swine flu A.10 News 
NP232 10-Oct-09 Maple Leafs guard against a new foe; H1N1 flu; 
'People have no pre-existing immunity to it' 
S.3 Sports 
NP233 13-Oct-09 Young women hit by H1N1 virus; Canadians 
study 
A.6 News 
NP234 13-Oct-09 Japanese firm's anti-H1N1 suit for the busy 
business owner have 40% kill rate 
FP.14 Business 
NP235 14-Oct-09 H1N1 vaccine set for trials, Ottawa says A.8 Canada 
NP236 14-Oct-09 Doctor battles political prattle over flu vaccine; 
H1N1 preparations; Physician, former senator 
takes talk-show host to task for rant 
AL.4 Arts & Life 
NP237 16-Oct-09 The pursuit of unethical equivalency A.4 Canada 
NP238 16-Oct-09 Manitoba considers cars for paramedics A.6 News 
NP239 20-Oct-09 Common cup communion cut to fight H1N1 A.6 Canada 
NP240 21-Oct-09 H1N1 fears, economy and age may mean a lot of 
leftover Halloween candy 
A.9 Canada 
NP241 21-Oct-09 One set of dirty hands could spread infections 
throughout a hospital: study 
AL.4 Arts & Life 
NP242 21-Oct-09 Risk from H1N1 vaccine 'close to zero' AL.4 Arts & Life 
NP243 22-Oct-09 The WHO's political pandemic A.16 Editorial 
NP244 22-Oct-09 H1N1 vaccine given a green light; Clinics coming A.2 News 
NP245 23-Oct-09 City-run H1N1 flu clinics set to begin; 'Some 
interruption' 
A.14 Toronto News 
NP246 23-Oct-09 Hello, goodbye, are you sick? If you have to say 
it, say it with sign language 
A.18 World 
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NP247 23-Oct-09 The cyber crime epidemic; Terrorists and rogue 
states are moving their battle to the Internet.  How 
do we fight it? 
A.23 Issues & Ideas 
NP248 23-Oct-09 Ontario deficit to hit $25 billion, as tax revenue 
takes a plunge; Spending also increases by $4.8-
billion 
A.8 News 
NP249 24-Oct-09 Who's afraid of the big bad flu A.1 News 
NP250 24-Oct-09 'Who' do they think they are? A.25 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP251 24-Oct-09 Pandemic paranoia A.8 Canada 
NP252 24-Oct-09 A vexing vaccine A.8 Canada 
NP253 26-Oct-09 Doctors question ethics of needles for children A.1 News 
NP254 26-Oct-09 H1N1 National Emergency: Obama; A 'proactive 
measure', says White House 
A.12 World 
NP255 26-Oct-09 Ten clinics to open on Nov 2 across Toronto to 
provide H1N1 vaccinations 
A.5 Canada 
NP256 27-Oct-09 It's time for flu shock therapy A.1 News 
NP257 27-Oct-09 Piglet pandemic A.19 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP258 27-Oct-09 Piglet pandemic A.19 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP259 27-Oct-09 Canadians swamp H1N1 clinics; 'protect myself' A.4 Canada 
NP260 28-Oct-09 Canadians lining up at vaccine clinics; Public 
health urges calm after H1N1 claims youths; 
Seven more deaths 
A.1 News 
NP261 28-Oct-09 Officials urge calm as H1N1 claims teens A.1 News 
NP262 28-Oct-09 Not enough truth on flu A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP263 28-Oct-09 Not enough truth on flu A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP264 28-Oct-09 96 have died in Canada A.4 Canada 
NP265 28-Oct-09 High fever, cough among symptoms A.4 Canada 
NP266 28-Oct-09 This took my son; 13-year-old boy developed 
cough on Saturday 
A.4 Canada 
NP267 28-Oct-09 Got a bone to pick with your MD; Common 
Complaints 
AL.10 Arts & Life 
NP268 28-Oct-09 Exercise can be an ally against illness; Take 
precautions and pay attention to bodily signals 
AL.10 Arts & Life 
NP269 28-Oct-09 How pros stay out of the clinic; The key to 
addressing H1N1 among athletes is taking 
measures to stop its quick spread 
AL.10 Arts & Life 
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NP270 28-Oct-09 Avalanche backup goalie Budaj diagnosed with 
swine flu 
S.5 Sports 
NP271 29-Oct-09 H1N1's rarely fatal trait; Science of new flu; 
unique ability to bind itself to lung tissue 
A.1 News 
NP272 29-Oct-09 Dealing with a 'pandemic' A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP273 29-Oct-09 Dealing with a 'pandemic' A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP274 29-Oct-09 Forget H1N1, I was worried about the Post A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP275 29-Oct-09 But is the vaccine a good idea? A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP276 29-Oct-09 Full Pundit A.23 Issues & Ideas 
NP277 29-Oct-09 The man, myth and mission; Comment A.4 Canada 
NP278 29-Oct-09 Long lines expected at flu clinics; Mount Sinai 
Hit 
A.8 Canada 
NP279 29-Oct-09 Laing force to the bench after coming down with 
H1N1 virus 
S.3 Sports 
NP280 30-Oct-09 Caption Only A.1 News 
NP281 30-Oct-09 'Why don't they open more locations?"; Lineups 
begin 
A.13 Toronto News 
NP282 30-Oct-09 Province braces for a possible vaccine shortage; 
Production issues 
A.13 Toronto News 
NP283 30-Oct-09 Heckle all you want..but not if you're sexist A.16 Editorial 
NP284 30-Oct-09 A better way to get people vaccinated A.17 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP285 30-Oct-09 Senators urged to ignore lobbyists saying H1n1 is 
conspiracy to depopulate planet 
A.8 News 
NP286 30-Oct-09 'Significantly less' vaccine than expected; Clinics 
may have to modify rollout plans 
A.8 News 
NP287 31-Oct-09 Odds are H1N1 vaccine is safe.... A.27 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP288 31-Oct-09 ...or is it? A.27 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP289 31-Oct-09 Clinics cancelled next week; Priority only; 
Shipments expected to increase soon 
A.4 Canada 
NP290 31-Oct-09 Private clinics hope to give H1N1; Will help 
reach more people, companies say 
A.4 News 
NP291 31-Oct-09 Flames' Boyd is a flu survivor; 'I just lay in bed' S.5 Sports 
NP292 02-Nov-09 Hedy's latest A.14 Editorial 
NP293 02-Nov-09 Vaccine production disappoints Minister; H1N1 
immunization; Drug maker overstated capability 
A.4 News 
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NP294 03-Nov-09 Did Canada botch the vaccine rollout? After child 
deaths 'things went viral' 
A.1 News 
NP295 03-Nov-09 Swine flu and the new 'weird-ists' A.14 Editorial 
NP296 03-Nov-09 Stop fanning the flames of hysteria A.15 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP297 03-Nov-09 Vaccine tallies just don't add up A.6 News 
NP298 03-Nov-09 Global reactions A.8 Canada 
NP299 03-Nov-09 Evan's death puts human face on flu; 'Lasting 
impression' 
A.8 Canada 
NP300 03-Nov-09 Liberal president calls H1N1 crisis Harper's 
Hurricane Katrina 
A.8 Canada 
NP301 03-Nov-09 Smelly, but it works; the flu is in the news, but 
the common cold hasn't gone away 
B.6 Arts & Life 
NP302 04-Nov-09 'My peeps are dying' A.20 Editorial 
NP303 04-Nov-09 Who do we believe about H1N1? A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP304 04-Nov-09 'Enough of this nonsense'; Will Michael Ignatieff 
be as blunt when he meets Prince Charles next 
week? 
A.3 News 
NP305 04-Nov-09 Vaccine injection rates differ by region A.4 Canada 
NP306 04-Nov-09 Votes don't spring from misery A.4 Canada 
NP307 04-Nov-09 Disaster planning in disarray: AG report; Public 
Safety 
A.6 Canada 
NP308 04-Nov-09 Risk-management team to deal with H1N1 could 
keep your bottom line intact 
FP.17 Financial Post 
NP309 04-Nov-09 Flames take hit over early flu shots; H1N1 
vaccination; 'Our players did not seek to avoid 
lineups' 
S.4 Sports 
NP310 05-Nov-09 Gun registry takes a hit; 8 Liberals support bill to 
kill own initiative 
A.1 News 
NP311 05-Nov-09 In the Flames' defence A.18 Editorial 
NP312 05-Nov-09 Don't listen to weirdists, get the vaccine A.19 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP313 05-Nov-09 Unfair attack on Hedy Fry A.19 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP314 05-Nov-09 H1N1: Are corporate fat cats to blame? A.20 Issues & Ideas 
NP315 05-Nov-09 Follow the rules and everybody wins A.20 Issues & Ideas 
NP316 05-Nov-09 One of these things is not like the other A.20 Issues & Ideas 
NP317 05-Nov-09 1.8 million doses for next week: Harper; Two-
month-old among four new deaths report 
A.8 News 
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NP318 05-Nov-09 Health worker fired over Flames' shots; Some 
players on Maple Leafs also vaccinated, team 
says Global National 
A.8 Canada 
NP319 05-Nov-09 Flu scandal hits Alberta; Early vaccinations; 
Provincial official fired after Flames jumps the 
queue 
B.9 Sports 
NP320 05-Nov-09 Gagner is No. 1 by default; Oiler's youth a 
liability due to injuries 
B.9 Sports 
NP321 05-Nov-09 West jet profit down 46% on slow recovery; 
We're just scared 
FP.4 Financial Post 
NP322 06-Nov-09 H1N1 nears peak: Experts, dreaded second wave 
'has been fairly mild' 
A.1 News 
NP323 06-Nov-09 Health Minister tells athletics to get in line: 
'Respect the science' 
A.6 Canada 
NP324 06-Nov-09 What we've learned so far; A collection of 
rambled thoughts from Royalty Watch 2009 
A.8 Canada 
NP325 06-Nov-09 Canucks' Bernier slowed down by suspected case 
of swine flu 
S.5 Sports 
NP326 07-Nov-09 Less potent H1N1 vaccine to be used; Flu-shot 
queue jumping at Mount Sinani under fire 
A.15 Canada 
NP327 07-Nov-09 'Not enough vaccine to operate,' Peel Public 
Health shuts down H1N1 clinics 
A.19 Toronto News 
NP328 07-Nov-09 Teachers should be given vaccine A.29 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP329 07-Nov-09 Flames' vaccinations spark second firing; No 
waiting for H1N1 shots for hockey players 
A.7 News 
NP330 07-Nov-09 Neighbourhood watch TO.3 Toronto News 
NP331 09-Nov-09 Too much 'awareness' is bad for our health A.16 Issues & Ideas 
NP332 09-Nov-09 B.C. Legislates end to paramedic strike A.5 News 
NP333 09-Nov-09 Ottawa should have switched seasonal flu vaccine 
to H1N1, doctor says 
A.7 Canada 
NP334 09-Nov-09 Study worst cases of flu, group urges; Funding 
shortage 
A.7 Canada 
NP335 09-Nov-09 School absentee rate blamed on H1N1 scare; 10% 
in Gta schools; Pattern expected to appear in city 
next 
A.9 Toronto News 
NP336 09-Nov-09 Ukrainian president sees no need for swine flu 
state of emergency 
A.9 News 
NP337 09-Nov-09 Flu slows Luongo's rib fracture recovery; Sedin 
could return 
B.4 Sports 
NP338 10-Nov-09 The babe of brewskies AL.3 Arts & Life 
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NP339 11-Nov-09 Hand sanitizer costs city $645,000; Single source 
deal; Nearly twice the going rate to give workers 
four each 
A.1 News 
NP340 11-Nov-09 Detainees ahead of soldiers in H1N1 line - probe 
ordered 
A.10 News 
NP341 12-Nov-09 Keeping the faith alive with holy water 
dispensers; Italian inventor helps ease H1N1 fears 
for faithful 
A.2 News 
NP342 12-Nov-09 Sanitation & sanity A.22 Editorial 
NP343 12-Nov-09 Health-care staff embrace H1N1 shots; 
Vaccination rates soar as workers respond to call 
A.8 Canada 
NP344 13-Nov-09 Agency striving to build blood inventory A.12 Canada 
NP345 13-Nov-09 Children need only half-dose of H1N1 vaccine: 
new guideline; 26 New Deaths 
A.13 Canada 
NP346 13-Nov-09 Ottawa chemistry professor among H1N1 victims A.13 Canada 
NP347 13-Nov-09 H1N1 virus not likely to make big impact on 
economy: study 
FP.3 Financial Post 
NP348 14-Nov-09 H1N1 mania uniquely Canadian overdose A.1 News 
NP349 14-Nov-09 Around The League S.5 Sports 
NP350 16-Nov-09 The fairest of an unfair lot; Want to end queue-
jumping? Make people pay for vaccines 
A.14 Editorial 
NP351 16-Nov-09 Morality from H1N1 'no worse'; Top Health 
Official; death rate comparable to seasonal flu 
A.4 Canada 
NP352 16-Nov-09 Calgary Catholic churches alter communion as 
H1N1 precaution 
A.6 Canada 
NP353 16-Nov-09 Molecule may be flag for H1N1 danger; Lung 
inflammation 
A.8 Canada 
NP354 17-Nov-09 An injection of reason about H1N1 A.18 Issues & Ideas 
NP355 17-Nov-09 Liberals immune to flu facts; Scare tactics 
continue as public fears wane 
A.4 Canada 
NP356 17-Nov-09 Probe underway after nurses take H1N1 vaccine 
home for family members 
A.7 News 
NP357 18-Nov-09 Flu clinics now open to 'everyone' A.13 Toronto News 
NP358 18-Nov-09 Waiting is always the hardest part A.13 Toronto News 
NP359 18-Nov-09 Communion in the era of H1N1 A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP360 18-Nov-09 Not enough vaccine for everyone by Christmas: 
public health officer 
A.4 Canada 
NP361 19-Nov-09 H1N1 flu shots now available to public; Ontario, 
Winnipeg 
A.10 News 
NP362 19-Nov-09 Conflicting information about H1N1 vaccine A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
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NP363 19-Nov-09 Liberal health critic: We're not 'spinning' flu fears A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP364 20-Nov-09 Astham raises risk a child will end up in hospital 
with H1N1 flu 
A.6 News 
NP365 20-Nov-09 Canucks jumped H1N1 vaccination queue; 'Out 
of Sequence'; Health officer says players were 
'outside of risk group' 
S.3 Sports 
NP366 21-Nov-09 Worst of flu pandemic behind us, experts say; 
Shot still urged 
A.4 Canada 
NP367 23-Nov-09 H1N1 drugs not needed for mild illness: who; 'Bit 
of Catch-22" 
A.5 News 
NP368 23-Nov-09 Glove company proved to be perfect fit FP.6 Financial Post 
NP369 24-Nov-09 A prescription for quackery A.16 Issues & Ideas 
NP370 24-Nov-09 H1N1 vaccine program on the mend AL.5 Arts & Life 
NP371 25-Nov-09 Swine flu pandemic peaks in Ukraine; 1.6 million 
fall ill, while 388 die in three weeks 
A.19 World 
NP372 26-Nov-09 Day-long downpour dampens Hajj start A.12 World 
NP373 26-Nov-09 Canadians aid for flu-struck Ukraine A.21 World 
NP374 26-Nov-09 H1N1 three to four times as likely to hospitalize 
children than regular flu 
A.8 Canada 
NP375 27-Nov-09 Olympic police have 750 on standby A.10 Canada 
NP376 27-Nov-09 Study test H1N1 risk from cigarettes; Second-
hand smoke; children exposed may become more 
severely ill 
A.10 News 
NP377 28-Nov-09 Europe hit by H1N1 mutations, as two die; Drug 
resistant 
A.16 News 
NP378 30-Nov-09 Swine flu fears abate after annual Hajj A.18 News 
NP379 30-Nov-09 Pandemic may have peaked, agency says; H1N1 
influenza; admission, deaths from swine flu down 
A.6 Canada 
NP380 03-Dec-09 Give up on the flu scare A.23 Issues & Ideas 
NP381 03-Dec-09 Risk of H1N1 transmission still high despite 
levelling of cases: doctor 
A.8 Canada 
NP382 09-Dec-09 Diabetes is a serious risk A.21 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP383 11-Dec-09 Poll give Wildrose big lead; Alberta PCs falling A.4 Canada 
NP384 12-Dec-09 Snow angels for dollars; Celebrating winter 
weather can lend support to sick children 
FP.19 Financial Post 
NP385 14-Dec-09 A year to forget for the Liberals A.1 News 
NP386 15-Dec-09 How does he do it? A.20 Issues & Ideas 
NP387 15-Dec-09 Millions of doses left over; Provinces ponder 
what to do with surplus H1N1 vaccine 
A.4 Canada 
NP388 15-Dec-09 Is it time for the three-point solution? B.9 Sports 
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NP389 18-Dec-09 An enigma wrapped in a football uniform B.11 Sports 
NP390 19-Dec-09 Supreme court reject herpes 'accident' claim; 
Paralysis 'tragic' but not within meaning of policy 
A.13 Canada 
NP391 22-Dec-09 Senate to pass $871B health bill; Filibuster ended; 
enough votes secured to pass before Christmas 
A.11 World 
NP392 26-Dec-09 When there's nothing left to fear A.12 News 
NP393 29-Dec-09 Bitterness and venom in Ottawa A.20 Editorial 
NP394 31-Dec-09 Economy declared top story of 2009; Editors 
decide 
A.6 Canada 
NP395 31-Dec-09 JAL shares dive on bankruptcy fears; Seeking 
fourth government bailout since '01 
FP.9 Financial Post 
NP396 05-Jan-10 Don't let the sniffles leave you snookered; Cold & 
flu season 
AL.5 Arts & Life 
NP397 09-Jan-10 Jean Coutu's quarter improves 10%, credits over-
the-counter sales from H1N1 
FP.5 Financial Post 
NP398 14-Jan-10 Stelmach shuffles Alberta Cabinet; Three new 
members 
A.10 News 
NP399 15-Jan-10 Blades of Steel? A rocky period of Olympic 
preparation will put Patrick Chan's mettle to the 
test 
B.9 Sports 
NP400 19-Jan-10 Dispute over name sinks Islamic Games; Arab or 
Persian? 
A.16 World 
NP401 19-Jan-10 Word tourism said ready to rebound FP.14 Financial Post 
NP402 28-Jan-10 Canada donates 5 million doses of vaccine A.6 Canada 
NP403 03-Feb-10 Chief public health officer in Czech Republic has 
caught H1N1 
A.17 World 
NP404 12-Feb-10 High-end cosmetics help shoppers beat discount 
trend; Earning up 7% 
FP.4 Financial Post 
NP405 17-Feb-10 The cost of the (far too) common cold and flu; 
Prevention, treatment and knowing the difference 
MP.2 Cold & Flu 
NP406 17-Feb-10 H1N1 by the numbers MP.2 Cold & Flu 
NP407 17-Feb-10 Risky business; Reduce your risk of catching (and 
spreading) viruses 
MP.2 Cold & Flu 
NP408 17-Feb-10 Drink Up! Seven crucial reasons why staying 
hydrated should be top of mind this cold and flu 
season 
MP.4 Cold & Flu 
NP409 17-Feb-10 Taking charge of your health; The true 
determinants of our immune system's strength are 
within our control 
MP.4 Cold & Flu 
NP410 17-Feb-10 Containment strategies MP.5 Cold & Flu 
NP411 17-Feb-10 Flu 411; What it is, what it ain't and everything in 
between 
MP.6 Cold & Flu 
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NP412 17-Feb-10 Coping with congestion; To drug or not to drug MP.6 Cold & Flu 
NP413 17-Feb-10 It's complicated...; The flu - in any form - should 
not be taken lightly 
MP.7 Cold & Flu 
NP414 17-Feb-10 Supplemental Knowledge MP.7 Cold & Flu 
NP415 23-Feb-10 Rapper's death gives other a second chance A.13 Toronto News 
NP416 24-Feb-10 A healthy correction FP.9 Financial Post 
NP417 02-Mar-10 Time out works for Harper's favour A.1 News 
NP418 03-Mar-10 Disturbing increase in Alberta syphilis cases; 263 
last year 
A.5 News 
NP419 11-Mar-10 Flu shots futile: Study: Nursing home test; 'didn't 
find' proof immunization stops virus 
A.1 News 
NP420 18-Mar-10 Ottawa mulls backup vaccine supplier A.6 Canada 
NP421 23-Mar-10 Spending trim only $1.3 B, Day reports; Treasury 
Board 
A.7 Canada 
NP422 25-Mar-10 Faith Healing A.14 Issues & Ideas 
NP423 30-Mar-10 Resistant swine flu strains emerge quickly AL.5 Arts & Life 
NP424 07-Apr-10 Ottawa's H1N1 ad blitz cost $37M; Health 
experts divided on program's effectiveness 
A.1 News 
NP425 12-Apr-10 Le Ticket A.2 News 
NP426 13-Apr-10 H1N1 communication poor, WHO admits A.6 Canada 
NP427 14-Apr-10 The pandemic that wasn't A.19 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP428 15-Apr-10 The WHO's biggest mistake A.16 Editorial 
NP429 16-Apr-10 Who's blaming Who? A.15 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP430 17-Apr-10 WHO praised for H1N1 strategy A.25 Letter to the 
Editor 
NP431 20-Apr-10 A year later: Flu lessons learned A.4 Canada 
NP432 19-May-10 Cascades' handy solution; Anti-bacterial paper 
towels 
FP.1 Financial Post 
NP433 26-May-10 Less than 60% of city health-care workers 
immunized during H1N1 campaign 
A.10 Toronto News 
NP434 28-May-10 The swine flu pandemic that never was A.16 Editorial 
NP435 28-May-10 Kenney needs results on Mexico file A.4 Canada 
NP436 01-Jun-10 CD review AL.2 Arts & Life 
NP437 03-Jun-10 Ottawa stumbled on H1N1, Ontario's medical 
officer says 
A.10 News 
NP438 02-Jul-10 $500,000 study will track long-term effects of 
H1N1, vaccine on pregnant women 
A.5 Canada 
NP439 20-Jul-10 The real costs of H1N1 A.6 Canada 
NP440 04-Aug-10 Mexican airline seeks protection FP.2 Financial Post 
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NP441 11-Aug-10 WHO cancels its false alarm; H1N1 scare reveals 
pattern of needless panic 
A.1 News 
NP442 11-Aug-10 Medicago wins swine flu grant FP.4 Financial Post 
NP443 17-Aug-10 Asian nations work on pandemic plan AL.5 Arts & Life 
PS1 19-Nov-09 Deconstructing Swine flu   
PS2 11-Mar-10 Goopy Gold   
SS1 03-May-09 Facts about human swine influenza (swine flu) 15 News 
SS2 10-May-09 Health Region reviews planning for swine flu 8 News 
SS3 17-May-09 There is still more to learn about influenza; 
Infection prevention is the best defence for the flu 
12 News 
SS4 23-Aug-09 Disease prevention -- the power is in your hands 18 News 
SS5 20-Sep-09 Seasonal influenza vaccine blitz on for three 
weeks 
16 News 
SS6 04-Oct-09 Happenings 28 News 
SS7 25-Oct-09 You can stop the spread of H1N1 influenza 7 News 
SS8 01-Nov-09 Immunization for pandemic H1N1 influenza 10 News 
SS9 08-Nov-09 Pandemic H1N1 - do your part to limit the spread 6 News 
SS10 15-Nov-09 Dishwasher trouble can cause quite a stink 24 News 
SS11 15-Nov-09 Pandemic planning -- how prepared are you? 6 Health 
SS12 29-Nov-09 Combatting the myths that surround H1N1 8 News 
SS13 03-Jan-10 It's time to make realistic New Year's resolutions 6 News 
SP1 24-Apr-09 Authorities watch for Mexican illness A.11 National 
SP2 25-Apr-09 No Canadian cases yet of human swine flu; At 
least 60 people may have died so far 
A.14 National 
SP3 25-Apr-09 Sask. Health officials monitor flu outbreak A.8 Local 
SP4 27-Apr-09 Swine flu in Nova Scotia, B.C. B.5 Arts & Life 
SP5 27-Apr-09 Swine flu B.5 Arts & Life 
SP6 28-Apr-09 Canadian officials on swine flu alert; World 
health agency raises pandemic alert; six Canadian 
cases confirmed in N.S., B.C. 
A.1 News 
SP7 28-Apr-09 Provincial flu plan put in place A.1 News 
SP8 28-Apr-09 Canada's calm response to flu promising sign A.10 Forum 
SP9 29-Apr-09 Flu spurs Mexican travel concerns; Two airlines 
halt flights; Seven new swine flu cases confirmed 
in Canada 
A.1 News 
SP10 29-Apr-09 No swine flu in Sask. So far; Ten possible cases 
under investigation 
A.3 Third Page 
SP11 29-Apr-09 Cdn. Tour cancels two events in Mexico B.4 Sports 
SP12 29-Apr-09 TSX falls for second day on flu concerns C.6 Business 
SP13 29-Apr-09 Swine flu gets big dose of media coverage D.8 World 
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SP14 29-Apr-09 Business feels flu fear; Restaurants ordered to halt 
sit-down service in Mexico City 
D.8 World 
SP15 30-Apr-09 Canadian Tour cancels weekend event in Mexico B.4 Sports 
SP16 30-Apr-09 No Sask Cases C.5 National 
SP17 30-Apr-09 WHO raises pandemic alert level C.5 National 
SP18 30-Apr-09 Term 'swine flu' misleading: pork industry official C.6 Business 
SP19 30-Apr-09 Investor confidence helps boost markets C.7 Business 
SP20 30-Apr-09 Remembering lessons at SARS ground zero; 
Hotel guest's sneeze was felt around the world 
C.8 Business 
SP21 01-May-09 Swine flu cases jump; Fifteen new cases of 
influenza virus confirmed in Canada 
A.1 News 
SP22 01-May-09 First Nations only too familiar with pandemic A.11 Forum 
SP23 01-May-09 Biden right about flu dos and don'ts: expert A.12 National 
SP24 01-May-09 City school step up cleaning A.2 News 
SP25 01-May-09 Swine flu and the stock market; What's bad for 
some is a boost for others 
C.10 Business 
SP26 02-May-09 Canadians calm: poll; Swine flu cases hit 51 in 
Canada 
A.1 News 
SP27 02-May-09 Flu a concern, but no reason for hysteria, experts 
say 
A.12 National 
SP28 02-May-09 Strawberry makes career out of playing the field B.3 Sports 
SP29 04-May-09 Canadian flu cases top century mark; Human-to-
swine virus transmission reported in Alta. Farm 
A.1 News 
SP30 04-May-09 Summer entertainment forced to face swine flu 
scare 
B.4 Arts & Life 
SP31 04-May-09 Mexico's flu epidemic in decline: official C.9 International  
SP32 05-May-09 Crowns take precaution against possible flu 
spread 
A.3 Third Page 
SP33 05-May-09 Loud sneezers safe from quarantine for now A.3 Third Page 
SP34 05-May-09 Co-operation only effective tool to fight 
pandemic 
A.6 Forum 
SP35 05-May-09 Easy germ control A.6 Forum 
SP36 05-May-09 Alta. girl suffers from severe case of swine flu A.8 National 
SP37 05-May-09 Countries banning pork misinformed: Bjornerud D.3 Business 
SP38 06-May-09 Canada questions quarantine; Montreal students 
sequestered in China 
C.4 National 
SP39 06-May-09 Employers must be ready for a health crisis; 
'Unsafe' workplace could lead to employee 
lawsuit 
D.3 Business 
SP40 06-May-09 Afghanistan's only pig quarantined in flu fear D.6 International  
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SP41 06-May-09 U.S. Reports second flu death; Mexico outbreak 
eases, public, business life slowly return to 
normal 
D.6 Business 
SP42 07-May-09 Food safety overreaction 'swine' of the times A.9 Forum 
SP43 07-May-09 Lab sequences flu virus B.8 National 
SP44 07-May-09 Mexico returns to life after flu C.10 World 
SP45 07-May-09 Katy Perry shows of 'trendy' swine flu ring C.2 Arts & Life 
SP46 08-May-09 City teen positive for flu; Two swine flu cases 
confirmed in Sask. 
A.1 News 
SP47 09-May-09 Swine flu confirmed in woman who died A.12 National 
SP48 09-May-09 Identify virus properly A.14 Forum 
SP49 09-May-09 Health officials to meet St. Joe's parents A.3 Third Page 
SP50 11-May-09 Two Sask. Boys latest confirmed flu cases A.1 News 
SP51 11-May-09 Obama becomes comic-in-chief B.6 News 
SP52 11-May-09 Flu cases continue to increase C.8 International  
SP53 12-May-09 Flu numbers increase; Six new cases in Saskatoon 
region 
A.3 Third Page 
SP54 13-May-09 Two more Sask. cases H1N1 flu emerge A.6 Local 
SP55 13-May-09 Twenty-eight new flu cases confirmed in Canada B.6 National 
SP56 13-May-09 Mexico hotels offer flu-free guarantee D.4 World 
SP57 14-May-09 Ag minister assures consumer pork safe to eat A.2 News 
SP58 14-May-09 Factory farming policy at bottom of flu pandemic A.9 Forum 
SP59 14-May-09 Flu virus slowing in Mexico, health minister says D.8 World 
SP60 15-May-09 Official says new H1N1 cases found in health 
region mild 
A.6 Local 
SP61 15-May-09 Don't call it 'swine flu' A.9 Forum 
SP62 16-May-09 Saskatoon area proves hotspot for H1N1 virus A.7 Local 
SP63 16-May-09 It's too early to relax about flu outbreaks, WHO 
warns 
C.15 World 
SP64 19-May-09 Canada lifts limits on travel to Mexico; H1N1 
virus similar to seasonal flu: official 
A.1 News 
SP65 20-May-09 Drug firms urged to increase production of flu 
vaccine 
C.4 World 
SP66 21-May-09 Cases of H1N1 flu on rise in province A.6 Local 
SP67 21-May-09 Canadian boy sick in Cuba with H1N1 D.8 World 
SP68 23-May-09 New flu cases continue to emerge A.13 Local 
SP69 26-May-09 Best to pick and choose from weather forecast 
buffet 
A.3 Third Page 
SP70 26-May-09 Flu cases near century mark A.5 Local 
SP71 30-May-09 Sask. Has 123 cases of H1N1 flu A.10 Local 
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SP72 03-Jun-09 Flu suspected at 13 Ottawa schools A.9 National 
SP73 05-Jun-09 Flu outbreak suspected in Regina elementary 
school 
A.3 Third Page 
SP74 05-Jun-09 Man. First Nation confirms flu cases B.8 News 
SP75 06-Jun-09 Student diagnosed with H1N1 A.4 Local 
SP76 06-Jun-09 Health ministers clash over H1N1 flu response A.8 National 
SP77 09-Jun-09 Critical flu cases surge in Manitoba A.7 National 
SP78 10-Jun-09 Full-blown flu pandemic 'very close' A.9 National 
SP79 12-Jun-09 North advised to watch for flu; New viruses can 
hit aboriginal people hard, Sask.'s top MD warns 
A.3 Third Page 
SP80 12-Jun-09 Flu pandemic declared D.7 World 
SP81 12-Jun-09 Around the World in Photos D.8 News 
SP82 13-Jun-09 Manitoba reserves need help with flu: charity A.16 National 
SP83 13-Jun-09 Here are some things that nobody wants to hear A.3 Third Page 
SP84 13-Jun-09 Sask. sees first H1N1 case requiring hospital stay A.4 Local 
SP85 13-Jun-09 Around the world in photos C.15 World 
SP86 15-Jun-09 Vigilance, not panic A.8 Forum 
SP87 16-Jun-09 Ont. Reserve braces for more flu cases B.7 National 
SP88 18-Jun-09 Health region CEO optimistic on flu vaccine A.9 Local 
SP89 19-Jun-09 First Nations prime ground for H1N1 pandemic A.11 Forum 
SP90 19-Jun-09 Flu season could last all year in U.S. D.7 World 
SP91 20-Jun-09 H1N1 cases grow in province A.7 Local 
SP92 20-Jun-09 Nudists bare down for Guinness record B.3 Sports 
SP93 20-Jun-09 what makes a good father? E.2 Weekend 
Extra 
SP94 24-Jun-09 Alcohol worries kept sanitizer from reserves A.11 National 
SP95 24-Jun-09 Que, Ont report flu-related deaths A.11 National 
SP96 24-Jun-09 Companies must react fast when bad news hits; 
Accusations must not end up as public debate 
D.3 Business 
SP97 25-Jun-09 First Nations call for state of emergency B.7 National 
SP98 26-Jun-09 First Nation flu numbers concern PM A.8 National 
SP99 26-Jun-09 Gov't seeks livestock aid; Saskatchewan calls for 
federal funds to support producers 
C.9 Business 
SP100 27-Jun-09 Flu virus sends two to intensive care A.5 News 
SP101 29-Jun-09 First H1N1 death in Sask.; Woman suffered from 
underlying health problems 
A.1 News 
SP102 29-Jun-09 Swine flu paternalism A.8 Forum 
SP103 30-Jun-09 Sask. sees second H1N1-related death; Both 
victims had other health issues 
A.2 News 
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SP104 03-Jul-09 Hallway nursing formalized; Procedure created 
for treating patients when bed unavailable 
A.3 Third Page 
SP105 03-Jul-09 'Swine-flu parties' not good idea: experts A.9 National 
SP106 07-Jul-09 Sask. Child dies after contracting H1N1 virus A.4 Local 
SP107 08-Jul-09 New flu strain in Sask.; Virus discovered in hog 
farm workers is different from H1N1 
A.3 Third Page 
SP108 08-Jul-09 Bjornerud to attend national meeting C.5 Business 
SP109 09-Jul-09 Harry Potter actor recovers from H1N1 flu C.2 Arts & Life 
SP110 13-Jul-09 Calgarian who died of H1N1 may have become 
ill in Sask 
A.4 Local 
SP111 14-Jul-09 Wall's high-energy Sask. Vision A.6 Forum 
SP112 14-Jul-09 Yellow Quill mourns woman who died from 
H1N1 
A.7 Local 
SP113 14-Jul-09 Licensed H1N1 flu vaccine still months away: 
WHO 
B.6 National 
SP114 15-Jul-09 North American leaders set to meet B.8 National 
SP115 15-Jul-09 Hog sector's collapse imminent C.4 Business 
SP116 16-Jul-09 Smoking greater risk A.9 Forum 
SP117 18-Jul-09 Sask. sees fourth H1N1 death A.7 Local 
SP118 18-Jul-09 Hotel industry sees occupancy rates drop D.1 Business 
SP119 20-Jul-09 AFN prepares to elect national chief A.4 Local/Regional 
SP120 21-Jul-09 Compensation program for flu vaccine sought A.7 National 
SP121 24-Jul-09 Officials approve Tamiflu for babies C.5 Arts & Life 
SP122 24-Jul-09 Britain hard hit by flu pandemic D.7 World 
SP123 25-Jul-09 Here are some bad ideas for using WD-40 A.3 Third Page 
SP124 25-Jul-09 Two sides of the Hawaiian Islands; The beaches 
are nice, but to see real life you have to get out in 
the country 
E.15 Weekend 
Extra 
SP125 27-Jul-09 Universal flu shots not planned for province A.1 News 
SP126 27-Jul-09 Buying a piece of paradise; With strong dollar, 
Canadians can cash in 
B.5 Personal 
Finance 
SP127 28-Jul-09 H1N1 spreads to remote corners of world: WHO C.8 World 
SP128 30-Jul-09 Flu vaccine priority list not yet created in Canada; 
U.S. health officials make recommendation on 
priority groups 
C.4 National 
SP129 30-Jul-09 Stomp firms in receivership; Companies hit hard 
by depressed hog market; millions owned to 
creditors 
C.5 Business 
SP130 30-Jul-09 Swine flu hitting pregnant women really hard D.8 News 
SP131 31-Jul-09 'Kiss' warning issued for rock music fest D.6 World 
SP132 01-Aug-09 Wall-flower no longer A.10 Forum 
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SP133 04-Aug-09 Premiers, lobbyists gear up for conference A.4 Local 
SP134 04-Aug-09 Good hygiene can slow spread of flu in home A.5 National 
SP135 05-Aug-09 Flu an issue for premiers, aboriginals A.6 Local 
SP136 06-Aug-09 Native leaders seek flu plan; Premiers' meeting 
puts H1N1 virus on today's agenda 
A.4 Local 
SP137 06-Aug-09 Nurses call of pandemic preparations A.5 Local 
SP138 06-Aug-09 H1N1 kills third B.C. Resident B.8 National 
SP139 06-Aug-09 Drinking whisky touted as swine flu fighter D.8 World 
SP140 07-Aug-09 Premiers pleased with H1N1 plan; Ottawa, 
provinces agree to share vaccine costs 
A.1 News 
SP141 07-Aug-09 Big brother is watching A.2 News 
SP142 07-Aug-09 No consensus reached on EI A.8 Forum 
SP143 07-Aug-09 Calderon to press Harper on visas at weekend 
summit 
C.10 National 
SP144 11-Aug-09 Around the World in Photos C.8 News 
SP145 12-Aug-09 MPs criticize gov't handling of flu pandemic B.7 National 
SP146 13-Aug-09 Minister accuses MPs of making flu political B.6 National 
SP147 17-Aug-09 Health Minister speaks to CMA delegates today A.5 Local 
SP148 17-Aug-09 Hog farmers to be paid to shrink production; 
Gov't announces $75 M in assistance for industry 
A.7 News 
SP149 18-Aug-09 MDs told to unite against H1N1 A.3 Third Page 
SP150 18-Aug-09 Flu concern cancels lakes conference A.4 Local 
SP151 18-Aug-09 Gov't should appoint 'health czar': journal C.4 National 
SP152 18-Aug-09 No 'golden parachute' for hog producers: 
Kleinsasser 
C.8 Business 
SP153 20-Aug-09 Flu pandemic panic leaves sanity behind A.3 Third Page 
SP154 20-Aug-09 A.M Lineup B.2 Sports 
SP155 21-Aug-09 Sask. Party declares health care top priority A.6 Local 
SP156 21-Aug-09 Treat suicide epidemic among young as priority A.9 Forum 
SP157 21-Aug-09 Vaccinate students first: study C.6 National 
SP158 22-Aug-09 H1N1 pay for MDs? Gov't, SMA in talks on fees 
in the event of pandemic 
A.1 News 
SP159 22-Aug-09 Nurses pan H1N1 fees for doctors A.11 News 
SP160 22-Aug-09 Stand back six feet, H1N1 on its way A.4 News 
SP161 22-Aug-09 Cattle, hog inventories down, Statistics Canada 
says 
D.1 Business 
SP162 25-Aug-09 Farm cash receipts decrease in '09 C.5 Business 
SP163 26-Aug-09 Unseemly cash grab A.10 Forum 
SP164 26-Aug-09 H1N1 preparations urged for those lung disease C.12 National 
SP165 27-Aug-09 Refer to flu virus as H1N1: Bjornerud C.8 Business 
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SP166 27-Aug-09 H1N1 flu hits 40-year-olds hardest D.7 National 
SP167 27-Aug-09 Man. Chiefs to bring flu stories to Ottawa D.7 National 
SP168 28-Aug-09 H1N1 madness strikes A.11 Forum 
SP169 28-Aug-09 Ottawa trying to speed up flu vaccine delivery B.8 National 
SP170 29-Aug-09 Health region tweaks plans for pandemic A.1 News 
SP171 29-Aug-09 Provinces make H1N1 preparations C.11 Special 
Section 
SP172 29-Aug-09 Preparing for the flu; Everything you wanted to 
know about H1N1 but were afraid to ask 
C.9 Special 
Section 
SP173 31-Aug-09 Pandemic alert system needs changes: profs A.7 National 
SP174 01-Sep-09 Natives target of health cash announcement; 
Ottawa to build new nursing stations 
A.7 Local 
SP175 01-Sep-09 Journal finds flaws in vaccination plan B.6 News 
SP176 02-Sep-09 H1N1 found in Man. Hogs A.2 News 
SP177 02-Sep-09 Elmo joins H1N1 flu fight D.6 News 
SP178 03-Sep-09 Scale of expected pandemic 'frightening': ICU 
doctor 
C.12 National 
SP179 04-Sep-09 H1N1 could hit early: officials; Enough vaccine 
on order, but flu virus may precede it 
A.6 Local 
SP180 04-Sep-09 Winnipeg doctor testing vaccine A.6 Local 
SP181 04-Sep-09 Doctors ready to take on whatever roles needed 
during flu outbreak: SMA 
A.6 Local 
SP182 05-Sep-09 U of S school of public health gets new director A.6 Local 
SP183 08-Sep-09 Sask. flu worries few; Many unconcerned about 
possible H1N1 outbreak, poll says 
A.1 News 
SP184 08-Sep-09 Flu fears pose danger of their own: expert A.6 National 
SP185 09-Sep-09 H1N1 stops Italians kissing saint's blood C.12 News 
SP186 10-Sep-09 Farmers COOL to protectionism A.10 Forum 
SP187 10-Sep-09 Company confident in H1N1 vaccine A.12 National 
SP188 11-Sep-09 Indian control over health care emerging issue A.11 Forum 
SP189 11-Sep-09 Start flu vaccinations soon, U.S. Study says A.12 National 
SP190 11-Sep-09 One West Nile case reported; Main risk period for 
contracting in Sask is over 
A.3 Third Page 
SP191 12-Sep-09 National hospital network to monitor flu-vaccine 
reaction 
A.13 National 
SP192 12-Sep-09 Say this for Pacman Jones, he is a man of 
conviction 
B.3 Sports 
SP193 14-Sep-09 Take measures to slow H1N1 spread: officials A.3 Third Page 
SP194 15-Sep-09 Death-care industry sees changes A.4 Local 
SP195 15-Sep-09 Single dose of flu vaccine brings immunity B.8 National 
SP196 16-Sep-09 U.S. Approves H1N1 vaccine D.8 News 
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SP197 17-Sep-09 Stay at home if flu hits you: health official A.2 News 
SP198 17-Sep-09 Highest risk people to get H1N1 vaccine first B.8 National 
SP199 18-Sep-09 U.S. among countries to share flu vaccine B.8 World 
SP200 18-Sep-09 Gov't apologizes for body bag shipment; Number 
of bags delivered with flu supplies was 'excessive' 
D.7 National 
SP201 21-Sep-09 Body bag fiasco reveals attitude of insensitivity A.6 Forum 
SP202 21-Sep-09 Flu focus of inner-city barbecue A.7 Local 
SP203 21-Sep-09 The apostrophe -- often used and abused B.7 Bright Side 
SP204 21-Sep-09 Aboriginal flu strategy unveiled B.8 National 
SP205 22-Sep-09 Aboriginal lives devalued A.6 Forum 
SP206 22-Sep-09 H1N1 plan sickening A.6 Forum 
SP207 22-Sep-09 Flu vaccine rekindles questions over autism link B.8 National 
SP208 23-Sep-09 Canada wants a carbon copy of U.S. Policy A.11 Forum 
SP209 23-Sep-09 Pregnant women urged to get H1N1 flu vaccine B.7 National 
SP210 24-Sep-09 Ont. won't force shot on workers B.7 National 
SP211 25-Sep-09 Sask. focuses on H1N1 shots; Seasonal flu 
vaccinations may be delayed: McMorris 
A.3 Third Page 
SP212 26-Sep-09 Wall astute pigskin prognosticator A.11 Local 
SP213 26-Sep-09 Grits promise bas on 'politized' ads A.15 National 
SP214 26-Sep-09 Province confirms flu strategy; Seasonal shot 
given to seniors before mass H1N1 program 
A.3 Third Page 
SP215 26-Sep-09 Wage mandate angers SGEU head Bymoen A.6 Local 
SP216 30-Sep-09 Flu threat causes break from routines A.1 News 
SP217 30-Sep-09 Balanced discussion vital A.12 Forum 
SP218 01-Oct-09 Another flu vaccine recommended B.8 National 
SP219 01-Oct-09 Prof works to protect body against diseases C.7 Business 
SP220 02-Oct-09 H1N1 just one epidemic facing Indian Country A.11 Forum 
SP221 02-Oct-09 Expediency ensures government's survival A.2 News 
SP222 02-Oct-09 No evidence hand-washing prevents spread of flu: 
study 
A.8 Local 
SP223 03-Oct-09 Gov't to distribute H1N1 guide for workplaces A.7 Local 
SP224 03-Oct-09 Clean in seconds flat; keyboard designed for 
multiple users 
F.13 Business 
SP225 05-Oct-09 Hepatitis C infections 'silent epidemic": doctor A.5 Local 
SP226 06-Oct-09 Credit union prepares for H1N1 A.7 Local 
SP227 06-Oct-09 Flu scare taxes safety supplies A.7 Local 
SP228 06-Oct-09 MDs, nurses seek better pandemic plan B.7 National 
SP229 07-Oct-09 Hallway care intolerable A.14 Forum 
SP230 07-Oct-09 Health region cuts services to battle flu A.15 Local 
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SP231 07-Oct-09 Gov't under fire over flu vaccine schedule, plan C.7 National 
SP232 08-Oct-09 Canada trails U.S. in release of H1N1 vaccine C.4 National 
SP233 09-Oct-09 Health services curtailed by H1N1 A.1 News 
SP234 10-Oct-09 Employers get flu primer A.11 Local 
SP235 10-Oct-09 Mexico rich in tradition and culture; Fun-filled 
and affordable too, Mexico is the perfect getaway 
E.8 Weekend 
Extra 
SP236 10-Oct-09 Pharmacist relish evolving role in industry F.16 Business 
SP237 13-Oct-09 Health hot topic for new session; McMorris 
expected to fact questioning when MLAs return 
A.1 News 
SP238 13-Oct-09 Swine flu hits harder in young women; High level 
of death among healthy: study 
A.8 National 
SP239 14-Oct-09 Officials urge flu prevention; H1N1 flu may 
result in up to 30,000 cases in Saskatoon region 
A.1 News 
SP240 14-Oct-09 Don't panic on H1N1 A.10 Forum 
SP241 14-Oct-09 Flu season a harbinger of change? A.2 News 
SP242 14-Oct-09 Health board hears pitch for sending surgeries to 
Rostern (Flu supplies a concern) 
A.3 Third Page 
SP243 14-Oct-09 Diabetes a quiet, growing epidemic A.6 Local 
SP244 14-Oct-09 Clinical trial set for H1N1 vaccine C.4 National 
SP245 14-Oct-09 Russia opens door to more Canadian beef C.5 Business 
SP246 15-Oct-09 Passive-aggressive Norwegians snub Bush A.3 Third Page 
SP247 15-Oct-09 Possible H1N1-linked death probed A.6 Local 
SP248 15-Oct-09 Pork producers can access funds; Advance 
payments under Agristability may keep 
operations afloat 
D.1 Business 
SP249 16-Oct-09 H1N1 not confirmed as cause of teen's death A.7 News 
SP250 16-Oct-09 Businesses encouraged to have flu plan D.1 Business 
SP251 17-Oct-09 Supplies stockpiled to fight H1N1 A.1 News 
SP252 17-Oct-09 Nasty session in the offing A.14 Forum 
SP253 17-Oct-09 H1N1 hits Sask. School hard A.2 News 
SP254 17-Oct-09 Government cuts spending; Belt-tightening due to 
miscalculation of potash revenues 
A.3 Third Page 
SP255 17-Oct-09 Only 36% in Sask. plan to get H1N1 vaccination A.4 Local 
SP256 17-Oct-09 With Leafs, Argos, it's all gutter talk B.3 Sports 
SP257 17-Oct-09 Pack your flip-flops and travel insurance E.15 Weekend 
Extra 
SP258 17-Oct-09 No sanctuary from flu, even in church E.7 Religion 
SP259 19-Oct-09 H1N1 halts common cup communion A.3 Third Page 
SP260 19-Oct-09 Positive H1N1 tests higher in B.C. A.7 National 
SP261 20-Oct-09 Flu vaccine on its way; Health minister expects 
approval to authorize use 
A.1 News 
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SP262 20-Oct-09 CHINEX cancelled C.12 Business 
SP263 21-Oct-09 H1N1 vaccine arrives in Sask.; Health Canada 
approval needed before province can begin 
vaccinations 
A.6 Local 
SP264 21-Oct-09 Fewer trick-or-treaters expected this Halloween A.9 National 
SP265 22-Oct-09 Health region sets dates for vaccinations A.1 News 
SP266 22-Oct-09 Back up talk on H1N1 A.11 Forum 
SP267 22-Oct-09 Quarantine lifted at Notre Dame A.12 Local 
SP268 23-Oct-09 Have H1N1 questions? Here are some answers A.3 Third Page 
SP269 23-Oct-09 NFC East suddenly looking vulnerable B.4 Sports 
SP270 23-Oct-09 Diversions C.2 Arts & Life 
SP271 24-Oct-09 Half of Canadians don't plan to get the H1N1 
shot, poll reveals; Second wave of flu has landed 
nationwide 
A.13 National 
SP272 24-Oct-09 It's shoulder season on Mexican Riviera E.15 Weekend 
Extra 
SP273 24-Oct-09 The two Cancuns provide a taste of the Mayans' 
ancient playground 
E.8 Weekend 
Extra 
SP274 26-Oct-09 Don't let flu fears bug you this fall C.10 News 
SP275 26-Oct-09 Graduating students forgo handshakes D.7 News 
SP276 26-Oct-09 Que. Health workers get vaccine early D.7 News 
SP277 26-Oct-09 Shortness of breath sign of dangerous flu 
infection 
D.7 News 
SP278 27-Oct-09 Flu shots begin A.1 News 
SP279 27-Oct-09 Six schools hit hard by H1N1; Teens affected in 
13 communities 
A.3 Third Page 
SP280 27-Oct-09 Leap of faith needed A.6 Forum 
SP281 27-Oct-09 A.M. lineup B.2 Sports 
SP282 27-Oct-09 Babcock focused on Wings, for now B.3 Sports 
SP283 27-Oct-09 Thousands wait in line for flu shots B.7 National 
SP284 28-Oct-09 H1N1 hits home for grieving family; La Ronge 
hotel owner who lost daughter to virus advocates 
prevention efforts 
A.1 News 
SP285 28-Oct-09 Canadians roll up their sleeves A.1 News 
SP286 28-Oct-09 Flu outbreak hits Melfort A.3 Third Page 
SP287 28-Oct-09 Flu planning 'unacceptable'; More respiratory 
therapists needed in Saskatoon: union 
A.3 Third Page 
SP288 28-Oct-09 Saskatoon health-care workers get H1N1 shots A.3 Third Page 
SP289 28-Oct-09 Alta hotels feel crunch of economic downtown A.4 Local 
SP290 28-Oct-09 Christensen bitten by flu bug at junior A 
challenge 
B.4 Sports 
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SP291 28-Oct-09 Honesty best bet for flu talk with kids D.4 National 
SP292 28-Oct-09 Vaccinations expanded as flu gains momentum D.4 National 
SP293 29-Oct-09 At least six u of S students affected by H1N1 
outbreak 
A.3 News 
SP294 29-Oct-09 Anxiety a symptoms of H1N1 pandemic fears A.4 Local 
SP295 29-Oct-09 Flu virus on agenda for FSIN A.4 Local 
SP296 29-Oct-09 Fantasy players cry: O captain, my captain B.4 Sports 
SP297 29-Oct-09 Huskie women's hockey series postponed until 
January 
B.4 Sports 
SP298 29-Oct-09 NHL players being hit by H1N1 virus B.4 Sports 
SP299 29-Oct-09 Farm exports snagged in safety net C.10 Business 
SP300 29-Oct-09 Nobel laureate advises everyone to get vaccine D.7 News 
SP301 29-Oct-09 Canadians told to avoid travel; H1N1 continues to 
spread across country 
D.7 News 
SP302 30-Oct-09 Health fixes costly, hard, political A.10 Forum 
SP303 30-Oct-09 Ignorance, fear biggest threats posed by H1N1 A.10 Forum 
SP304 30-Oct-09 Sask.'s vaccination protocol a pain A.2 News 
SP305 30-Oct-09 Flu virus strikes suddenly A.8 Local 
SP306 30-Oct-09 Health region urges limit to ER flu visits; 
Hospital emergency rooms for 'extreme' cases. 
A.8 Local 
SP307 30-Oct-09 H1N1 vaccine supplies may run short: gov't B.8 News 
SP308 31-Oct-09 Ghoulish antics scare voters A.12 Forum 
SP309 31-Oct-09 Sanitizer hot commodity A.12 Forum 
SP310 31-Oct-09 H1N1 clinics in Saskatoon A.14 Local 
SP311 31-Oct-09 Vaccine shortage changes province's H1N1 plans A.14 Local 
SP312 31-Oct-09 McMorris on hot seat over shipping patients to 
B.C. 
A.4 Local 
SP313 31-Oct-09 Marital trouble for baseball owner apparently 
began with dropped fly 
B.3 Sports 
SP314 31-Oct-09 Two few Americans seek vaccine: CDC C.10 World 
SP315 31-Oct-09 H1N1 vaccine shortage; Canadians turned away 
as clinic run out of vaccine 
C.12 National 
SP316 31-Oct-09 'Flu rage' becoming epidemic C.12 National 
SP317 31-Oct-09 We can only hope This is It D.5 Business 
SP318 31-Oct-09 Ukraine shuts schools over H1N1 D.7 World 
SP319 02-Nov-09 Flu vaccination program still lags A.1 News 
SP320 02-Nov-09 Times, they are a changin' B.7 Bright Side 
SP321 02-Nov-09 Victims of H1N1 from across Canada 
remembered 
B.8 National 
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SP322 03-Nov-09 Region prepares for flu shot lines; Clinics begin 
today for those in high-risk categories 
A.1 News 
SP323 03-Nov-09 Absences on rise A.2 News 
SP324 03-Nov-09 Hospital cancels surgeries A.2 News 
SP325 03-Nov-09 Process trumps blind ideology A.8 Forum 
SP326 03-Nov-09 Aglukkaq defends gov't response to flu pandemic C.10 National 
SP327 04-Nov-09 Crowds endure wait for flu shot A.1 News 
SP328 04-Nov-09 Private firm provides shots for companies A.1 News 
SP329 04-Nov-09 Gormley wrong again A.10 Forum 
SP330 04-Nov-09 H1N1 schedule A.2 News 
SP331 04-Nov-09 Kids roll up sleeves for H1N1 shots A.8 Local 
SP332 04-Nov-09 Alberta to investigate how Flames players scored 
H1N1 flu vaccine 
B.2 Sports 
SP333 04-Nov-09 Riders fired up to face Stamps B.3 Sports 
SP334 04-Nov-09 Christiansen's slow start not hurting hockey Dogs B.4 Sports 
SP335 04-Nov-09 Auditor general criticizes gov't pandemic 
planning 
B.7 Local 
SP336 05-Nov-09 MPs aim at registry; Private member's bill to end 
long-gun registry gets cross-party support 
A.1 News 
SP337 05-Nov-09 Provinces waiting for vaccine numbers; Ontario 
official surprised by PM's 1.8M dose estimate 
A.1 News 
SP338 05-Nov-09 Don't panic over flu A.11 Forum 
SP339 05-Nov-09 Minister must quite A.11 Forum 
SP340 05-Nov-09 Day 2 of H1N1 clinic goes smoothly A.3 Third Page 
SP341 05-Nov-09 No queue jumping: MD, Says H1N1 vaccine not 
being provided to private companies 
A.3 Third Page 
SP342 05-Nov-09 H1N1 vaccination clinic information A.6 Local 
SP343 05-Nov-09 An outsider's inside look at an NFL game B.3 Sports 
SP344 05-Nov-09 Health official fired over Flames' vaccinations B.7 National 
SP345 06-Nov-09 Schools to get vaccine; Elementary school 
students next in line for H1N1 flu shot, health 
region says 
A.1 News 
SP346 06-Nov-09 Anarchism no solution A.11 Forum 
SP347 06-Nov-09 Risk management blown A.11 Forum 
SP348 06-Nov-09 Blowing chance to change legislature A.2 News 
SP349 06-Nov-09 Lions to see last of dome B.4 Sports 
SP350 06-Nov-09 H1N1 deaths expected to rise; Virus' second wave 
accelerating in Canada 
B.7 News 
SP351 07-Nov-09 Premiers hold H1N1 discussions A.13 News 
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SP352 07-Nov-09 Temperatures rise over vaccine queue jumping; 
Hospital donors allegedly given H1N1 flu shots 
and Edmonton Journal 
A.13 News 
SP353 07-Nov-09 Latest revelation from Agassi: He suffered with 
flyaway hair 
B.3 Sports 
SP354 07-Nov-09 Durant receives word from the wise B.4 Sports 
SP355 07-Nov-09 Around the world in photos C.16 News 
SP356 07-Nov-09 Fort Hood tragedy explodes on Twitter D.6 Business 
SP357 07-Nov-09 Modestly proposing special treatment E.3 Weekend 
Extra 
SP358 09-Nov-09 Flu clinics move to schools today; More than 
25,000 health region residents have received 
H1N1 shots 
A.1 News 
SP359 09-Nov-09 Act to protect yourselves A.6 Forum 
SP360 09-Nov-09 Privatization's downside A.6 Forum 
SP361 09-Nov-09 Alta. Premier passes review A.8 National 
SP362 09-Nov-09 Canada wrong to produce seasonal flu shot first: 
critics 
C.8 National 
SP363 09-Nov-09 Problems plague vaccination efforts C.8 Sports 
SP364 10-Nov-09 What's different about this flu season? The fear A.3 Third Page 
SP365 10-Nov-09 FSIN opens flu call centre A.4 Local 
SP366 10-Nov-09 Englot adds insurance for curling pre-trails B.2 Sports 
SP367 12-Nov-09 Adopt Indian greeting A.11 Forum 
SP368 12-Nov-09 Helping poor deal early with flu wise A.11 Forum 
SP369 12-Nov-09 Vaccinate based on need A.11 Forum 
SP370 12-Nov-09 Deaths studied for H1N1 link; Hospital ICUs 
'managing': MD 
A.3 Third Page 
SP371 12-Nov-09 H1N1 shot expanded in region A.6 Local 
SP372 13-Nov-09 H1N1 reality check A.11 Forum 
SP373 13-Nov-09 Most healthy children won't need second flu shot A.12 National 
SP374 13-Nov-09 Few adverse reactions to vaccine A.8 News 
SP375 13-Nov-09 Two more Sask. H1N1 deaths A.8 News 
SP376 13-Nov-09 Mom slowly emerges from H1N1 coma B.7 National 
SP377 13-Nov-09 Big Sky files for creditor protection C.8 Business 
SP378 13-Nov-09 Italian invents anti-H1N1 holy water dispenser D.8 News 
SP379 14-Nov-09 Cash crunch sidelines little guy A.12 Forum 
SP380 14-Nov-09 Asking H1N1 questions wise strategy A.2 News 
SP381 14-Nov-09 Student conducts H1N1 survey A.3 Third Page 
SP382 14-Nov-09 SHR adds to H1N1 vaccination program A.9 Local 
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SP383 14-Nov-09 Hog producers wait for break; Industry needs 
price hike: Bjornerud 
D.1 Business 
SP384 14-Nov-09 Fear no flu: Keep on travelling E.14 Weekend 
Extra 
SP385 14-Nov-09 Sanitizing gymnasium makes sense in flu season E.2 Weekend 
Extra 
SP386 16-Nov-09 Praireland peekaboo A.3 Third Page 
SP387 16-Nov-09 Wait for your turn A.8 Forum 
SP388 17-Nov-09 H1N1 eyed in chemist's death A.2 News 
SP389 17-Nov-09 Flu assessment centre touted as success A.2 News 
SP390 17-Nov-09 Big Sky politicking stinks A.6 Forum 
SP391 17-Nov-09 Aglukkaq attacked on H1N1 B.7 National 
SP392 17-Nov-09 Study finds some H1N1 immunity D.7 World 
SP393 18-Nov-09 Physician specialities a cash consideration A.1 News 
SP394 18-Nov-09 H1N1 shots A.3 Third Page 
SP395 18-Nov-09 Number of H1N1 deaths in Sask. increases to 
nine 
A.3 Third Page 
SP396 18-Nov-09 H1N1 campaign slowed by vaccine production 
lag slows 
C.6 National 
SP397 19-Nov-09 Ont., Man. open doors wide for flu shot; Alberta 
expands vaccination plan to include parents 
A.10 National 
SP398 19-Nov-09 Abilities council workers produce H1N1 kits A.9 Local 
SP399 20-Nov-09 Trust WHO on vaccine A.13 Forum 
SP400 20-Nov-09 Vaccine eligibility expands; H1N1 shots available 
for all residents next week 
A.3 Third Page 
SP401 20-Nov-09 Flu centre open until Monday A.4 Local 
SP402 20-Nov-09 Vancouver Canucks jumped H1N1 queue C.8 News 
SP403 20-Nov-09 Children with asthma have higher H1N1 risk C.8 News 
SP404 21-Nov-09 MDs urge people get seasonal flu shots A.11 National 
SP405 21-Nov-09 Swine flu may have hit a peak, not over yet A.15 World 
SP406 21-Nov-09 Flu shots for public set for next week A.9 Local 
SP407 21-Nov-09 Tourist attraction make for dirty destinations E.14 Weekend 
Extra 
SP408 23-Nov-09 Don't downplay deaths A.8 Forum 
SP409 23-Nov-09 Overuse of antivirals could make H1N1 virus 
resistant: experts 
A.9 National 
SP410 24-Nov-09 H1N1 vaccination site at Prairieland closed today A.2 Third Page 
SP411 24-Nov-09 Sask. green flu outbreak claims a million victims A.6 Forum 
SP412 24-Nov-09 Revisit isotope decision, doctors tell gov't B.7 National 
SP413 25-Nov-09 H1N1 vaccinations now available for all; 
Prairieland flu shot clinic opens doors wide today 
A.1 News 
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SP414 25-Nov-09 All swill that end swill A.10 Forum 
SP415 25-Nov-09 Vaccine distribution panned A.6 Local 
SP416 26-Nov-09 Mass immunization clinic opens at Prairieland 
Park 
A.1 News 
SP417 26-Nov-09 People lied to get vaccine: doctor A.8 Local 
SP418 26-Nov-09 H1N1 peak saw 1,370 kids out of Catholic 
schools; Vaccination rate vary widely between 
schools, officials says 
A.9 Local 
SP419 26-Nov-09 H1N1 hits kids hard, data shows B.7 National 
SP420 26-Nov-09 Secondary infections after flu increase B.8 World 
SP421 27-Nov-09 More than 5,000 line up for shots A.10 Local 
SP422 27-Nov-09 Police officers on standby for Olympics A.11 National 
SP423 27-Nov-09 Researchers look into links between severe 
H1N1, smoking 
C.12 National 
SP424 27-Nov-09 Flu fears boost garlic price C.13 World 
SP425 28-Nov-09 Health minister gets vaccinated; Encourages 
fellow Canadians to get their H1N1 flu shot 
B.7 News 
SP426 30-Nov-09 Second wave of H1N1 may have peaked A.11 National 
SP427 30-Nov-09 End of the roll for Blades; Hitmen 5, Blades 4 C.6 Sports 
SP428 02-Dec-09 'Global warming' decade's top word A.1 News 
SP429 03-Dec-09 Vaccination pace lags in region; H1N1 will linger 
although second wave has peaked in region 
A.1 News 
SP430 03-Dec-09 Swine flu warning issued C.9 Arts & Life 
SP431 04-Dec-09 Flu shot clinic busy A.7 Local 
SP432 04-Dec-09 Too early to declare H1N1 over: WHO C.9 World 
SP433 05-Dec-09 Wage gap wide; How do we determine who is 
underpaid? Overpaid? 
A.1 News 
SP434 05-Dec-09 McMorris joins ranks of vaccinated A.13 Local 
SP435 05-Dec-09 H1N1 ends with a whimper A.16 National 
SP436 05-Dec-09 NHL skates to top of Yahoo! Search list C.15 World 
SP437 07-Dec-09 Top 10 stupid gizmos give gift of laughter A.7 News 
SP438 08-Dec-09 H1N1, TB infections overlap B.7 National 
SP439 08-Dec-09 H1N1 toll similar to regular flu D.6 World 
SP440 10-Dec-09 Canadians vulnerable to H1N1 B.7 National 
SP441 11-Dec-09 Charities A.3 Third Page 
SP442 11-Dec-09 Mass immunizations to end; H1N1 shot to be 
given at health offices; vaccination rate 41% in 
region so far 
A.3 Third Page 
SP443 12-Dec-09 H1N1 preparedness A.16 Forum 
SP444 12-Dec-09 Uninsured Americans flock to free clinics C.17 World 
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SP445 15-Dec-09 Public urged to get H1N1 shots; Fewer men than 
women getting vaccination: doctor 
A.3 Third Page 
SP446 15-Dec-09 More patients strain SHR budget; Growing 
population means more hospital visits 
A.4 Local 
SP447 16-Dec-09 Develop city as health research hub: prof; Clinical 
research facilities touted 
A.6 Local 
SP448 16-Dec-09 Sign of dangerous H1N1 infection identified B.5 National 
SP449 17-Dec-09 Prairieland flu clinic to close A.9 Local 
SP450 19-Dec-09 Immunization program shifts to public health 
offices 
A.10 Local 
SP451 19-Dec-09 Man hurt by unprotected sex denied disability 
award 
A.14 National 
SP452 19-Dec-09 Youthful writers create their own traditions E.2 Weekend 
Extra 
SP453 19-Dec-09 Santa gets H1N1 E.3 Weekend 
Extra 
SP454 19-Dec-09 Anti Clause passes on the joys of the season E.6 Weekend 
Extra 
SP455 21-Dec-09 Extreme change both challenge, opportunity; 
Economic recovery will see a number of shifts in 
society 
C.13 Business 
SP456 22-Dec-09 H1N1 plan done right A.12 Forum 
SP457 22-Dec-09 Remembering flu victim C.8 National 
SP458 24-Dec-09 Seasonal flu shot can enhance H1N1 shot C.12 National 
SP459 26-Dec-09 Don't needle me over this, please A.2 News 
SP460 26-Dec-09 H1N1 threatens systems F.14 Business 
SP461 28-Dec-09 Sask. Response to H1N1 a team effort: 
McKinnon 
A.3 Third Page 
SP462 29-Dec-09 Remembering the pop culture moments of the 
year 
B.3 Arts & Life 
SP463 30-Dec-09 Potash earnings drop a big story in '09 C.9 Business 
SP464 02-Jan-10 Be it resolved A.10 Forum 
SP465 02-Jan-10 Canada could see surplus of flu vaccine A.11 News 
SP466 02-Jan-10 Economy top story of 2009 A.9 News 
SP467 02-Jan-10 2009 In Pictures E.1 Weekend 
Extra 
SP468 02-Jan-10 This year belonged to Oasis of the Seas E.10 Weekend 
Extra 
SP469 04-Jan-10 France joins sell-off of H1N1 flu vaccine A.9 World 
SP470 04-Jan-10 Huskies v-ball team schooled by masters C.5 Sports 
SP471 04-Jan-10 Fans give their two cents' worth C.7 Sports 
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SP472 09-Jan-10 H1N1 immunity begins to build C.11 World 
SP473 12-Jan-10 Useful medical tools A.6 Forum 
SP474 14-Jan-10 Breast health centre improves service A.10 Local 
SP475 14-Jan-10 SHR absolutely not overstocked with managers A.9 Forum 
SP476 15-Jan-10 bumpy road to Vancouver; Chan hopes to put 
tough year behind him at weekend's nationals 
B.2 Sports 
SP477 16-Jan-10 H1N1 measures discontinued for Catholic diocese A.12 News 
SP478 16-Jan-10 One million missed work due to flu; November 
numbers suggest people heeded advice to stay 
home 
B.6 News 
SP479 16-Jan-10 Pandemic flu still active, WHO warns D.7 News 
SP480 21-Jan-10 'Twit-storm of misinformation' surrounds Haiti 
online 
D.6 National 
SP481 23-Jan-10 H1N1 flu levels normal or below A.15 National 
SP482 28-Jan-10 Canada to donate vaccine A.12 National 
SP483 12-Feb-10 Lessons of SARS helped in H1N1 fight: official A.5 Local 
SP484 12-Feb-10 H1N1 patients hospitalized more C.6 National 
SP485 17-Feb-10 Manitoba addicts using hand sanitizer C.11 National 
SP486 24-Feb-10 Pharmaceuticals new normal for many A.2 News 
SP487 03-Mar-10 Potash industry to get refund; Sask. to record 
negative number in potash revenue 
A.3 Third Page 
SP488 16-Mar-10 Experts exaggerate risks; rarely held to account A.3 Third Page 
SP489 18-Mar-10 Backup vaccine supplier considered A.11 National 
SP490 22-Mar-10 The 10 per cent solution A.6 Forum 
SP491 24-Mar-10 Criticism growing at the expense of civility A.2 News 
SP492 27-Mar-10 H1N1 swine flu can quickly develop resistance: 
report 
C.14 World 
SP493 30-Mar-10 Region to halt rehiring of retirees; Health 
officials' hiring plan focuses on new graduates 
A.1 News 
SP494 01-Apr-10 Partisans attacks poisons politics for all parties A.14 Forum 
SP495 13-Apr-10 WHO acknowledges pandemic shortcomings B.7 National 
SP496 17-Apr-10 Violence scares off tourists to Mexico D.7 World 
SP497 19-Apr-10 'Miracle' baby at home after mother's flu battle A.8 National 
SP498 24-Apr-10 Poor communications dogged H1N1 outbreak; 
But policy worked, said health minister 
A.15 National 
SP499 26-Apr-10 Hounds win national title B.5 Sports 
SP500 06-May-10 Feeling snakebit about panic over H1N1? A.3 Third Page 
SP501 11-May-10 This spring unusual for agriculture C.5 Business 
SP502 15-May-10 Info requests Sask. Speciality A.6 Local 
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SP503 26-May-10 Sask. farm income strong in '09; Decline in farm 
expenses fuels rise in net income 
C.8 Business 
SP504 01-Jun-10 A calendar of days of interest A.2 News 
SP505 02-Jun-10 H1N1 epidemic fuelled big jump in worker sick 
days 
A.1 National 
SP506 03-Jun-10 No personal agenda in hospital plan A.6 Forum 
SP507 04-Jun-10 H1N1 vaccine reached half city population; 
Vaccination rates across country vary widely 
A.10 Local 
SP508 05-Jun-10 A pandemic's lessons A.16 Forum 
SP509 08-Jun-10 H1N1 exposed gaps in planning B.7 National 
SP510 10-Jun-10 Feds want us to go jump in a lake A.2 News 
SP511 14-Jul-10 Coalition urges Tories to reverse census stand C.6 National 
SP512 22-Jul-10 Photo caption contest A.2 News 
SP513 09-Aug-10 End of H1N1 pandemic near B.6 News 
SP514 12-Aug-10 Half of Sask. Vaccinated for H1N1 A.2 News 
TS1 01-Oct-09 Classifieds A.6  
TS2 15-Oct-09 Cover: H1N1 A.1  
TS3 15-Oct-09 The practical students' guide to H1N1 A.12 Opinion 
TS4 15-Oct-09 Campus chat A.16 Opinions 
TS5 15-Oct-09 New university policy will likely increase 
absenteeism 
A.4 News 
TS6 15-Oct-09 Getting sick from swine flu paranoia A.5 News 
TS7 05-Nov-09 Report from Students' council A.2  
TS8 05-Nov-09 Flu rampant in residence A.4 News 
TS9 05-Nov-09 Flu and hockey don't mix A8 Sports 
TS10 12-Nov-09 Report from Students' Council A.2 News 
TS11 12-Nov-09 Ad from Pharm Choice A3  
TS12 19-Nov-09 We are all going to die; Vaccination too late A.10 Opinion 
TS13 19-Nov-09 Nursing student launches H1N1 survey A.2 News 
TS14 19-Nov-09 Fact sheet: H1N1 vaccine A.4 News 
TS15 19-Nov-09 Letters A.9 Opinion 
TS16 03-Dec-09 Fist bump good and safe for everyone A.10 Opinions 
TS17 03-Dec-09 Good riddance, 2009 A.9 Opinions 
TS18 07-Jan-10 2009: a year on campus in brief A.3 News 
 
